ZARAΘUŠTRA, PHILO, THE ACHAEMENIDS AND ISRAEL

being

A TREATISE UPON THE ANTIQUITY AND INFLUENCE OF THE AVESTA

for the most part delivered as
University Lectures

by


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Part I: **Zaraϑuštra and the Greeks**

Part II: **Zaraϑuštra, the Achaemenids and Israel.**

Composed at the request of the Trustees of the Sir Jejeebhoy
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Zarathushtra and the Greeks

A discussion

of the Relation existing between the Ameshaspentas and the Lógos

of the Greek Philosophical writers

for the most part delivered as University Lectures

being

Part I

of

Zarathushtra (Zoroaster), Philo, the Achaemenids and Israel.


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
Zarathushtra, the Achaemenids and Israel

by

the Rev. **Lawrence Heyworth Mills,** D. D.
Professor of Zend Philology in the University of Oxford.

To be had of **F. A. Brockhaus** in **Leipzig.**
1903—04.







Preface to the first issue.

Thankfully reporting my general circumstances to be favourable, I would yet say that the passing-on of time renders it prudent that I should not delay any longer than may be necessary in issuing the first portion of this Work.

In special studies like the present completed sections necessarily become detachable units; and critical writers more often than not have published treatises upon parts of the main lore which engages their professional attention at certain intervals.

This discussion was asked of me long since by representative persons, which is another reason why I present a portion of it now, notwithstanding the fact that all, or almost all the remaining parts of it lie ready type-written to the printer's hand [1].

By waiting till the whole book is manufactured I might lose forever the opportunity of saying what it has cost me so much labour and time to prepare.

I therefore proceed to lay before my auditors in Oxford and before my readers elsewhere what I have been able to ascertain with regard to the relation once supposed to exist between the well-

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[1] One can of course never be certain as to what one may not add to such a broad presentation of a subject.

known chief Concepts of the Zend Avesta and certain more or less closely analogous developments among the suggestions of the Greek philosophical writers, including permissibly among them the Jewish Alexandrians with their most prominent scholar, Philo.

I have in my opening chapter entered to a certain extent upon prefatory and introductory matter, which renders what I have to say here all the more succinct.

The work is an attempt to fulfil an engagement accepted by me now some few years ago with the Trustees of the Sir J. Jejeebhoy Translation Fund of Bombay. Those Gentlemen (then upon that Board) requested me to write a book upon the 'Antiquity of the Avesta', the occasion for their invitation having been (apparently) a sudden change of opinion on the part of one who was intimately associated with the works of Parsi scholars and also nearly allied to myself (not however that this item was directly mentioned).

I answered my esteemed correspondents that I could furnish them with an essay within a very short time, but that a thorough investigation of the question might be delayed for some few years [1].

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[1] ,owing to the fact that I was in the course of preparing several other works, the shortest of which required prolonged attention. (See the Texts of the Pahlavi Yasna as for the first time edited with collation of Mss. and also for the first time critically translated and commented upon in the JRAS July 1900, April and July 1903, Z.D.M.G. April and Oct. 1902, April and Oct. 1903, JAOS July 1901, and Oct. 1903, etc., etc.; see also the Dictionary of the Gāthic Language of the Zend Avesta 1902, preceded by the Second Edition of Verbatims and Metricals in 1900. etc.).

And in fact I have indirectly fulfilled both these proposals, for I began not so long after their communication to print articles distinctly bearing upon the matter in the Asiatic Quarterly Review and later in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society and in that of the American Oriental Society and in the American Journal of Philology as well as in the Critical Review, and several of the Chapters contained in this book are really approximate reproductions from those insertions [1].

I was especially under obligations for the commission for an interior reason. It was this, - to meet the request made it obligatory upon me to do without further delay what I had always otherwise intended to do, which was to take up once more the thread of my original researches begun in '72. As I have elsewhere noted [2], I entered upon Zend Philology in the summer of 1876 in order to follow out a study of the history of Hegel's method of procedure by sublated negation, regarding this latter as having had its true origin through Fichte and Jacob Boehme in the writings of the Gnostics, whose ideas in their turn were, as I then thought and as I think still, to a large extent founded upon the suggestions of the Avesta or of its kindred lore.

I trust that my results will be viewed with the

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[1] The introductory chapter was partly printed in advance in the Asiatic Quarterly Review (Jan. 1903), so the treatment of Tansar's letter (1902), so the section upon 'parallel development' (1901). So 'Zarathushtra and Heraclitus' and 'Philo's dynámeis', appeared in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (see July 1901, Oct. 1902), etc.

[2] See The Five Zarathushtrian Gāthas, Introduction, at the close.

more indulgence when it is remembered that this is the first serious effort as yet ever made by any writer to present anything like an interior investigation of the question.

The influence of Philo upon the Avesta had been asserted by a great scholar and repeated, I dare say, by his gifted satellites; but he did not proceed to enter upon any very close discussion of the texts on either side, or of the subject matter considered in its entirety; that is to say, not so far as I am aware.

I cannot believe that he would have persisted in his sudden change of opinion had his valued life been prolonged. As to this however no one can make an assertion. It is sufficient for me to say that I have spared no pains to make the treatment thorough; and I trust, that this will be obvious upon the face of it [1].

[1] Naturally I mean to say this only when my full argument is taken into consideration in the sequence of my publications. As to the main matter in hand, the translation of the Gāthas, I am happy to say that so far as a literal rendering is concerned, my Latin Verbatims of '92—'94 have not yet been superseded, nor are those which I made of the Gāthas into Sanskrit; see Roth's Festgruss, 1894, and the Actes of the International Congress of Orientalists at Paris, 1897; that is to say, 'not', judging from a certain prominent rendering of Yasna 45 by another writer. For my verbatim treatment of that piece (in 1892—94) *is with some alternatives practically identical* with that referred to. See also the copious translations which appeared not long since in the works of a certain brilliant, if young, contributor to the Syntax of the Avesta in JAOS. With one notorious exception, which really proves the rule, we are now (some of us very reluctantly) practically unanimous. In the exceptional case referred to the Author follows all the eccentricities of tradition with little reserve.

With few exceptions no *verbatims* are taught in any critical school save those published in my Gāthas of '92—'94 as re-edited in the English Verbatims of 1900. Even as to interpretation, which is a very differ-

There is one especial service which I hope that I may have rendered to my greatly more distinguished colleagues upon kindred branches of research.

It is this. We are, all of us, particularly anxious to secure the opinions of experts upon the connection of other specialties with our own.

Here historical writers will at least receive opinions upon the relations of the Avesta from one who has made exceptional sacrifices of time, effort and patience in the study of them; and he should therefore be all the more fitted to afford auditors, whether through print or lecture, information as to what are the bearings of the matter as regards other themes as well as to give closer elaborations of the original texts. I call this first publication 'Zarathushtra and the Greeks' instead of the fuller title for an obvious reason. For the traditional aspects of the inquiry so far as it touches upon history I refer to the admirably complete summaries of Professor A. V. W. Jackson as published in his very valuable volume, The Prophet of Iran, Zoroaster, NY. This present treatise necessarily confines itself to doctrine; and to history only as affected by interior considerations.

L. H. M. Oxford 1903—04.

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ent thing from Verbatim translation, there is scarcely a possible opinion of any serious importance which cannot be found at least alternatively stated in my three Editions together with the Commentary of '92—'94, and the Dictionary, Gāthas, Vol IIIa pp. 623—21, 1902. Many subordinate touches are of course appearing by way of superficial improvement; but they are for the most part really mere alternatives, the authors themselves not regarding them as the most probable suggestions; and they are doubtless very useful in stirring up thought.

Contents of Part I.

For the Contents of Part II, see that Vol. at pages VI—XIV.

[(later note) Vol I having been extensively circulated as being complete in itself, and being still on sale as such, it is necessary to place the Table of Contents of the Vol. within its own covers, with the table of Contents for Vol. II within that other volume. Otherwise those who have already purchased copies of Vol. I, which of course omit the Contents of the then still unprinted Vol II, would miss that Table entirely].



The Avesta[1].

No subject in the range of ancient oriental literature should be considered more important of its kind than that collection of venerable documents which has come down to us under the above mentioned well-known name. The immense literature of India with its divisions and subdivisions would indeed prove itself a formidable rival to any other monument of the early intellectual life of man. Its depth and later rare refinement, with its minute delineations of the more subtle forms of human passion, and the rough exuberance as well the remote age of its earlier portions make it, taken as a whole, perhaps the most astonishing phenomenon of its kind among the present possessions of our race, always excepting the aesthetics and dialectics of incomparable Greece, and the moral earnestness of the Jewish and Christian Scriptures. But truly wonderful as Indian literature may well be termed, it does not in the matter of spiritual tone surpass the sparse relics of Iranian lore in their mysterious sublimity, if indeed it be fair to institute a comparison between the two. For, let it be well remembered, each may claim all that is impressive in the other, as they are very near akin.

[1] Introductory.

And in their close relationship the northern lore, shorn of its dimensions as it is by the effects of an unfavourable climate and a bad (strategetic) position, (on the highway of migration between East and West) may still assert for itself in the primeval sisterhood, if not the senior place, at least one which, in several important particulars, is of superior interest.

Its myths are as hoary with the gray of primitive history as the Indian; its language, while it has shown signs of departure from the common mother stock in some particular items where the Indian has remained steadfast, has yet preserved others which are lost in the kindred speech; and perhaps it can claim a preponderance of earlier survivals.

And the Iranian, as of course, occupies the more original home. The Aryan Indians (as no one doubts) once lived in lands to the North East (or North West) of Iran, if not in Iran itself. And our convictions as to this are not founded upon mere undefined traces of their nationality, but we have actual relics, even in our documents, of those who held to the Indian creeds. They still lingered in the times of the later Avesta as a down-trodden portion of the community, while in the feuds of earlier centuries they are strong and vigorous, as seen in the older book[1].

There they enter fiercely into the very struggles of the partisans of the two (once twin) religions, just as the Dēvas themselves and the Asuras were said to contend, in some of the old fragments of the

[1] The Gāthas.

Indian lore [1]. D(a)ēva-worshippers are met with as an inferior caste in the Vendīdād long after the mass of the D(a)ēva-worshipping Aryans had gone south (toward India). And we have in the Gāthas a conflict so marked, and of a bitterness so pungent, that some scholars have been induced to believe that it affords us a glimpse of an original feud, having been actually the scene of the first split between the main body of the Iranians and the future Indians. Some critics have also in fact asserted their belief that this religious difference really induced the memorable march toward the land of the Five Rivers with its momentous consequences [2]. And, as I need hardly add, in these more northern places where future Indians and Iranians once lived, (and loved and quarrelled) we have way-marks of that remote and still prior migration from the unknown land from which the earliest Aryans came.

In these time-honoured paths there lingered a scant nation of virtuous husbandmen who preferred to worship God under simpler names than Váruṇa or Indra, if indeed their epoch was not so remote that these venerable names were as yet unheard by them [3]. And as these 'tiller-men [4]' were of the same blood with the future Indians, so they spoke the same rich language, as described above, with a difference not greater than, if indeed so great as, that which

[1] See Haug's Essays, pages 270, 271.

[2] See my article The Veda and the Avesta in East and West, Feb. and March, 1902; see also the XIXth Century Review for jan. '94.

[3] Which indeed seems hardly possible.

[4] Aryans.

distinguishes the dialects of Greece[1]. They knew the same gods also who were extant at their particular ages, and sang to the best of them in the same old metres. It is therefore not at all quite fair to separate these lores too widely.

Questions indeed arise, and must for ever remain unsettled as to how far the differing literatures were divided as to time; but no one with any capacity whatsoever to read the evidence can well fail to recognise the identities, as they so unmistakably reveal themselves before our eyes. Veda is Avesta in many a fundamental trait, and Avesta is Veda. Each however has its strongly marked idiosyncracies as a subdivision of the whole. The Veda possesses enormously the greater bulk, and in the richness of its very numerous sections and subsections it surpasses Avesta amid a thousand forms of beauty and exactness, while the Iranians lead the Indians and in fact all ancient folk beside them in the elevation of their moral and religious tone. Yet even as to colour and aroma, we could only acknowledge the superiority of India so long as we forget that mass of middle and later Persian art which may be regarded as a continuation of the Avesta in a certain sense, with the Pahlavi literature as the intermediate between the two. Surely the early Ṛk is not much nearer to the Hitopadeça than the later Avesta is to the first Persian bard; and if we take in the middle Persian literature, Iran does not look so scant in comparison with the thronging South. The

[1] The one from the other; see Oldenberg, The Religion of the Veda, p. 27.

fairest field for an estimate is however the earliest period; there the two lores should be regarded, for once at least, as things by themselves, apart; for so indeed they are, in the Gāthas and in the Older Veda. When the Vasishṭhas [1] chanted the Ṛk of the seventh book, or the Vāmadevas that of the fourth there was no other Veda extant of any equal power. And so when Zarathushtra first composed the hymns of which our Gāthas are the fragments, there was nothing among things germane which equalled them extant, as we must believe. The Veda [2], even of that day, is everywhere the fullest, judging from the wild luxuriance of its human thought alone. Its varied poetic forms impress us; but Avesta stands for ever alone as the oldest lore still surviving which speaks so distinctly as it does, revealing to us a spiritual life on earth with a moral heaven beyond it.

And great is our privilege in exploring it. For where, to mention but a single point, in all the thousand Ṛks, if we must compare the two, can you find such a grouping of personifications as in the Immortal Seven, the Ameshas, Ahura with his Six? In the Veda they exist indeed, but in sporadic occurrences, not grouped but torn apart, if we may so explain their scattered distribution, or, it may be, never gathered, and therefore lost to that signal influence which comes from the concentration of ideas. And that combination of the concepts in the Avesta, the good God with His attributes, made

[1] So, better than Vasishṭha.

[2] In a larger sense.

up one of the most powerful beliefs that has ever influenced the destiny of men.

With regard also to the differing phases of their hoped-for spiritual future, the most effective considerations which can operate upon the careers and destinies of men, where do you find such pointed expression of the soul's own judgment upon itself? Much as the later Indian literature may indeed surpass the later Iranian, that is to say, if we exclude the middle and later Persian from the literature called 'post-avesta', in the closeness of its definitive discussions, and more engaging as the primitive Indian may appear in its accumulated attractions, tinged with the charm of a richer fable, yet amid those first voices which arise from the abyss of immemorial antiquity the Avesta can claim that deeper grasp and nobler enthusiasm which lifts the soul higher out of the dust of sensuality into the clear realm where it is freed from the degrading claims of mere self-centred interests and linked closer in its better aspiration with the spirit of the Divine.

I do not know that we are called upon to take into consideration such a subordinate matter as *the range of their respective influence* (that of the Avesta and of Veda).

The swarming millions of India, even at an early period, no doubt presented an audience in their cultivated classes which was impressive indeed, and they must be said to surpass any fair estimate of the numbers of those who listened to the Ṛishis of Old Iran. So also as to the succeeding populations in the accumulating generations, the throngs of quick-witted hearers must have been greatly more

compact in India than in the North. And indeed may we not say with reason that the learned class was greatly more numerous there than in any other centres, not excluding those of European nations at any past age, and with them even those of the present (?) day. But if we may include all Iran, I am not aware that any one Empire in India ever surpassed, or even reached the dignity of Persia from the time of Cyrus. She was the Rome of Asia and for centuries, later even subduing repeatedly the forces of the Eternal City. Her literature, as represented by the Zend Avesta in its related lore and in its now lost portions, if not by the echoes of our actual books themselves, had its effect beyond any manner of doubt upon the Medo-persian Emperor of Babylon.

Deeply inspired by the entire atmosphere of those thoughts which are so obviously forced upon us from the Inscriptions, and which are as unmistakeably seen to be germane to the Avesta, he did not yield his interest so much to the engrossing theologies of Assyria, or to the current literature of India, even then (?) perhaps over-refined, blasé, too nimble of the wit, but he became distinguished by sympathy with a small group of captive tribes (by the waters of Babylon) on whose development were to depend the most extensive religious movements which have ever taken place. India itself could not boast an audience more mighty than the combined Europe which has accepted the lore of the once Jewish exiles, whose Divine Martyr uttered a Persian thought in Persian syllables [1] at the moment

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[1] *Ἀμην λέγω σοι, σήμερον μετ᾽ ἐμοῦ ἔσῃ ἐν τῷ παραδείσῳ.**

when he was (as has been believed by the West for many centuries) redeeming the very world. Avesta, or something radically akin to it [1], that is to say, to a distinct extent identical with it in sisterhood or origin, moved the mind that ordered the Restoration of the Holy City and the Return of the vanguard people. Surely in the matter of audience, if the ultimate hearers are held in view, Avesta might not fear a comparison with Veda; that is to say, if Avesta is as nearly kindred to the Inscriptions, as the Inscriptions are to the Scriptures.

In the mediaeval period the literature of Persia, had it been known in Europe, would have taken a very high, if not the leading rank, and until late in that interesting age; and at present Persia is entitled to be called at least the most European of Eastern nations. And it is far from certain that she does not owe all the manhood which has ever characterised her from the first to her earliest source of guidance, with its solitary voice proclaiming amid the brutality of an undeveloped age the need for 'holiness as to thought, as to word, and as to deed'.

Yes, the Avesta is important, if anything at all like it could be ever called so; and it should be preserved to us not only as a mass of documents considered by some to be of interest, nor even as a quantity of unique monuments, but most of all as a Holy Book.

Schools of sound exegesis should be founded

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[1] That the early Avesta was once far more widely extended as oral lore than the portions which have survived to us goes without saying and as of course.

totally freed from that sinister corruption which combines to exalt empirics and stifle advanced discussion.

And yet, it was just as we were beginning to investigate the Avesta in the only way defensible, that is to say exhaustively, we heard a voice which seemed to utter impeding principles. A prominent expounder suddenly retracted his clear words, or rather superseded them without retraction. A man, the endeared of all, whose genius was as delicate (and beautiful) as his personal honour was untarnished, turned his back upon some of the leading facts which he had himself in his first edition presented, and perhaps even more pointedly than others; and with a change which one cannot so well explain.

Here are his statements as to the antiquity of the Avesta in the first edition of his Vendīdād made in accordance with principles then widely accepted, and on the strength of which I acceded to his urgent request that I should become his continuator in the Series of the Sacred Books of the East[1]. »That all Avesta ideas were already fully developed »in the time of, or at least at the end of the Achae»menian dynasty appears from the perfect accor»dance of the account of Mazdāism* in Theopompus »with the *data* of the Zend Books.« Introduction to S.B.E., IV, p. XLII.

»We must admit that the religious literature »then in existence, if there were any, must have

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[1] »Je le désire du fond du cœur; car à defaut de vous je ne vois pas qui pourrait faire la chose et la faire bien . . dans l'espoir d'une réponse favorable.« Letter of Nov. 5th, 1883.

»differed but little, so far as its contents were con-»cerned, from the Avesta . . . ., therefore nothing »forbids us to believe, with the Parsis, that the »fragments of which the Avesta is composed were »already in existence before the Greek invasion.« S. B. E., IV, Introduction p. XLIII, flg.

. . . »It is quite possible« (he goes on to say) »that Herodotus may have heard the Magi sing in »the fifth century B. C. the very same Gāthas which »are sung now-a-days by the Mobeds in Bombay, p. LIII. »Some parts of the collection are undoubtedly older »than others . . . (hardly however a necessary remark).

»The Gāthas are certainly older than the rest »of the Avesta«.

»There is no part of the Avesta which . . may not »have been written in those times (the Achaemenian »period). Nay the Greek accounts of that period »present us, in some measure, with a later stage of »thought, and are pervaded with a stronger sense »of symmetry than the Avesta itself. Such pas-»sages as the latter end of the Zamyād Yasht and »Vendīdād X, 9, seq. prove that when they were »composed the seven Arch-dēvs were not yet point-»edly contrasted with the seven Ameshaspends*, and »*therefore those* passages (some of the very latest parts, »L. H M.) of our extant Avesta *might have been* »*written long before the time of Philip*[1]. The theory »of time and space as first principles of the world, »of which only the germs are found in the Avesta, »was fully developed in the time of Eudemos, a »disciple of Aristotle«, see p. LIV.

[1] The italics are mine, for the passage is most remarkable.

My gifted friend here repeated the universal argument, which is that Herodotus and his successors report a stage of Mazda-worship which had become more fixed and liturgised than such lore as we find even in »parts of the later Avesta« [1].

Those statements I take as my 'text' in the following discussion. My lamented colleague's later views as to the main issue treated in this discussion are directed fully against himself. I will defend him therefore, as I say, against that opponent (himself).

I had kept silence, though deeply wounded at the turn events had taken. It seemed almost as if my fellow labourer had intended to belittle the subject which he had committed to me in so conspicuous a manner. But any conscious tendency in this direction was of course impossible.

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[1] The newer Avesta could not however possibly have been less than from two to five centuries later than the older Avesta, the Gāthas [1]. So [2] wrote the author of S. B. E., IV, in 1881, and it was on the strength of this that he urged me to take up his task, and that I accepted the engagement. I make no attempt at all to trace out all the ideas which may be intended to lurk in the various allusions to the subject in the great works of the eminent author. I refer the reader to those impressive publications for all the details which were intended to be obscurely implied, or not. But many points seem to me to be hinted at by the Editor rather than fully stated. I confine my discussion to those above. It is of course possible that I have misapprehended some particulars, and so misstated them. I only hope that I have indeed so mistaken him. Just in so far as any critic may suppose me to have done so, just to that degree let this argument be regarded as having no direct application to his later departure; but let it be regarded as a defence of the Avesta against any possible future attacks from others occupying such a curious point of view as that which I have succinctly sketched. [1] M. [2] as above.

II.

The Discussion.

Perhaps it will be well to begin our discussion with a curious question which gives point to the whole matter at once (I have already alluded to it). It will be remembered that among the views so suddenly brought into prominence by my more distinguished associate was one which to non-experts may have appeared very striking indeed. It was to the effect that the Vohumanah of the Zend Avesta was the Lógos of Philo; that is to say, that the entire system of Gāthic thought was closely akin to that of the Platonic-philonian philosophy, to which philosophy it was, as he avowed, indebted for its conception of Vohumanah and the accompanying five personified abstractions so well known under the popular name of Ameshaspends (amesha spenta), a title which does not occur in the Gāthic Avesta, appearing however in the next oldest portion, the Gātha Haptanghaiti. As we see, this introduces us at once into the interior of the entire subject, for if the Gāthic system be dependent upon the Philonian, its origin must be subsequent to it.

To explain a little more fully.

The point which was made by my colleague and to which I refer with so much regret was then this:

That our present surviving texts of the Gāthas date from B. C. 100 to A. D., a chief reason given being that they are full of the spirit of Philo,

especially as expressed in those concepts to which I have just referred.

My greatly distinguished predecessor seems to have been confirmed in this unfortunate conclusion by three items, one of them something considerably more than a subordinate consideration.

First, he notes the place in the Dēnkart where one Tōsar (*sic*, emended with fair probability to Tansar) is mentioned as a chief Mobed who collected the religious documents of his time.

Second, he cites the Arab historian 'Mas'ūdī', also of the IXth century to prove that a certain Bīshar (the name being again restored as 'Tansar' by correcting the small diacritical points of the Arabic) was a 'Platonician'.

And third, he reproduces Tansar's celebrated letter [2] to the princelet Jasnaf-shāh of Tabaristān, where the supposed character of this Tansar is fully depicted; for according to that document, if only half accepted, this Tansar was certainly a very remarkable man, corresponding also in a very interesting manner with the Tōsar or Tansar of the Dēnkart and with the Bīshar (Banshar etc. restored as Tansar) of Mas'ūdī. The points of the connection, as I suppose, were somewhat as follows:

This Tansar being believed to be a Platonic philosopher of the school of Socrates (is this a pardonable little blunder?), the circumstance proves that people could be Platonic, or Philonian, in Medo-persia in the year A. D. 226 (about). Then, if the

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[1] Or 'holy'.

[2] Which had long been known in manuscript.

Gāthic concepts, Vohumanah, or Asha, could be regarded as showing strong analogies with the Lógos of Philo (based upon the Platonic concept though modified), we have an obvious proof from probability that there was some historical connection between the two.

I hardly believe that it was meant to hint that Tansar in A. D. 212 flg. was actually the author of the Gāthas!, (this latter as a possible alternative to the view that they were composed B. C. 100 to A.D. One circa). But that a Tansar of the year A.D. 212(?), flg. was, or may well have been, the author of some portions of a lore now lost, which might be justly called 'Avesta', or even of parts of our present later Avesta (and this was perhaps intended to be suggested), is an idea which possesses every plausibility; for if this Tansar did not write, or re-write, something which might well be called 'Avesta', somebody else exactly in his position must most assuredly have engaged in such a kind of authorship. For beyond any reasonable doubt 'Avesta' of such a kind as that which we have in the later fragments was being continually written. And indeed we have one surviving piece among our actual Avesta texts which, considered as language, is as bad in its forms as anything that a Tansar might have written, and it is perhaps greatly later than his age [1].

To continue (and as I proceed I will fill up the gaps in the statements which seem to have been intentionally left open); — I should say that we were intended to be informed that some Alexandrian,

[1] See the Yasht XXIV of Westergaard.

or some Persian scholar largely under the influence of the Alexandrian Platonism, not only inspired the idea of Vohumanah (or of Asha) in the Gāthas, but that he was actually the author of these singular pieces in their ancient Zend, with their old antevedic metres, with all their personal allusions, and in their, at times, really passionate tone. Whether this authorship was intended to be represented as a forgery, or as genuine, is not very clearly said Possibly our great critic actually meant to imply that there was really a Vīshtāspa at the time of Christ, and a struggle then transpiring between the Iranian tribes and the Daēva worshippers lingering in that far northern land with the original Zarathushtra at the head of the Iranian forces; and this, hundreds of years after the name had become a household word in many lands, and the language had merged into Pahlavi.

I do not know that it will be any very serious 'anticipation' for me to say here at once what I expect to say later on with proofs and illustrations with regard to the authorities adduced in support of this theory. It is this; I am of the opinion that the venerable Dēnkart as well as Mas'ūdī, or Tabarī, or Albīrūnī, while of the greatest value when taken as indirect witnesses, are yet at times wholly useless, or worse than useless, when taken in direct affirmative evidence, as in fact are nearly all ancient and also many modern histories, for their own literal statements are, some of them, among the most 'unhistorical' that have been recorded.

And here also our eminent commentator

began his attack most fairly, as I understand him, not upon this direct evidence of the Dēnkart, or of Mas'ūdī, or of 'Tansar's' letter, but most appropriately upon that of the Gāthic texts themselves. The whole argument is well built upon the too advanced depth of the thoughts in them. The accomplished Zendist could not believe them to be ancient in the old Vedic sense[1]. He therefore positively held during the last few years of his lamented life that this Gāthic literature was indebted to a direct or indirect historical contact with Alexandria, having been composed by some Parsi-persian who had drunk deeply at the sources of Philonic inspiration, possibly in the City itself.

With this further attempt to unravel the tangled issues we can at once address ourselves to the closer details of the subject.

The first thing for us to do is obviously to ask what the concept of Vohumanah precisely is, as it appears in the Gāthas. Then we had better discuss thoroughly the document which is supposed to have brought up the whole question, i. e. Tansar's letter. And after this would be the time to examine into the nature of the Philonian Lógos, showing how little it stands really related to Vohumanah. The way will then be open for us to refute the variously important or trivial arguments which have been adduced to disprove the Antiquity of the Avesta upon the grounds of this supposed close relation between it and Philo, as well as for other reasons once thought by some to be valid;

[1] This doubt was however first expressed in SBE, XXXI, p. xxxvi.

and then we can see what can be said to show the close connection between the Bible (Scriptures) which Philo had been taught from his infancy and the Zoroastrian lore, through the Achaemenian Inscriptions.

Vohumanah.

What then, let us ask, was the Vohu manah[1] of the Gāthas? We can very rapidly correct a subordinate misapprehension, pausing only for a moment. It is Asha, the Vedic Ṛita, which should have been brought forward as the analogon to the Lógos, and not Vohumanah; for this latter came to the front through a mistake in exegesis on Y. 28, 2 or 3.

Asha, as Ṛita, is actually a lógos, the rhythm of nature. But the error is of trifling importance, for the question is as to the analogy of the Lógos of Philo, or one of the lógoi, with some one of the concepts of the Zoroastrian heptade, or the lack of such analogy. What then was the Zarathushtrian Asha, or Vohumanah?

An indispensable distinction.

First of all it is necessary to make here a greatly needed distinction. It is one which ought indeed to be obvious; but unfortunately it is far from familiar. So that if we are to make it, we must do so in the most incisive manner that we

[1] In the Avesta two words, Vohu manah; in the Pahlavi one word, Vahōman or Vohūman, in the Parsi Bahman. I will write it in familiar occurrences as one word.

can command. Perhaps the most discouraging, and I had well nigh said, fatal circumstance in connection with the entire controversy is the simple failure on the part of most writers to define, or even to state, what really the sphere of the facts, or supposed facts, is in regard to which they are attempting to draw conclusions. In plain words we seem too often not really to know even what facts we are talking about. What should we say for instance of debaters in biblical exegesis who proceeded as if the Pentateuch and 'the Lives of the Saints' were of similar date and of equal importance in church history? Or what should we say of people who used 'Christianity' with no apprehension that it includes various and sometimes heterogeneous forms of belief? Yet in our so-called Zoroastrian science outside a very small number[1] of fully informed persons, writer after writer quotes, now from the Gāthas, and again from the late Pahlavi books, and apparently as if they were closely related and equally authoritative parts of the same fundamental lore.

What should we say of a scholar who spoke of the Greek philosophy and its dogmatic system as if there were no distinction between the physicists and the idealists? One can only repeat the facts, though with little prospect of their being even superficially taken into consideration. Be it known then, let me attempt once more to say, that not only the

[1] In all these specialties the number of living persons who even make any pretension to be called 'experts' in a thorough, and therefore in the only truthful sense, is exceedingly restricted.

Asha and Vohumanah of the earliest period, but also several other elements of the first importance in it beside them become essentially modified in progressive degrees as the texts grow remoter (and yet more remote) from the Gāthic period: so that even in the later but still rich, valuable and genuine Avesta these original concepts seem to have lost almost entirely some of their most important original uses.

While again, on the other hand, between the later Avesta and the next stage, that of the Pahlavi literature, the meaning of these words is also different in both point and degree of significance. Let it then be distinctly understood that it is my purpose to discuss these concepts for the present only or chiefly as they appear in the original and oldest Avesta, that is to say, in the Gāthas, which are the obvious expression not only of the oldest forms of sentiment in the entire lore, but which are also the expression of a sentiment which was acutely experienced by persons living at the time of their composition.

These questions are however so exceedingly wide and so exceedingly difficult that I have made them the subject of laborious separate treatises. And these I have had the honour to insert in that most authoritative periodical, the Journal of the American Oriental Society. They will be found under the following titles and dates; —

'Asha as the Law in the Gāthas', J. A. O. S. 1899, pp. 31—35.

'The personified Asha', J. A. O. S., pp. 277—302.

'Vohumanah in the Gāthas' J. A. O. S., second half, 1900, pp. 67—87.

'Khshathra, Āramaiti, Haurvatāt and Ameretatāt', it is hoped, will follow. To these the reader is referred. But, as many valued friends in Bombay may not be able to gain a ready access to those volumes, I will say here in a few words what my results have practically been. I discover Asha and Vohumanah to be first of all simply expressions for the attributes of 'truth' and 'benevolence'; first as those characteristics are supposed to inhere in the supreme good Deity; and then I find them as expressing those qualities in the faithful disciple.

After this I find that they become also personified, first rhetorically, then doctrinally, as 'Archangels of God', and later even as 'his sanctified servants', Asha representing in these instances 'the orthodox community', and Vohumanah 'the orthodox individual'. This explanation leaves them indeed very impressive and refined as religious-philosophical conceptions, but they seem to have been introduced in a spirit which was quite simple and without any trace whatsoever of hair-splitting dialectics. They however express in a significant manner the activity of the Deity as directed by His justice and His love, and by these as exerted toward His entire creation, which is declared to comprise the chief objects even of material nature [1]. There is indeed 'an evil creation'; but with this the supreme Deity has nothing whatsoever to do, either directly or in-

[1] The earth, the rivers, the waters, the winds, the cattle, and man.

directly through either his Vohumanah or his Asha (except indeed to oppose and finally to overcome (?) it). It is the work of a separate Original Spirit, not supreme of course, but independent [1]. Such are Asha and Vohumanah in brief.

And what on the other hand is Philo's Lógos?

We can answer this question most conveniently if we include what we may have to say within a more extended section; that is to say, within a direct examination of the supposed analogies which are believed to exist between Asha and Vohumanah as described above and this same Platonic Philonian Lógos.

Before however we enter upon this detail it lies in our path first to examine critically that brilliant document which seems to have given rise to entire suggestions involved. Let us then recall and study more carefully 'Tansar's letter'.

Tansar's alleged Letter.

The distinguished Commentator proceeds as follows.

The Chaplain of Ardishīr is known to us through the Dēnkart, a Pahlavi compilation of the IXth century. In this treatise this Chaplain is given the title of Herbad of the Herbads, that is to say, High-priest, or Chief of the Religion, and the personal name by which it mentions him can be read either Tōsar, or Tansar [2].

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[1] See below on the fuller analysis of the system, also in its relation to that in the Achaemenian Inscriptions.

[2] See Haug's Essay on Pahlavi, p. 146 (bound up in one volume with the Old Pahlavi-Pāzand Glossary).

It is this Tōsar, or Tansar, whom Ardashīr, according to the Dēnkart, charges with the task of collecting the Sacred Texts on which Zoroastrianism reposes, and of restoring the Avesta which had been lost or mutilated. He receives the epithet of 'man of the doctrine of the ancients'.

In addition to this Mas'ūdī (so spelling the Arabic historian's name), also of the IXth century, alludes to the relations which Ardashīr had at the commencement of his reign with a pious personage of royal blood, named Bīshar, who belonged, as he says, to the Platonic sect[1] (sic). In the Kitāb et-tambīh** he returns to this Bīshar, 'a name which the fancy of the copyists transforms now into Banshar, Yanshar, Tabshar' (on account of the shifting of the small diacritical points which determine whether a letter should be read 'b' or 't', 'y' or 'n', etc.); and this recalled to Professor D. the Tōsar or Tansar of the Dēnkart. This Bīshar, etc. was, so Mas'ūdī, as cited in the passage, goes on to say, Ardashīr's Mobed and also his 'apostle' (sic). He (this Mobed or apostle) was one of 'the Kings (sic) of the provinces'[2], and he reigned in the Province of Persia, Farsistan, at the ancient seat of the Persian kings.

Again, he repeats, that he was of the Platonic sect, that he abdicated (so), and embraced the religious life (so). Then he, this Bīshar, proclaimed the advent of Ardashīr, sent missionaries into the provinces, and so facilitated the triumph of the Prince

[1] In his Golden Meadows, II, 161.

[2] Mulūk ut-tavāif.

over the other provincial kings. Mas'ūdī adds that he composed excellent treatises upon administration and upon religion. In these he justified the innovations which Ardashīr had introduced into both, and which were unknown to former kings. In particular a letter of the king of Tabaristan is cited, and another to the king of India (so). Mas'ūdī, as the Editor remarks, gives us a fragment of one of these letters[1]. But a happy accident, so he adds, has preserved to us the whole. (Journal Asiatique, mars-avril, p. 186, flg.).

A certain Bin-ul-Ḥasan, a native of Tabaristan, had undertaken to write the history of his country. In the course of his researches he found an important document in a shop at Khvārizm. It was apparently a letter addressed by Tansar, a Persian sage and High-priest of Ardashīr Bābagān, to Jasnaf-shāh, the prince of Tabaristan.

Bin-ul-Ḥasan translated it into Persian and inserted it in the Introduction to his history of Tabaristan. This was in about the year A. D. 1210. The text from which Bin-ul-Ḥasan thus translated into Persian was itself in Arabic and made by one Ibn al-Moḳaffa', a converted Guebre (i. e. a renegade Zoroastrian), who had devoted himself to translating the principal national books of the Persians into the language of their conquerors, 450 years before.

He died in 760 A. D., in the year 152 of the hejira (hijrah). This Arabic version is supposed to

[1] The following reference is made: 'voir la citation au commentaire de la page 17 b.'

have had two intermediaries at least between it and its Pahlavi original, Bahrām, son of Khorzād, and before him his father Manūchir (so), Mobed of Khorasan, and still other intermediaries are mentioned, viz. 'the sages of Persia (so)'.

The document, as already intimated, is in the form of a rather abnormally extended letter from its reputed author to the Prince above named, written with the object of inducing him to give in his adhesion to the Rule of Ardashīr. And it is moreover said to have been written in response to a letter of inquiry received from the said Jasnaf-shāh, in which he brings a severe critique to bear against the acts of Ardashīr, and this fourteen years after he had begun to reign[1]. In itself, as a document and without any reference to its genuineness, or to its partial genuineness, it possesses great interest. But very much of its supposed original has perished, and little wonder; Ibn al-Moḳaffa' is supposed to have worked on it nearly *five hundred and fifty years after the accession of Ardashīr.*

His translation of it, or that part of the letter which is supposed to be his translation, is so overloaded with Arabic allusions that the style at least

[1] So far, these remarks are almost a translation from the number of the Journal Asiatique. I may say that I understand that a very able English translation of the whole letter was made by a High-priest Darab Peshotan Sanjana of Bombay. I wish that I had seen it; doubtless it contains valuable annotations. I may mention to non-experts in Bombay that translations by different writers must really differ from each other in some respects; but that more often they only seem to differ through the choice of varying words which possess very nearly the same meaning.

of the original work must have been wholly, or almost wholly, obliterated.

And Bin-ul-Ḥasan translated this translation *nearly four centuries and a half after this,* evidently taking similar liberties. That is to say, the last translation was made at second or fourth hand about a thousand years after its lost original was supposed to have appeared, four intermediaries at least having interposed, not to say an indefinitely larger number.

The above data, aside from my own few remarks, I take immediately from the mars-avril number of the Journal Asiatique of 1894, pp. 185—188, to which the reader is referred.

The Editor justly calls attention to the fact that at the age of Ibn al-Moḳaffa', A. D. 760, Pahlavi must have still been current as a written language, so that so far as the actual wording goes, a document might well have survived from the date of Ardashīr, A. D. 212—230 odd, to the time of Bahram and Manūchir, the originals of Ibn al-Moḳaffa'; see above. And I would cordially add that such a political letter as this had an increased chance of surviving; moreover I positively believe that portions of it have survived and are incorporated in the document, though not in its original terms.

The French translation published in the number of the Journal Asiatique for mai-juin 1894 'représente essentiellement la version d'Ahmed-Bey Agaeff' (a young musulman of the Caucasus, and a pupil of Professor Darmesteter in Paris in 1892). It had been revised by M. Ferté in 1894 at the French

Consulate at Teheran. The text is said to be substantially that of the Indian Office Library, no. 1134, though it was first made on no. 7633 of the Addenda of the British Museum. Before we come to our discussion of it, let me say here at once with regard to this French translation which lies before us, that I accept it cordially, but with reserve, as Professor Darmesteter did, not at all criticising its freedom, which is often desirable and admirable.

It is no doubt a very great advantage for us to have a version of a Persian document from the pen of a native Persian, but we must not forget that this writing is by no means a modern Persian document; and one can easily see from even our own early English that a Persian of to-day might very readily misunderstand some of the idioms of the thirteenth century. The piece, while affording no particular difficulty as to the main bulk of it, is by no means so clear in many places, not to speak of the fact that the text itself at times requires especial emendation. But I accept the rendering gratefully for the time being; and it would be also odious as well as difficult to attempt to rearrange it. For, let it be distinctly understood that I object to the statements contained in it only partly; and I differ from the conclusions drawn from them by the commentator *only up to a certain point;* and I am in controversy with thos ewho have brought it forward only in an external sense. That is to say, I have little interest in questioning anything that may be questionable in the treatment of the texts, as such, either as regards the edition, or the translation.

My present business is with the historical conclusions, which are very often to be drawn from texts even when they are imperfectly reproduced; and it is proper to state our point at places, not from the letter itself, but from other works of its Editor.

The object in bringing the letter forward seems to have been to prove that there existed in Persia at the time of Ardashīr a high state of social and intellectual culture, and even a school of philosophical thought, this being regarded as fully illustrated as well as proved by the document. Then the impression seems intended to be left upon us that much Avesta was written during the early part of the reign of Ardashīr, which last is, in fact, quite natural enough, even if other views are not to be supported. If any Avesta could have been written at the period, the implication is left upon us that the Gāthas themselves may have been written some 200 or 300 years before, say in A.D. *circa* or B.C. 100. I do not think that the above course of reason is sound. My reasons are that the 'letter,' like scores of similar documents in those early and also in later ages, is, in everything but its nucleus, entirely spurious, and with the rejection of it I most especially doubt the presumption that a philosophical spirit at all seriously prevailed at the time in Persia.

I hope to illustrate the truth of these last objections by an examination of the document as published and explained in the French periodical.

The Document.

Graphic details meet us at once at the commencement. Tansar (accepting this reading of the name also provisionally for the Bīshar of Mas'ūdī) is said to have been a 'Mobed of the Mobeds', which is well in keeping with the conclusions, as Zarathushtrianism was distinctly organized, and its adherents might be well called a 'church', and the line of the Chief-priests must have been also continuous and practically unbroken.

We can freely compare our own ecclesiastical system as to this one particular.

But extraordinary peculiarities are at once claimed for this Archbishop (*sic*), and by himself; before these, however, we have the item from Masū'dī quoted. This refers to a self-sacrifice *not* claimed by Tansar himself. The Bīshar (Tansar) mentioned in Mas'ūdī was said to be one of the provincial kings (or princes), and to have reigned in the Province of Persia. He was also declared, as we have seen, to have been of the Platonic sect (so). He abdicated and embraced the religious life (thus our worthy annalist). Now these tales of kings becoming monks, though always, of course, possible, are, as in themselves, more than suspicious; and here our suspicions are at once deepened into the strongest possible adverse conviction after reading the letter of this princely renunciant with philosophic convictions. I for one do not hesitate to say that I do not at all believe that the author of such a composition ever had the oppor-

tunity of resigning a kingdom, however insignificant. He states that he was an 'ascetic', and had been one for fifty years. 'I have abstained rigorously', he goes on, 'from the joys of marriage and of love, from the acquisition of riches and the intercourse of men. I have never taken deeply to heart what I happened to desire, and have lived in the world as a prisoner, that the nations (*les peuples*) might know my justice and my virtue, and seek my counsels as to the salvation of the soul'.

Now this would indeed be an admirable policy for securing the object held in view; and if the bombastic tone of the letter did not betray it as the made-up fiction of a later age, it would be adapted to its object. Audacity in an extreme manifestation might seem well calculated to produce the desired effect; but it is out of all keeping with historical circumstances. Asceticism and celibacy were, in the first place, strictly against all the usages of the Parsi priesthood, in all probability also as even defined by law. And these assumptions are still more out of keeping with the character of the man as revealed in this document, which is supposed to have been his composition. Then, also, his excessive claims to spiritual sanctity are not harmonious with the tone of his effort, which is worldly to a degree. I will not, of course, deny that egotism and vanity may have manifested themselves in a person otherwise fairly honest and sincerely fanatical; but the objection which I have already made is so obvious a difficulty with the later compilers of the letter that they immediately hasten to 'accuse'

while 'excusing' themselves, for they elaborately anticipate the expected criticism.

Anachronisms in the course of the discussion.

"How could I dare to attack my religion," he is made to exclaim, "by refusing to accept what it permits as to wife, as to wine, etc., for to forbid what is permitted is as bad as to permit what is forbidden?" He proceeds to defend himself by way of precedent; — that is to say, he cites certain supposed sages who did the like from the days of Darius. 'They preferred,' he declares, 'to isolate themselves, to renouce this hollow life and the ways of the brutes (*sic*). Blushing to own those as their companions who were walking outside the paths of reason, they crushed their hearts; and, refusing to play longer with foxes, they went to seek peace among the panthers. They bid adieu to the world, renounced the thousand passions which follow it, and preferred the struggle for the soul and for eternity to those scenes, where they empty the cup of vain desires; they sacrificed their passions to the salvation of their souls, for it is written in the Bible (*Car il est écrit dans la Bible!*[1]) 'to fly from the ignorant is to approach unto God,' for there are none more miserable than two kinds of men; the first is the sage whom the world leaves miserable in the hands of the ignorant; the second is a King whose evil fortune has hurled him from a throne to poverty.' One would suppose that this passage was enough

[1] This exclamation point is my own, not the reviewer's.

alone and of itself to decide at once and for ever as to the genuineness of the letter. What had the Iranian High-priest of Ardashīr to do with the Hebrew Bible in A. D. 226 odd? Of course, the remark came from one to whom the Thora* (so) (not 'la Bible') was familiar through the Kurān, and the Kurān alone; but the Kurān was not composed till centuries after A. D. 226, nor known in Persia till still later. Yet the distinguished Editor is equal to the occasion, for he at once elides the passage, and most properly so. The sentence is not possible, so he cordially acknowledges, when regarded as an original part of a letter composed at the time and place named, and by the person who, as he maintains, had been the author of it.

Surely by such a process we can prove anything to be genuine.

We have only to cut out of it all the passages which make it clear that it was late. Of course, we must eliminate the passage, if we wish to prove that the bulk of the letter was written in A. D. 226, following; but what right have we to eliminate this passage unless we at the same time eliminate whatever is cognate to it? What can be more apt than this rejected citation, or more germane to the context? Why should it be eliminated? The process of elision can only be rationally guided by the congruity or incongruity of the passage to be retained or elided either to the immediate context, or to the bulk of a document. The author of the letter wishes to conciliate sympathy with those who voluntarily or involuntarily fly from the world, and in defiance

of the spirit of Zoroastrian precepts. The words seem written by a man who knew something of the (early) lives of the saints written centuries after Ardashīr. If a real Tansar at such a date had any knowledge of the Bible, it would be only to despise it. And yet this 'Bible' citation is wholly germane to the contexts, for both the old and the new Bible abound in ascetic hints urging upon men to give up the world to save their futurity. The new presents one ascetic figure which has been signal for all ages[1]. Why then, should these remarks be cut out? As we all agree, no High-priest of Ardashīr ever penned or dictated such a sentence; but neither did he pen that which goes before it, nor that which follows after. Why not elide those passages as well? The sole difference between the Editor and me is this: that in order to get at the real nucleus of the letter as extant in A.D. 226, I would elide not merely an awkward passage here and there, but almost the whole mass of the text as in its present form, for almost the entire mass of it, as it now stands, is impossible as an original production by a Parsi at the date proposed.

Further discussion.

But let us not consider the question settled by any means. On the contrary, let us patiently proceed to examine the entire document, or the greater

[1] Viz., the Baptist.

part of it, for it is in itself of the highest interest, in fact a masterpiece in early historical romance.

Upon this beginning follows a statement concerning Quābus king of Kirman, and his submission; and we have but few data at hand to verify or refute it, save that the entire tone and diction of the remarks are far advanced beyond the period to which we must assign Ardashīr and his counsellor. Ardashīr is declared to have remarked in the style of Louis the Magnificent, and to his Mobed of Mobeds; see p. 513: — 'We intended not to give the title of 'king' to any creature in the kingdom of my ancestors, but here is Quābus, who has come to seek asylum with us, and we will confirm to him his throne and crown.'

It is of course not only possible, but very probable, we might even say 'certain', that some of the petty princes who were nearly independent under the Parthian dynasty, should have hastened to make their submission to the new ruler; and that the timely submission of Quābus should have secured to him advantages; but that Ardashīr ever expressed himself in the finely discriminating manner recorded with reference to the fact I do not for a moment credit. He would have had no audience capable of appreciating his subtle diplomacy; notice also the expression 'the great way of obedience' which savours of religious vows, and later times. I do not think that it refers to the Gāthic 'way' in any sense, which it might well, if the other circumstances were congruous.

Claims to clemency.

Not far on after this follows a claim to peculiar clemency in the interest of the King (of kings), almost in contradiction to what is said later (see p. 515). 'The reigning Shāhanshāh (so) has power,' so the document goes on to say, 'over religion. God is his ally, and in changing this work of destruction and in altering the order of violence, I see him better armed and adorned with virtues than the ancients.' But as a matter of fact he found it to be necessary to execute his brothers,[1] a too familiar procedure for an ancient Oriental upon mounting a despotic throne. Still, this particular by no means decisively militates against the genuineness of this eulogy. Ardashīr may well have dealt less in bloodshed than others (yet see p. 43); and nothing would be more natural than that he should order his creatures to multiply assertions to this effect as to his goodness; and as to this the substance of the letter must have been genuine. But these urgent and cunning injunctions which resulted in its present form belong to the party politics of a different age. I make no doubt of it that the real author of the Persian translation was in sympathy with the Parsi community, whose first Sasanian King he was lauding, though I am not quite sure that he was himself a Parsi; and the passage seems to me to have been intended to produce an effect upon Parsi and Arabic opinion long after the conquest, toning up the waning Zara-

[1] This is the opinion of a certain close critic. It hardly looks like the Gāthic lore.

thushtrian sentiment of the day, and stemming the tide of perversions to Islam.

The Destruction of the Books.

Then follows (p. 516) a simple acceptance of the ancient tale that Alexander destroyed the sacred books, no limit being placed to the assertion: 'He burnt our sacred books written upon twelve thousand ox-skins.' But does the distinguished Editor really seem to hint here, or elsewhere, that this is a reason for supposing that 'all the original Zend documents have totally disappeared'? I should hesitate very seriously before I accused anyone of such an idea. In the loose phraseology of the later Zoroastrian books this was, however, often and plainly stated. See the 'Ardā Vīrāf', with its allusions to 'the accursed Alexander', i. 7, and the 'religion written upon prepared cow-skins and with golden ink (*sic*), which he burnt up'.

The fact that valuable or splendid Mss. emblazoned upon leather were burned or otherwise destroyed at Persepolis and in various places during Alexander's march is most credible. As the religion of Auramazda was nearly universal, it would seem to be hardly possible that some Mss. should not have disappeared, especially from the chief palaces, which immediately attracted the cupidity of the invaders; but that Alexander of all men in any way whatsoever especially ordered their destruction depends entirely upon how much he may have feared their influence as a means of strengthening the fanatical resistance of the population. In the first flush

of his successes, and in the eagerness of pressing them, he may possibly have given a free hand to military arson; but everything goes to show that directly his results seemed secured, he would have been anxious to preserve rather than to destroy the Mss. He seems soon to have hit upon a policy of conciliation and even of assimilation; he affected to become half-persian himself, at one time even adopting the Persian dress; he tried to talk the Persian language, and sought to be indoctrinated in its lore. He was the last man living to order the destruction of the monuments of an ancient faith, unless he acutely felt the danger of their inspiring his adversaries, and any such apprehension with regard to the Zoroastrian documents must have been rapidly dispelled, if it ever existed. Precious copies of the Mss., like many a fire-altar, must have been destroyed with the brutal fury of a victorious soldiery, and, as usual, the person supreme in command reaped the credit of the mishap, though he may never have known that it occurred. But that anybody endowed with a critical judgment should for a moment suppose that Alexander destroyed all the then extant 'books' or manuscripts of the Zend Avesta, or could have destroyed them had he made the attempt to do so, is very remarkable, nor has anyone positively ventured upon such a suggestion. The priesthood swarmed, of course, and every hamlet had its altar, or at least its assembly; the sacred places may have been indeed defenceless, but the Mss. would have been hurriedly concealed. That there existed some very valuable parchments in the

palace at Persepolis goes without saying, for even a lukewarm King would have preserved a fine collection, and this whether or not they were written in 'letters of gold' and on 'cow-skins.' If they were set up in gilt they would have been beautiful enough, for the character was shapely even then; but that these codices comprised more than a very few copies of their extant Zoroastrian scriptures is not at all probable. They perished, naturally enough, with the burning castle; but there were doubtless hundreds, if not thousands of copies of every one of the different books in the strong chests of the priests scattered throughout the provinces. To destroy the Mss. so that not a 'letter remained' would have taken years, and occupied an inquisition aided by the most modern of police. The 'scriptures' were a talisman of life to the people; an indestructible fanaticism would have saved them. The loss of the treasures at Persepolis was doubtless great, and Alexander, if he ever heard of it, would have bewailed it most. However that may be, this much is certain: that whether done at Alexander's order or by his wish, or without his directions or knowledge, this pre-vandal vandalism could not have had any appreciable effect upon the continuity of the great religion, as it did not, in fact, for Ardashīr some 500 years later than this could only have enthroned a faith which was part and parcel of the mental life of vast masses among his people. So much for the really unreasonable belief that Alexander burnt the Mss., all of them, and on purpose; that is to say, such an opinion would have been extra-

ordinary when regarded as the conclusion of a modern critic; but it was a very natural belief indeed when regarded as prevailing among the Zoroastrian Persians at the time of Ardashīr the Great. This, then, is in favour of the general authenticity of the facts presented. Alexander's foraging parties must have burnt up many documents with or without his will or knowledge; and nothing was more natural than that he should have reaped the credit of burning all of them that were so destroyed; for it would be foolish to suppose that any facts in favour of that great conqueror, who was so bitterly hated, could have maintained themselves for a decade in the memories of his enemies. The 'infamy' of Alexander was the talk of the priesthood for generations, and if Ardashīr encouraged it, the circumstance simply proves that he did not possess either the inclination or the capacity to make the easy discriminations in the case. The least statement that modified the iniquities would have been extremely unpopular. Even a longer catalogue of misdeeds would not have come amiss to him. As it is, the indictment is by no means light, and it is quite certain that it prevailed at every period since the date of its victim. Both Ardashīr and his Minister may well have uttered the usual calumny whenever they were displeased with Greece or with Macedon, or otherwise thought that the repetition of it might be useful.

This item, then, belongs to the real nucleus of the 'letter', whether gathered from separate documents long subsequent to Ardashīr, or not. But it is

simply a matter of course; it proves nothing, nor does it disprove anything, and, indeed, I may say at once that the same can be said of almost every sentence in the piece.

To proceed; – the statement that Ardashīr was the 'right-minded and honest man to revive the religion' must be of course understood chiefly in a political sense; and it was fully justified, all things considered, though in all human probability he owed his success from the first to the last as much to the vitality of the Religion as that vitality owed to him. But this is not my present point, which is the credibility of this 'letter' as being a document founded upon an historical nucleus. Such a statement as the one just recalled would be very natural, and something like it must have been constantly said.

The social status reorganised.

Another item most certain or probable in itself is that the new king reorganised the social status, or at least attempted to do it. He rallied, or revived the system which had been earlier in vogue, but how about the *names* of the different classes? They are all in Arabic, which came in 300 years after Ardashīr, as did the Kurān alluded to above. Our answer to this would be wholly sympathetic with the reproducers of the document; it is that Persian itself is now at least one-fifth Arabic, and it may have been so in A.D. 1210; and that this Arabic-persian was the language of the last author. Such objections as that to the use of Arabic, I am

glad to be able to say, have little validity. If Arabic terms were made use of in this translation of the XIIIth century, where more simple ones would have been natural, the plea might be made that this was simply accidental; and this reply would be all sufficient. But the question with reference to the subject-matter aside from the dialect is not so easily answered. How about the existence of that passage in the Yasna, Pahlavi or otherwise, in which this enumeration of classes is seen to have taken place?

The Pahlavi Yasna cited; its effect upon dates.

First we must notice in passing that if these sentences really occurred in a Pahlavi treatise of A.D. 228, that is to say, in a Pahlavi commentary on the Yasna, they prove at once the point which the entire reproduction of the 'letter' was intended to disprove; for such occurrences show of course that the original Avesta Yasna XIX, of which the Pahlavi was a commentary, existed much earlier than at such a date. I am far from wishing to press any adventitious advantage in this debate. But I must really point out that if this passage is supposed to be a part of the Pahlavi Yasna, and especially if that Pahlavi Yasna were at all like the document which has survived to us as the Pahlavi Yasna, and if it existed in this form in A.D. 212—228, the fact would push back the date of the original Zend Yasna XIX say a hundred, if not hundreds of years beyond and before that date; for valuable, or rather invaluable as the Pahlavi translations

which have survived to us are, the differences between them and their originals, that is to say, their inaccuracies, prove that they, the Pahlavi translations, must have post-dated their originals by at least a hundred years, many would say by a much longer period. The date of Yasna XIX would then in that case be pushed back at least till A.D.; and Yasna XIX is later Avesta. And this would therefore have a disastrous effect upon the theory that the Gāthas, or the original Avesta, were composed as late as that same Annus Domini, or indeed 100 years earlier.

The opinion that the Gāthas antedated the rest of the Avesta may be regarded as universal. And several of the compositions which follow the Gāthas are of earlier date than this Y. XIX. The Ahuna vairya, Airyaman Ashya, and the Yẹñhẹ hatãm; these may indeed have been echoes of the Gāthic period, say 50 to 100 years after it had closed. But then comes the Yasna of the Seven Chapters [1], which was so distinctly later that the term 'Bountiful Immortal', amesha spenta, first appears in it. This shows that the Gāthas had even then been long looked back upon as ancient pieces, for nowhere within them do we meet with these terms. Then come the Srōsh Yasht and the Hōm Yasht, which could hardly be expected much before two hundred years at the very least; where then are we to place Y. XIX in reference to the age of the Gāthas? not to speak of its Pahlavi translation, which I have purposely excluded for the moment. Surely if Y. XIX

[1] See S.B.E., XXXI, page 281, cp. this with the oversight in a certain prize essay which did me the honour to refer to me.

were written about the time of Christ, and the Hōm Yasht, the Srōsh Yasht, the Seven Chapters, and the Yeṅhe hatãm, etc. intervened between the already previous date of this Y. XIX and that of the Gāthas, together with the main Yashts and the Vendīdād as well, then the Gāthas would certainly be determined to an antiquity of at least 200 to 300 years greater than that assigned to them by the brilliant scholar who has pressed this letter upon our attention (in connection with an argument to the effect that the Gāthas were composed as late as 100 B.C., possibly even hinting at a later authorship). If the passage was Pahlavi because our Pahlavi translation existed at A.D. 212—228 odd, this of itself frustrates the purpose for which the passage was cited. But, as I say, I would not press such a point, for there is no reason at all why the Avesta text itself should not have been cited in Pahlavi forms, even if no full or continuous Pahlavi commentary then existed, almost impossible as this latter supposition appears to be. I will then simply point out the obvious circumstance that if this passage was written in Pahlavi or otherwise in A. D. 212—226 (about), then in that case it is certain that the Avesta text of Yasna XIX, Pahlavi or original, must have existed then. But if only this is true, and if it be not certain that a regular *Pahlavi* translation of the Avesta texts somewhat like our present ones existed at that time [1], then this alone and of itself proves that the Gāthas, which were so

[1] Which, as I may say in passing, I regard as simply an obvious certainty, for Pahlavi had been familiar for centuries.

long previous to that Yasna XIX, were far older than one of those dates so uncritically assigned to them in the face of universal opinion. But all this is mentioned only in passing, important though it is. Our present and immediate object is to show what is possible as part of a letter written by a Tansar (sic) at the date suggested, and what is not possible. Whatever the important bearing of this citation may be upon the question of the date of the Gāthas, the citation itself was thoroughly possible at the period stated; and the fact that the present terms are in Arabic has no force at all as an objection. The item indeed possesses no power whatever to increase the probability that the nucleus of the letter was written in A.D. 228, but it also possesses no force in the contrary sense.

What now follows seems to me to be probable enough as one of the particulars freely disseminated at the period of the Restoration; but it is diametrically in contradiction to what was so emphatically said in the earlier part of the letter; see above on page 34.

Ardashīr's moderation.

For the letter goes on to say; see p. 520: »'In regard to what may appear excessive to your »eyes in the tortures or penalties which the Shāh»anshāh inflicts and in the prodigality with which »he sheds the blood of those who act contrary to »his views or his orders, know well that the an»cients had a shorter arm (literally a shorter hand) »than he, because disobedience and the abandonment

»of good manners did not exist (sic) in the cha-»racter of the people'«.

It is therefore freely conceded here in this part of the (extended) 'letter' that Ardashīr shed blood abundantly, and this coincides with the facts; for not only did Ardashīr find it necessary to resort to such a procedure, but this was in so far the custom that three[1] at least of the Parthian kings succeeded to the throne upon murdering their fathers. Yet notice the cynical language, p. 521: »It is the rain »which reanimates the earth, the sun which comforts »it, the wind which increases its breath. If he pours »out the blood of such people with a prodigality of »which one sees no end, we, for our part, know »that it is the life and happiness of the future (sic)«.

This was indeed in the true line of sequence; and I by no means deny that the justifications were warranted in the sense of the times.

Those early centuries after Christ were as terrible as those before him. Bloodshed may well have been absolutely indispensable to avert what was worse, and that is, anarchy. I only object to the excessively worked-up and most modern type of thought and diction with which the whole theme is handled, and to the direct contradiction in terms in the 'letter' itself. It is impossibly original to a Tansar of the middle of Ardashīr's reign.

»You tell me«, so the supposed author of the 'letter' goes on to say, »that they speak much of »these effusions of blood, and fear them. I tell you »that there are many kings who have poured out

[1] Did not four? of them follow this device?

»blood solely by shedding a few drops; others have »slain thousands who ought to have slain more, for »the thing was necessitated by the times and the »men«[1].

Eliminations.

But what shall we say as to the 'elimination' of the passage translated on page 521? It seems to be exactly in harmony with the context, and, as we may notice, it is not written in Arabic[2]. The concluding bracket which separates it from the rest of the text is accidentally absent, which I note simply to guide readers. It should be added in the 7th line from the top of page 217, mars-avril 1894. The passage seems to be a good clincher for the general argument. It proceeds to show why the King gave the order to prevent the passage of persons from class to class. 'If masters were turning servants and servants masters, if wives were to rule and husbands obey', it was indeed time to put a check upon promotions. Of course this most elaborate description (both text and context) savours wholly of a later age.

And the Editor eliminates it, very properly. But why does he eliminate it without eliminating the text before it and the text after it, which are wholly germane to it? I object to these eliminations, as will be observed, *solely in case we are to stop too soon with them.* Of course there was

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[1] Everything in the dissertation is too much spun out and too modern; too full and too nervous, for the time supposed.

[2] Though this would make little difference.

a Mobed of Mobeds, and his name may as well have been Tansar as anything else, and of course there were scores of such documents as the nucleus of this brilliant and ingenious piece [1].

Further items.

But of this more hereafter; — to keep on now with our review before we draw our final conclusions-, the Shāhanshāh is further said, p. 522, to have established a travelling school of cavalry; which pervaded the Empire. No king of Persia on his accession could have failed to revive such services, how much less Ardashīr. The item is very natural, but it is nothing to our point; it is one of the particulars which the politician of the VIIIth, or the later century brushes up to show the character of the Founder of the Dynasty which the Arabs had conquered. Notice in passing the affectation and extravagance of the expression 'This King surpasses Bahman, son of Isfandyār, as to whose goodness all the ancient nations are in accord'. Panegyric would be natural enough and well in place, but not in wordy bombast at that period of time. Then the homily as to Ardashīr's enforcing conversions is altogether too elaborate for the occasion, in the midst of a reign after a savage revolution. 'The ancients', so the document goes on to say (p. 524), 'put everyone to death who departed from the established religion; but the Shāhanshāh keeps them for a whole year (sic) and plies them with catechisers!; only

[1] If there was not an historical nucleus for this one, it would be strange indeed.

then on his persistence did he execute the heretic'. This at such a date. It was a hint delivered in the eighth, ninth, or a later century by a renegade Zoroastrian to show the Arabs of that moment how to act. Had they pursued such a course many more Zoroastrians might have recanted, and earlier than they did; and those who wrote this sketch might well have saved the lives and property of many of their fellow countrymen. (However, whether by guile or bloodshed, the Arabs, as we know, at last reduced the adherents of the old faith to a wretched handful; but that is not our business here). Then follows an allusion to a law referred to Yasna XII, 2. But if the Oldest Avesta was written in the year 'One', as the Editor would gladly have proved to us, then Yasna XII hardly existed at 228. See above as to the citation from Yasna XIX; the same arguments apply. We must claim an universal acquiescence in the view that time was needed for the change from the personal Gāthas, depicting, without intending it, a vivid history, to the most conscious Yasna XII carefully worked up as a fixed profession of the faith.

Other Objections.

My chief objection as ever is, I repeat it, the impossibility of the whole *character* of the composition as original to A. D. 212—228. There is a delicacy and finesse about it that seem to be in harsh discord with the epoch of a great military revolution and with the general oriental literature of the time. *That was no age for mincing distinctions.*

As to the 'enregistrations', and general laws re-establishing ancient distinctions of classes, they are all natural enough; for Persia established the first postal system in the time of the great Darius, and registration must have existed; what I object to always is the way in which it is talked about. On what particular warrant does our distinguished commentator excide the 'bizarre' citation on page 527, mai-juin 1894, about the 'coffre', and the things which follow from Genesis? I fail to perceive it, unless the whole treatise is 'excided'. The item is directly in point as to the desirability of not mingling the classes, and not only this; it is categorically so applied. It is a citation fast enough; but the real cause of its excision is that it is obviously so late. I agree with the commentator, that it was never written in A. D. 212—226; I simply, as usual, go much further than he does; *and I excide* its context which is equally impossible for the time. Then see the next remarks about the composition of wills; p. 529: and the division and inheritance of property; and compare these with the book of Leviticus on the one side and the crude regulation of the Vendīdād on the other, remembering that on the theory which it is attempted to establish the Vendīdād must have been written or put into shape just about the time of this Shāhanshāh, or even some hundred of years *later*. *The hints of Leviticus could only have come through the Kurān, which was written centuries after Ardashīr*, and was extremely familiar to the Arabic translator, that is to say, if it be true, as is maintained, that he was a renegade

Zoroastrian, and a convert to Islam. This our translator so fully admits that he excerpts the whole passage as usual; but why 'excerpt' all this, if anything else is to stand? It is germane to what goes before and also to what follows. But, above all, does it, or any other portion of the 'letter' adjust itself to Persia in A.D. 226, if the Vendīdād was then composed and *at that place;* for that is the consequence involved? *Compare the Vendīdād with this Letter!; — to regard the two as contemporaneous in the same locality would appear to be the ultra pointing of a sarcasm.*

A striking feature.

But we now come upon an item which again gives the commentator pause. It is nothing more nor less than the mention of Ardashīr's own will in a letter which is supposed to have been practically dictated by this Ardashīr himself. We may believe even Mas'ūdī when he speaks of Ardashīr as having left a will; but how could it be mentioned in a letter which he Ardashīr inspired while he was alive, and for the special purpose for which this dissertation** was written? That the will was a final testament and not an 'ordinance', as is suggested, is a point out of all dispute; see the next page, 533, where the writer speaks of the King's death. Was the will published before he died, and in the very middle of his reign? Persian kings generally, and this Ardashīr among them, took precisely the contrary course with reference to *some* of their possible

heirs (see above). They acted as if those heirs, and not they themselves, should be the parties to make their wills, and a very much later eastern monarch is mentioned who did not permit his wives to have sons, as they, the future sons, would be too prone to make use, if not of a 'poudre de succession', then of some other convenient mode of disposing of their parent. It hardly seems likely that Ardashīr should have *published* his will before he had actually established his Empire; and according to this letter, his rule was manifestly not yet consolidated. Here was a powerful Prince still undeclared as a loyal subject; and the whole object of the letter is to secure his adherence; and would he accomplish this object by speaking of his 'will'? A modern might hit upon such a device possibly to throw dust into another's eyes, while guiding the developments of some subordinate conjuncture, but hardly an Ardashīr laying the foundations of his Realm.

Yet see the detail which follows in the document. The writer, or one of the writers, indulges in platitudes as to the degenerate state of things.

This item of the will is about as probable a proposition as that he, Ardashīr, really 'abdicated' as Mas'ūdī reports, and soon after the supposed date of this document. And all of this has been seriously regarded as an integral part of a letter to one of this King's future vassals, urging upon him his submission before his (the King's) real reign

can be said to have actually even begun [1], for I cannot myself believe that even the nucleus of this letter was written midway in the King's career. Fourteen years are a long time for Ardashīr to have left a princelet independent; and a new sovereign, introducing a new dynasty, would hardly urge inferiors to submit by making known his last will in the very epistle in which he urges their surrender.

Another curiosity.

Still more curious does it seem to me to be that any critic could for a moment accept the elaborately detailed account of the *mode of appointing a successor to the throne.* Let any one, whosoever he may be, if he be only an unprejudiced witness, read these regulations; and then say whether he believes that *this* was part of a letter of a successful adventurer** to one whom he wished to make his adherent in Persia and at that early year. It is also spun out to a degree, a fanciful and theatrical description of what a later annalist might have sketched out as an interesting mode of procedure in a kingdom upon paper. See the questions and answers all elaborately given.

But to go on with our task. In enumerating the four* parts of the earth he begins with the region of the Turks, and our brilliant commentator at once changes the reading to 'Turanian'; or more

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[1] Later on he may have associated his son with him in the Kingdom; see the sculpture of Takht i Bostān.

properly he refers this passage to a later age; for the Turks, as he remarks, only entered upon the horizon of Iran under Khosroes Anūshirvān. It is however always a little awkward to say *when* one particular race or nation was *not* known to another. A negative statement, as Kant would have said, is nearly or quite an 'universal statement'.

Some remarks upon modesty.

On page 534 (to go back for a moment) we have a specimen of the critical skill of one of the early re-writers of this document, which, let it be well remembered, I most seriously admire and greatly value as one of the choicest bits of VIIIth, IXth, or XIIIth century literature. One of them explains 'airya' as Parsi '*er*' in the sense of 'modest', which may well have been a secondary meaning, whereupon he enters upon a self-laudation à propos of it.

Now *all* our attempts at etymology may of course be pardoned, but see what follows from this effort. »This name recalls«, so he says, »and it »preaches to us our duty. It secures us honour and »consideration and dignity . . . since humiliation . . . »attaches to pride. We have also remained faithful »to this idea and to this moral tendency . . . »We were the envy of the world, sovereigns »of the seven quarters of the globe« . . . (That was in a sense true; yet hear this): . . . »To such a »degree were we thus sovereigns that if one of »us travelled we were supreme* in the seven karshvars »of the earth, so that not a creature dared from

»fear of our Kings to cast on us a disrespectful »glance!« That seems couched in rather too high a tone for the period mentioned. From this there proceeds some further curious history dealing with a Persian Prince long subsequent to Ardashīr, for he bears a name which seems to be of Turkish origin. The distinguished Editor here eliminates as usual all that seems inconsistent with his theory, — and we should understand that his explanation, like that adapted by me, is in no respect inconsistent with such a procedure.

But here he seems to eliminate mainly on account of an anecdote which follows (see page 535), which he again justly declares to be an addition of the Arab translator. I cannot however at all see why it, not the story but the passage, is not a good illustration of the matter in hand, supposing the matter in hand to be likewise of later date and an 'addition' of some previous 'editor'. It is quite right to 'eliminate' the whole allusion, if we wish to lay bare the nucleus of the treatise; *but then we must not stop at that; we may 'eliminate' the whole context to which it is germane.*

Listen also to this further description of Persia. »This fourth* region (the land of the modest) is »the privileged portion of the earth, and compared »with other countries it is the head, the umbril, »the camel's hump, and the stomach. The head, »because from the time of Iraj, son of Farīdūn, »pre-eminence and sovereignty has belonged to all »our kings.

»They, the Persians, have governed all nations«.

(This was almost true of the Achaemenians, as we may note in passing.) »Conflicts which arose amongst »nations were regulated according to the views and »order of our kings. They sent to them, the Per»sian kings, their daughters and tribute and pre»sents . . . It, Persia, is the navel of all lands »because it is at the centre of all the nations of »the globe; and its inhabitants are the most illus»trious, honoured, pious and brave. It has the »horsemanship of the Turk [1], the ingenuity of India, »the dexterity and the art of Greece (*sic*). God has »given us all these talents and in greater measure »than to any one of these other peoples.« He goes into the 'tint of their complexion, and the colour, length and medium straightness of their hair'. . . . »All the sciences of the earth are our portion [2] . ., »all difficulties between subordinate princes are settled »in accordance with the religious law and the »process of proof! As to military prowess, one »thousand of our men have never proceeded to »attack twenty thousand of an enemy without »returning victorious!« Such is the style of this supposed religious ascetic of the year 226 A.D. No wonder Jasnaf-shāh gave up appalled. This was the Platonic philosopher of the school of Socrates and one of a set almost fit to write the Gāthas!

What I shall say further will be for the most part a mere repetition of the foolish items; — foolish,

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[1] But the Editor has noted that the Turk was known only later (?).

[2] Did this assist in forming the opinion that philosophical science was familiar in Persia in A.D. 226?

let me always remind the reader, only when one regards them as being really believed to be the statements of such a person as the supposed Tansar writing at the dictation of an Ardashīr at the date ascribed to them. The author, or authors, of the valuable piece soon take[1] up a series of statements which may well reproduce, while they enlarge upon, some actual annals of the time of Ardashīr. It is fully certain that Ardashīr caused his agents to proclaim far and wide, that he would »pour his favour upon all who submitted.« They also doubtless reproduced the standing claims against Rome. And they may well have done their best to spread the pompous assertions that he, Ardashīr, would postpone his campaign against Rome till he had reclaimed the domain of Darius (only we have some suspicious doubts as to whether the crafty conqueror would so plainly unveil his intentions to the enemy by making them too public*). It is not unworthy of a passing word to mention that 'Alexander', the so hated name in Iran, happened to be also the name of the then reigning Roman Emperor[2]. The items which follow are again well in keeping, and must certainly have reproduced what were the standing claims of Persians against Rome. The quick eye for the provinces makes these passages all the more probable. 'He, Ardashīr, will take no rest', the 'document' proceeds to say, 'till he has avenged Darius against the Alexandrids, and so

[1] or 'takes'.

[2] Alexander Severus.

enriched his treasury and that of the State, having restored the cities which Alexander so wickedly destroyed in Farsistan 500 years before . . . '. Here we have again a touch from a later hand. One almost doubts whether political romance at such a time, fantastic as it sometimes is, would have thought particularly of the extinct cities in a moment of triumph. If the memory of their devotion was so many centuries old, this item would look particularly academic. The man of action has obviously here brushed up his history for effect. He, the supposed author, goes on with his ancient annals. 'He would subject them, the Romans (?), to the tribute which had always been paid to our Persian kings for the country of the Copts and for Syria, which our kings formerly conquered in the land of the Hebrews, since the invasion of these countries by Nebuchadnezzar'. To which the 'letter' adds a thoughtful excuse on behalf of the Persians for not pushing matters too far, and that reason was this, 'that the climate in those regions was too bad, and the chronic diseases too prevalent for his countrymen to settle there'. Then comes (page 549) one more of the anachronisms: 'This state of things continued till the time of Khosroes Anūshirvan* 531—578'. That is to say this state of things mentioned here in this supposed letter of Tansar in A.D. 226 circa, continued and was stated in this same letter by this Tansar, to have continued till a period more than three hundred years after this same writer of this letter, Tansar, had been dead and in his grave

(or rather pulverised to dust, for the flesh of a Parsi was first exposed and not buried), and Ardashīr with him, and the princelet to whom this 'epistle' is supposed to have been addressed along with the two! Our great reviewer and commentator here naturally assents that this is hardly possible. So he proceeds as before to cut the passage out. Yet where is the sign of a break in the diction or the narrative? I again agree in exciding, but my excision would be rather 'excavation' than 'excision'. I would excide what goes before and what follows after. The document here recalls a remark of the recipient of the letter. He had stated that he was related to the Shāhanshāh* through a connection with Ardashīr son of Isfandyār, called Bahman. This certainly looks like a contemporary morsel. A prince would have been likely to be put thus to his resources, and the answer is not unlike what a vain politician would make to him. 'I assure you', he declares, 'that this second Ardashīr is far superior to the first', etc., etc. This was of course the recurring cry of the Restoration, even after its crisis. But the whole description of the thing is elaborated and beyond all proportion for the date. The Persians of the VIIIth, IXth or XIIIth centuries under the Arab power had every motive for reconstructing the historical importance and glamour of their venerable but now superseded dynasty. Their ready wit would most naturally weave a subtle fiction. But the Ardashīr of the Restoration was a man of another mould, and still somewhat in his struggle; for he is actually supposed to be endeavouring in this

very letter to secure the adherence of an additional Chief. Why then is the correspondent made to speak so extensively and so eloquently of him as the author of faits accomplis? The answer might indeed be that he was purposely blatant. The document goes on, page 550, if possible still more in the style of a sensational fabrication: »You say that the acts of the »Shāhanshāh astonish you. There is nothing in them »which ought to produce that effect so much as the »manner in which he has alone of himself conquered »the world. For four centuries the land (or 'la »terre entière', the whole earth) was filled with fero- »cious beasts, demons with human faces without »religion, morals, education, wisdom, or shame. It was »a people from whom only desolation and corruption »came into the world. Cities had become deserts, »buildings were in ruins. In the space of fourteen years* »by cleverness, strength and genius he (Ardashīr) »has made waters flow in the desert, and founded »cities, created villages, as they had not done in »four thousand (!) years before him (*sic*)«. That is certainly a 'modest' statement for our Platonic philosopher of the sect of Socrates and our ascetic Archbishop who had abjured ambition, say for 'fifty years'. If he thought that his master, supposing him to have existed, had established such a record as having done more in fourteen years than had been accomplished by all preceding Persian monarchs, Darius the Great included, in 4000, we have but a small opinion of the strength of his judgment; if he were indulging in mendacious panegyric, he was not very exalted as a saint. He goes on: »He,

»Ardashīr, has brought in architects and inhabi- »tants, constructed roads, published laws even »on eating and drinking, on apparel, on travelling »and sojourning. He has put his hand to »nothing without inspiring men with confidence and »bringing matters to a favourable result. He has »worked so well for the future that for a thousand »years after him his work will never be interrupted (!). »He finds more happiness in that future, and takes »more pains for the generations which will come »after him than in the present moment, and more »than in arranging the affairs of his contemporaries«. This was certainly an ideal characteristic; but the panegyrist goes one step further; »he takes more »interest in it (that is to say, in the affairs of the »generations which shall come after him) than he »does in the *preservation of his own health* (!). (Here »the sacrifice becomes serious indeed). 'Whoever', he »proceeds, 'will reflect upon all the merit, know- »ledge, reason, eloquence, anger and satisfaction, »generosity and modesty which he has developed »during these fourteen years, will be able to re- »cognise the fact *that since the Almighty Artisan »of the world constructed the azure sphere of heaven, »the earth has never seen a King so just as to be »his equal* (!)« That was doing pretty well (for a careful official). But he is again as free to predict the future, good and bad, as to delineate the past. »The door of welfare and of order which he has »opened will remain open for a thousand years. »And did we not know that the abandonment of his »will shall bring on trouble and confusion in the

»world, at the end of a thousand years, untying what »he has tied, we should say that he was labouring »for eternity«.

A singular interpolation.

Here follows what seems to me to be a shred from the noble doctrine of the Stoics, 'Notwithstanding that we are *creatures destined to destruction and annihilation*, philosophy demands that we should toil for that which is to last, and that we set our wits to work for eternity'. Where did this singular scrap come from? If it means anything, it is a genuine fragment. Philosophy, as we know, came to Persia in the person of Simplicius and his seven colleagues in the VIth century, 533* A. D., they taking refuge at Teherān as long as they could endure its barbarity; that is to say, for two years. Did this trace of true philosophy indicate a romancer of some philosophic culture in, say the VIIIth or IXth century? Whoever the writer may have been, it is not necessary to say that he never penned these words in the reign of Ardashīr. The composer by implication applies all this to the supposed recipient of the letter: 'You ought to be among those who toil for eternity, etc., though destined to extinction'. At the time of Ardashīr the doctrine of personal immortality must have been particularly strong, as I need hardly say, when regarded as an article of faith among the Persians, for the Revolution was largely carried through with the aid of religious fervour.

Here then we have a positive case for a later

date. If 'immortality' was marked as a doctrine of the Persians in ordinary times, and if the enthusiasm for it was great in the crisis of the religious Restoration, how comes it that a man supposed to be canvassing politically at the very height of this struggle could yet make use of the sentence which I have cited quite in the spirit of the materialistic fatalism, an impossible utterance for such a time and place? With most pertinent worldly wisdom he however adroitly adds: »(You will not »need to toil with only annihilation in view); you »will soon receive the benefit and happiness reserved »for your services. God grant that trouble may »not fall upon your people«.

An extraordinary suggestion.

We now come upon remarks so utterly alien in tone from the time and place, and so near akin to the Mohammadan* controversy that, next to the notice of facts of later date, they constitute an objection to A.D. 212—226*, which is more powerful to one who reads the Persian of 1200 A.D. and later, than all the other items presented put together.

»Be convinced«, he concludes, »that the man who »gives up personal effort and falls back upon pre»destination [1] degrades and vilifies himself, and he »who excites himself and allows himself to be »excited in free investigation and denies predestination »is an infatuated dunce. The wise man should

[1] ! That for the time of Ardashīr.

»take the via media between free endeavour »and destiny« (! this for the year stated); »pre-»destination and free will are like two packages »on the back of a quadruped, if one is heavier than »the other the baggage falls to the ground«. Who does not recognise at once the later fencings of religious dialectics? Jalālu-'d-Dīn i Rūmī is full of things like this; and the whole train of ideas came in with the Kurān. And yet this is left undisturbed in the letter and not 'eliminated'. Surely this must have been an oversight on the part of the gifted Editor; and we must excide it for him. It is simply ridiculous to suppose it to be a part of a political letter written at the date suggested. And the passage affords an absolute proof to all moderately experienced readers that the letter in all but its nucleus was the product of a later age. It is almost, if not quite as certain a proof that A.D. 212 — 226* never saw such a document, as an alleged note in the middle age would be shown to be false because it mentioned some modern invention; — not quite so striking a proof of impossibility, but really quite as firm to those familiar with the circumstances; — the ideas are literally a part of the later age.

Upon this appears an anecdote in further apt illustration of this same fatalism; and much of the same kind abounds in later Asiatic theological literature. The distinguished Editor immediately and, as usual, simply cuts it out; I would at once follow his example, save that I would 'cut out' all that precedes it, for I can see no just warrant for rejecting the illustration while retaining the principal passage which

is equally impossible for Persia at the time supposed. The anecdote is as distinctly apt to the context as it is reasonable to expect; it is germane to what goes before as it is to what follows.

So much for the facts as cited by the 'letter' in the edition as it stands before us, or rather for most of them. A thorough and critical revision of the text and translation of the letter on my part is uncalled for; see the cogent reasons already given; and in fact only a verbatim is needed, and with the texts now printed any one can make that for himself. The argument is concerned with the general bearing of the letter, and only very seldom indeed with textual difficulties.

Résumé as to its style, — excisions.

I had intended to divide my brief review of this very interesting document into two portions, one concerning its facts, and one upon the style; but the style is in itself almost the most prominent fact, and it is inextricably bound up with the other elements.

What, then, is our conclusion? — first and foremost as to the body of the document. And here I differ from the eminent Editor, as I cannot too pointedly repeat, *only in the degree* of my estimate of the details; yet I cannot at all conceal the fact that this matter of 'degree' is decisive. He excerpts all that seems to him to be absolutely impossible as a portion of a work written at the time and place stated, about A.D. 212—226, and I literally follow in his track so far as this principle is concerned. Among these impossible allusions he

excludes all those portions of the letter which speak of matters which were notoriously not in existence at that period of Ardashīr, and secondly several other important items which do not seem to him to be congruous to that early authorship, such as the mention of the 'will' of the man who is in the next chapter spoken of as practically the inspiring originator of the so-called epistle itself. But he preserves a large part of the document, and attributes it really to one Tansar (so deciphering the name in the Dēnkard and in Maçoudi, or Mas'ūdī), to correspond with the name of a chief Mobed, or Archbishop**, under Ardashīr the First. I endeavour to carry out *the same process of excision exactly, only that I leave a greatly more reduced residue as the result.* And if the alternative opinion suggested on p. 191, Mars-avril 1894 be accepted, then *I hardly differ from my so greatly distinguished colleague* save as to the effect of his conclusion. See where he most sagaciously admits that the texts may be the work of Bahrām. Things that could not possibly have had any existence in A.D. 226 (circa) were of course not referred to at that period; nor could a style of composition together with a grasp and delicacy of thought which were common in Persia in the XIIIth century, and also possible from the VIIIth to the Xth centuries, have been habitual to any such person as a simple Mobed of Mobeds under Ardashīr.

Perhaps this is a favourable place to bring in another unmistakable touch from the hand of a later artist, even if we must go back to the 'introduction' to the 'letter'

in which it occurs It is that wonderful piece of counsel which Aristotle gives Alexander. The sage, for so he was evidently supposed to be, tells him (Alexander) 'to leave princelets independent of each other, so that they shall be sure to disagree; so many misunderstandings, rivalries, and quarrels will arise among them that they will have no time to avenge themselves upon you, and they will be so absorbed in such distractions that they will forget the past'. Surely such blasé remarks were never made by an Aristotle, first or second. But this was not in the letter proper. Here is, however, a piece of avowed thirteenth-century writing, or, at least, of ninth-century writing. It is not presented as a part of the letter, and *yet it matches in style completely with it;* and it matches also with that style throughout.

I must therefore designate the whole document, and without hesitation, as being in its present form a subtle political fiction of the highest possible value, worked up like many other such spuria, [1] and upon ancient traditions of the glorious Sasanian Restoration, intended, moreover, to gratify the wounded vanity of the crushed Persian circles who, in the seventh to ninth century or later, still adhered either in heart or practice to the primitive Persian faith. And I do not yield at all to the Editor in my admiration for parts of it, nor for the skill or veracity

[1] Such spuria are well-nigh universal, as the reader should understand. Recall for instance the letters of Heraclitus, the false books of Plato, the spurious pieces of Philo, etc., etc. Literature is full of such apocryphal documents.

disclosed in it, regarded as an artistic production or reproduction, of a later age. I will go further, and would say that the document was unquestionably founded, like almost every other document of the kind, upon facts past, or long past. Beyond any manner of question, there was a flood of political circulars or official 'letters' sent by the agents of Ardashīr methodically to every potentate within the Empire, soliciting his adherence to the new régime with promises and threats (see above). Instead of there being one 'letter', like this, in all save its impossible amplifications and its thirteenth-century style, there must, of course, have been scores of them. That Restoration was a 'large affair', if ever a revolution was. The amount of 'business' — military, diplomatic, and bureaucratic — involved in it must have been immense; and Ardashīr was not the man to neglect its chief items in any way. If there was no Tansar as Mobed of Mobeds at his Court, then there was beyond all doubt some other Archbishop, so to speak, if not like him personally, yet discharging the self-same functions; and it matters little what his name was called. And such an official could not have avoided being in the very centre of the situation, for Ardashīr was pushing the interests of the national religion for all that they were worth. It is not improbable that an ardent fanaticism was prominent among the chief forces upon which he relied to complete those results which seemed to be, and which were, quite all-important. If, then — I repeat it — there was actually no such person as this High-priest at the Court

of Ardashīr about 212—226 A.D., there were most certainly many busy and shrewd public officials of various degrees of authority closely resembling this supposed Tansar, and ready to do the bidding of their master. These persons would be naturally ecclesiastics for the reasons given; and they were doubtless writing letters continuously to the Governments of the provinces, each one of which must have dealt in panegyric toward the new Emperor, though in rougher and simpler words. And over these astute persons there would be, unquestionably, the titular head; but whether this nominal Primate were really the force which Ardashīr was using, or only the figure-head to some other abler man, can never be surmised. Office itself, however, at that early day must have constituted a predominant element of power. Still, whatever imperfections may exist in the grouping of the ancient facts which are supposed to be represented, it cannot be denied that early history is illustrated in the details. And that is my verdict.

The piece is beautifully worked up with ingenious and refined imagination from ancient hearsay, or possibly from older documents.

But what results if the letter be genuine as actually written at the date of Ardashīr? Let it be supposed for a moment, and for the sake of argument, that this really attractive piece was in reality so composed, as it stands, at the time stated. What then? What bearing has such a fact upon the date of the 'Old Avesta'? What sort of an author does

it show this one to have been? Was he a '*Platonist of the school of Socrates?*' (*sic*). If so, I fear that he was a bad imitation of his masters; or the school, on the other hand, must itself have degenerated. Let me be pardoned for saying it; but if ever a vain coxcomb penned a pointed political paper (not, so to say, a 'pamphlet'), it was this wonderful ascetic Ecclesiastic who declares that he had abjured the world for a lifetime, and who is also supposed to be a person who [1] renounced a throne!, one of the most suspicious items, as it seems to me, in literature.

No possible freedom in the last very fair French translation can at all conceal the eccentricities of the individual on the supposition that it was written at the time reported. If a Tansar, as a narrator, wrote this at the date suggested, then he was not an infatuated egotist only because he was untruthful; and upon that understanding his existence was wholly to be regretted as an element in so serious a situation.

Nor was his Chief himself, as he depicts him, any more exalted in principle than we should expect for the time, place, and circumstances. Let it however be once more supposed, for the sake of argument, not only that the piece was genuine, but that all such objectionable features as we have noticed were wholly absent, what, even then, in all the world, has such a letter to do with the 'Antiquity of the Avesta'? Do such allusions to speculative thought as appear in it at all illustrate the presence of the

[1] As Maçoudi (Mas'ūdī) says.

Gāthic spirit in Persia at that time? It seems to me to be absurd upon the face of it to mention such a parallel. And where is the first word in it even about the collection of primitive documents, to which allusion has been made?, not that we should suppose for a moment that such a work had been neglected. What bearing could such expected, and even necessary, clerical diligence have upon the antiquity, or non-antiquity, of those time-honoured relics? Collections of ancient parts of the Avesta with additions to them and translations of them into later Zend and into Pahlavi must have been taking place from the earliest periods, and especially at crises of religious revival.

Are we to suppose that the Gāthas were written in the year One, or at B.C. 100, because a resuscitation took place when Zoroastrianism mounted the throne in the person of Ardashīr two or three hundred years later on? There is no necessary or relevant connection whatsoever, so far as I can see, between the two propositions.

No one doubts that religious zeal was at a white heat in A.D. 212 and for some time following, while with it theological ingenuity became active, and documents worthy to be called 'Avesta' must have been composed; the contrary is most improbable. Is it possible that a Restoration which was probably largely incited by the priestly class, and which seated a person upon the throne who himself claimed priestly descent, and which, as we see from much unintentional evidence, affected a religious sentiment, could possibly have neglected

its, to it, so sacred Scriptures? If the hated Alexander could eagerly seek out the Persian sages, and affect the Persian lore, together with the Persian dress, how much more would the busy Ardashīr attend to a matter so vital in every sense to the moment! Except in times of exceptional neglect or degeneration, the documents were not only periodically, but almost continuously, subjected to revisional treatment[1] How many scores of centres must there have been where the rites were celebrated! And how often were the scrolls stored in their priestly chests recopied as they became worn out by use, new documents, expository or original, being most certainly often added to their number. The Pahlavi translations, or the Zend of the Avesta, must at least have been continually recopied, emended (?), and increased from the very first. It seems simply childish to place any exceptional emphasis upon that statement of the Dēnkard, to the effect that the religious documents were collected[2]. *Of course*, the Scriptures were re-collected, recopied, and enlarged. And if the Vendīdād, the Yashts, and the Gāthas possessed in themselves any evidence at all that they originated at the time of Ardashīr, *of course* it would be natural to suppose that they were among the documents which were composed at that period, or that it was they, among others, which were recopied, explained (!), and sanctified afresh; and this would be practically certain. And, so far as re-editing was concerned; that is to say,

[1] of some kind or another.

[2] See it alluded to above, upon page 64.

rearrangement in the liturgies, etc.; this must certainly have happened even with regard to the Gāthas themselves. The statement cited does not touch the question of their origin, which depends wholly upon their internal evidence, and upon that of the other lore, the Indian, which is so intrinsically related to them. *Some* documents were continually appearing; and some, beyond a doubt, appeared under the stimulus of the Restoration; but what those documents were would be plainly shown by their contents; that is to say, their contents would plainly show at a glance, at least whether it were possible that they were composed at such a time, place, and under such circumstances, or not. Our inquiry, however, has reference to a particular part of the Avesta, that universally acknowledged to be its original and oldest part.

These ancient pieces are, I need hardly say, of all possible documents of the kind about the least probable as the *forged* product of the Sasanian age, early or late; and, in fact, there is no one, so far as I am aware, who supposes that they were composed in that age, unless, indeed, there is a certain undertone of insinuation throughout the translation and representation of this 'letter', which was intended to induce a current of opinion trending that way. The question, however, lies in a certain sense upon our path, and we must consider it.

Is it, then, likely or possible that while priests were elated in a crisis of enthusiasm at the glorious events which were transpiring, any one of them,

even if he had the power, should have set to work to forge those deeply meditative though impassioned pieces, with all their wranglings and their hopes, and with their wonderful internal evidence, as well, of contemporaneous historical origin? Was that a time for a fantastic invention which was to foist upon the people *the very central document of their Religion*, for let it never be forgotten that the Gāthas were the very core of all the religious traditions of the Persians then, and deservedly so considered, for they are obviously a contemporaneous record of the life of their Prophet; and they, the Gāthas, together with other sacred pieces, were the objects of worship in the course of the liturgies?

Or was the impression, on the other hand, at all really intended to be insidiously conveyed that the Gāthas thus actually *arose* as *genuine compositions*, with all their homogeneous lost companions, in Medo-Persia in the years A.D. 212—226 (*circa*)? Granted that there existed brilliant schools of Zend philology throughout the Sasanian age, — and the origin of the new Zend alphabet thoroughly proves that such centres must have existed, — can culture itself account for the origin of a document which is totally alien from all the facts of the period? Where was the Vīshtāsp struggling for the early throne? Or was this name (Vīshtāsp) a pseudonym for Ardashīr with the extinct Arsacid, or his lingering adherents, as the dregvant? [1] Were these the objects of the Gāthic anathemas? Where were the Daēvas, that

[1] A word for the 'faithless' with which the Gāthas deal.

is to say, the Daēva-worshippers? These were on the south-east toward India, not among the Parthians or Persians who had been Mazda-worshippers, as is believed [1], for ages. The lingering Daēva-worshippers were kindred to the Ṛig-veda men. There was once a day when Iranians, too, worshipped Dēvas*, like their so distant kinsmen. 'Heaven-gods' was an Indo-aryan name in ages lost to memory. Did Dēva*-worshipping tendencies linger till AD. 226 at Teherān? The Gāthic struggle, as we hold, was one of the original conflicts which turned those Dēvas* into Devils, and a signal part of one of them. These questions cited are truly difficult.

And who was the Zarathushtra? Was this Tansar the man? Such questions seem to an antiquarian critic to be simply irrational; and they were hardly ever really meant to be seriously suggested, if at all.

And here I must recall what was said in the preface to my new and curtailed edition of the Gāthas, which seems also to have produced conviction in some quarters at least. It anticipates, indeed, what I shall have to enlarge upon still later; but it will yet be useful if now stated here. It is that we hold the Gāthas to be ancient, not at all because of anything in the nature of authoritative assertion to that effect contained within them, or in any other possible documents. All definitive assertions of claims to antiquity, veracity, possibility, or probability, have with me at least — for I venture to speak for no one else—absolutely no persuading

[1] That is to say, largely so. See even the Religion of the Arsacids.

force. On the contrary, such assertions, if too urgently presented, would immediately arouse my own suspicions. Just in so far as any passages in the Gāthas [1] *asserted* them to have been composed at any particular date, early or late, just in that degree would I, for one, repudiate such a passage. We hold them to be the delineation of long-past scenes; but scenes, indeed, like those in the Iliad, or other very ancient compositions, might have been totally poetical and illusory, and obviously intended so to be understood; but we believe these hymns to be the expression of contemporaneous life, because they *disclose this without intending it, and as it were in passing.* They are made up of personal allusions of such a character as to convince us that they refer to real and contemporaneous events. And we hold them to be centuries older than Ardashīr, because *these allusions are wholly unconscious.* They obviously refer to people who could only have existed at an early period, for we are forced by their language, and, above all, by their extraordinary metres, to associate them with the Ṛig-vedic Indians of at least many centuries before Ardashīr. Evident traces of positive association with Ṛig-vedic worshippers linger in the books themselves, or, at least, traces of association appear with remnants of tribes, the bulk of whom had indeed, perhaps a long time before, pressed southward through the Khâibar [2]. But I will not

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[1] See my introduction to the second edition of the Gāthas, 1900.
[2] *Sic.*

pause longer upon this just here, as I have dealt with it before.

To sum up, then, my own impressions, which, however, I am very far indeed from wishing to press unduly upon others, —though, as I am in duty bound to say, they have been formed after very severe and prolonged labour and reflection throughout many years; —they are as follows:

I confess that I cannot at all understand how a great scholar of such widespread authority as the gifted Editor of this letter could push it forward as having any decisive connection whatsoever with the question of the 'antiquity' of those strangely original rough Hymns, or, indeed, with that of any other part of the Avesta. I reserve to this late place a remark with regard to what many might consider to be the crucial point of all—the identity of the names Bīshar and Tansar. I may say that the identification of the two is not at all so curious as it looks, and to my mind the probability of the identification is shaken merely by the fact that it is not so urgently called for; —that is to say, that it is not needed as an element of proof. The existence of such an high-priest with those functions, and the collection and revision of 'Scriptures', together with the re-organization of the ecclesiastical institutions and the ritual, were all certainties and matters of course. The identification of the *name* itself is of little importance so long as we see that the items mentioned were altogether commonplace; *both they and the name deny nothing, and they*

prove as little. The only item worth a moment's notice is the eccentric allusion to the Platonic character of this Bīshar-Tansar; and that, together with what corresponds to it in the 'letter', was one of the obvious affectations of a later century brought in by the sojourn of Simplicius at the Persian Capital in A.D. 533.

Scraps of philosophy lingered from that hour, doubtless, in many a linguistic school of Persia, and they were by no means absorbed by the intense Biblical fervour which took possession of Persian literature almost simultaneously through the Arabic conquest. Does, then, the Platonic character of this Bīshar-Tansar of the sixth, seventh, ninth, or thirteenth century prove or suggest any strong influence exerted by the Philonian Lógos in Persia in A.D. 226? I may say at once — though of course I re-open the question elsewhere — that any philosophic tendency following upon Simplicius' visit in the sixth century seems to me to be utterly bereft of all power as a source of proof in this connection with reference to A.D. 226, three hundred years before.

Having done my best to form an unprejudiced opinion of the value of this most interesting piece of literature as evidence of the existence of the philosophical habit of mind in Persia in the middle of the Reign of Ardashīr, it will be now my duty, after thanking the Editor and the translators of it, to go into similar details with regard to the Philonian philosophy itself.

III.

Preparation for the study of the Lógos.

But before we do this it may be as well to pause for a moment while we clear the atmosphere of our subject, by asking what we are really to expect in our search. Are we seeking to prove that because certain resemblances are traced by some persons between ideas in the Philonian philosophy and ideas in the Avesta, and that their arguments are satisfactory (which I deny), that therefore, and in consequence of such external, or even internal, resemblances, really supposing them to be demonstrated, it stands proved that there existed a close historical connection between the two; and that this was such a relation as exists between cause and effect? It seems to me to be highly desirable that we should once for all examine this matter closely and decide it; for we are exposing the truth to a very great risk, if we are to hazard everything upon a decision as to whether the two lores are at all alike, or not.

Is it then at all a fact that such supposed resemblances, even if they be shown to exist, really prove any such close historical connection between the Avesta and the Philonian philosophy as may be considered to be that existing between origin and result?

For without pausing to discuss this question as to actually existing resemblances further just at this point, it may be very useful indeed for us to stop and inquire whether a similarity, even such as was taken for granted by the authors of the suggestion

referred to, entails such an external historical connection between the two important lores as that to which I have alluded.

Similarity in details no absolute proof of identity in origin.

Let it be supposed for a moment, for the sake of argument, that the 'Vohumanah' of the Gāthas was 'like Philo's Lógos'. Is there not an important method of accounting for this resemblance before we take into consideration any such influences as those which might be derived from immediate external contact? For we need not pause here to prohibit the use of such a very unfit and conventional term as 'accident', which is a mere name for our ignorance.

Aside, then, from this last, let me fully state my problem, which is, that where two things of the nature of those here present are found to be alike, it is not necessary for us to assume that one of them is related to the other as cause is related to effect, not even when they have appeared at times closely near to each other. No resemblances, however close, and no apparent connection, however positive, are in themselves an absolutely certain proof of causality, or even a proof of immediate identity in origin, for these circumstances might be the consequences of more general laws, which necessarily control the forces out of which both the phenomena in question arose at remotely previous periods. In which case the likeness which exists in these ideas would arise from the same

causes indeed; but these would be seen to be causes so distant as almost to reside in the original unity of the forces of Nature. Certain of the ideas in the Gāthic hymns and some of those in the Philonian and in the Greek philosophies may therefore, as I contend, have arisen from causes which had nothing whatsoever to do with any immediate personal or national connection between the Iranian people on the one side and the Greeks and the Jews on the other in the historical period. But more.

It seems to be absolutely certain that such ideas as some of those which prevail in the Gāthas and in Philo not only *may* have originated independently of one another, but that they are such as *must* inevitably have so arisen in the minds of human beings of a certain not so narrowly restricted type; and this so soon as they have attained to a certain degree of development and of culture upon development, and so soon, also, as they come under the influence of certain never-failing quasi-external phenomena. Similar ideas not only do, but they must, arise independently in each human being, if they contain what we may term the 'necessary elements'. Why should they not? To some of us this seems to be so plain as to appear to be a mere feature in universal natural history (Naturwissenschaft).

The human organism is of exceptional delicacy and of remote ancestral origin, as are very many of the higher organisms beneath it. The inner life of these latter may (strange as it may seem to some of us) be the more familiar to science; and we may be more ready to concede a common pre-

destined similarity in ideas to them; if, indeed, the lower orders can be said to have 'ideas', which, however, I, for one, could not for a moment think of attempting to deny.

From what we might call the almost miraculous forces, which lurk in every inferior cerebral (or spinal) cell, and as the result of impinging approaches, which are indefinitely less than visible to the naked or even to the assisted eye, the fundamental tissues, out of which all life proceeds, find themselves in action and reaction, first as recipient and then as originating powers, supreme over the future course of the individual being, rudimental as that individual may be. And as each separate division of a lobe, from its central muscle to its remotest tendril, is a physical continuity to a remotely previous series, we might, if we possessed sufficiently minute perceptive powers, trace back the thread of its history till at last we find the point of common origin for all of them. This would be some primeval entity, containing within itself the possibilities of all that follow it as its parts.

And as everything extant and visible in the class of objects which we may be considering has arisen from that same original, this original must have been divided and subdivided, as its offspring have been reproduced, into portions, which must be to a high degree, and, in many instances, well-nigh essentially alike. These developed entities also, whatever we may term them individually, are not only of identical origin in their past, but they are subject to very nearly the same class of external

influences in their present and in their future. How is it possible that they can escape developing, in their turn, subjective tendencies, followed by motions or actions which are similar?

If their origin were not explained as external to Nature, we should be inclined to look upon them as a section of a circle in a perpetual motion of indefinitively previous origin and indefinitely enduring continuity. In a manner fully analogous to this, that higher organism, the human brain, has had its being, passing through very similar stages of development. And these have been, presumably, more marvellous than has been the case with any of the others. Both in its susceptibility to impressions from without, and in the intercommunication of the forces which enable it to co-ordinate those impressions, that is to say, in its *character*, it must be, comparatively speaking, far more fixed and vigorous, as the product of immensely more numerous antecedents, through an indefinitely prolonged preparatory history. Upon each internal receptive nerve-centre minute photographs (so to use such a figure of speech) have been precipitated for ages in the continuous line of life, and stored away unconsciously in the successive folds of memory. At given moments the action of external personal or impersonal nature touches the recipient organ, surcharged as it is with (accumulated) responsive vitality.

At each such impact, sensibilities are awakened more subtle than many of the otherwise occult forces, moving, (if we might make use of such a figure) in their reaction with a velocity of which the magnetic

current may afford an emblem. Apprehensions and desires spring into rapid life till full ideas are born. And from the first stir of a molecule to the finished elaborations of intellection all results must be just in so far essentially kindred in each as the substantive beings are in themselves similar, and as the ideas are fundamental and necessary. No two individual living objects are, we must suppose, actually the same, either in their texture or inherent energy; but no two of their particular class can be essentially dissimilar in their chief characteristics. The same ideas must arise from the same contacts of the same forces, under identical surrounding circumstances.

No such closely similar products could be counted upon as occuring in sporadic cases wholly isolated from each other. Each cerebral centre, as an organ of thought, is a part of its mates, though at present severed from them, for it contains a portion of that so mysterious substance from which each other one of the kind derives its origin.

And as the nerve-centres of distinctly defined human beings are yet to be considered as parts of one another in the sense expressed, so the scenes which unroll themselves before the vision and the other subjective susceptibilities of each are necessarily as similar to man, as they are to his brother of the lower orders. Not only are the constituent material elements, in the interests which operate upon people, practically the same, but the very combinations and detail of recurring objects and events are similar *History not only does, but must*

repeat itself. As the great commonplaces of meteorology have established themselves as regular, giving us the expectation of what makes our life possible as a period of sane activity, so the great throng of the detailed motions or events in the world are to be expected in their general character. Rising crops, accumulating ores, diverted rivers, tunnelled mountains, controlled electric forces, marts gathered in teeming centres, factories tremulous with fiercely-driven mechanisms, schools of practical learning thronged and busy. Anything and everything real, or merely seeming, reverts not in a circle unprogressive and vicious, let us hope, but in a spiral, with ever-increasing development. Each individual combination is coming on, culminating and redissolving into its elements from a past eternity, and so will each continue to do to a similar unending futurity.

The scene, with its big faults and its small advantages, streams slowly around us, now repulsive to the verge of the terrific, but again sublime. And all comes before the self-same expectant and receptive faculties, as well in men as in brutes, creating impressions and suggesting motives, till the thoughtful observer is soon convinced that the individual is but a part in one vast organism. How is it possible, then, that we should not experience at times the same fundamental surmises—nay, the selfsame identical conceptions even as to what may not seem so much to be the primal elements of things?

To sum up. Ideas arise independently in different parts of the world and in different minds, just

as they arise in the same narrow community and in the same mind at different times without the link of recollection. And not only do they so arise independent of all immediate external mental contact, from one region to another, but they cannot help but so arise, recurring and at certain quasi registrable intervals. It is not only not strange that the same ideas should arise in parts of the world so far separated, and in times so different as those of Zoroaster and of Philo, supposing the former to have lived several centuries before the latter; but the contrary to this would be strange. *The reproduction of ideas not only may, but it must happen.* Especially must this be the case when these so-called fundamental ideas which we are considering are the moral ideas, these latter being almost instincts, for we experience the immediate necessity for their application at every step.

This is to such a degree the case that the moral idea is often supposed to be discernible to some extent, even in the 'animal' world. And when we see gifted intellects elaborating in the main the same theories, though ending with different selections, it becomes simply ridiculous for us to expect to find no similarity between even widely-separated individuals of a similar class and in lores of the same general tendency. The moral ideas depend upon measure, and measure is the prerogative of man. The ideas in the Zarathushtrian Gāthas supposed to possess a similarity to certain ideas in the Philonian philosophy are chiefly of this character; and they are ideas which could not well possibly have failed

to emerge from any civilization which possesses the characteristics which are claimed by experts, both for the Iranian lore and for that of the Alexandrians.

We find also, as a matter of course, much the same ideas developed in India, to an extent only surpassed in the schools of Greece; and it was as inevitable that they should appear there as in Iran and in Egypt, though, properly speaking, we should treat the Indian and the Iranian lores as different parts of the same homogeneous thing.

It seems to me, then, to be in itself contradictory to all sound procedure in material as in historical science, to suppose that the ideas in the old Avesta are in any way necessarily connected with those in the Philonian philosophy, as either cause or effect. But supposing it to be evident that this relation existed between the two, and that one of them was the cause of the other as its effect, then I do not hesitate to assert that, beyond all question, it was the Zarathushtrian which was the source of the Philonian ideas (involved), and not the Philonian which was the source of the Zarathushtrian — that is to say, if these features of resemblance are such as they are supposed by some to be. But this latter I by no means hold to be the case.

Independence of origin further considered.

If then there exists any data forcing, or even strongly inclining us, to put the Gāthas at a different age from Philo, and to hold them to be otherwise

also separated from him in a manner which is absolutely effective, so that no intellectual intercourse, direct or indirect, were possible between them on either side; then in that case, in view of what has been said, the fact that the one could speak of individual character as divisible into the three distinct departments of 'thought, word and deed', 'of the bodily life and the mental', of 'the soul's own conscience becrying the wicked', and the other could speak of the Lógos with its kindred subconcepts [1] are things which could only be expected; and as such they do not necessitate the acceptance of the slightest external historical connection. And if it were not for other circumstances which prove such an historical connection, I should be strongly inclined to believe that the resemblances between the Gāthas and Philo were of this nature; that is to say, I should be inclined to hold that they had arisen separately and also necessarily, unconnected with each other by any influences which had made themselves felt during the historical period; for ideas of this description must inevitably have so arisen and independently of each other, just as the suns arise upon the horizon, the earth revolves, and vegetation develops.

And I for one, and as a matter of course, let me say it as if in parenthesis, would regard it as a far more rare and therefore prized result, if we could be sure that the noble and clear thoughts in the Gāthic Avesta and in the Jewish-greek philo-

[1] Supposing these to be nearly allied to the Gāthic concepts, which supposed circumstance I would however deny.

sophy severally arose each in its pure individuality, as christaline formations do, not degraded by any suppositions of a borrowed origin, either in the one case or in the other. And I also, really, even think it finer if we can imagine to ourselves such a lore as either of these even without successors, a purely isolated development of something that is good in our enfeebled, and too often degraded history.

I would not however press this last, but with regard to the first I should insist. We should sometimes look at mankind as artists look at them. Surely if the human race were in so far developed and educated into a capacity for fine ideas, and to such a degree that the results of this capacity could come out in more than one way in several different and isolated centres, there is little doubt but that this would show that the general character of the whole family of man was higher than would appear to be the case if that refinement were necessarily borrowed at every recurrence from one contemporaneous centre to another.

The way is now clear for our continued detailed discussion on the main question.

The Gāthas and the Philonian Philosophy.

We have studied with care Vohu manah, as in the sources of critical information [1], so also, Asha Khshathra, Āramaiti [2] and the rest. We have made

[1] See above on p. 17 flg.

[2] See the Five Zarathushtrian Gāthas with the Zend, Pahlavi, Sanskrit and Persian texts, Commentary vol. II. and Dictionary vol. III., first section, pages 623—821, [illegible] to [illegible].

a review of Tansar's letter, which document is supposed to have led a great scholar to see Philonian Philosophy in the Gāthic concepts.

Let us now in due course examine the Philonian Philosophy itself as closely as the nature of this treatise will admit, comparing it together with its Lógos with the Asha and Vohumanah* of the Avesta as we proceed, not forgetting however the other Amesha-spentas.



IV.

The Lógos.

The Philonian doctrine is of course Platonic in many of its main features, which for the most part engage our attention here. What then was Plato's doctrine of the Lógos or of the νοῦς (noũs), for so he for the most part called it. To introduce a delineation of this system, it will be necessary to go to the very root of the entire matter, and to trace the idea of the Lógos, so far as it arose in the Greek mind from the very first.

Accordingly I proceed to sketch its history. And if I seem to some readers to go too far back in the investigation, my answer would be one which should satisfy at least the adherents to the original Iranian lore, for it would be that the true sources of that lore have never been presented, or hardly even seriously discussed in the still so sadly neglected state of Iranian studies And then perhaps I may hope also to bring up, even before the teachers of Greek philosophy, some facts of high interest which, though known to Orientalists as of course, are yet seldom brought out of their almost forgotten texts, and placed in the new light of the present situation of ideas [1].

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[1] I would, however, advise some of my readers to pass for the present from this place to the chapter on Philo's δυνάμεις; see below, returning later here.

The Greek Lógos.

It is my task then to compare the Greek Lógos with the Amesha-Spentas of the Zend Avesta; — and as I have found reason to warn the literary public against expecting any proof of the existence of too strong analogies between the two developments, I am under a necessity to refrain, so far as possible, from colouring my statements as to what the Greek Lógos is, with those very arguments which I use to controvert its claims to analogy here. An obvious protest would be at once put in against any conclusions which I might draw, for it would be said: 'You have put in a prejudiced statement of the systems whose supposed historical influence you are anxious to deny'.

I therefore take especial care to cite the usual presentations of the subject, which are readily accessible in familar editions. First of all we must carefully recall our 'Zeller'[1]. After him Heinze[2] claims our attention; — and in fact, I will endeavour as far as possible actually to follow this last writer, so far as I can agree with his masterly disquisition. But I beg the reader carefully to note that where I approximately present Heinze's views upon the subject, even page after page, I by no means pretend to make even a partial translation of

[1] Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung. Erster Teil, zweite Hälfte. Fünfte Auflage, pp. 623—740.

[2] Die Lehre vom Logos in der griechischen Philosophie, von Dr. Max Heinze. Oldenburg, 1872.

his language, or a full reproduction of his views. I cite only what of them I deem to be necessary, together with those of Zeller, and in language more free and readable perhaps, than a literal translation would be [1].

I proceed then to give my summary as nearly as possible unprejudiced by any of my own especially favoured and possibly preconceived theories, though of course I cannot be expected to refrain from stating my own long since settled views, as well as my latest immediate impressions, and in my own way.

Plato, Philo's real master, came early under the influence of Heraclitus (of Asia Minor, be it noticed), through his (H.'s) pupil Cratylus; and it was Heraclitus precisely, who first distinctly formulated the idea af a Lógos in the Greek philosophy; that is to say, so far as we are now aware of the history of those early literary or intellectual events.

Predecessors of Heraclitus.

Before the Lógos of Heraclitus, as is usual in the cases of all originators, the thing 'originated' was already present in its germ for his use in the half-formed surmises of his predecessors.

For it was none other than Hesiod who used a word and expressed an idea [2] which, together with

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[1] It is also, of course, impossible to give a translation of an author when one is perforce constrained, with parallel procedure, to report the views of several writers at once, with one's own opinions upon them.

[2] Op. 692: *μέτρα φυλάσσεσθαι*, 718: 'the abundant loveliness of the tongue that moves in rhythmic order'.

the hints of other schemes, led up to the early concepts.

The first Greek naturalists believed, indeed, in an original substance of the universe out of which everything arose and in which everything consisted; they also attributed to it life and motion, and gave it different names. One thought it was 'water'. Another called it the infinite, (*sic*) [1], as undefined substance matter. At other times they thought it was 'air'.

Parmenides [2] had spoken of trusting only the Lógos, that is to say 'reason', while distrusting the senses, imagination etc.; but this does not seem in itself to possess much speculative importance.

He reduced everything to one in his philosophy and denied development. He did not like the idea of motion [3], and had no conception of the consciousness of the Lógos; nor had Heraclitus this latter for the matter of that.

His natural philosophy was so bad that he believed in the stationary character of all things as a *στασιώτης τοῦ ὅλου,* and he earned the name of 'no-naturalist', *ἀφύσικος* from Aristotle. We have no analogy with either Asha or Vohumanah here.

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[1] cp. the Avesta conception of 'infinite time'.

[2] Flourished in the 69th Olympiade, 504—500 (B. C.)

[3] See Heinze, p. 59 and Zeller, part. I. pp. 553—584.



Heraclitus.

It was the keen discriminator of Ephesus [1] who first saw a certain something imperative, not to say imperious, in the rhythm of nature, of its motions and of its developments.

I would say of him 'this great generaliser'; for we must concede him that title, however much we may differ from his ultimate conclusions.

Heraclitus did not indeed definitively resolve those secrets which the labour of all these centuries has only just succeded in discovering or rediscovering, but he came so very near to this that we may fairly say that if he had possessed one fraction of the data which we now have, he would have surpassed most of us of these latter days in the depth of his intuition and in the keenness of his analysis; for he seems to have surmised what we now know to be the true definition of 'heat', as an everliving fire, 'kindling with regularity, burning out with regularity'; cp. the *μέτρα φυλάσσεσθαι* of Hesiod.

'The sun shall never pass his measure, for did

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[1] Died about 470—478 B. C. For his fragments, see Bywater's masterly edition quoted by Zeller, etc. Clarendon Press, Oxford. Bernays Gesammelte Abhandl. I, 1—108. Bernays Heraklitischen Briefe. 1869. Lassalle, Die Philosophie des Herakleitos des Dukeln, 1858. Gladisch, Herakleitos und Zoroaster 1859 (antiquated). Schuster, H. von Ephesus, 1873. Teichmüller, Neue Stud. z. Gesch. d. Begriffe I, 1876. E. Pfleiderer, Die Philosophie des Heraklit, 1886. Patrick, Heraklitus, Baltimore, 1889, etc.

he do so, the night goddesses, aid of justice, would find him out', cf. Plut., de exil., II. 604, 9.

We do not distinctly gather that he held to any unchangeable underlying substance of phenomena. All is 'becoming' with him. But surely one would think he must have seen that an eternal substance was necessary, the everlasting changing of the forms of which constitute perhaps existence, certainly 'creation' and 'events'.

The one underlying substance which exists according to his ideas was what he called, as I have cited, 'fire'. We should call it 'heat', the eternal perpetual motion; that is to say, its mode.

Nature moves in so far as it is subjected to, or better, in so far as it possesses 'caloric' (*sic*) from the slowly dissolving ice to the electricity of the atmosphere; and the march of nature is rhythmical; it has reason; for all things adapt themselves each to the other and fall into their places; and out of the clash of seeming discord life with all its developments, mental, emotional and moral arises; — there was reason 'Lógos' (here in this application meaning more 'a sentence' than 'mere speech').

And for this discovery or recognition a great church father reckoned him among the fold of Christians before Christ: 'They who live according to or 'with' the Lógos, are', said Justin, 'Christians, even if they were thought atheists; and such were Socrates, Heraclitus and the like among the Greeks' [1].

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[1] See the well-known place in Justin Martyr, Apol. I, 85, C.; quoted by Heinze, etc.

An incongruous grouping indeed, as we should say, but one which perhaps shows the power of the Lógos all the more.

The moral order of the life of Heraclitus was thought of; but it was his theory which was the occasion of the remark. The idea of reason as inherent in nature dominated his Philosophy. That Philosophy indeed impresses us with its 'one' arising from two opposites, while the opposites become knowable only after the splitting of the unit into two.

It was hardly however as some think [1], the march of motion by the sublated negation which Fichte and Hegel most prominently revived and elaborated [2]. It was moreover wholly materialistic, let it be noted well. Although as in the case of every similar supposition, we may always understand 'materialism' in a certain deeper and sublimer sense [3].

For matter must have been regarded by Heraclitus as a thing which contains within its potentiality all that we know of mind or morals. The Lógos of Heraclitus is the eternal law of motion in the strife of contending elements; that is to say in the embrace of opposites, 'splitting all things', but 'putting the split together' and again 'the split'; cp.

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[1] See Lassalle.

[2] Recall Hegel's remark to the effect 'that there is no sentence of Heraclitus which he had not embodied in his Logik'; see Patrick upon this.

[3] The word naturally grates upon ours ears and upon our feelings. But after all not a single item, in the myriad experiences of sentiment, is denied by any of the so-called materialists. All must concede that if everything is material, then material also is everything; honour, justice, mercy, devotion, everything arises from it, and intellect the first of all.

the pseudo-hippocratic writing '*περὶ διαίτης*' of the 'builders'. *Τὰ μὲν ὅλα διαιρέοντες τὰ δὲ διῃρημένα συντιθέντες* (Heinze); see also Philo quis rer. div. heres, I, 505, on this dividing; see H.'s XLIIId fragment, etc. By strife alone life, according to H., becomes possible; disease makes health good and pleasant. 'There is no harmony without the height and the depth (*sic*) (or between the flat and the sharp?), and no peace without war'.

And this creative all moving 'war' in nature was again the 'Lógos' under a different name and from another point of view. The Lógos is also 'fate', not a blind fate by any manner of means.

Fate as the Lógos was the Creator (*sic*) of all things from the running together or conflict of opposites.

Justice is also war, and war is universal; everything takes place with strife. The just, or more properly the exact, is the cause and result of fire (i. e. Heat), which is immanent; that is to say, permanently dwelling in the universe of nature. For this 'heat' has its law, according to which it unfolds and again folds up the world; that law is its rythmic reason, or Lógos. It is conceived of as material, as I have said, and the fire filled with spirit is another representation of the same Lógos, This Lógos is one and the same world-forming element as fire (i. e. heat), but viewed from a different side. The Lógos is as little immaterial as Fire.

It is material; but then, as before-said, matter must have been conceived of in a sense which has made it all inclusive, the sum total of universal sub-

jective experience. And he called this comprehensive concept 'Lógos', this being the first extended use of the term in this sense by a philosophical teacher in the history of Greek literature. Sextus Empiricus in his work Adversus Mathematicos VII, 2, flg. 5. 397 flg. quoted by Zeller, Heinze and others, speaks of this Lógos as the 'divine Lógos'; see Heinze, p. 44; but he hardly meant to report the expression as having been used by Heraclitus; the θεῖος and θεῖον are probably due solely to Sextus himself. And with all of this his Lógos was 'unconscious'. Such was at least most probably his opinion; and possibly von Hartmann started from some such hint.

It, the Lógos, was a reasonable force which inheres in the substance-matter of the world. There is nothing material without it.

It has no pre-existence (see H. page 25), except as all things pre-exist in their predecessors, of which they really form a continuous part. It rules all things and domineers over the realm of intellection and morality, eliminating all independence from each of them. Such was, in a few words, the scheme; — perhaps a little too much portrayed in the sense of Hegel by Zeller, and too much in the sense of mere 'nature' by the extremists on the other side [1].

On the fascinating depths of such a system, with all its errors or its truth, we may not dwell, and in fact I make the above remarks only with

[1] Surely the progress of development by the supercession of opposites applies to natural phenomena as well as to ideas. In so far Hegel most certainly was right in speaking of Heraclitus as he did.

reserve. I would return to the matter once and again before I express so fully all my personal opinions. I am not accustomed, as I hope will be conceded to me, to propound views not founded upon 'exhaustive' evidence[1]. But to one habituated to such investigation the gist of the matter is clear at once. We have here an astonishing and pregnant scheme strangely deep, yet strangely material. And this is the Lógos which is supposed by some to have been the ancestor of Vohumanah or of Asha!

We need hardly have waited for a full discussion of it before we decided whether such a Lógos was likely to have been their progenitor or not.

In some respects indeed both Asha and Vohumanah might have been proud of the connection; but that is not our point just here. A radical historical connection between such a Lógos and the Avesta of the nature of that between cause and effect is here not to be thought of.

It is in the sphere of purely mental, and as we may also say of moral, action that, strange as it may appear, we find one delicate item of analogy, though I fear my readers will term it rather far-fetched. Yet I present it for what it may be worth.

As we find in the fragments of Heraclitus the first statement of a self-moving reasonable or reasoning force, so it is in the Avesta that we have, of all possible lores, the first record of the soul's

[1] See the Preussisches Jahrbuch, 1897, p. 68, Sonderabdruck. 'in gründlichster Weise'.

moral self-motion, if I might be permitted to make use of such a form of words, — a pulse of spiritual progress in the thought, in the word, and in the deed, from their inception in the first consciousness of a living subject to their consequences, felicitous or calamitious, first in the future of the present life, and then in a scene beyond it.

For these states of moral habit seem actually to be continued on of themselves, not merely as the occasions, but also as the constitutive elements of their own rewards or punishments in the present and in the future state. If this last idea was not fully grasped, it was at least strongly adumbrated. In Y. 30, 4, 'the worst mind' seems really to be put into the place of the 'worst fate'. While the 'best mind' is 'Heaven', the passage having been beyond a doubt one of the sources, and perhaps the oldest surviving one, of the use of the word 'best' 'bahisht' among the Persians for 'Heaven'.

And distinct departments in the future spiritual home-life had the very words 'good thought', 'good word', and good deed' for their names [1]. It is the sinner's own conscience which shrieks at him on the Judgment Bridge, see Y. 46; and it is his own good thoughts, words and deeds which meet him and conduct him to his final happy destiny [1]. Whether our full modern idea to the same effect was really intended, I mean of course the idea that 'virtue is its own reward', we may indeed doubt.

Zarathushtra would possibly have thought such a pointed view too extreme to be at all practicable,

[1] See Yasht 22, Westergaard.

or indeed safe; regarding it as dangerously refined and calculated to suspend all wholesome fear in inferior minds; but, that it occurred to him dimly at least and as if only to be rejected seems certain. At all events we have here a positively certain case where ideas, like events, cast their shadows before. These remarkable suggestions were the first of their kind, so far as I am aware in the entire history of speculation, the incipient glimmering of the noblest idea with regard to human conduct that has ever emerged from the consciousness of man. And the analogy which I would draw is the following; and I confess it is an exceedingly subtle one, and only thrown in for a *very* esoteric circle.

As Heraclitus was the first to formulate for us the idea of self-motion in the universe of physical nature, but yet as including more dimly the intellectual and moral world, so Zarathushtra gave us the first hint to our common, but so beautiful modern proverb, the idea of a sort of self-motion of moral economics, or in the forces which control them. This however is the mere phantom of an analogy, striking though it be so far as it extends. It is indeed 'a likeness in the air'; and it is mentioned as an interlude and as if in a parenthesis alone.

But aside from anything like this, to those who study the history of the idea of the Zarathushtrian Asha, a certain general analogy with the Lógos of Heraclitus when also more closely understood, becomes perceptible. The idea, like its Indian counterpart, *ṛitá,* arose from the observed regularity of natural phenomena, the rising, course, decline and

disappearance of the Sun and other heavenly bodies, the succession of the seasons, etc. These became imitated in the ceremonies of religious worship; and the priestly officials were termed the *ṛitávan* and the *ashavan*; and there indeed we have what reminds us of the Lógos of Heraclitus, in so far as it is likewise a 'rhythm'.

But as to what the rhythm of material nature actually was, the systems were poles apart. As all must admit, Heraclitus must have been somewhat aware of the nature of the widespread Mazda-worship with which his successors were so familiar, for the Persian forces which looked to Ahuramazda for victory and abhorred Aṅgra Mainyu as the author of defeat, surged for years up to the very gates of Ephesus when Heraclitus was in his prime. He was even invited, as is believed by some, to the Court of Darius; and the false letters may be the echoes of the fact. It is therefore very possible indeed that the stories of the two originally antagonistic divinities of the Persian creed assisted those early impulses which impelled this man of genius as he proceeded to improve still more upon the simple downright statements of the Zoroastrian oracle; — but this is only possible.

The Zoroastrian dualism only by a very wide inference bears any marked likeness to its successor; while on the other hand, no one of the known Greek ancients, so far as I am aware, had any conceivably immediate influence upon the plain, though imposing, scheme of Zarathushtra.

With Zarathushtra opposition and war were

indeed in the nature of things, for there were 'two Original Spirits'; this was the foundation of his views. But we find no emphatic suggestion with him that this was in any sense ordained for good. According to some passages the 'evil are to lie forever in Hell', If this however is to be modified by Yasna 30, 12, 'Upon this shall there be salvation' (*ushtā** [1], the beatific state)', then we have indeed a happy result; but there is no statement anywhere in the Avesta to the effect that the strife in nature was conducive to better things even when regarded as an educator. Nor in fact are there any precise statements as to physical nature which are so conspicuous with the Ephesian.

Undoubtedly antithesis is the key-note of Zarathushtrianism. Even in the Gāthas we have conspicuously the beginning of the pairing. Opposite Ahura Mazda stands Angra Mainyu, the most formidable Devil ever developed, actually the maker of one of the two opposing worlds. Opposite Asha, the regularity and truth, we have the Drūj, the falsehood in the foe; opposite Vohumanah we have Aka manah, opposite Vahista manah Achishta manah. Opposite Khshathra the dush-khshathra; opposite Āramaiti taramaiti; opposite Haurvatāt and Ameretatāt we have descriptions of woe, as Garō-dmān, Heaven, is in the face of the Drūjō-dmān, Hell, while the eternal antipathetic antagonism between these forces is well expressed in the mutual repu-

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[1] Really an adverbial form but idiomatically used as a substantive.

diation of Yasna 45, 2[1]. In the later Avesta and in the later Persian they become still more completely paired and in the Gāthas this conflict seems to have become accentuated by the miseries of warfare, that is to say, if the woes of 'the Kine' were the echo of those of the people[1]. If the opposition of powers was the only point at issue, then the two systems were indeed related, and the dualism of Zarathushtra was only repeated in the 'war' of Heraclitus.

Beyond this point however Heraclitus must have made great strides in a definitively philosophical sense.

It is profoundly to be regretted that we posses such scanty remains of what he wrote or said. They do not occupy much more space than one of the longer Gāthas, and not as much as some two of them together.

Heraclitus, let me repeat it with emphasis, made this opposition, which Zarathushtrianism also so fully delineates, to be the constitutive law out of which alone all existing things arise and continue, while Zarathushtra only does this by inference, if at all. Here however we are not concerned with inferences.

Zarathushtra showed the grouping faculty in a remarkable degree and that compact hard reason which recognised even an horrific fact and an horrific being. He went no half way with his Satan. Heraclitus however went even beyond these views

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[1] See the passage elaborately treated in my Gāthas, Commentary, first and second edition; but I must return to it later on.

and claimed the terrific in life to be not only its reality, but the source of its vitality, and Zeller is highly critical in seizing upon this point, though others still mention the fatuous 'Honover'. Zarathushtra worked out a clear polarisation of all the good and evil elements in preceding systems, if systems they could in any sense be called.

Out of all the Gods he grouped all the chief abstracts and deified them in one small company, even resolving seven of them into one in so far as he presents them as the attributes of Ahura. And he grouped all the evil into equally limited masses, and there he left them to fight out their battle in the awful encounters of human and superhuman existence; but Heraclitus quarrelled even with Homer because he seemed to disapprove too much of strife [1].

There was one great question however in which they were happily agreed; nowhere do we see any indication that Zarathushtra ever supposed evil to inhere in matter, while Heraclitus went so far as to pronounce a materialistic Pantheism [2]. As to the fire of Heraclitus, when compared with that of Zarathushtra, it is indeed possible that the smoke of the altars in the Persian camps around his city which remained so loyal to the Persian cause, and the rumoured echoes of their Adar Yasht or of its predecessors, may have attracted his attention; and upon reflection this may well have confirmed his

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[1] But I must return to this subject later on, where I will treat it more fully; see upon the Inscriptions and the Avesta.

[2] Or 'panlogism'.

own convictions as to the supreme position of the 'mode of motion' among the elements.

If so, Zoroastrianism did another great service to the world, if only by an accident; but of course the sublime concepts of Heraclitus went far beyond even the beautiful Zoroastrian worship of the holy thing, which was indeed far more with his successors than the mere 'altar fire'; and should be fully recognised as 'heat', not 'flame' alone, for we have its varieties at least in the later but still genuine Avesta as interpreted by the later Zoroastrianism; even the caloric seated in the plants was known as well as that in living creatures. But as to the two systems in their entirety, they were well nigh contradictory opposites. Zoroaster's (that is to say, Zarathushtra's) was a harshly limited monotheism, if such a contradiction in terms can be permitted for the moment, to convey a popular idea. It had its good creation and Creator in antithesis to its still more limited mono-demonism ('so' again) with its counter creation and Creator, That is to say it offered 'two worlds' and two quasi independent Deities; its dualism in a certain sense anticipated the more philosophically stated one of Anaxagoras, of Plato, and then of Philo; but Heraclitus banished at once both* God* and devil. His Gods were akin to men [1]. So that the Lógos of Heraclitus, while resembling the Asha of the Avesta as the rhythm of law, developing it, this latter, Asha, was with Zarathushtra's later successors, and let us not forget

[1] Notice where he says that 'neither any of the Gods nor men had made this world'.

it, also a name for 'fire', though chiefly through the ritual which was indeed an 'Asha' by pre-eminence. And though the Fire-lógos of Heraclitus must have been to some degree touched at least by the universal sanctity of fire upon the altars in India and Persia [1], as even also I must insist, in Greece, yet this Fire-lógos was in so far radically different from that of the Avesta that it was in no sense whatsoever *a created thing*. With Heraclitus there was no 'creation' with which to associate it and no 'Creator', while both Asha and Vohumanah at their second (logical) stage as personified concepts, were on the contrary both freely said to be 'created' by the Great Good Being as whose attributes they first appeared. He made them as the hypostatisation in personification of the great moral instincts of 'law' and of 'goodness'. While therefore this identification of the Lógos with the fire, or heat, should not disturb us much when 'heat' is understood to be merely the vital force, yet on the other hand a self-moved ever-living power which contains within itself the reason of all that 'becomes' and has never had a beginning, is a thing presented in a very different light from the Asha of Ahura Mazda, even though this latter be by a figure and

[2] Recollect that Persia was on the way from India to Greece, (on one way at least); and that the vast Indian philosophies and worship are actually parts of the identical lore reached by Persian sages, the Indians having positively once lived in the primeval Iran, or near it, and formed one identical race with the authors of pre-gāthic Gāthas, if such a turn of speech may be allowed, or if indeed such an hypothesis as the existence of distinct predecessors to the Gāthas could be entertained.

only later called 'His son'. The 'Asha' of Heraclitus, to use some violence in language, was together with his Fire-lógos, a reason-guided and guiding force which evolves all things out of — what?; — out of itself?; — so it seems. But in the Avesta that 'Fire' was not at all originally identified with Asha, for the concepts in the Gāthas show no such connection. And the systems which at first sight look so closely related spread in their developments still further, worlds apart. So that aside from internal characteristics as a rhythm of motion, nothing could be so different from either Asha or Vohumanah, or any of the Ameshaspends, as the Lógos of the great Asiatic, magnificent though it may well be thought to be.

Yet this concept of the bitter misanthrope, so heterogeneous from Avesta, formed the beginning of the Greek idea of 'Lógos', and influenced all future thought up to the very days of Philo.

After Heraclitus.

For a long time Greek philosophy made little progress beyond Heraclitus with the idea of the Lógos. But his conception that 'everything is in motion', that is to say, 'in the act of 'becoming' something different in form' was more and more valued, people beginning however to demand that this everlasting 'becoming' should end in some positive 'being', till at last they thought of such a thing as the 'absolute intelligence' (see below).

Empedocles [1].

Empedocles had only used the words ὀρθὸς λόγος in the sense of the agreement of thought with what is actually real; and this is far short of the sense which I am endeavouring to trace in the word. His doctrine that 'love' and 'hate' are the causes of motion, love uniting things and hate scattering them, reminds one however of the Zarathushtrian dualism. The likeness is not however such as need detain us here.

Democritus [2].

Over the Lógos of Democritus according to which οὐδὲν χρῆμα μάτην γίνεται, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἐκ λόγου καὶ ὑπ' ανάγκης; Stob. Ekl. I, 160, we need also not linger, as it refers to a cause without which nothing happens rather than to a law of reason [3].

Heinze remarks that Alkimos (Alcimus), mentioned by Diogenes Laertius, attributes to no other person than a comic poet, Epicharmos (-mus), the leadership in the development of the pure doctrine of ideas, with what justice, I am unable to say; and there is much uncertainty about the passages attributed to him.

The νοῦς of Anaxagoras [4] who first brought philosophy to Athens in 426 B. C., circa (where Zeno [5] of Elea seems to have passed some years

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[1] Born about 430 B. C., flourished in the 84th Olympiad.

[2] According to one account born in 80th Olympiad, 460—456 B. C.?

[3] See Heinze, p. 58, also Zeller. Erster Theil S. 839 flg.

[4] Anaxagoras, born about 500 B. C., died 423—7, Zeller p. 968.

[5] Zeno born 495—492 B. C.

with him) advanced decidedly toward the doctrine that the moving power was above and outside the world of matter. 'Matter had rested during endless time [1] motionless till mind, *νοῦς*, stirred it like a whirlpool'.

We see at once the difference between this view and that of Heraclitus, we might better say 'the contradiction' between them. And this starts us upon the road toward Plato and his later successor.

The *νοῦς* of Anaxagoras introduced the theistic element into philosophy. He leaves a suspicion that he held the *νοῦς* to be in everything; but he does not go into the relation of the *νοῦς* to the soul more closely.

Yet whatever his exact idea may have been, it had only the usual unavoidable external resemblance to any one of the possible conceptions of either Vohu Manah* or Asha, so far as we can define it. It, this *νοῦς*, was God himself, the One mental power which stirred motionless matter, and brought forth the phenomena of creation (cp. Genesis I.). And no one anywhere, as I suppose, has thought that either Asha or Vohu Manah* absorbed or obliterated the creative attribute of Ahura Mazda Himself according to the analogy of the noũs of Anaxagoras.

Socrates.

With Socrates the Lógos becomes intimately connected with causality; and here we continue to

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[1] This most decidedly philosophical expression occurs in the Avesta, *zruni akarane*, vd. 19, 33 (Sp.).

meet expressions which to an unskilled person bear some distant resemblance to Vohu Manah (Vohumanah). The Cause of the world is the 'goodness of the World-maker', which (i. e. the world) is in consequence arranged in the best possible manner in accordance with design through an *αἰτία μετὰ λόγου τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης θείας ἀπὸ θεοῦ γιγνομένη*[1]. There was a series of causes between the Supreme Being and the created world. His 'goodness' was the first and His 'Demiurge' was the last so in later philosophies, especially in that of the Gnostics. The Demiurge is the last cause next to the creature, and the idea of 'the good' is the highest next to the creator. Heinze is of the opinion that perhaps the Demiurge is also to be considered as the summing up of the ideas, and that he is outside the world, that is to say, supranatural and transcendant like our Deity, and not a part of nature. I should say so, evidently.

These causes and particularly the last of them, the Demiurge, remind us of the Amesha-Spentas; but their function as Intermediaries between God and matter is heterogeneous to the relation between Ahura and the Ameshaspentas, for Socrates' notion of matter, as developed into that of Plato, was antagonistic to Zoroastrian concepts.

Plato.

Plato carried out these views of Socrates, and held to a *νοῦς* which was outside and beyond the

[1] Sophist. 265, C.; see also Tim. 38, C.: ἐξ *οὖν λόγου καὶ διανοίας . . ἥλιος καὶ σελήνη καὶ πέντε ἄλλα ἄστρα γέγονε.*

world and nature. That is to say, he held to 'a God'. But he thought out another νοῦς which is in the world, and as it were, a part of nature, and united with the Soul of the World; and this last Should conduct the World by means of convincing it toward a likeness with the 'ideas' by means of the overcoming of 'necessity' which was with him another name for matter. So also in the domain of ethics, this νοῦς was to lead to the resemblance of the soul to God, the absolutely good and beautiful.

With Plato, reason thus struggles with necessity, that is to say, with matter (*sic*), because there is a chasm between the two; and this is Plato's dualism [1], whereas with Heraclitus we have a monism, with him reason and necessity coinciding. In ethics especially, according to Plato, the opposition exists; the body, i. e. matter, hinders the true cognition and the unfolding of the ideas.

This νοῦς, also called 'Lógos', or at times the λογιστικόν, does the same duty in the individual man as in the universe. No knowledge or cognition can take place without it; the like is known by the like.

The mortal part of the soul is made out of 'Gods' (*sic*) which have developed into being, the immortal part is however developed out of the 'Soul of the World' [2]. Individual souls are not emanations

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[1] Compare that with Zarathushtra's! in Y. 30.

[2] I follow Heinze and the others closely here in stating the slippery fancies of the great phantast, with which I have personally only a moral sympathy. See Zeller of course for fuller expositions.

from the Soul of the World, but, like it, formed from a commingling of the same essential substances. Sometimes Plato seems to say that individual souls are 'pieces of the World-soul, as bodies are composed of the elements'.

This was also Socrates' theory; whether taken from 'the World-soul', or formed directly by God, reason was the most 'divine' attribute which we possess and enables us to approach the goal.

With the νοῦς the soul ever attains the good, but with ἄνοια the evil; T. 73, A. 88, B. Leg. 897. B.

With his 'World-soul' Plato opened new paths, and is regarded by many as the source of the Philonian and even of the Johanian Lógos. Why he used the word νοῦς instead of λόγος is not so clearly known, except that it was for the sake of more precision. Anaxagoras had however used νοῦς and with effect; so he adopted the word. In their nature of course Asha and Vohu-Manah (Vohumanah) hold a strong external analogy to the νοῦς, as was inevitable in using terms to express views on the same general subject.

Ahura thinks, speaks, and does things ashā, i. e. 'in accordance with His holy law'.

The holy man is ashavan, etc., and vohū mananhā means 'in accordance with His benevolence'. But this resemblance is upon the surface for the reason that the noũs-lógos of Plato was especially thought out as endowed with the power to pass over from the immediate domain of God into a world of material necessity, which he, Plato, together

with his predecessor and his friend, regarded as being in itself evil and repugnant to the Deity.

Neither Asha nor Vohu Manah were endowed with any such capacity for the simple reason that Zarathushtra did not conceive the need for it to exist.

But as the inferior νοῦς could not be called the full Lógos with Plato(?), the analogy which we are looking for should be found in the higher νοῦς; see above. But that higher νοῦς, if it was like anything in the Avesta, was *like Ahura, and not like Vohumanah or Asha*, and the conceptions here are as unlike in colour as they are in immediate origin.

Aristotle.

To approach the idea of the Lógos in Aristotle I must pause for a moment to notice the general features of his system, for it extends beyond that of his predecessors; and also beyond that of his great but too imaginative contemporary. He pressed the idea of design to a more advanced position than Plato; and originated the idea that a state of aim or design existed in the world of itself. And this is justly considered to have been a decided advance in the history of philosophy, though it was of course implied in the Monism of Heraclitus. The question in tracing historical developments here in this treatise, is however not as to what is implied, but as to what is stated. As design, or the aim held in view in the adaptations of nature, needs 'thinking', all nature is under the dominion of 'thought'. Nature does nothing unreasonable,

or in vain. *ἡ δὲ φύσις οὐθὲν ἀλόγως οὐθὲν, μάτην ποιεῖ,* De coelo II, 11, 291, b, 13. Of all possible things she makes the best *ἡ δὲ φύσις ἐκ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων ποιεῖ τὸ βέλτιστον,* De part. an. IV. 10, 687, a., 15, *ὅτι τὴν φύσιν ὁρῶμεν ἐν πᾶσιν ἐκ τῶν δυνατῶν ποιοῦσαν τὸ κάλλιστον,* De vit. et m. 4, 469, a, 28. *πάντα γὰρ φύσει ἔχει τι θεῖον,* Eth. Nic. VII, 14. 1153, b, 32.

But nature needs no previous reflection, for it would be foolish to refuse to believe that a thing was done for the sake of some object because one does not see the thing that moves it reflect. Art does not reflect, yet a design abides in it, Phys. II, 8. 199, b, 26.

Thought or reflection must be above nature, and yet exercise a power upon it, in order that it may move in accordance with reason. The driving principle as first motive power is the transcendent God; that is to say, it is God as outside of and beyond nature, not indeed as unconscious power [1], but as a conscious individual being, and at the same time as absolute thought.

But the unmoving God cannot bring matter into motion. This latter therefore was conceived of as the last aim to be striven for, as what is desired and thought, which, like the 'beautiful', exercises a moving power without moving itself.

This theory, says Heinze, has of course its difficulties; for if the thought of God influences the world, it would be under His active force in such a manner that a dynamic Pantheism would be shown

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[1] See also above upon Anaxagoras.

to be Aristotle's view of the subject, all the substantial features of his dualistic theism having vanished

He seems, continues Heinze, to incline somewhat more toward a Pantheism in psychology; for his energetic νοῦς which works on what is passive, παθητικός, seems to be the Divine Mind itself, being simple, without passion, unalterable, and indestructible.

His 'thought' indeed approaches that of the Divine Mind, for it occupies itself not with the material of things, but simply with the conceptions of them; its thinking is identical with being thought. But this is merely an undeveloped tendency. In the Ethics man is declared to be endowed with free will; the business of this latter is to assure to the reason the dominion over the soul, so that the activity peculiar to men is exercised and the design which lies in it is brought to completion. And then so soon as it becomes the question in hand to determine action through reflection or discursive thought as opposed to moral intuition, the faculty in mind which effects this is called sometimes the λόγος, sometimes the λογιστικόν. The immediate seizure of the individual final object appertains to the νοῦς, as also in the sphere of the pure theory, the direct knowledge of first principles. There is therefore a 'practical reason'; and it can be reckoned among the virtues.

Discursive thinking, διανοεῖσθαι, is not the proper designation for the exercise of this practical reason. It is its direct θεωρεῖν (perception) which raises man to a kind of divine life, to the highest happiness,

to pure theory. As using this direct perception the νοῦς, as the practical reason stands over the Lógos as well as over the ἐπιστήμη, understanding. Both are dependent upon it, and must prepare the basis on which they stand by means of it.

If the Lógos in man thus had only to do with derived thinking, and not with the simplest and last principle, it could not be chosen as a designation for God, who always thinks without intermediary,

The Lógos plays an important part in the Ethics, since moral character is imparted to actions by means of it, through rational insight and by reflection: yet it has no objective character in that treatise: it is simply practical reason as it shows itself in individuals, now weaker and again stronger. It is like 'the judgment of a sensible man'. The ὀρθὸς λόγος has however a more objective form in the Ethics. The words were in common use, and occur even in Herodotus as equivalent to ἀληθὴς λόγος 'true speech', or simply 'truth'.

Plato uses the expression in the same sense, but as of a faculty in the soul united with the ἐπιστήμη. It is reason hitting upon the right. Virtue was defined, says Aristotle, by all who described it as ἕξις κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον 'a habit of mind in accordance with the correct Lógos'; not merely 'according to' the true Lógos, but μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου, i. e. with it, so that the *orthòs Lógos* is not only the Norm, or rule, according to which the virtuous acts; but it is precisely one of the elements of virtue. He appears to mean that nothing is virtuous which is not intended to be such.

Correct reason is not an objective Norm or rule, but the *φρόνησις*, sagacity (?), in every individual man which determines the correct means for accomplishing any result, and to which therefore all human virtue is to be referred. The *ὀρθὸς λόγος* must remain in reciprocal action with virtue; it is itself a virtue, with which at the same time all ethical virtues will exist. It makes a man the *φρόνιμος*, the wisely prudent, and the correct means of his procedure depends upon its decision.

In the Great Ethics, the *ὀρθὸς λόγος* occurring less frequently, has still its important meaning, for the virtues are 'action according to the correct Lógos' which is elsewhere described or defined thus: *ὅταν τὸ ἄλογον μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς μὴ κωλύῃ τὸ λογιστικὸν ἐνέργεῖν τὴν αὐτοῦ ἐνέργειαν*; or *ὅταν τὰ πάθη μὴ κωλύωσι τὸν νοῦν τὸ αὐτοῦ ἔργον ἐπιτελεῖν*; when the non-logical part of the soul does not hinder the logical part from exercising its own energy, or 'when the passive does not hinder the *νοῦς* from doing its own work'.

No mention is made of this *ὀρθὸς λόγος* as an objective principle universally valid.

The Lógos has many uses with Aristotle. Heinze and the others have found it united, as if with an equivalent, with *οὐσια, τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, εἶδος, μορφή, τέλος, οὗ ἕνεκα*, with the principles called *ἁι ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ἀρχαί*, also with *ἐντελέχεια* and *ἐνέργεια*. As formal principle it opposed matter, in which (matter) necessity was fixed, while in itself 'design' was predominant. It becomes also again enclosed in matter, and through this concrete 'essentiality' arises.

Where is the least likeness to Vohu Manah (Vohumanah) or to Asha, or the Gāthas (!) in all this?

God acts 'with His good mind' indeed, as in accordance with 'His law', 'Asha'; but what resemblance has this mode of action to what I have stated above, (it being the simple function of benevolent wisdom or regular exactness).

The ὀρθὸς λόγος is a refined idea interposed to account for the unmoved and unmoving God, and the moving, that is to say, the living, phenomena of the world.

In the Zend Avesta no such intermediary is in any possible way called for, as the mobility or non-mobility (*sic*) of God or matter is not discussed (as such). He is outside of the world just in the ordinary sense that our Yahveh is, and he simply proceeds to make it and Asha and Vohu Manah (Vohumanah) with it, now 'begetting them as a father', now 'forming them as a creator', now 'acting according to their interior meaning'.

Of course there is some external likeness between a word which means 'correct reason' and one which means 'good mind', and the external likeness certainly becomes close between the Demiurge and the Geūsh tashan, that is to say, if the Geūsh tashan be not another name for Ahura; but coming to closer inquiry, the resemblance fails utterly because the conditions of the scenes of action are totally unlike, the Greeks having thought out a dualism which was absolutely unlike the dualism of the Avesta or its fainter image the dualism in the

Ṛig Veda, and the dualisms in all the polytheistic theologies.

For the Greek dualism was one between God and matter, whereas the Zarathushtrian was one between a good God and an evil God, each original and independent, matter not being regarded as being in itself evil in any sense.

The Lógos among the Stoics.

Plato had supposed the general ideas actually to exist objectively, as an offset to the world of mere appearances in order that we might be able to attain and possess a positive knowledge of anything; and in the course of the statement of his system he had spoken of the Lógos and the orthòs Lógos as I have shown above; and I have found not a solitary interior trace of Vohumanah in it, and only such exterior traces of resemblance as could not fail to exist in ideas which were of the same general nature.

Aristotle, departing widely from his more fanciful contemporary, supposed all the forms of things with the exception of the highest as well as their substance to be closely united with (or 'bound to') matter; and made them as an integral part immanent in the first existences.

In the system of the Stoics, however, the Lógos is the working principle, matter, the unqualified unformed part of the same system, being the passive. *Δοκεῖ δ'αὐτοῖς ἀρχὰς εἶναι τῶν ὅλων δύο, τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον. τὸ μὲν οὖν πάσχον ἑιναι τὴν ἄποιον ὀυσίαν, τὴν ὕλην, τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν τὸν ἐν αὐτῇ λόγον, τὸν*

θεόν· τοῦτον γᾶρ ἀΐδιον ὄντα διὰ πάσης αὐτῆς δημιουργεῖν ἕκαστα. Diogenes, VII, 134 [1].

The theory is, as may be seen, up to a certain point similar to that of Plato and Aristotle. There is matter and working form in each; but the supreme difference is at once manifest when we see that they identified the Lógos, the working principle, with God; they did not regard him as a final cause *outside of the world.* Totus est ratio, God is the ratio faciens, dispositor atque opifex universitatis, Tertullian Apolog. 21. Kornut. N. D. XXVII, 205, *ὁ προεστὼς κόσμου λόγος* [1].

Inert and motionless matter is formed to the most beautiful and best world which is possible by the divine reason, or the reasonable God, who is the Lógos. He upholds all things in their forms and motions, as well as forms all things, giving them their motion, not satisfying himself with the first shock of incipient energy.

He is the Lógos according to which the world is continuously governed, he is omnipresent and everywhere visible.

As all is arranged according to design this could not be otherwise. Reasonable thought must appear throughout and permeate all things.

As the poet quoted in the Acts of the Apostles says — *μεσταί, δὲ Διὸς πᾶσαι μὲν ἀγυιαί πᾶσαι δ'ἀν-*

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[1] These are standard citations; see Zeller, p. 131, Heintze, etc. I do not regard it as very impressive procedure to cite the weaker passages simply with the object of making quotations never noticed before.

θρώπων ἀγοραί, μεστὴ δὲ θάλασσα καὶ λιμένες. πάντη δὲ Διὸς πεπλήσμεθα πάντες [1].

It was even a popular idea; cp. Vergil: Jovis omnis plena . ., and : deum namque ire per omnes terrasque tractusque maris coelumque profundum [2].

Nothing can happen, or be thought of, without the Lógos, for everything which exists has reason in it.

But this intellectual power of the Lógos is *material.* Not that they actually believed that everything happened through simple and *explicable* mechanical causes, as Democritus and Epicurus might have said, though this is possible; but all is bodily or corporeal, and so material.

As I should think, they must have recognised mysterious and incomprehensible forces in corporeal nature which was identical with the Universe. And these forces must have guided the development of matter in harmony with design to ever-increasing amelioration: they pressed the idea of the body further than was usual.

Body is 'firm and stubborn' τοῦτο δὲ καὶ στερεὸν σῶμα καλεῖται. No effect can take place without approach and touching.

Only the bodily can sympathise with the bodily; and *the soul itself* has the three dimension τριχῆ διαστατόν as being extended throughout the whole body.

The Soul of the World, ἡ τοῦ ὅλου ψυχή, is mentioned in Platonic language by Cleanthes and Chrysippus; but with them it is also corporeal, as

[1] The initial verses af Aratus.

[2] See Heinze, Zeller, etc.

is God Himself (N. B.) [1]: *ὄυκουν ἀνθρωποειδὴς ὁ θεός… οὔ δὲ αἰσθήσεων αὐτῷ δεῖ, καθάπερ ἤρεσεν τοῖς Στωικοῖς. μάλιστα ἀκοῆς καὶ ὄψεως· μὴ γὰρ δύνασθαί ποτε ἑτέρως ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι* [2]. Tertullian, strange to say, is said to have himself approached the stoical materialism.

Rarely was the Lógos spoken of as 'corporeal', yet this sometimes happened *καὶ ὁ λόγος τοῦ θεου* (a later Stoic expression) . . *οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ πνεῦμα σωματικόν* [3]. As however there was no difference between God and the Lógos, 'bodily' applies to both, a passage from Seneca to the contrary probably rests, thinks Heinze, upon a corrupt text.

The question of course reverts. What kind of 'matter' was this substance of the world. We have the four elements, *στοιχεῖα*, elements and *ἀρχαί*. If the moving force is outside of any of these, we come at once upon Platonism, a God outside of nature. They often called God, or the Lógos, pneũma, a *πνεῦμα διὰ πάντων διεληλυθὸς καὶ πάντ' ἐν ἑαυτῷ περιέχον . . . πνεῦμα κατ' οὖσιαν . . . ὀυσία θεοῦ ἀεροειδής*, a sort of breath. 'Haec Cleanthes in spiritum congerit, quem permeatorem universitatis affirmat', Tertull. Apolog. 21. 'Divinus spiritus per omnia maxima ac minima aequali intentione diffusus', Sen., cons. ad Helv. 8, 3. This 'pneũma' gives form and substance to all, to the fruit, to the seed, to the trees. Sen. Quaest. nat. II, 6, 6. Note Seneca's expression 'intentio aeris'. The properties of things

[1] Ahura Mazda's 'body' is spoken of, but merely after the manner of Yahveh's, in figurative language; never in any strict statement, as the Stoics spoke of it.

[2] Clem. Strom. VII. 720, D.

[3] Orig. C. Cels. VI, 71 (Heinze).

are 'streams of air'. The strength of the body is sufficient tone in the nerves, that of the soul *τόνος ἱκανὸς ἐν τῷ κρίνειν καὶ πράττειν καὶ μή*, sufficient tone in the judgment, and in action, and in non-action. Changes in things which are formed are changes in the *πνεῦμα*. As God is a breath, so he is 'fire', 'animal heat', etc.; the world is a living being. There is heat in inorganic substances, as was proved by sparks from stones struck by iron, etc. (*sic*).

Air was sometimes looked upon as the forming principle, and sometimes heat.

The Aether combined the qualities of heat and air, and was called 'God' (*sic*). Some of the elements, were active, some passive. Heat and cold were active; moisture and dryness passive; recall Heraclitus. Motion is contained in the two superior principles and is original in them; and the *πνεῦμα* is *κινοῦν*[1], motion. The four elements are not of essentially different origin.

The original fire changes itself into air, then into water, then into earth.

The *διακόσμησις* is the development of individual things till the fire consume them all, to begin the world process anew, and so endlessly.

An inconsistency however exists, for a part of matter is without life and motion. This would make all the rest a moving God, so again introducing a Platonic dualism.

It would be a waste of words to pause here

[1] Notice how closely this approaches our late discovery that heat is a 'mode of motion',' Chrysippus by Stobaios, Ekl. I, 374: *εἶναι τὸ ὂν πνεῦμα κινοῦν ἑαυτὸ πρὸς ἑαυτο καὶ ἐξ αὑτοῦ ἢ πνεῦμα ἑαυτὸ κινοῦν πρόσω καὶ ὀπίσω.*

discussing the unlikeness of this Supreme Lógos to either Vohumanah or Asha; cp. also the Lógos of Heraclitus.

The Lógoi.

We now come upon the Lógoi, the Lógos in the plural, the Lógoi spermaticói. The Lógos spermaticus was the forming principle. The Stoics used the idea of the seed more fully than previous systems; cp. however above upon Heraclitus.

'Air resides in seeds; and by its expansion rocks are moved' . . . . From the seed of the organic being they began to speak of a seed of the Universe (*sic*), which they again called the Fire, i. e. heat. The substance-heat has a life-power in itself, pervading the world, which is a living being' [1].

Everything arises from it (heat); and all dissolves into it again.

The fire-heat is *καθαπερεί τι σπέρμα, τοὺς ἁπάντων ἔχον τοὺς λόγους καὶ τὰς αἰτίας τῶν γεγονότων καὶ τῶν γιγνομένων καὶ τῶν ἐσομένων*, Euseb. Praep. ev· XV, 14, 817, a (H.).

The seed has *reason*; it *is* reason, Lógos; all things lie in it in germ. Water [1], as the original substance, receives the seed Lógos. As the active principle, the Lógos, is the Demiurge, a term also applied at times (?) to God.

Here we must recall again the Gēush tashan,

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[1] Readers of the later Avesta are reminded here of the sacred water of Ardvi Sura Anahita, which purifies the seeds of plants, of women, etc., but no philosophical or scientific idea lurks in that at all.

the Herd-maker, who seems at first sight a sort of Demiurge, as the idea glints in the Gātha; but Ahura himself is elsewhere in the Gātha positively explained as the Gēush tashan 'former of the cow', or ox; see Y. 51, 7, 'thou who hast made (tashō) the cow'. None the less we must assert that here an idea of a distinct existence for a Demiurge in a good sense casts its shadow before.

With the Lógos in this sense the plural is more frequent than the singular, doubtless on account of the variety of the detail operated upon by the spermatic forces; 'Alexander and his groom both go to *εἰς τοὺς αὐτοὺς τοῦ κόσμου σπερματικοὺς λόγους* [1].

The *λόγοι σπερματικοί* are sometimes absolute; sometimes contained in the *πῦρ τεχνικόν*.

Like God, the *λόγοι σπερματικοί*, are original and not derived, being however first unfolded in the *διακόσμησις* of the world. As the world arose, or 'arises' (so better), these Lógoi are in it, *ὅτι λόγοι σπερματικοὶ λογικῶν ζώων ἐν αὐτῷ (κόσμῳ) περιέχονται . . . ὁ δέ γε κόσμος περιέχει σπέρματος λόγους λογικῶν ζώων.* Sextus ad. Math. IX, 103, S. 575.

They work ceaselessly in nature; and are the innermost essence of its force, its *δυνάμεις γόνιμαι* or *σπερματικὴ δύναμις*, vis omnium seminum singula proprie figurans. They are near the *ποιόν* the second category of the Stoics, the first being the *πρώτη ὕλη* or *οὐσία*, like the passive principle of physics.

The second category, like the Lógos, must bring the first to 'quality'. Plotinus and Plutarch

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[1] See Heinze, p. 113.

complain of this that God seems derived from matter. The *λόγοι* have much analogy with Aristotle's *λόγοι ἔνυλοι*.

All things therefore develope according to necessity; fate rules in cause and effect; nothing happens without 'a first'; effect becomes at once again a cause; but fate must work according to reason. Says Chrysiphus: *εἱμαρμένη* is the *λόγος* of Jove, or the *τοῦ κόσμου λόγος*, or the *τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ προνοίᾳ διοικουμένων· ἢ λόγος, καθ' ὃν τὰ μὲν γεγονότα γέγονε, τὰ δὲ γιγνόμενα* [1] *γίγνεται, τὰ δὲ γενησόμενα γενήσεται* [2]. But this fate and Lógos are the same. Regarded as purely physical, the Lógos is called *εἱμαρμένη*. Design coming more into view, it is *πρόνοια* (i. e. forethought in the sense of 'providence'), the absolutely necessary is what is absolutely adopted to its end. Both are bound up in the absolutely 'logical'. Some of the Stoics, like Cleanthes among the earlier ones and Epictetus among the later, were animated by deep religious feelings and approached Theism, 'providence' being then the feature which they held most in view.

They tried to straighten out their ideas, so as to be in harmony with popular feelings.

Fate was *ἀνάγκη*; it was unconquered, unhindered, not to be turned aside, *ἀνεκβίαστος καὶ περιγενητικὴ ἁπάντων* [3].

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[1] Such expressions as these last of course occur in the Avesta, 'things that were, and are, and are to be, etc. The Gāthas have a few very marked occurrences of the presence of such a grip of ideas.

[2] Plut. Stoic. rep. 47. 1056, C. Stob. Ekl. I, 180; see Heinze, p. 126.

[3] Plut. Stoic. rep. 45 f. 1055 ff., Heinze, p. 128.

Neither freedom in God, nor chance in physics, was possible. There was no *τύχη*, nor moral and physical evil; for in view of finalities these do not exist. Heraclitus had long before preferred hidden to visible harmony.

All will be woven at last into one, and the seeming inequalities will disappear; *κακία* (evils) have their own object. Everything must have its opposite; there is no happiness without unhappiness, and even no truth without the lie.

For a moment Seneca seems to abandon his Monism inclining to Plato, for he said that 'God could not have avoided evil, on account of matter'.

Sporadic inconsistences are however universal. A man is not continuously of the same mind, nor indeed always of the same nature.

It is not necessary to enter upon any fuller discussion of this most interesting (if erroneous) system. We have reached at once what we need in it. Its Lógos, like that of Heraclitus, has absolutely nothing to do with Asha or Vohu-Manah (Vohumanah). If it resembled anything in the Iranian philosophy, it would be again of course Ahura Mazda; but the idea of comparing the Gāthic religious philosophy, with its 'two first spirits' with the Stoics' doctrine of two principles, one merely passive, and the other active, does not seem to have occured to any one at all; and no wonder.

In one particular this Lógos resembles Asha or Vohumanah; but it is a particular which is accounted for only upon the supposition that Asha or Vohumanah are parts of the world, even when re-

garded as attributes, and that they are 'bodily' spirits? (*sic*), cp. the *πνεῦμα σωματικόν*. It is this; viz. that the supreme objection to comparing Vohumanah with the Noûs-Lógos of Plato, and the Lógos of Philo, is removed, for matter is no longer described as evil, an idea, as I cannot too often repeat, totally repugnant to Zoroastrian philosophy; see also above upon Heraclitus.

Matter was with the Stoics, not an evil thing nor an inferior thing, needing an inferior God outside of the world to create it, and to manage it; and so evil negatively, that it to say, needing an emanation from God to save Him (God) from the degradation and humiliation of coming into contact with it. But God is the Lógos; and the Lógos is itself in a sense material.

If in this we can see a resemblance to Vohumanah, or Asha, who certainly did not disdain the material substance of the world, then I might say that science is welcome to it. I concede this the more freely because I can easily prove *that Vohumanah long antedated it.* But this last is not our question just here; see below and at the close.

The Eclectics.

While we could not expect much of importance from the Eclectics who succeeded the earlier Stoics, we yet find in the book *περὶ κόσμου* [1] of the time of Antiochus [2] the beginning of the Philonian Lógos,

[1] Among the works falsely ascribed to Aristotle.

[2] Antiochus, long a hearer of Philo of Larissa, mentioned and described the battle near Tigranocerta, B. C. 69, which approximately fixes the date of his death; Zeller 598.

so far as it was regarded as the summing up of the 'powers' of God, for it speaks of them for the first time in history as separated from Him almost as if they were regarded as persons, or as if at least, the first of them, was so regarded.

Curiously enough, Persian imagery is made use of, God being compared to a Persian king [1]. This seems of itself to point to the Persian invasion of Greece. If so, it brings us at once into a certain connection with Parsism, for the Persian Influence as well as the Persian arms extended over the (neighbouring) territories of Syria, and had been long previously also felt in Egypt. 'God sits on His Throne like a Persian King', while His power goes forth through all the Universe, moving the sun and moon, and pervading the whole heaven; it is the cause of salvation to those upon the earth [2].

In this work God is the *νόμος ἰσοκλινής* and 'the entire world', as constructed by Him, divides itself into the different forms of nature *διὰ τῶν οἰκείων σπερμάτων*, etc. But yet no special mention is made of the 'reason of the world' in so many words.

Alexander of Aphrodisias.

Alexander of Aphrodisias [3] speaks of the Divine Understanding as the Stoics spoke of the Lógos. The New Phythagoreans held to a mixture of Platonism, Stoicism, and Aristotelianism.

[1] So Heinze.

[2] 5, 397 b. 16, Heinze.

[3] Appointed to a peripatetic school at Athens, and thanks Septimius Severus and his son Caracalla somewhere in the interval 193—211 A. D. in the dedication of his book *περὶ εἱμαρμένης*, Zeller 686.

The phrase ϑεῖος λόγος, means, with one of them, mere 'divine reflection', not the 'reason of God' which 'streams out into the world'.

Consistency as well as originality are not frequent in this school.

Alexandrian School.

Alexandria however claims the honour of a true revival of mental science, seeming to anticipate the scholastics of the middle ages The latter brought the Bible to Philosophy, while the Alexandrian school first brought Philosophy to the Old Testament. The real substance of the Old Testament was spirited away; and the Greek Philosophy gave the model for the trick.

Aristobulus[1].

Aristobulus was the first to appear with the attempt to harmonise the Bible with science, though traces of Greek speculation were to be found in the translation of the Septuagint, Daehne. II, 11 flg. These were however easily explicable as common forms of expression used by cultivated persons in the schools of the period.

Aristobulus called himself a 'peripatetic'; but the Church fathers viewed him justly as the founder of the Alexandrian School. 'The limbs of God', he said, in handing his book to Ptolemy, 'are here

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[1] Flourished about 160 B. C.

taken only in an allegorical sense'. He followed in this the methods used by the Stoics in treating the mythologies of Greece. He found everything which he wished to find, of course, in the old records of the Bible, claiming a priority for them as inspiring all other philosophical developments.

He has been accused of being in so far dishonourable that he altered texts to suit his purpose. Heinze gives a specimen, from the Orphic hymns, and other passages are also mentioned which strongly resemble the Mosaic writings. These were, however, curious pious frauds. His Sophia was like that of the Proverbs, not a separate personal subject. Like the χάρις, this Sophia was probably one of the 'powers' which he accepted between God and the world. These 'powers' seem in a certain sense to be separated from God.

There is no Lógos in Aristobulus in the purely Greek sense. His 'word' is the creative Word of God, which appears in the Old Testament, presented in allegorical colouring.

Heinze finds no trace of Greek influence in the Book of Job, the Proverbs, or the Koheleth, Baruch, and the Siracid. He finds the personification of wisdom in the son of Sirac to be merely poetical, and the 'wisdom-lore' of the above works he justly holds to be purely Jewish.

The pseudo-Solomon.

As to the pseudo-Solomon, his wisdom is a *πνεῦμα*. This *πνεῦμα* is the *πνεῦμα κυρίου* and the *ἅγιον πνεῦμα*. So also Jesus the son of Sirach makes these two concepts one.

This *πνεῦμα* is called *νοερόν*; which recalls the same words as used by the Stoics (see Heinze), and the Stoical pantheism is approached in the idea that this *πνεῦμα* pervades everything, as had indeed appeared in Aristobulus and the author of the *Περὶ κόσμου*. It is analogous to the omnipresence of the Stoic Lógos. Hitherto we have found absolutely nothing of the Avesta, Asha, or Vohu manah (Vohumanah) in the Greek, or Jewish-Greek; but 'the first of created beings', reminds us, not of the Vohu manah of the earliest Zend Scriptures, the Gāthas, but of the later Avesta, or its Pahlavi translation. Vohumanah was in no sense the first of the Ameshaspends in the Gāthas; and the expression 'first created' has no meaning for it. The 'firstness' of Vohumanah is due to a mistake of the Pahlavi translator at Yasna 28, 3. Yet the later but still genuine Avesta names it, or him, Vohumanah 'first'.

In the so-called Wisdom of Solomon we have what seems also to be an approach to the materialism of the Stoics, the Spirit *πνεῦμα* itself is called *πολυμερές, λεπτόν, εὐκίνητον* (H. 196) which look like the characteristics of what is corporeal, though its name be *πνεῦμα*.

That the style of the Stoics influenced the composer is rendered still more likely by an interesting coincidence. Heinze notices the predicates to the πνεῦμα in Wisdom VII, 22; and there were 26 predicates to the 'agathon' as mentioned by Cleanthes. And here we come upon a Zoroastrian analogy, for the wisdom here is not absolutely separated from God, although she is πάντων τεχνῖτις, τὰ πάντα ἐργαζομένη; that is to say, she is omniscient, omnipotent, governs all for the best, and continually renews all things; and directs the fate of men, especially that of the pious. Nothwithstanding these attributes and functions, she stands by while God Himself makes the world; and this was totally unlike the Lógos, and in harsh discord with the supposed needs which called him forth. Her influence is ethical both objectively, as a being, and subjectively, as a quality of the individual. Here indeed we have a resemblance in the Gāthas, and a strong one [1]; but mark well; *it has nothing to do with the Lógos.*

The Stoics used the expression ἀπόῤῥοια of 'the All'; and the Son of Sirach speaks of God 'who pours his wisdom over all his works'; but the expressions made use of by the pseudo-Solomon, while implying the same ideas, may be regarded as merely poetical. With him 'wisdom' is the 'breath of God', 'the pure outgushing of all-powerful glory', 'the reflection of eternal light', 'a spotless

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[1] Thine was Piety, verily; Thine too, Kine's Creator, was Wisdom; see Yasna XXXI, 9, Gāthas, pp. 67, 456.

mirror of the activity of God', and an 'image of his goodness'. No exact philosophical ideas are here intended, and no 'emanation' in the sense of the Lógos. No such antithesis appears between Wisdom and God as appears in Aristobulus, and the author of the *Περὶ κόσμου*, nor any such as appears between God and His 'power', nor is any activity ascribed to Wisdom apart from God. The Wisdom of God pervades all, The Lógos of the Book of Wisdom occurs three times, each explicable from Biblical passages; the creation, the saving of Israel when wounded by the serpents in the desert, and the smiting of the first-born of Egypt. This Lógos is not synonymous with Wisdom, but parallel with it; (so Heinze, who has closely watched and compared all the occurences) [1]. Little Greek influence is to be traced in the 'Wisdom' or 'Lógos' of this book.

The Fourth Book of the Maccabees.

The unknown author of the fourth book of the Maccabees has a Lógos and a logismós which are remarkable, but have little cosmical peculiarities.

In the 'fabulous Aristeas' we have 'A God whose power goes through all', which does not offer the distinction between God and his 'powers'.

[1] The reader can easily verify for himself, for the book presents no difficulty.

Jason of Cyrene.

So the little known Jason of Cyrene composed a history of the Syrian war, and in the second book of the Maccabees we have an extract from it. The 'Power of God' as it ruled in the Temple is here separated from His power when seated on his heavenly Throne, which seems to show a gleam from the ideas of the existence of powers intermediate between God and the world [1].

[1] So Heinze.



V.

The Philonian Lógos.

Preliminary Remarks.

Enough perhaps has been already said by me in different essays, and indeed in the foregoing parts of this Treatise, to give a brief general idea of the Philonian Lógos so far as it bears upon my subject. But it is very far indeed from the scope of this present inquiry to leave any one of its main features unsketched, much less to conceal my own impression of some of its chief phases, comparing them with our Vohumanah or Asha; for it is just the neglect of such an attempted thoroughness which, as I fear, has given rise to the entire misunderstanding.

Too many scholars, driven on almost against their wills by haste, are apt to copy one from the other statements, too often careless, about Philo and Plato without giving themselves the trouble to turn over their pages even in the translations, not to speak of their texts. But the works of these writers are extremely accessible; and have been edited, re-edited, and translated so often that any person of average capacity or taste for metaphysics, can not only verify assertions with a few days' labour, but enjoy an incomparably agreeable experience, examining the entire subject. The works of Philo Judaeus are especially accessible (at short notice) to all readers of Greek in the excellent* edition of Tauchnitz,

1889, which is at hand, at an extremely low price. This gives many, if not all of the variations which preserve any pressing importance; while the older editions of Mangey, (with Aucher) and Richter, may be found in any Library which lays any claim to be considered complete. Respectable translations also of the various parts of Philo's works exist; and among the best (?), or nearly complete ones, that of Pfeiffer (with text) may be referred to, while that of Mr. Yonge in Bohn's series is also extremely useful. It is indeed to be regretted that gentlemen in India, for whom this essay is chiefly written, are likely to be more versed in Sanskrit than in Greek; for the most excellent translation possible, seems hardly able to supply that something which one always gets from the sight of the texts of a work in its original.

But however familiar one may be with Philo's text, a person would be very much of a dilettante who neglected all the fine distinctions and remarks which have been made by specialists upon the subject, such as Heinze and Siegfried, in the course of their partial translations and their comments; while of course no one has any right to speak at all who is not familiar with our illustrious Zeller (in his masterly and engaging volumes).

Even in the light of lexicography we should search out every accessible opinion of every respectable author; and that of course even notwithstanding the universal fact that each of them without exception is of necessity even less than a beginner on some one side branch of the widely extended

theme. For it is precisely the least thorough of all writers upon a certain point under investigation who may, whether by wit or accident, hit upon the actual idea in the original. And it is in fact just the case with Mangey's edition, that while it may be quite faulty in some particulars, it more than makes up for the deficiency in others; for he suggested a throng of fresh readings of the text which have, many of them, been practically accepted by critics as sound or probable restorations.

Let us then with Philo's texts in our hands, and neglecting no commentator nor translator, ask ourselves, what really were the ideas expressed in Philo's conception of his Lógos, and as to how far they can be compared with the Vohumanah or Asha of the Zend Avesta.

Closer Discussion.

So far as originality in the writings of Philo is concerned, it must be looked for only in those less prominent characteristics which belong rather to detail than to substance.

Much of the colouring, and indeed some of the more important features in Philo's presentation of his Lógos were (as has been also said by me elsewhere) due to his more immediate predecessors, the Stoics. And the cast of most of his views in certain particulars is also, on the other hand, strongly Biblical. Indeed he himself would have claimed that they were wholly and really Mosaic; but this would have been a mere morbid excrescence of his diseased national, or personal, vanity; for intellec-

tually vain indeed he was, though a man of fervid genius, honest in his intentions, and laborious as a constructor.

The main features of his actual system are, however, to be found in Plato, as mediated by the intervening philosophical authors and compilers, especially by the Stoics, radically as Philo differed from the latter in the main. I do not however forget that some writers, and among them, even Zeller, have declared Philo's conception of the Lógos to be peculiar to himself, though presented in a Greek dress. His ideas were original, as it seems to me, more in the sense of being an original 'mixture'. More than one writer has also noticed a probable influence on the part of Parsism upon Philo.

I of course, as a former theologian, ought to be somewhat more at home with these particulars of his system than others; for I have been obliged to dabble in the Hebrew language, history, and literature throughout my entire adult life [1]; and of course I have been always deeply interested in Philo's curious Jewish Lógos, taking the very breath as it does, so to speak, out of the mouth of God, and as if that breath were a separate attribute, carrying also such a way of doing things, as Philo's procedure seems to do, to an unwarrantable extreme. I know of course that he was also influenced by the then existing Jewish Halacha and . . . Midrash . . ., etc. [2].

[1] Having necessarily begun it as an indispenable preliminary to the reception of Holy Orders, at about 1858.

[2] To which works however I have given no close attention at all.

The colouring and side-features of a system are important in many ways to certain investigators; and they are also above all of value in estimating the historical sources from which a system springs, and the connections which it maintains with contemporaneous and contiguous philosophies; but I am free to confess that the impression which the main structure of any scheme in itself makes upon me is of such a nature that I am perhaps too apt to yield my attenton to it, to the exclusion of its more adventitious characteristics [1].

The Intermediary.

The supposed necessity for an intermediate power between God and the world had been indicated in the philosophy which was prior to that affected by Jewish influences (see my frequent allusions to it above), and the idea had been further developed by Jewish speculation; but with Philo of Alexandria it was everything, strange as it may seem to us.

With him every element in philosophy must be traced to the Scriptures, whether from fanatical conviction, or from the supposed necessities of his

[1] It may be well for me to recall just at this point that I began all my personal intellectual activity in literature with an incipient study of Philo, and that at a very early age. I may also add that I felt much the difficulty of pursuing interior investigation throughout the years of my pastorate, actually breaking away however only in '72, and devouring the closer results of philosophical and linguistic criticism. My interest had centred in the Gnosis; and it was not till '76 that I turned to the Avesta to study the history of Hegel's procedure by sublated negation.

situation, which might be described as a sort of lay priesthood; and allegory made it easy for him to find in those Scriptures whatever he liked. He found Moses to be full of Greek, having first however richly sown the scriptures with classic lore [1].

Plato and the Stoics contribute the larger part of the subject matter with which he deals, but he affected all the Greek philosophy, and he finds Plato the 'holiest, and the great (... omnino magnus Plato...'), Heraclitus, 'the great and famed', 'Parmenides, Empedocles, Zeno, Cleanthes, are a 'holy union of divine men' [2]; but he found them all in debt to Moses.

He brought everything into connection with the Jewish Scriptures or Jewish Philosophies. His idea of God was so exalted that he denied Him all qualities; and called Him *ἄποιος* 'not having a manner', which at once seems to eliminate Vohumanah and Asha, both of them, at least from His character. He surpassed Plato and Aristotle in his abhorrence of anthromorphism; his God was the 'being one', the *ὤν*, or again simply 'being' (*τὸ ὄν*). He was not only unnameable, but inconceivable. He was unalterable and simple, above and exempt from the conditions of time and space, since He created them. He alone is 'true being'; other things, which are subject to the conditions of time

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[1] Siegfried mentions somewhere** that a speech of one of the Patriarchs is much decorated with Greek classical expressions.

[2] Qui omn. prob. II, 447, ed. Mang.; De provid. II, 42, 1, 77, Aucher; Qu. rerum div. her. I, 503, De provid. II, 48, 1, 79. Auch., etc. (Heinze).

and space, have a merely apparent existence. He stands in no relation to other things, not being *πρός τι*; He is self-sufficient and possesses absolute completeness, is free from all evils, and alone possesses true happiness and blessedness. He is the highest good and beauty, the highest blessed one, and even 'better than the good' (which, strange to say, is a Gāthic expression, Y. 43. 2 [1] but not applied to Asha or the rest). He is more beautiful than the beautiful, more happy than the happy, etc. [2]. And yet he had 'no qualities' with all this),

He was the 'mind of all things', not just here the 'Father', as Ahura is of Asha and Vohumanah. He is the working force operating upon soulless and motionless matter, which was simply passive, recalling once more the main feature of the Platonic dualism, which is simply contradictory to the implied doctrines of the Avesta.

Philo is a little pantheistic with it all (this by an accidental departure), at times following the usual inconsistency of speculative composers; and he by no means shakes off the Stoics, whose very expressions he seems to use, radically opposed as his main doctrines were to theirs. For, if God be the *νοῦς τῶν ὅλων* 'the mind of all things', He could not be said to be so absolutely separate from them.

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[1] But though quite possibly equivalent to the summum bonum, that 'better than the good' in Y. 43, 2 is there not applied to Ahura, let it be noted well, in any sense whatsoever; it is the ideal goal of the beatified man; its form is approached by that of Indra Ṛ.V. 461, 3, (6, 20, 3) 'stronger than the strong'.

[2] Leg. ad Gai. II, 546; De septen., II, 280, De m. opific. I, 2.

But such inconsistencies, let us constantly recall, are nearly universal, and therefore only to be expected. Likewise, and let us note it again (in passing), if God were Himself the 'mind' of all things [1], He needed no 'good mind' within, outside of, or beyond Himself to be either His attribute, or His agent.

Like Plato and the Stoics, Philo found the world to be the most excellent possible. But as the 'world' is here the 'Universe', we must not be led astray by the expression. It included of course a 'Devil and all his works'. Though the Authors of the Avesta, if closely cross-examined, might have possibly, or even probably, assented to the idea that the world was 'the best possible', yet the Avesta nowhere gives a definitive suggestion in this sense, although it really underlies all meditative common-sense.

To say that the world is 'the best possible' is not really to say a great deal. It could, according to Philo, neither have originated, nor could it have been maintained without God's constant activity; the world was therefore, as the Stoics said, 'full of God'. He, God, embraces everything, but is embraced by nothing; He is every-where and yet nowhere (*sic*), for He only created space when He created objects. He has filled all things (Leg. alleg. III., 1, 88), and 'gone through all, and left nothing empty of Himself' (De Sacrific. Ab. et C. 1, 176). Yea, He is Himself the All, (though this should not be considered irreconcileable with what

[1] De m. opific. 1, 2; De migrat. Abrah. 1, 466.

was said immediately before; viz. that there was 'no space' for Him in the entire world). There is little doubt that Philo was a good deal of a Stoic at heart (as I have hinted just above) notwithstanding his final decisions. But whatever he really or occasionally thought, he openly taught a doctrine quite inconsistent with the Stoa, viz. that *God only touched the world through intermediaries.*

The opposition between God and the world was too abrupt; so he held. He would have been defiled, had He touched it, even to bring it into form (unlike the God of the Gāthas and of the entire Avesta, who especially 'formed ('tashaṭ (tashō, tashan)) the herds, the waters, and the plants' (so indeed in all Zoroastrianism, early and late). He could not have created the world by direct action, much less could He have had to do with evil.

The Ameshaspentas in Philo.

At this juncture we have the opportunity to introduce what has been supposed to represent the Ameshaspends in the works of Philo. When God said 'let us make man'; in these words He (the Deity) is supposed by Philo to have called upon assisting-beings to undertake the work with Him, they attending to its more painful elements. *Ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον, ὅπερ ἐμφαίνει** συμπαράληψιν ἑτέρων ὡς ἂν συνεργῶν, ἵνα ταῖς μὲν ἀνεπιλήπτοις βουλαῖς τε καὶ πράξεσιν ἀνθρώπου κατορθοῦντος ἐπιγράφηται ὁ θεὸς ὁ πάντων ἡγεμών, ταῖς δὲ ἐναντίαις ἕτεροι τῶν ὑπηκόων· ἔδει γὰρ ἀναίτιον εἶναι κακοῦ τὸν πατέρα τοῖς ἐκγόνοις.* De m. opific. 1, 17 flg. 'It behoved the Father to

be no cause of evil to His children', He left this, or, this was left, to others of His servants.

De profug. I, 556: *ἀναγκαῖον οὖν ἡγήσατο τὴν κακῶν γένεσιν ἑτέροις ἀπονεῖμαι δημιουργοῖς, τὴν δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἑαυτῷ μόνῳ.*

Such a God was of course in a certain sense really as limited as Ahura, whose domain did not, for a period, extend over the boundary line of 'the good'. But even at this stage we cannot fail to be struck with the total dissimilarity of these other Demiurges to the Ameshaspends. *Where do the Ameshas ever mingle themselves with Ahriman, playing catspaw to the limited good Deity, doing the evil work for Him?* And indeed how much higher is the simple scheme of the Avesta than this well-meant, but really degrading hypothesis of Philo (and his Platonic predecessors), which seems to us to be as conspicuous for its weakness as for its meanness [1]. We must not however suppose that Philo attributed this arrangement to the will of God. It seems to have been thought out as being in the nature of things; which relieves the situation. God could indeed create the ruling faculty in our souls, but not the subordinate capabilities (? *sic*). The subordinate faculties were not evil, but made evil possible. He, the Deity, therefore gave over to His subordinates the construction of the way to sin (De confus. ling., I, 432). This looks however as if the arrangement originally issued from His will.

And this, as Heinze points out, is an echo of

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[1] It may however be explained as the result of a failure of all attempts to define the *θεός*.

Plato (see Tim. 41, B, flg.), who, as Philo does, makes the highest God leave the evil work to the lesser lights of the Pantheon.

So with punishments, He, Philo's Deity, puts them off upon His servants, while He Himself enjoys the luxury of the indulgence of His love, De profug. I, 556. He recommends the penalties indeed: . . . *ὀυκ ἄνευ μὲν ἐπικελεύσεως τῆς ἑαυτοῦ βασιλέως ἅτε ὑπάρχοντος, δι' ἄλλων δέ, οἳ πρὸς τὰς τοιαύτας χρείας εὐπρεπεῖς εἰσι*, De Abram II, 22, De somn. II, I, 690.

It seems really meant to be suggested by Philo that He (the Deity) was as well entitled to an intermediary executioner (hangman) as other 'Kings'; and this would be anthromorphic indeed. In this sense he was the 'Prince of Peace', while His servants were the 'Chiefs of War'. The Right (was it Asha?) sits by His side; and while hating evil, has for her (the Right's) business its punishment, De decalog. II, 208. (Asha in the old Avesta is indeed often spoken of as the 'companion' [1] of Ahura, though he, or it, is still all the same the rhythm of holy law in the Universe, the State, and in the Church, and though he, or it, gave its very name to the saints, who are the 'ashavan', that is to say, 'the ones endowed with Asha'). He, the Deity of Philo, even leaves smaller benefits to His servants. He gives health directly. So in the Avesta 'health', that is to say, 'complete wholeness' is indeed one of His Own attributes; and it is also, as here, a gift which He imparts to His faithful. But

[1] See Y. 32, 3.

this is one of the most prominent concepts in the entire Avesta lore. With Philo, however, He leaves the 'healing of disease' to His subordinates; not so Ahura; so He leaves also 'the avoidance of sin' to them. He is the 'Feeder; or 'Nourisher'; so by construction at least in the Avesta, as in every other similar Bible; but His Lógos is the Healer [1]. Did not the Lógos have the nobler duty of the two? God could not approach these lesser benefits, for they lay too near the evil! He was so absolutely pure and sublime; and was otherwise so far removed from the material substance of the world that the Intermediaries were indispensable even here. There is some trace of reason, to some of us, in the idea that it would be helpful to us on our side to have Intermediaries between our highest conception of a sublime personal God and ourselves; His very benefits might appal us. But to speak personally for one moment, it has always been totally incomprehensible to me how a religious mind could ever tolerate the idea of an Intermediary between God and itself, unless that Intermediary were indeed a part of God, especially representing mercy, and unless this Intermediary be, as by every necessity, thus *one* with the Father; so that the 'Father' is never robbed of the sublimest attribute of which a God can be thought to be possessed. But where is there such an idea in the Avesta as that of 'mediation' in connection with the Ameshas in any clear or definite sense, or indeed at all?

[1] Leg. alleg. III, 1, 122.

They indeed ask for the very 'sight of God' to consult Him even as to the interests of agriculture, though these were vital to the last degree. God speaks to the soul directly and repeatedly, though the expressions themselves are of the nature of poetical representations, that is to say, the questions and answers are used as poetical representations of the immediate conference of the soul with God. And these interlocutions formed so graphic a feature that they became themselves objects of sacrifice; cf. the sacrifices made to the questions and answers in Y. 44. There is plenty of analogy between the descriptive characteristics of Philo's Lógos and of his female quasi-Lógos, the Sophia. It is, however, the chasm between God and the world which in Philo makes all the difficulty. The Infinite could not, according to Philo, operate directly upon the finite, nor 'being' upon 'becoming' (*sic*). The Intermediate Beings are therefore necessary to bring phenomena to pass, to maintain them in a world, and to satisfy the bias of men towards things above, (De somn. I, 1, 641, De gigant. 1, 263). The very air which we breathe was full of these bodiless souls (*sic*). Philo makes a great business of describing and naming these Intermediate Beings at the apex of which stood his Lógos.

Philo uses the idea of the Lógos as if it were already familiar to his circle of hearers and readers. He must have found it practically ready to his hand; he seems even to say so, *μᾶλλον δέ, ὡς εἶπέ τις* (a quite remarkable point, the suggested emendation of Mangey seems perfectly gratuitous), (*τὸν θεῖον*

λόγον) ὅλον δι' ὅλων ἀναχεόμενον καὶ αἰρόμενον εἰς ὕψος, De somn. II, 69, p. 334.

How far this θεῖος λόγος, with which his public were familiar, was a developed idea in the Philonian sense, who can say;? but the question possesses considerable historical interest.

His Lógos is the former of the world and its maintainer, also 'the tool or instrument of God', De cherub. I, 162, Leg. alleg. III, I, 106. Here I gladly concede that both Asha or Vohumanah are often spoken in the instrumental case as qualifying the creative action of Ahura. But here is a whole system of so-called philosophy fully adopted from the Platonic school, and elaborately extended with no little *scharfsinn* to make definite and fixed the one point that God did not create the world, except in a *very* remote manner indeed, touching its substance with tongs (so to speak); whereas in the Avesta, if He makes everything with Ashā, it means simply with His 'accuracy'; and, if with Vohumanā, it means 'with His good will'.

But Philo's Lógos is again 'the rudder' with God as 'the steersman' (De migrat. Abr. I, 437). Where are such figures of speech applied in the Avesta?, which is thought by some writers totally to ignore the sea. If the Avesta-writers were familiar with Philo, all this would have left its traces.

God saw (De mundi opific I, 4) that nothing could be blameless in the world which had no antecedent ideal pattern in its formation; He therefore formed His intellectual ideas of the world which was to be, as an architect might form his ideas of

a future edifice. He formed the mental sketch of an ideal city. And, as an architect might carefully compare the advancing work with his drawn and measured designs, so God proceeded in the building of the Kósmos. As the brain of the architect is to his work, so is the divine Lógos to the world; it is even called the 'book' in which the essential elements of all other things were written; Leg. alleg. I, I, 47, *Βιβλίον δὲ ἔιϱηκε τὸν τοῦ ϑεοῦ λόγον ᾧ συμβέβηκεν ἐγγϱάφεσϑαι καὶ ἐγχαϱάττεσϑαι τὰς τῶν ἄλλων συστάσεις.* Neither Vohu manah nor Asha was ever a 'book'. There is some very serious doubt indeed whether any 'books' existed at the place and time in which the Gāthas were composed. The Lógos is also both 'tools' and 'chart'. It is even the 'ideal world' itself after which He (Philo's God) would make the real world, De m. opific. I, 5.

This seems a reversion to Panlogism and the Stoics, though not an absolute, nor a complete one. But where are such things said of any of the Ameshas of the Avesta in the Gātha, or elsewhere? Asha is not that 'ideal world'; though the word, sometimes comprehends 'the community' in the Gāthic scene, but only in the higher, though familiar, religious sense as 'the embodied Law'. So Vohumanah is often the typical saint, the orthodox citizen, but only in the purest sense in the Gāthas; (see 'the Personified Asha' and 'Vohumanah in the Gāthas' in the Journal of the American Oriental Society, 1900 already once referred to). Or, will any one recall the fact that Asha in the genuine but still later Avesta represented 'the Fire'!, and

so the chief element in the physical Universe as if according to Heraclitus (see above). Asha as the 'fire' in the later time had reference to the altar flame primarily beyond a doubt; so Āramaiti was also secondarily 'the earth'; Khshathra though only secondarily, 'metals'; Haurvatāt only later 'water'; and Ameretatāt 'plants'; (but these points must come in again with us in our discussion later on).

The Lógos unites within himself, or within itself, the foreseen conceptions of the world which was to be. He (or 'it') is the 'idea of ideas'.

Here is an assumption of the identity of the projecting power with the projected scheme; but both Asha, Vohumanah and the rest were *regulative* ideas within the mind of God; and only grand ideal constructive and originating forces projecting a world, and at the same time being that self-projecting world itself, by an enlargement, or expansion of their ideas.

Among the various tropes with which Philo tries to express his idea is that of a 'seal'. The seal is indestructible, while it impresses an indefinite number of images upon the wax. The 'ideas' were called 'seals', De profig. I, 547. No such image is familiar to the Avesta; and it is the business of my opposition to accumulate analogies. The lightest and most trifling often strikes us most, and is indeed of the most value as an evidence of historical connection.

The Lógoi.

This introduces us once more to the word Lógos in the plural; see above, where we discussed it in connection with the Stoics. As there were many 'ideas', so there were many 'Lógoi' in the sense of reasoned-out intellectual schemes. They are associated with the 'Angels' (*sic*), which might recall the Ameshas (see below); but where is any one of the Immortals of the Avesta ever called the 'Father' except Ahura Mazda himself? Such is the Lógos of Philo in De som. II, 1, 683. If the Lógos is the 'Father' of all the Lógoi *πατὴρ λόγων ἱερῶν*, surely neither Vohumanah nor Asha was that (see also above). He, the Lógos, fructifies with the best thoughts, like a husband; see De leg. spec. 11, 275; but in the Avesta no such gross indecency is immediately suggested; the idea of 'wife' is merely used sporadically. But this suggestion refers only to Ahura Mazda, not at all to Asha, nor to any other of the Ameshas; none of them is ever a 'husband'.

Philo deals with the *ideas*, as Plato does; but with him they *proceed*, from the thinking or thought of God, while with Plato they are underived. *Πλάτων φιλωνίζει ἢ Φίλων πλατωνίζει*, Phot. Biblioth. 86. b, 26.

The ideas as genus and species.

The ideas were both original imagined schemes according to which the world was to be formed, and they were also genus and species, to which the

individual object was relegated, a curious and interesting turn of thought, Leg. alleg. I, 1, 47.

As genus and species were the inevitable subdivisions under which the ideas would arrange any subject matter submitted to them, they seem to have been regarded as parts of the ideas themselves; as they certainly are concepts indispensable to all analysis. The ideas are eternal and remain ever 'equal to themselves' (*sic*), De cherub. 1, 148 (Heinze). They are not only the original formers, genuses and notions of everything which is intellectual as well as of what is sensuous, the proper essence of arts, sciences and virtues rests in them. De agricult. I, 326. De mutat. nom. I, 600. The highest 'idea' is the Lógos, the supreme category which subordinates all things to itself, recalling the Stoic doctrine of the *τὶ*. The Lógos is also 'manna'; and we are fed with it (*sic*), (see Heinze, p 223); the Lógos is also the indefinite *τί*. The Lógos is the most productive or generative, after God; but *τὸ δὲ γενικώτατόν ἐστιν ὁ θεὸς καὶ δεύτερος ὁ θεοῦ λόγος.* But again we have the statement that 'the Lógos is called God', De somn. 1, 39 (I, 655). Where is Vohumanah the same as Ahura in the Gāthas? Where is there anything of 'the Ameshas' in all this? The Ameshas are ideas fast enough in their original meaning; but this is their nature in common with many other Avesta notions and words, Ashi, Sraosha, etc., and also in common with a throng of Vedic ones; but where is the smallest similarity in the treatment of the two sets of ideas? What have Asha and Vohumanah and Khshathra to do with

genus and species, any further than that they are characteristics which of course possess and express specific qualities? Where is Vohumanah or Asha 'eaten as food'? Ameretatāt did indeed represent plants, as instances of life, and they were for 'food'; but this was because ameretatāt *meant* 'deathless long life'.

More definitive discussion.

To proceed with our exposition of the main points in Philo's system. The problem was to account for the influence of these Lógoi (ideas) upon matter; — *how* was the unchangeable 'metallic seal' to imprint an image upon the pliant wax? *Who* was to form the changeable phenomena after the eternal and unchangeable pattern? With Plato the ideas were probably 'living powers', 'working causes' (Heinze p. 223). 'Only an idea can make a thing what it is' (so H.? Phaid. 100 (so), D.?). So Philo followed; but he expresses himself differently.

God could not Himself approach formless matter. The original images of things must themselves possess the power to impress themselves. They seem lifeless enough when spoken of as qualities (ποιότητες), measures μέτρα, or numbers ἀριθμοί. But these names did not hinder Pythagoras from using one of them to express what were living forces. (His 'numbers' may have been thought of as possessing 'self motion', one might suppose because of the infinite and unrestrainable progress of the mind of itself in subdividing or in counting, which process can only be arrested by turning the thoughts away from the subject). Then the λόγος

ποιός of the Stoics goes over into physics; so Philo followed suit, and called his 'ideas' 'forces'[1]. And they are busy enough; according to him; De monarch I, 11, 219. They put the disordered into order; they define and limit the undefined and unlimited, and make each individual thing an individual συνόλως τὸ χεῖρον εἰς τὸ ἄμεινον μεθαρμοζόμεναι. Again the Lógoi seem to be in so far above and separate from the ideas (or from other ideas) that He (the Deity, or the Lógos (?)), uses them to form lifeless matter after their pattern, De confus. ling. I, 414. The Lógos was therefore not a lifeless original image, but a living Being at times (with Philo), who contained the forms within himself, gets 'matter' into his power, and through his own might (though it was not original), brings motion into the inert mass, and constructs the forms in which it is to be developed impelled by his own moving energy. So Philo came in fact almost to Plato's scheme, only that with Plato they were 'original essences', having their causes only in themselves, while Philo derived them from God.

The source of their existence was outside of themselves. So far as this goes it is true enough of the Ameshaspentas, as of any other qualities ever attributed to God or man. In Plato all came to an apex in the idea of 'the good'; — was this Vohumanah? If so, it was composed *after* the Pahlavi translation of Yasna 28, 3, where vohu manah (so) is erroneously described as the 'first creation'. With Philo all the ideas are *included* within the

[1] Plato had of course previously made use of such a term.

Lógos. He, the Lógos, does not represent any especial one, not even that of 'goodness'. With both Plato and Philo 'the ideas' are 'living' (so) (see above).

Plato himself (thinks Heinze) may have only meant 'reason' by 'the good'; certainly he only meant this sometimes, Phileb. 22, C. Heinze recalls also that the new Pythagoreans had already before Philo considered the Lógos as the antecedent ideal image, in imitation of which the world was made. Where are either Vohumanah or Asha represented in such a sense, as prototypes, ideal images in accordance with which God made the world? They are the divine characteristics which influenced all His actions, not the pattern or model, except in an indefinite, remote and almost intangible sense; and we are here largely concerned with what is palpable and calculated to strike the mental eye, and so to induce imitation.

The Lógos as the Splitter.

The Logos was the forming power, because he was also the 'divider', the 'splitter'. The first thing to do was to separate and sift; see Genesis I. That is the nature of all preliminary intellection; the more it divides, the richer the store of objects before it becomes. He, the Lógos, had to form both heaven and earth; and he (or 'it') divided *ad indefinitum*. He divided matter into light and heavy, fine and coarse; the fine he split again into air and fire, the coarse into water and earth; — subdivisions followed. Even the soul was divided into its reason-

able and unreasonable parts, speech into truth and the lie, and perception into that which seizes an object and that which does not seize one (*sic*). As species, so at last individual beings, must come to light more and more by means of division and distinction.

So, in reconstruction, the more varied the materials out of which a composite object has been constructed, the richer will be its fabric. It is a compounding together of opposites and without these contradictions and oppositions nothing can be thought of as species.

Nay, the world itself consists of oppositions and contradictions; recall Heraclitus. Like Heraclitus, curiously enough, Philo made 'strife' the moving principle and 'war' *πόλεμος*, 'the father' of all things, and still identical with the Lógos! (see Heinze 228). This does not seem to harmonise very well with the system of the Avesta, or with the idea of Vohumanah or Asha.

Strife is indeed the beginning; and the fierce battle of good and evil is the history of Zoroastrianism; but neither strife nor Vohumanah is the 'father'; nor is 'strife' stated to be an ameliorating factor; it remains an evil till it is finally overcome.

This non-formative factor in Philo is not immanent in matter, nor the same thing with it; but it has come to it from without. With Heraclitus however it is an eternal principle, and no progress is thinkable without it. Philo however seems to make progress dependent on continuous dividing and separation; (Hegel is our most prominent

modern example of this). But both make the development of the world nothing else but the unfolding of 'reason'; everything is to be deduced from this; and is therefore logical. Philo associates this process with the activity of human thought; he approaches the idea of the identity of thinking and being, but however as derived and not as absolute (see Heinze p. 229).

It is needless to say that there is nothing of Zoroastrianism in all this, unless it be Zoroastrianism developed from a long previous age. The simple is never derived from the elaborate; let it be well noted.

Philo's Jewish colouring.

But it is time for us to turn to the Jewish colouring in the works of Philo. Of course the separation of God from the world; that is to say, His transcendence, must have been derived from the Greeks; but Philo found it (so at least he persuaded himself) also in Moses, as the word *ῥῆμα*, and so the Lógos, which he claimed to have antedated at least that of the Greeks; God's word was His work *ὁ λόγος ἔργον αὐτοῦ*, De sacrific. Ab. et C. I, 175. But neither Asha nor Vohumanah are a 'voice', not even 'a creative voice', nor even 'a reasonable voice'. There is not the smallest similarity between the ideas. The two spirits create their worlds with no dramatic commands, not even so many as we find in Genesis. The Lógos on the contrary was often distinctly this latter, viz. a 'reason in speech'. He was more than mere 'sound'. But Vohumanah

is never 'sound' at all; though Ahura 'spoke' with both Asha and Vohumanah that is to say 'with truth and kindness'. Then again he, the Lógos, is sometimes called the 'house' in which God, the νοῦς τῶν ὅλων, 'the mind of all', dwells. I am not aware that Ahura Mazda is ever spoken of as dwelling in either Vohumanah or Asha, as 'in a house', where He 'arranges his ideas before He brings them out into the world'; see De migrat. Abr., 1, 437. But, of course, as God created the world by His word, so Ahura must have created it 'with good mind', not indeed so much as '*with asha consenting*' [1].

What scheme of creation ever said anything else?

Not pausing to solve the question which arose between Heinze and Zeller as to whether Philo supposes a double Lógos to exist, one corresponding to the Lógos endiáthetos (λόγος ἐνδιάθετος) on the one side, and one to the Lógos prophoricós (λόγος προφορικός) on the other, the planning and the executive Lógos in men, or whether he meant by his somewhat corresponding terms, Kósmos noetós and Kósmos aisthetós (κόσμος νοητός and κόσμος αἰσθητός) only analogous divisions in the manifestation of the Lógos [2]), let us simply ask at once whether the two worlds of Y. 28, 2 or 3, Y. 30, etc. stand related here.

Philo certainly speaks of 'two worlds', one a

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[1] See what I have said elsewhere on 'the priority of Asha'. Notice the distinct difference in colouring, whereas copied lore reproduces the colour of its original.

[2] See the footnote on p. 160.

younger son of God, inasmuch as it is sensuous; for the older, he said, was no (*οὐδένα*) *sensuous* (?) [1] one, being intellectual; and, as the elder, it was considered as deserving to abide by Him, and not to go forth as the *προφορικός, ὁ μὲν γὰρ κόσμος οὗτος νεώτερος υἱὸς θεοῦ, ἅτε αἰσθητὸς ὤν· τὸν γὰρ πρεσβύτερον τούτου οὐδένα* [2] *εἶπε νοητὸς δ' ἐκεῖνος, πρεσβείων δὲ ἀξιώσας παρ' ἑαυτῷ καταμένειν διενοήθη.*

But this latter difficulty does not affect our question. What shall we say as to the 'two worlds', or 'two lives' of Yasna 28, 2 or 3?; see S.B.E. xxxi, p. 18 flg., 29 flg. also Gāthas, at the place, pp. 4 and 394.

Of course the two general ideas are kindred, like all the other similar concepts in the two systems; but as to any resemblance in the definite points involved, it is wholly absent.

How has 'the bodily world', a practical religious concept, anything to do with a Lógos prophoricós, an entirely speculative postulate? Or what has a 'world of mind' referring to intellect and

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[1] Qu. D. s. immutab. I, 277.

[2] As to the *οὐδένα* which gives Heinze trouble, as well as Keferstein, who would read '*εἰκόνα*', and Richter who suggests *ἰδέαν*, it seems awkward enough, as must be confessed. It possibly refers to some lost words which once intervened; or it may be a defective mode of expression: 'he said that the one older than this was no *sensuous kósmos*, but that one is intellectual' . . . Or again is it not better to transfer the whole sentence, for, as in oriental writings, a sentence doubtless often became displaced: . . . for he said that there was none older than this': let this be considered explanatory; and it may well have stood originally at the end of the passage after *διενοήθη*: 'the younger was sensuous; but that one, *the older*, was intellectual, and as being older and deserving to abide by him, he was thought out (?) *for this honour*, for he (God) said that none was older than this one': so everything comes into order.

Heaven, for the matter of that, anything to do with a Lógos endiáthecos, as Philo understood such a thing.

Ahura himself arranges and plans; *He* is the ἐνδιάθετος; and Asha in one place is the *object*, not the subject of mantā, cp. Y. 31: He (Asha) constitutes however a good προφορικός (with his companion attributes), but then *he is inferior* to the original reason. It is by the exercise of his Asha or Vohumanah, and other attributes that Ahura Himself performs those acts of creation and providence which are denied to Philo's God as beneath His sublimity.

The kósmos aisthetós and the kósmos noetós look very like our 'two worlds' in Yasna 28, 2; but they are not lógoi. No one ever thought of denying such resemblances as exist between such concepts.

The dim presence of these distinctions in the Zend Avesta is not only not remarkable; they are simply unavoidable because necessary to all speculation of the kind. And the activity of Ahura in exercising these attributes is entirely simple, corresponding to the activity of a supreme good Creator in all theogonies, though it is often actually impossible to tell whether the passages in the Gāthas mean to describe God as immediately working through His attributes, or through the men in whom those attributes have implanted themselves; see above on Asha and Vohumanah. Both Asha and Vohumanah are 'executive', fast enough, 'bearing forth' the plans of God, but they have no such

position as the Lógos; see above. And, moreover, Vohumanah and Asha are not either of the '*two worlds' of the Gāthas in any sense whatsoever. These two worlds are 'intellectual religion' referring to Heaven, and 'pious bodily life' upon earth.*

So far said then, according to Philo, the world is created through reason νοῦς, or its manifestation, the Word, the Lógos. This world is an imprint of the Divine Reason; and so the most complete work. Moving ideas which were the *forces propelling* life were active; and the Lógos was the sum of them.

It is easy to see that neither Vohumanah nor yet Asha correspond to such a Lógos; they are more like one of 'the ideas'. It is Ahura Mazda Himself who is nearer the Philonian or the Stoic Lógos, as I have already repeatedly said or implied; for it is He who unites the ideas. And such a general scheme of divine attributes and powers must have been common to every school of thinkers of the same type the world over without any regard to the kind of language in which they clothed their thoughts or to the dates at which they were uttered. So also in the matter of *keeping together* what has been once formed. Here again the Lógos would be Ahura; for although the Jewish-Greek had the θεός behind the Lógos, still the Lógos was an uncreated part of Him (so to speak). The Lógos keeps the kósmos in order, and the regular changes in the seasons are preserved by him; so Heinze finds, I think correctly. Compare this with Y. 44, 3, 4; Ahura was Asha's father, asha being in that place the rhythm of the physical universe, 'the thing pro-

duced', and only in the most subordinate sense 'the producer'. He was *a* lógos, as I have always said, but of a fifth degree lower dignity than *the* Lógos of Philo. It is again *Ahura* who does this thing, that is who creates something physical, which was considered impossible to Philo's God. It is not Asha who does it.

The Lógos was also used in the sense of 'the Law', as Asha was. He was the unbreakable band (δεσμὸς) which binds all tightly together σφίγγει. Otherwise the entire earth would be dissolved by the seas, the 'air would be set on fire by the fire and the fire extinguished by the air (*sic*)', De plant. N. I, 331; De profig, I, 562, De confus. ling. I, 425. This indeed would be the use of Asha, and we actually have the expression 'whose bond binds the saint' Y. 48, 7; though some might not agree to my rendering; and the terms are not positively certain.

Here we have an analogy fast enough; but it is a wonder that such similarities do not appear more frequently. Asha is under God the rhythm of order, keeping all things in balance within the solar system (not at all so of Vohumanah); but in the Avesta this rhythm is the *thing produced*. It is He himself, Ahura 'who through Asha keeps ruin from all Y. 44, 2'. Ahura is 'Asha's Father', let me repeat, whereas it is the Lógos who is sometimes called 'father' of the other ideas; see elsewhere above and below.

The Lógos may indeed be 'God's Son' in some of the side issues, and by implication, just as

'laughter' was; but not in its main application. It was the Kósmos which was more distinctly God's Son (see above); or the two Kósmoi, a younger, the sensuous, and an older, the intellectual.

The Lógos 'goes through all' like God Himself. He leaves nothing empty of himself. *τὰ πάντα τῆς οὐσίας ἐκπεπληρωκώς*, Quis rer. div. her. I, 499; De som. II, 1, 691: *τὸν θεῖον λόγον . . . μηδὲν ἔρημον καὶ κενὸν ἑαυτοῦ μέρος ἔχοντα, μᾶλλον δὲ . . . ὅλον δι' ὅλων αναχεόμενον.*

Quest. in Exod. II, 68, II, 515 Auch.: Dei verbum nihil omnio in natura relinquit vacuum, omnia implens; see Vita Mos. III, II, 154. And he is continuous and never severed; his smallest part, like the coriander seed, even when divided infinitesimally, possesses the power to fructify (sic; see Heinze p. 237).

I am not aware that either Vohumanah or Asha correspond to this description. Far from it, for Asha and Vohumanah have little or nothing to do with the domain of the Evil Spirit, Angra Mainyu, at least not, except to attack it at its borders; *while the Lógos was especially contrived to pervade nature in the unlimited manner described.*

The Lógos puts on the world like a garment *ὡς ἐσθῆτα*; in the Avesta it is God 'Who clothes Himself with the heavens', not Asha, much less Vohumanah [1].

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[1] I think Yt. 13, 3, also refers to the Heaven (with emended text) as the star-spangled garment which (Ahura) puts on; others differ.

Philo's scheme approaches the Panlogism of the Stoics at times; and this is radically different from the concept of Ahura and His Asha or Vohumanah; that is to say, Philo's Lógos is largely taken from the Stoics, save as to the one fundamental and vital principle that the Philonian Logos is (in a curious sense), separated, and is therefore distinct from God, emanating from him, and also separated from matter, though acting upon it, whereas the Lógos of the Stoics was essentially one with both, God and material substance.

The parallelism between much of the Stoic Lógos and that of Philo was naturally quite evident to the latter, inasmuch as he derived the outline and much of the substance of his scheme from his predecessors. As I have cited above, both Zeno and Cleanthes, were saints in his eyes, together with Plato, and Heraclitus (a curious group).

Still more closely defined particulars.

Descending into particulars; one of the subdivisions or aspects of his (Philo's) Lógos was that of nature *φύσεως*. His originals had spoken of it as 'material'; but in a certain lofty all-inclusive sense; Philo uses the term oftener in a narrower moral sense. The good man's actions should be *πρὸς τὸ βούλημα τῆς φύσεως, καθ' ἣν καὶ ὁ σύμπας κόσμος διοικεῖται,* conformed to that purpose of nature in accordance with which also the whole world is regulated.

Here indeed we have an approach to Asha as

again the 'rhythm of nature' and a closer one than before; cp. Y. 44, 3; see also above in several places. But the question is as to the status and relations of this Lógos, not as to its final operation. Here the two views are radically dissimilar; and we can never present this point too often and in too varied a light. The Philonian Lógos, let me repeat, as I understand from the overwhelming majority of Philo's expressions concerning it, was *positively invented*, or at least applied, for the purpose of supplying the Intermediary between God and matter to which allusion has been so often made, and the necessity for which was never dreamt of in the Iranian system; see above.

The Lógos Spermatikós.

To proceed; — like the Stoics, Philo held to a 'reason (Lógos) in seeds', which directs their development; and this might be said to be like the ṛitá (asha) of the Avesta, but only in the vaguest and remotest possible manner, which the mere words 'law of nature' must always convey. Otherwise we have a total absence from the Avesta of this fine detail. The lógoi spermatikoí were forces driving on the expected and predestined changes through seed, root, branch, leaves, and fruit, back to seed again. Rather cp. Gen. I. than the Avesta.

Philo strictly distinguishes between the material substratum of the seeds (of everything) which he holds to be entirely corporeal, and the living germs of reason which determine from within what

forms the future being (plant or animal) will take. These germs have nothing material about them, according to him, not even in the noble sense of the Stoic philosophy; but otherwise they correspond closely to the *λόγοι σπερματικοί* of the earlier school. Leg. alleg. III, 1, 117 an *ὀρθὸς λόγος* is spoken of as *καὶ ὁ σπερματικὸς καὶ γεννετικὸς τῶν καλῶν*; and Quis rer. div. heres, I, 490, as 'the unseen, seminal, formative, divine lógos; *ἀόρατος καὶ σπερματικὸς καὶ τεχνικὸς καὶ θεῖος ἐστι λόγος, ὃς προσηκόντως ἀνακείσεται τῷ πατρί*, a very interesting passage.

These things might of course have been said by a devout and inventive person of a philosophical turn concerning Asha, and many more things of a similar kind, (not so much with any accuracy of Vohumanah); but then they simply were *not* said in the old Avesta in any definite or direct sense; and not at all, so far as I am aware, in any sense. Philo seems however again at times to approach the lofty materialism of the Stoics, almost committing himself to the view that the Lógos was the pervading source and essence of life as head (I fear that *he* did not recognise it 'as a mode of motion', as his predecessor came so near to doing; see above); but occasional expressions occur in authors in almost any sense. What we are discussing here is the main body of Philo's thought, without being baffled by occasional lapses into the higher schemes of the Stoics, (things indeed in themselves so impressive as to present constraining attractions to any one capable of comprehending them). On the other hand he, Philo, at least indirectly calls the fire

'spiritual'; ἰδοὺ ὁ νοῦς, ἔνθερμον καὶ πεπυρωμένον πνεῦμα[1]. (I am sorry to say that we are only warranted in seeing an allusion to Fire-worship in a Parsi sense by interpreting their so-called Fire-worship as the recognition of the mysterious (?)[2] perpetual motion resulting from fire as the eternal force which propels the ever changing forms of matter.

If 'heat', as the mode of inexplicable (?)[2] motion, driving on the universe in its cycles, and forcing it to return everlastingly to the same forms, be the wonderful thing adored by Fire-worshippers, we can little cavil at their weakness. Then indeed 'Philo's spirit-fire' is of the same kin.

But, as always, this leaves one question untouched, Philo does not exactly assert the identity of the πνεῦμα and the Lógos. The fire was also the 'causing cause'; but he speaks of it as the all-filling power, as he does of the πνεῦμα which pervades all things; and the fire was as one of them, the causing cause. The word πνεῦμα as here used came from the Stoics (see above on the Stoics, page 128).

We have indeed a striking analogon to the concept, the πνεῦμα, in the Spenta Mainyu, the 'bountiful', or with some, 'the holy', spirit, which, like the 'Holy Spirit' of the Old Testament, and indeed also of the New Testament, is often difficult to distinguish from God Himself.

We read of 'the first *gift* of the bountiful', (or 'holy'), spirit of Mazda, as being 'all actions (cere-

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[1] De profug. I, 566. [2] Do these things need explanation?

monial, civil and moral) done according to the Law; i. e. with sacred justice and regularity (Asha)'; see Y. 28, 1; see also Y. 47, an entire section being devoted to this 'spirit' (cp. my Gathas, pp. 274 to 285; 563—567). But the delineation is exceedingly scant, sparse and disjointed at the places.

Let me say here, as if in passing, that the very sparseness of the epithets applied to Asha in the Gāthas proves of itself almost conclusively that their Author could never have been influenced by anybody like Philo, whose epithets are very numerous indeed. Epithets multiply in the *derived*, seldom in the original document. This *πνεῦμα* however inevitably reminds one of the Spenishta Mainyu just as any similar intellectual term would remind one of Vohumanah.

But this *πνεῦμα* is spoken of as 'understanding'. It is *καθ' ἕτερον δὲ τρόπον ἡ ἀκήρατος* (unmixed) *ἐπιστήμη, ἧς πᾶς ὁ σοφὸς εἰκότως μετέχει*[1], cp. 'the Spirit of Wisdom' of the pseudo Solomon. It is like the *ὀρθὸς λόγος* as principle of morality; so in the Avesta the Zoroastrian saint was filled with vohumanah. What could be more natural? It has never been asserted by me or others that the Zoroastrian Lore was utterly unlike every other religious lore of a similar general description. In fact Zoroastrianism, as being more especially a religion depending upon definite compositions, belongs by its very nature to the same general class as the native Jewish religion of Philo.

[1] De Gigantibus, I, 265.

Philo uses the word *πνεῦμα* almost in an Old Testament sense, mixed however with Stoical conceptions; and like the Stoics, he seems to accept 'fate'; the Lógos is the *ἀΐδιος νόμος*.

And he often apparently forgets for the moment his Platonic dualism, being temporarily lost in the Monism of the Stoics (see above).

Self-contradictions are however universal and only to be expected in sporadic occurrences in the works of all ancient writers, and in fact also in those of all writers, ancient or modern. His doctrine of fate seems inexorable, like that of the Stoics; The Lógos is 'the steersman' of everybody's destiny. (see also above), De Cherub. I, 145. Qu. D. s. immutab. I, 298.

Fate, if it be alluded to at all in the Avesta, seems referred immediately to the 'will of God'.

Cp. the Gāthas at Y. 29, 5, and at p. 419 flg.: 'To us shall it be as he willeth': 'Ahura is most mindful of the decrees', etc.

In this extremely valuable Y. 29, 4, we have a fine example of what I have noticed as the 'adumbration' of a coming idea. Like events, ideas cast their shadows before. And as I hold it, we have in the Avesta the foreshadowing of some of the greatest intellectual conceptions that have ever emerged from the human consciousness: 'to us shall it be as He willeth' refers definitively and immediately, as I hold, to the sahvār(e) 'the mandates of decree' which Ahura was most mindfully pronouncing: (see the place in my S.B.E. xxxi, also Gāthas, new edition pp. 23, 24), 'which mandates

of decree had been carried out hitherto with regard to (this is a new item which I now suggest) Demon-worshippers and (holy) men, and which shall be carried out hereafter. He is the discriminating arbiter; to us shall it be as He shall will!' This last does not refer immediately to personal destiny here; so it is safest to suppose, — *but it started a train of ideas which infallibly lead up to that doctrine.* And the same is true also of the great doctrine that 'sin is the soul's own punishment, and goodness its reward'; it was perhaps not fully intended in our present modern sense; but *it infallibly led up to it;* see elsewhere above and below.

The Dynámeis.

We now come upon Philo's doctrine of the δυνάμεις; and this, as I need hardly say, especially interests us; for these concepts have been especially supposed to be an echo of the Ameshas, or vice versa.

Philo had absorbed so much pantheism from the Stoics that he could not think of a world which did not partake of the nature of God; but as this could not be, in his opinion, without Intermediaries (see above on the motive of the Lógos), etc., he proceeded to formulate such conceptions. So he tried to bring the Deity into nature so far as he could without giving up the idea that God transcended nature; that is to say, that He was not a part of nature, immanent in it. 'The power' of God is not separated from him, but yet it stretches

out so that He fills the world with himself, through His 'power' which goes out to the utmost confines of the Universe (De posteritate C. I. 229) and binds each part in the best harmony with every other.

Ἐπιβεβηκὼς δὲ καὶ ἔξω τοῦ δημιουργηθέντος ὢν οὐδὲν ἧττον πεπλήρωκε τὸν κόσμον ἑαυτοῦ· διὰ γὰρ δυνάμεως ἄχρι περάτων τείνας ἕκαστον ἑκάστῳ κατὰ τοὺς ἁρμονίας λόγους συνύφηνεν. It would seem to us to be natural enough that a Deity should possess 'powers', and that He should be allowed to possess them 'in peace'.

But in the De confus. ling. I, 425 these 'powers' of God begin to be treated as in antithesis to himself.

He is the *ὑπεράνω τῶν δυνάμεων ὄν.*

This seems sufficiently ridiculous to those not accustomed to the sore perplexities of these investigations; but it is not at all ridiculous in view of the unsolvable problems which, nevertheless people were then forced at least to attempt.

They, the Powers, encompass everything with invisible bands, which recalls what was said of the Lógos; see above.

They, these 'Powers', were really at bottom identical with 'the Ideas'; see above, De monarch I, II, 218. God could not operate upon impure matter, so he made incorporeal 'powers' as a go-between; these were 'the Ideas', and Zeller proceeds to remark that 'the ideas' were not merely pattern pictures, but working causes, p. 362; as if God could not have an idea without its producing its effect. For the matter of that this latter seems

sound enough; and both Asha, Vohumanah, Khshathra and the rest were ideas of God clearly enough; and we may well grant, nay assert, that God's ideas were also necessarily 'working powers': they must as of necessity fill up the existing Universe and keep it in life; — but Zoroastrianism knows nothing of the necessity for them as a go-between on account of the impurity of matter. These powers are the *contents* of the Lógos, just as the Ideas were; see above. We might almost blend the two names and say 'Ideal Powers'.

They also possess productive as well as controlling energy; see De confus. ling. I, 431 *δι' αὖ τούτων τῶν δυνάμεων ὁ ἀσώματος καὶ νοητὸς ἐπάγη κόσμος, τὸ τοῦ φαινομένου τοῦδε αρχέτυπον, ἰδέαις ἀοράτοις συσταθείς, ὥσπε οὗτος σώμασιν ὁρατοῖς.*

Heinze thinks that their office as original images for imitation in actual creation here falls into the background, while Zeller, p. 362, found them in this place in that function. Heinze thinks that the application of the terms here differs in the above respect from their application elsewhere. 'They surround God, like his court in untold numbers (not yet like the numbered Ameshas)'. De confus. ling. I, 431 (34). *Τίν' οὖν ἐστι, σκοπῶμεν. Ἑις ὢν ὁ θεὸς αμυθήτους περὶ αὑτὸν ἔχει δυνάμεις ἀρωγοὺς καὶ σωτηρίους τοῦ γενομένου πάσας, αἷς εμφέρονται καὶ αἱ κολαστήριοι.* But to this I will return later.

Here some might say that we come upon an item in Philo's presentation of these 'Powers' which at once annihilates their claim to be considered

analoga to Asha, Vohu manah and the rest of the Ameshaspentas.

Their 'untold' number does not very well accord with the 'immortal' 'Seven'. But we should not quibble about such a point (just here); for a few of them become excessively prominent; and these may be considered to be numbered: see De sacrif. Abel., 139, A, 173, M., also quoted by Zeller where two of them are selected.

Philo, like every other investigator of the kind, varied his mode of presenting such conceptions. He 'felt about' so to speak, as everybody does, till he got his system into shape. Or he may have become disgusted with his old results; and have varied them, half giving them up, sometimes doubtless from accesses of hypochondria, for he had his 'demon' worse than Socrates, suffering of course from irritation of the brain; cp. De s. Abelis et Caini, 1, 173: '*νίκα ὁ θεὸς δορυφορούμενος ὑπὸ δυεῖν τῶν ἀνωτάτω δυνάμεων ἀρχῆς τε αὖ καὶ ἀγαθότητος, εἷς ὢν ὁ μέσος τριττὰς φαντασίας ἐνειργάζετο . . .*; reminding us at once of Khshathra and Vohu manah. Cp. also De Abrah. 11, 19: *Καὶ ἡ μὲν ποιητικὴ θεός, ταύτῃ γὰρ ἔθηκέ τε καὶ διεκόσμησε τὸ πᾶν;* with the *βασιλικὴ* he ruled it *ἡ δὲ βασιλικὴ κύριος, θέμις γὰρ ἄρχειν καὶ κρατεῖν τό πεποιηκὸς τοῦ γενομένου.*

Notice that the *ποιητικὴ* is apparently called *θεός, θεόν*; cp. De profugis. 18 (1, 560: . . *ἐπὶ τὴν ποιητικήν καταφεύγειν δύναμιν ἣν Μωϋσῆς ὀνομάζει θεόν,* see Heinze also, p. 247 'Diese ursprünglichste kraft wird auch geradezu *θεός* genannt'. This most original power is also often spoken of as *ἀγαθότης,*

χαριστική, εὐεργετική, and therefore reminds us of Vohumanah.

The βασιλική makes even a better Khshathra. All must be maintained in the order which has once been established; 'Government' is its duty. The name came direct from Plato; see Phileb. 30, D. quoted by Heinze, p. 67 though it (the name) also bore in mind the Septuagint, and it is called ἐξουσία, ἡγεμονία and κύριος, De cherub, 1, 144. It possesses justice, δίκη: and so it appears legislative and punitive νομοθετική, κολαστική, Quis rer. div. her. 1, 496.

It has taken all in its bosom and penetrates the parts of all, De confus. ling. 1, 425.

Heinze remarks in passing that the names given are not merely synonyms of the two higher powers, the ποιητική and βασιλική; they seem to proceed in order. The beneficent follow from the world-creative and the legislative from the royal, De sacrific. Ab. et C. 1, 173 (see above) also quoted by Zeller and Heinze, and Δορυφορούμενος οὖν ὁ μέσος ὑφ' ἑκατέρας τῶν δυνάμεων παρέχει τῇ ὁρατικῇ διανοίᾳ τοτὲ μὲν ἑνός, τοτὲ δὲ τριῶν φαντασίαν, De Abrah. 11, 19 referred to by Zeller and Heinze, De monarch, (VI) 11, 219, M. quoted by Zeller Ἱκετεύω δὲ ἐγὼ τὴν γοῦν περί σε δόξαν θεάσασθαι· δόξαν δὲ σὴν εἶναι νομίζω τάς σε δορυφορούσας δυνάμεις ....

But we have not only two of the δυνάμεις brought forward; we have actually six grouped in a single place; — and as the Amesha Spentas are six exclusive of Ahura Mazda. This certainly looks at least like a coincidence.

And one commentator, Siegfried, supposing that Philo was here intending to present a correspondence between the number of the 'cities of refuge'; and the holy number 'Seven', thinks that we should consider the ὤν, with which Philo designates the Supreme Being, to be understood here, so making up the number six to seven; as to this see again below.

The one well-known place in Philo is (De Profugis 18, I, 560) where the Powers seem for a moment to be limited to six. This has naturally struck the attention of those who have been looking for coincident similarities between the Philonian pieces and the documents which mention the Ameshaspentas of the Zend Avesta. For, as one commentator, Siegfried, has supposed, some of us might consider his treatment of these six Cities to be equivalent to the citation of seven (as to which see below), this also equalling the number of the 'Immortals' of the Avesta [1].

I will first cite the passages; for they differ naturally from Philo's method of arrangement elsewhere, as he, in common with all authors of his class, differs from himself at different times in his life and at different phases of his experience.

Numbers XXXV, the Cities and the Powers.

The matter in hand is Philo's treatment of the passage in Numbers, xxxv, 6, where the names of the six Cities of Refuge occur. He allegorises as

[1] The Amesha Spenta (Amshaspends) are the 'Bountiful Immortals'; some render the 'Holy Immortals'.

usual keeping up his reputation as being the boldest of all writers, we might almost say, who have ever indulged in that method of procedure.

The First City.

The first 'City of Refuge' which he mentions is a 'metropolis' rather than a city. It is the θεῖος λόγος. This has been supposed by some to be a correspondent to the Zoroastrian Vohuman (vohu manah). Is it necessary to repeat here what I have already said (see above)?; which is that even if the entire delineation were purely Zoroastrian, yet this would be a mistake, for the θεῖος λόγος is only to be classed with an *asha* = *ṛitá*, the 'rhythm of law' in universal nature; see above upon the Lógos of Heraclitus and the Stoics.

The Formative Power.

The other five Cities he calls rather 'colonies', and chief among these was the 'Formative Power', the ποιετικὴ δύναμις. This might make a far better Vohu manah (Vohumanah) than the 'City' just mentioned; for the idea of 'creative formation' in itself implies 'benevolence'; and a good many expressions in consonance with this appear in connection with this ποιητικὴ (see below, where I endeavour to recapitulate).

The Kingly Power.

The third is the βασιλική, the 'Kingly Power', according to which the One 'Who has created governs what has been brought into existence'.

This certainly, at first sight, looks like Khshathra, as has been said; but see below

The Power of Mercy.

The fourth, the δυνάμις ἵλεως, is the 'Power' of 'Mercy', through which the 'Constructor is tender towards and pities His own work', and this ought to correspond to Ārámaiti.

The Legislative Power.

The fifth 'Power' conceived of as a 'City' is the 'Legislative', the νομοθετική, through which He forbids what ought not to be done; and this should correspond to Haurvatāt, 'Healthful Weal'.

The Kósmos Noetós.

The sixth is the κόσμος νοητός, not mentioned in De profugis, 18 (1,560), from a loss of text, but legitimately supplied from the De confus. ling., 1,431, and from elsewhere; and this should correspond to Ameretatāt, 'deathless long life'!

Now let us ask what is the truth as to the whole matter. And first we may recapitulate the particulars and enlarge upon them. I was for some time inclined to regard any objection to the figure of speech made use of as a quibble, unworthy of the discussion. But we should not be too hasty even here. The Gāthas make no use of such an illustration as that of 'Cities', whether as 'Refuges' or otherwise; nor are 'Cities' much more familiar to the later Avesta than they are to the older Veda.

Cities are rarely mentioned.

Among those mentioned in Vendīdād I, Ragha (Rages, *Ῥάγα*, etc.) is the only one that is really prominent as occurring in the later Avesta; Bawri, which is Babylon, is mentioned incidentally merely, while the list at Vendīdād I, just referred to, is also very late, and is not at all in analogy as to the number 'Seven', or as to any other particular; and I naturally dismissed the association as possessing little influence upon our results one way or the other.

Our Search is for Signs of Origin.

For we are searching for mere signs of origin, just here, as for other more serious analogies, that is to say, we are searching for graphic items which indicate literary relation. Such details should be of greatly more importance for this purpose than others which possess in themselves far more significance; and these features are wholly lacking in the Avesta. We have no 'Six', nor indeed any 'Seven', Cities of the kind depicted. But what have we to say to this supposed number as here present in Philo?

The Number Seven.

First of all, it really does not exist at the place; the Cities are Six, not Seven. To be sure, the Ameshaspentas (as distinct from the Supreme Being), i. e. the Archangels, were also Six. The number 'Seven' as involved with them is, indeed, not insisted upon in the Gāthas, nor had the name

Amesha Spenta (so, Amshaspends) been applied to either the 'Six' or the 'Seven' Personified Attributes in those early Hymns. But when the name was invented Ahura became immediately included with the 'Six', under the general designation, and the 'Seven' became a most marked, if not a supreme, element in the general concept, as it appears in the later Avesta; yet here we have but Six.

Were the Cities 'Seven'?

It struck Siegfried indeed, as I have said, that Philo intended to play upon the number 'Seven' here; and that we should supply the ὤν here with which he represented the Supreme Being, otherwise designated by the tetragrámmaton *y-hw-h* [1], so making up the Six to Seven; but the 'ὤν' does not seem to occur in the vicinity of the passage, and the point did not strike Heinze, who has searched the expressions closely. The Author of the Book of Numbers may have retained in his mind some idea of the 'Six' days of creation with unexpressed allusion to the Seventh. We are, however, in search of expressed analogies in mere external diction, for the moment; and this 'Six' of the Refuge Cities makes* but a lame 'Seven'.

Let the Cities be considered 'Seven'.

Yet let us concede the matter freely, even throwing in the 'ὤν', as I do not wish to push any accidental advantage. Philo's Cities, let us

[1] 'Philo von Alexandria als Ausleger des Alten Testaments', S. 215.

suppose, were indeed 'Seven'; and so we may call his δυνάμεις 'Seven', notwithstanding the harsh violence necessarily present, if we include the 'ὤν' within the number of His own 'powers'. What, then, does the analogy amount to?

What, if the Cities were Seven?

The mention of it even should be censured. 'Seven' is everywhere absolutely common property in similar Religions, chiefly on account of the natural divisions of time, while from the three here involved it would be especially difficult to exclude it. Whole masses of discussion in Philo abound in occurrences of 'Seven' (this in allusion to Genesis), while 'Seven' is as marked in the Indian as it is in the Iranian; cf. the seven *dvīpás* of the Indians corresponding to the seven Karshvars of Avesta (regions of the Earth). Then there are the seven *hótṛi's* (or *hotars*), the 'seven-wheeled car', the 'seven tongues of Agni' (fire), the 'seven-horsed sun', etc., etc. 'Seven' is even used for 'many'; see *saptá-pada.* 'Seven' could not well, or even possibly, be absent; and its occurrence, even if it really were genuine at De profugis, 18, 1,560, would possess no force whatsoever as a factor in the analogy between the 'Cities' and the Amesha Spenta.

The θεῖος *Lógos.*

Let us pass to the θεῖος λόγος. At first sight this concept seems to make an excellent Asha, for 'Asha', as *arsha* and *ṛitá*, is, in fact, an Indo-iranian

Lógos, as I would hold, of a certain sort. But it is conceded that the θεῖος λόγος, like its predecessor among the Stoics, generally included all the lesser lógoi, the ideas, or the δυνάμεις. He, this θεῖος λόγος, is here the 'Metropolis', not one of the 'Cities' without qualification.

Asha as a good Theîos.

Wishing to help out the argument that I am opposing, I will recall that Asha is exceedingly prominent among the Ameshas in the Gāthas; compare the expression 'with Asha consenting', etc.; a point lost sight of by those whom I am opposing.

But he, or it, so little included the others that vohu manah (Vohumanah), owing to a mistake in the Pahlavi translation of a certain passage, really elbowed itself, or himself, into the foremost place within the later citations; but let us concede this too, and call the θεῖος λόγος a good analogon.

Philo's Lógos claimed to be Jewish.

Can we forget that Philo's λόγος, θεῖος, or otherwise, though arising from his Greek predecessors, had just been seized by him (amusingly enough) as a product of his own Holy Lore (stolen property recaptured)? Remember even Zeller's perhaps extreme remark that his 'Lógos was Hebrew under a Greek dress', for his Lógos was the 'Word', that 'Word of the Lord by which the heavens were made', such as 'let there be light' and 'there was light' (see above).

This compared with the Gātha.

What trace is there of any such 'Lógos anywhere in the Gāthas, or even in the later but still genuine Avesta? Surely no one will seriously recall the time-honoured allusion to the Honover (*sic*), a singular mistake which curiously illustrates the total absence of even incipient study on the part of so many who make allusions to the Avesta. That Honover is, indeed, referred to in the late piece, Y. xix, as 'It was that Word which was before the sky and before the water, before the plants, and before the fire, and before the Saint and before the Demon-gods', etc. (see Y. xix at S.B.E., xxxi, 260 ff.).

The 'Honover' not Relevant.

Surely people should *look*, at a time so late as this, before they make their points in argument. This wonderful Lógos at Y. xix is the mere corrupted name for the post-gāthic piece, the *yathā ahū-vairyō* [1], *ahū-vairyō* having become *hono-ver.* It has nothing whatever to do with a Lógos in any interior or exterior sense whatsoever, either in the Avesta or elsewhere, or with anything analogous to one, save the name 'Word'; moreover, it may be very late Avesta, as it is Zand, or 'commentary' as well. How is it possible that either the Gāthic, or the later Avesta idea, could derive its origin from the

[1] A short formula in the Gāthic metre of Y. xxviii-xxxiv. The later name by which the earlier Y. xxviii-xxxiv was known was taken from that of this piece. Y. xxviii-xxxiv is called the Gātha *ahunavaiti;* i. e. like the *ahū-vairyō*; but the Gāthic metre was the original.

Jewish-greek Philonian one; and so soon after Aristobulos (-bulus) or Philo; and yet show no trace anywhere of such an origin, all the shreds and fringes of resemblance being lost?

Asha is at times Incarnate.

The one which is 'above all of them, the *θεῖος λόγος*', says Philo, 'did not come into any *visible manifestation*, as not being like anything visible to the senses; but it is itself the image of God'. How does this accord with even the Asha of the Gāthas, which is sometimes so 'incarnate' that the word often represents the 'Holy People' in their entirety, the 'Congregation', while in the later Avesta and later Zoroastrianism it actually often means the 'Fire'? Was not that a manifestation 'visible' enough?

Asha as the Charioteer.

One expression occurs (but not just here, with reference to the 'Cities') which recalls a strophe in the Gāthas, as it would recall strophe upon strophe in all anthologies, or poetry. The Lógos is named the 'Charioteer', [1] and the 'God' gives orders as to what concerns the straight chanoteering of the 'All'. The Gātha place speaks of 'the 'yoking-on' of the mighty steeds with the Law (*asha*) and driving to our help'. And in the later Avesta the Sub-deities, some of them, drive in chariots. What is the force of this as an analogon? I ought not

[1] De profugis, xix, 1,561, *ὥσθ' ἡνίοχον μὲν εἶναι τῶν δυνάμεων τὸν λόγον.*

to have introduced the point, as it deserves no answer.

The image is universal. Moreover, the colouring of the Gātha at this place is all Vedic (see below), the most so in all the Hymns.

The Poietiké as Vohumanah.

Then the ποιητικὴ δύναμις, which, be it understood, is ranked among the 'Colonies', so coming second and not first, as in the later Avesta, might still make a tolerable Vohumanah. That is to say, at our first glance at it (though Vohumanah is supposed by my opponents to be the First and to correspond to the θεῖος λόγος), for the ποιητική, as representing the 'formative power', naturally calls up creative 'beneficence'. See also the expressions made use of in allusion to it, ἀγαθότης, χαριστική, εὐεργετική; they certainly apply well to Vohumanah, but this curious vohu manah and λόγος (as some will have it) is actually called 'God' by Philo in one especial place; see further below; see also Heinze, p. 247, where our place is followed up. Where is Vohumanah called Ahura in the supreme sense in Gātha or late Avesta? He was included, of course, as one among the minor ahuras in the inferior sense at Y. XXVIII, 8 or 9, but so are all the others. Even the human prophet was a 'lord', ahura, the word being used in this sense also; but neither Vohumanah, nor any of the Six, is termed Ahura quite alone, and in that highest sense which alone is applicable here.

Vohumanah sometimes as man.

And surely no one intends to ignore such features as the human side of Vohumanah; he (or 'it') not only often represents the Orthodox Citizen very seriously at times in the Gāthas themselves, but he is also closely used for the 'Church member' in the later Avesta, the Vendīdād, so much so that he is actually spoken of as being 'defiled', precisely as one would speak of a Jew or a Brahmin being 'ceremonially unclean'.

Where does the ποιητικὴ δύναμις appear in any such a light in Philo? There is no telling what odd occurrences may be noticeable in obscure passages, but in the Avesta the occurence is not odd, nor indefinite, where it really exists.

The Basiliké and Khshathra.

The third δύναμις, the βασιλική, might be thought to be a good Khshathra; and according to De Cherub., I, 144, it possesses 'justice' and becomes 'legislative' (see above).

Khshathra has governing power indeed, or, rather, he is 'governing power', and would be by implication 'punitive', but he is nowhere 'legislative'; it is Asha who is par eminence the 'Law' in his leading rôle. Still, let us not be too exacting; let us pass the βασιλική, together with the ποιητική and the θεῖος λόγος. I will not even insist upon the fact that Philo might have omitted his βασιλική altogether, if he had not blundered with the Targum on Psalm LXV, his Hebrew being rusty, for it is Elohīm

there Who is *(sic)* 'legislative', and he, Philo, makes use of *κύριος* — cf. the *βασιλική* (thinks Siegfried, p. 214) — under the impression that it was the best word for the Elohīm as 'legislative', not noticing, or being aware, that the Septuagint use it, *κύριος*, for the tetragrámmaton *stehend*[1] while they translate Elohīm with *θεός*.

It is indeed true that we might have had no *βασιλική* had Philo been a better Hebraist, or one at all. But then, again, the *βασιλική* was Greek fast enough and good Platonic[2], entirely aside from either the tetragrámmaton, which he represents as the '*ὤν*' or this Elohīm, which is his (Philo's) *κύριος*.

And our point just here, let us distinctly recall, is 'literary colour'. We are not discussing here (at this place) the history of the doctrine at the Philonian stage, but the strange question of Philonic influence upon the authors of the Avesta, even of the old Avesta, the Gāthas.

In this light we do not care where or how Philo arrived at his *βασιλικὴ δύναμις*, except to look for the traces of this origin in what was said to be its 'echo'.

The βασιλική and Metals.

But, again, where is the *βασιλική* taken to represent 'metals', for which Khshathra came to be used sometimes, even in the later but still genuine

[1] Do they?

[2] Cf. Phileb. 30, D.: *οὐκοῦν ἐν μὲν τῇ τοῦ Διὸς ἐρεῖς φύσει βασιλικὴν μὲν ψυχήν, βασιλικὸν δὲ νοῦν* . . . See also H., p. 412.

Avesta, and in the later Zoroastrianism almost predominantly? for I think it is fair, though not absolutely necessary, to ask such a question. And with these three, or (with the 'ὤν' dragged in) with these four, even such a halting analogy, as might be supposed to exist comes utterly to an end, the 'ὤν' being before all of them the flimsiest representative of its impossible successor; for the 'ὤν' was, of course, the 'being', but still the 'non-existent [1] God' (*sic*). And what Parsi would like that said of his Ahura?

The δύναμις ἵλεως and Ārámaiti.

The *δύναμις ἵλεως*, 'in accordance with which the Creator is tender toward His own creatures', should correspond, as I have said, to Ārámaiti. But Ārámaiti is thought to be a feeling of reverence from the creature toward the Creator by some, and by others (so better) it is rendered 'zeal'; while at the next stage in the historical development it represents the 'Earth', owing to the just sanctity of early agriculture; for, as I would hold, the 'ar' of Ārámaiti is the 'ar' 'to plough', cf. aratrum, etc., and ārámaiti was originally perhaps the 'ploughing zeal'. This may shock some tastes, but we must endeavour to freshen our suggestions, and explain this idea of the 'Earth'. Where does the *δύναμις, ἡ ἵλεως* represent any such object? It comes direct from the

[1] He was among other things 'everywhere and nowhere'; see De confus. ling., I, 425.

Jewish ἱλαστήριον (Mercy-seat); where is there a trace of this in its supposed descendant?

Siegfried justly thinks that the ἵλεως was included under the 'goodness' of the 'formative power'; see the abstracts applied to this latter concept as cited above. And I for one, among others, have little doubt that Philo was merely spinning [1] out the number of the 'Cities' to the required 'six' (by no means 'seven'), and that this ἵλεως has not significance in the supposed analogy.

The νομοθετική and Haurvatāt.

Then, as to the νομοθετική, the 'Legislative power', it hardly deserves more notice, being clearly an after-thought included under the βασιλική, which itself only by an error (see above) was made so 'legislative'.

Yet it should correspond to Haurvatāt, Healthful-weal' 'freedom from illness', the supreme desire of so many then as now. Still more pointedly, let us ask: 'What has 'Legislation' to do with 'water'?' Even supposing that they thought of 'water' as a source of health, hydrostatics at that period did not

[1] And let us never forget that the Powers in general 'streamed forth from God' sometimes just as 'light' does. They were, as elsewhere, viewed 'infinite'. Zeller, for one, attaches little importance to this sixfold or sevenfold delineation; see p. 369 on Philo, He dwells upon the two first only, the ποιητική and the βασιλική, with the λόγος between as a bond of union, to which last Heinze justly takes exception. The λόγος was indeed a bond uniting those two most prominently, and as 'a bond' he is momentarily spoken of as intermediate; but it is inconceivable that Philo could have meant to refer to the Lógos as occupying an inferior position even just here. He was between the wo, but he included both.

occupy the attention of Governments local or more general; but the Haurvatāt of the date of Philo was mostly used for 'water'.

Where is the point of junction?

The κόσμος νοητός and Ameretatāt.

The bearing of this question is of course not at all so effective as that concerning the ἱλαστήριον which was marked in Philo while considered for the moment, for the sake of argument, to be the prior lore; but the question is fair. The last δύναμις, the κόσμος νοητός (De confus. ling., I, 431), seems to be intended to include all the other five retrospectively a parte(-i) post (so), as the θεῖος λόγος included them prospectively a parte(-i) ante (so); but who would ever assert that Ameretatāt, even if it were otherwise fully in analogy, included all its preceding colleagues?

And what has the κόσμος νοητός to do with 'deathless long life', the hope to 'live a hundred autumns', as we have it in the other Lore (the Veda)? The κόσμος νοητός of Philo did not refer to *futurity* in any sense, nor to a millennial scene where disease, old-age, and the rest are absent; see Yasht XIX, etc. It was, on the contrary, the great concept of an *ideal pattern* in accordance with which the Universe was to be evolved. Deathlessness is indeed 'ideal'; but there are other things 'ideal' as well. And what has the 'Ideal World' to do with fuel? For ameretatāt actually means 'firewood' in certain places in the later but still genuine Avesta, just as haurvatāt means 'water', and both are used together in this sense in the peculiar dual con-

struction. It might indeed be said that these uses of 'Ameretatāt' and 'Haurvatāt' in the Avesta were posterior to Philo, and therefore out of point in the question of Philo's influence upon the Iranian documents; but they show a dissimilarity none the less.

Yet, supposing for a moment that a relation existed, what could that prove? This thought of an 'Ideal World' is almost universal in religions. I would even volunteer to produce analogies; if there is none between the 'ideal' world and 'good old age', or 'firewood', there certainly is many a trace of an 'ideal world' in the Avesta. Recall our very striking summum bonum at Y. XLIII, 2, the 'better than the good'; see also again, the state called 'best mind' at Y. XXX, 4, which gave(?) the Persians their name for Heaven as the 'best' (see above).

If we understand Philo's κόσμος νοητός as an 'ideal state' free from illness, thirst and hunger, etc., there was indeed enough of it in the Avesta, as in every Religion of the kind. But we are looking for definite analogies as signs of *parentage*; and these should be incisive and unmistakable; and the κόσμος νοητός had none such with the 6th or 7th Amesha, the 'Immortal', Ameretatāt. It is in spirit a thoroughly Platonic concept. These 'six' Cities, or 'seven' if you will, have absolutely nothing to do with the Avesta, either as cause or as effect, except in so far as the Avesta, in common with the Veda, and more closely than the Veda (because geographically nearer), exercised an original influence upon the entire Greek development through

the School of Heraclitus as well as otherwise. In fact, as Zeller says (see above), of all these six or 'seven' δυνάμεις only the two which correspond to the 'goodness' and 'might' of another passage have significance as united by the Lógos, De cherub., 112 D., 144 M. Qu. in Gen. I, 57; IV, 2, etc. (Zeller's figures; see Siegfried)[1].

The Eschatology of Philo.

The Eschatology of Philo is, of course, fully developed in many respects, as much so as that of the Avesta, if not as much so as that of the New Testament. He lived at the very moment when Jewish thought was ripe for the Lógos of St. John [2].

Philo's religious Reflections.

His remarks about these symbolical 'Cities of refuge' are very evangelical in the moral-spiritual sense. They (the Cities) are 'in every way beautiful as Refuges for souls that are to be saved, having the best of walls'. 'They are effectively useful and philanthropic, for they arouse men to hope for the good'. 'He (God, or 'the author of the Numbers') urges the fleetest to make breathlessly for the highest City (i. e. the furthest in the Territory of Grace), the θεῖος λόγος, that, drinking of this fountain (*sic*) of wisdom, he may find eternal life as his reward in place of death.' Here we have 'eternal life', as in the Avesta; but the idea was

[1] Cf. also the 'goodness and severity' of God in Romans XI 22 ff.; see also IX, 22 ff.

[2] Whether it appears so early, or whether later.

by that time entirely Jewish also, and, if we must take notice of it, it should belong to Ameretatāt, 'deathless long life', and not to an Asha like this *θεῖος λόγος*, nor indeed to a Vohumanah; whereas, as against the Ameretatāt of the Avesta, we had the utterly dissimilar *κόσμος νοητός* (see above).

The 'sinner not so fleet was to try to reach the next highest or 'farthest' City, the *ποιητικὴ δύναμις*, which Moses called 'God'' (see above); 'for »when a man comprehends that the 'all' has been »created, he acquires a great possession of good; »and this good is the understanding, or knowledge, »of the One Who has made him. And this im»mediately persuades the created thing to love the »One Who has brought him into being'. I am not aware that the 'good mind', Vohumanah, was particularly speculative; its interior sense was pietistic, or moral, at most 'orthodox'; though Philo's wording here is well enough in point, if we wish to trace analogy; but see again what has been said above. 'The sinner flying from vengeance, but still »less swift (than the one in the state just mentioned), »has the 'Sovereign Power' as his City of Refuge, »the *βασιλικὴ δύναμις*, so Philo proceeds; 'for by the »fear of his Ruler a subject is admonished; even if »as a child he is not warned** by his father's »kindness, still this fear will to him good'. This is all excellent and sufficiently near the New Testament, cf. St. Paul's 'behold, therefore, the . . 'severity' of God', but it bears no literary resemblance to anything in the Avesta, certainly not to the migrations in the Vendīdād, which present a picture

totally dissimilar to these (see above). The 'still slower »fugitive is to head for the δύναμις ἵλεως, which en- »joins what we should do and forbids what we »should not do, for he who understands that the »Deity is not implacable but benevolent will repent »of his sin, influenced by the hope of pardon'. Here we have St. Paul's '(Behold the) goodness . . . of God'.

Once more very excellent, but not exactly Āramaiti, which was 'Zeal' in the Old Avesta, and the 'Earth' in the New. 'And he who accepts the opinion that God is a legislator, νομοθέτης ὁ θεός (probably thinking of τίθημι as a root for θεός, which some might ridicule [1]), obeying whatever He prescribes, will be blest'. All very well again, but not very similar to 'Healthful Welfare', the genius of good luck, plus the 'waters'. While the last of the fugitives will strive for the κόσμος νοητός, which Philo neatly defines as an 'escape from evils, if not, indeed, a participation in the more preferred advantages'. This, indeed, is far enough from either 'eternal life', 'long life', or our 'fuel'.

Asha, Vohumanah, and the δυνάμεις personified.

Above I have emphasized the very singular usage in accordance with which Asha represents the 'people', Vohumanah the 'saint', etc. I did not mention at that point a similar development among the devices of Philo. These δυνάμεις are in a sense personified; they are 'Servants surrounding God's Throne', they are 'Ambassadors making known His

[1] Recall -ϑāo as nom. of -ϑāh to ϑā (d'ā).

will', they are 'Mediators between Him and finite things'. And they are especially called 'Angels'. This looks like the Amesha; nay, they are actually called 'souls'. The historians only accede cautiously to a true personification here, and Zeller, with Heinze, adds a last word in query as to whether Philo, or, indeed, his earlier Greek master, had really ever reached a full idea as to what 'personality' in very truth might be supposed to be; surely the 'Soul of the World' was not 'a Person'. But what of the analogy, here at this place? Beyond any question at all it certainly exists. The Amesha Spenta are first abstracts, expressing the quality of the actions of the Deity, then those of His Saints, and at the next stage they become Archangels, and at a still later one the Community and the Saint, and finally the genii presiding over man, fire, metals, over the earth, the waters, and the plants [1]. And what of this? We must firmly answer, as before, that a similar personification, or hypostatisation, whether rhetorical (as a figure of speech), or positively believed in, was and is nearly universal in every known or conceivable religion of the sort. Moreover, the entire body of the Philonian, as of the Platonic concepts, is here wholly excluded in one compact mass by the simple fact that the Philonian Lógos was first introduced to bridge the supposed gulf between God and impure matter; for the idea of the impurity of material substance was abhorrent to the Iranian mind (see the Asiatic Quarterly Review for July 1900).

[1] See this elaborated in JAOS, '99, 1900; cited at p. 20.

The Abstracts and their Vedic analoga.

If those so noted abstracts with which we have become now familiar, have been shown by the reasoning employed above to stand in their own long history independent of any Philonian influence, how much more do they gain in position when their still venerated, if less distinguished, Vedic sisters take their place beside them?

And here we come again upon a great fact which should awaken the acute interest of all persons everywhere who are at all capable of appreciating what is really indeed an almost sensationally interesting particular. I have been forced to allude to it before, but now I will dwell for a moment upon it.

The Vedic Concepts.

While we study our comparatively restricted, but still devoutly pious and profoundly earnest Zend Avesta, we become gradually aware that we are in the possession of certain sublime ideas of a special character and of remotely ancient origin.

That is to say we are dealing with venerable facts which control the acutely interesting situation which is here under discussion with all that it entails.

The impressive masses of the Ṛg Veda Hymns, with their wide extent and great variety, come once more very clearly into view, as having the closest claims upon our attention while grouped with the Iranian fragments. And Parsis should not be adverse to the association (see above at p. 1, flg.).

The Association of the ideas is honourable to both the Avesta and the Veda.

Parsis and Hindoos as originally kinsmen.

It is highly desirable that both the Parsis and their kinsmen** should appreciate this and the advantages which it affords for the true understanding of their primeval literatures and their early Faith. Surely any people must gain in respect for their Creed and for their Holy Books when they become aware that they form no merely isolated structure cemented together by technical and localised expert authorities, carefully elaborating a tribal temple of merely immediate origin. A system should not be the more valued as being exclusively of private bearing, a sort of sealed-up mystery kept for the nation's handful and wrapt in occult half-stifled ceremonies which are devoid of interior meaning save to an initiated few.

The day is past, and let us hope forever, when Parsis, or their ancestral cousins should look askance at one another for any adventitious reasons, and at their Sacred Books.

The higher tone of sympathy.

A deeply sentimental and religious race must gain indefinitely in conscious self-respect when it becomes aware that the lore which it reverences, and the ritual with which it worships, is part of a great system of noble truths which were once common to them with the ancestors of the whole Aryan Race, widely extended, as it is, over the Globe, and distinguished in philosophy, literature, and in

every department of the arts of peace, as indeed also in those of war. Petty animosities, which may be fermenting for the moment in our minds in regard to those who profess what seems to us to be rival forms of worship, should be, in so far as may be possible, thrust aside, and we should be willing not only to forget acerbities, but to set apart antipathies to the systems whose lores, notwithstanding every conceivable perceptible defect, would yet prove, if they were fully known to us, to be so memorably great.

Iranians and Indian, their Ancient Faiths.

Iranian and Hindoo may indeed fear and still feel that the inveterate growth of centuries of misconception, aggravated and intensified by the pitiable play of much personal and tribal (local) friction, will forever make it unthinkable that they could experience reciprocal sentiments of delight in the very ancient Faiths whose relics they so profoundly venerate; but yet I, for one, at least, would indulge the hope that the Irano-aryans who worship Áhura and the Indo-aryans whose early cult still lifted some strains of adoration to Ásura, may be able, for a time at least, to forget all that is accidental which divides them and to recall those more deeply valued and vital issues which should once more unite them.

Veda and Avesta.

The advent of the Vedic and the other so-called Sanskrit literature was a well nigh incom-

parable intellectual event for Europe, when we bear in mind all that followed from it. See above at the first pages where I freely acknowledge that, as a literature in itself considered, the more strictly so-called Sanskrit accumulations would easily engulph the entire Avesta in case there arose any competitive estimate of the strangely kindred two, upon the grounds of mere artistic merit. But soon again we begin to inquire as to the time and place of the origin of each.

The Aryan Indians were once identical with the Northern tribes.

That the so-called Aryan Indians, the creators of the wonderful School of Indian thought, ancient and modern (if indeed we could call such a continent of various mental centres at all 'a School') were originally indigenous to India no educated person has supposed for decades.

The discovery of the Relation.

Was it not Burnouf who, searching for traces of Indian influence toward the North-West first came upon the signs of its relationship to the Avesta? The matter is so notorious that I hardly pause this time to verify my facts [1]. Not only are the Aryan Indians of the West and South-West of the Peninsula and of the East of it to be traced to those of the North and the North-West, but the North and North-West

[1] It has been said that the discovery of this relation of the Avesta to the Veda was actually the point of departure in the recognition of the Indogermanie unity of all the related languages; but I do not fully adopt this opinion as yet.

Indians are to be followed up indefinitely till we come upon the lands of the Avesta, which places were once also their homes (those of these now Hindoos), or others regions near them; that is to say, these were the common domiciles of the two.

The Indians notwithstanding their long, gradual, and, in the end, mighty migrations, at one time actually lived with the ancestors of their now Iranian kinsman somewhere in the regions themselves called later Iran [1], (or 'Eran'). Could we not even say that the Aryan Indians were themselves Aryan Iranians once: nay are we not under an obligation to make this statement? Their blood was doubtless as near akin to that of their old neighbours as was their language (see above); and the very metres [2] of the Hymns which they once sang together help on the proof of this, as they are still the same in the now so widely separated scenes [3].

Original identity of Aryans.

Their prose lores also, which are still so largely similar so far as the Iranian survives for a comparison, were then of course the same. They carried with them in that wonderful slow march not only the same Gods, but the same habit of making other deities to match the old by turning abstracts into personals; and it is here that we are to search for the proofs of the true origin of the great Concepts [4] in regard to which we are endeavouring to exercise so rigorous a search.

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[1] See above. [2] see the Tristup in the Gāthas.

[3] The scenes of origin. [4] Vohumanah, Asha, and the rest.

The Ādityá of the Veda.

The Veda, far off in the Indian East, beyond all reach of Egypt, was near akin to the Avesta; nay, I have boldly called it the same lore in its extreme South-eastern home; and everywhere there we have the same kind of abstracts appearing, and likewise generally soon personified, not always all of them, but the great mass of them. Take the very Ādityá with their 'mother', as we might indeed so call it, or her. Áditi is at first the abstract 'unboundedness', 'infinitude', 'unfettered power', and then the 'mother Goddess' of the idea ('infinitude'); so bhága is 'good luck' and then the same personified; dáksha is 'cleverness', and then the God of it; ánça is 'property', the 'sharing', and then its God, etc. So also where it is not the abstract idea, but a material object which meets us we have the same procedure; Váruṇa is the 'enfolding heaven', and then Váruṇa the God of it. Sūrya is the sun, and then Sūryā́ its Goddess; Agní is the fire, and then Agní, its endeared Protector. So also, where the word is first a common descriptive (of a living person), as mitrá 'the friend', and Mitrá 'the friendly God'; aryamán 'the ally', and Aryamán 'the god', etc.

And, among other abstracts, all of our Iranian Ameshaspentas, instead of being the recrudescence of Philo's Cities, or in any other sense the echoes of his teachings, are some of them, even more familiar to the Indian Veda than to parts of the Iranian Book; and of course they appear as abstract

there as here; and in fact, sometimes they never reach the state of Gods at all, as the Iranian forms which we are treating, so fully do.

The 'ṛitá*' of the Veda is the 'asha' of the Avesta, as no one doubts, a true Indo-iranian Lógos; and it, or he, occurs close on three hundred times in the Veda Ṛk. and in its very most ancient parts, say, some of them as old as 500 to 800 years before Philo lived in the Egyptian town. Kshatrá is Khshathra, and it occurs some forty-four odd times; arámati is āramaiti, and it occurs about eleven times, and often (as Sāyaṇa also understood it in the Veda) even of the 'earth'. Sárvatāti is Haurvatāt, and it occurs some score of times; while Vasumanas, which is vohu manah, is the name of a Vedic seer.

Here are all the Ameshaspentas which some would trace to Philo's cities. They thronged as household words (some of them) for centuries before even Plato, Philo's real instructor, weaved out his theories far off from the line of travel between these Indians and Iranians.

There was no Greek School at all in Egypt anywhere when Indian Ṛishis first sang these ancient names; nor, for the matter of that, were there as yet any Greek Schools in Greece, both far enough away. The whole suggestion of Philonian parentage or influence upon any important part of the Avesta system seems puerile in the extreme, unworthy of the source from which it came—the slip of a gifted brain, pre-occupied. The Avesta and the Veda are ancient sisters, as no one now pretends to doubt;

and if Philo inspired the abstracts of the one, he inspired those of the other also; and this would be a clear 'reductio' to the 'silly' [1] for it would be a 'reduction' to a joke. Both the Iranian and the Vedic concepts go back till they are lost in the mists of the ancient East; and as far back as we can trace them they are wonderful indeed; for they are, some of them, the deepest and (at times) also the most beautiful that the human mind has reached [2]. If their character therefore was not a simple fact, it would indeed be hard to credit it for they prove an advanced mental religious life in an early public and in a scene where other features remained completely undeveloped. And those which appeared in the Iranian Veda (the Avesta) became personified, just as those sister Concepts did which I have named.

Philo's self-consciousness and that of souls in the judgment.

We may conclude this section with an allusion which might however seem to some of my readers to be indeed satirical, not that it is intended to be such in any sense. I mention it in parenthesis.

[We have, all of us who are at all versed in Philo, been amused at the quaint vanity which he manifests, at times, and we have a curious case of it in what he says about his 'own soul' and the things it (his soul) told him, in these connections.

It happened in one of his customary moments of 'inspiration'. Upon this occasion he piques him-

[1] ad absurdum. [2] see above at Section I.

-self especially upon his astuteness, calling himself σπουδαιτέρος; (or should it be 'his soul' which was so clever?); the grammatical form would decide rather for the first. It seems that this interior in-dwelling person 'his soul' furnished him with an opinion, to the effect that the two Cherubīm (see above on previous pages) represented, the one the αγαθότης and the other the ἐξουσία of the ὤν; see the passage De cherub. 9 (1, 143).

He calls upon 'his mind', so varying the expression, addressing it in the second person, and, as it were, a separate being, ὦ διάνοια! It is not at all necessary to cite the passage, as its subject matter is quite parallel with what has been already so elaborately said, and it is substantially also included within it. It is sufficient merely to state the singular particular. He holds a detailed conversation with 'his interior self'; and it is not at all impossible that he may have been literal in his intention to represent this exchange of ideas thus.

Does then this odd fancy find any analogy in that memorable feature of the Avesta already mentioned above; see page 100, the agency of the soul's own conscience in its future rewards or punishments. Recall where the 'man's own soul' speaks to him in the Gāthas, at Y. 46 and in Yasht XXII? The answer is, that *it would be an insult to the Avesta to compare the two;* for the Avesta in the thought compared led the world of its time and place in one of the most important ideas which humanity had yet experienced. Nothing Philonian can approach it, much less this petty, but yet to

some of us most interesting effect of diseased cerebral action.

Philo's fancy, pardonable indeed as it is, with one subjected to acuter mental strains, was yet none the less a pure egregious egotism. The two conceptions, his and that of the Avesta, had contents totally dissimilar. It seems almost trifling to discuss them in the same inquiry. Philo's 'mind' was indeed 'speaking' to him and upon a serious subject, — a question in the theological exegesis of a passage in his Scriptures; but it concerned something of mere remote detail, a matter of little practical moment, however it might be considered. But Zarathushtra's point was vital and immediate, of the utmost critical effect to the immortal destiny of the human subject, and wholly moral. I may well fear that I do it dishonour to mention it in such a connection, or in such a tone.]

Up to the dates of those statements in the Zend Avesta men's thoughts as to future recompense, so far as they have been recorded, were all mechanical, ruthless and inconsiderate. The law of interior recompense, was perhaps not so consciously at hand in the thoughts of Zarathushtra, but his deducible ideas forecast it; subjective rewards and punishments are certainly foreshadowed.

And this was epoch-making for the time and place, the first clear statement of such conceptions in all literature. The conscience becomes the executioner, if it indeed does not constitute the very pains of Hell; and in a corresponding sense an approving voice within fills the being with

pervading peace, and it meets the saved man like fragrant breezes to a traveller approaching home. See Yasht XXII [1].

As time and circumstances are pressing me on; and as I am publishing the first portion of my argument, which is, in so far as I can make it, in itself quite thoroughly complete, I add a passage which should otherwise be in place only at the close of the entire Book. For without such a summing up inserted here and published with this section the threads of the various arguments would seem hardly to be gathered up; and some untoward event might interrupt the printing of the finished treatment.

What I then intended to say, and still intend to repeat as the last word in my discussion in regarded to Philo would be briefly this.

The Summing up.

The Avesta in no sense depends upon the Jewish Greeks. On the contrary, it was Philo who was in debt to it. He drank in His Iranian lore from the pages of his exilic Bible, or from the Bible-books which were then as yet detached, and which not only recorded Iranian edicts by Persian Kings, but were themselves half made up of Jewish-persian history. Surely it is singular that so many of us

[1] From here on I have large masses of Manuscript, almost, or quite, ready for the type-setter dealing with 'the Sophia' of Philo, and finding in it many analogies with the Avesta doctrine. But my results would be unvaried; see everywhere above. I hold my severely written pages possibly for another work, but more probably for my posthumous cremations.

who 'search the Scriptures' should be unwilling to see the first facts which stare at us from its lines. The Religion of those Persians, which saved our own from an absorption (in the Babylonian), is portrayed in full and brilliant colours in the Books of the Avesta, because the Avesta is only the expansion of the Religion of the sculptured edicts as modified. The very by-words, as we shall later see, are strikingly the same, and these Inscriptions are those of the very men who wrote the Bible passages[1]. This religion of the Restorers was beyond all question historically the first consistent form in which our own Eschatology appeared[2].

Before the Exile the Jewish creed was very dim indeed as to Resurrection, Immortality, forensic Judgment, and all we hold most dear[3]. The people of Ragha (Rages, Ῥάγα, etc.), whose name the Alexandrians knew so well from their Tobias, or from its sources, lived and died under the strong personal influence of these beliefs, with other elements beside them so searching that we can scarcely trust our eyesight as we read. Even the harsher features are recalled; the very Demon[4] of the Gāthas figured in the tales of Philo's youth.

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[1] Sceptics, indeed, might doubt the Scripture passages, but what sceptic can utterly doubt the sculptures of Behistān, not that all they say is accurate. In Part II they will, it is hoped, be thoroughly discussed.

[2] Not that ours was derived from it, but only matured and ripened through its influence under the providence and will of God.

[3] See the dogmatic of the Old Testament.

[4] *Ἀσμοδαῖος* is, however, really not more original than the Hebrew form, though the book itself was probably first worked up in Greek.

And these facts no serious expert will dispute. It is a case of simple record. The Irano-vedic lore developed in Iran the first definite form of our own ideas as to the future state, according to the obvious data in the case. There are more traces of the doctrines named above, with Heaven and Hell, as Orthodox Christians hold to them, in the texts of the Avesta than in all the Pre-exilic Books.

What has now been said will, I hope, be regarded as a careful synopsis of the argument against the Philonic origin of either Asha or Vohumanah in so far as the Greeks are concerned; and for the bulk of my readers it will be considered all-sufficient; that is to say, in so far as they cherish any confidence whatsoever in my studies and in my opinions. I have done my best to elaborate a critical delineation of Vohumanah and Asha, the only as yet one ever at all attempted; and I have given a preliminary summary as to the Logos of Philo, shewing how little the one corresponds to the other.

I have asserted with suggested reasons that Philo must have felt indirectly a Babylonian-persian influence with the conclusion that any similarities supposed to exist between his writings and the Zarathushtrian system must have been owing to ideas which made their way from that system, or from a congeries of closely connected systems of which Zarathushtrianism was a prominent unit; and I have constructed a provisional conclusion from these premises in so far as they are now presented.

ZARAΘUŠTRA, PHILO, THE ACHAEMENIDS AND ISRAEL

being

A TREATISE UPON THE ANTIQUITY AND INFLUENCE OF THE AVESTA

for the most part delivered as
University Lectures

by

Dr. Lawrence H. Mills
Professor of Zend Philology
in the University of Oxford.

Translator of the XXXI[st] Volume of the Sacred Books of the East, Author of the Five Zarathushtrian Gâthas, etc.

Part I: **Zaraϑuštra and the Greeks**

Part II: **Zaraϑuštra, the Achaemenids and Israel.**

Composed at the request of the Trustees of the Sir J. Jejeebhoy Translation Fund of Bombay.

To be had of **F. A. Brockhaus** in **Leipzig**
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Zarathushtra, the Achaemenids and Israel

A discussion

of the Relation existing between the Avesta, the Achaemenian Inscriptions and the Exilic Semitic Scriptures

for the most part delivered as University Lectures

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Part. II

of

Zarathushtra (Zoroaster), Philo, the Achaemenids and Israel,

Part. I

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Preface to Part. II.

I have little to add here to what was said in Part. I on pp. V—XIII except to repeat that, as before, several chapters have been rewritten from various Journals and Reviews, especially from the Asiatic Quarterly Review, and some from the Critical Review. I may mention however further items of work done as a reason for the delay in the issue of this second part.

The Pahlavi texts of the Yasna have been edited with the collation of all the Mss. in the Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft, in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, and in the Journal of the American Oriental Society so far as to the Srōsh Yasht inclusively. Y. LVII—LXI (Sp.) have been also offered to ZDMG. LXII — LXXI, still remain to be edited with Y. II—VIII, Y. XXIII—XXVII, Y. LI (Y. XXVIII—XXXIV, Y. XLIII—L, LI, LIII (W.) having appeared in the Gāthas, of which second Edition is in request). That is to say, the Pahlavi Texts of Y. I, X — XVI, XIX, XX, XXI, XXII, XXXV—XLI, LV, LVI (Sp.), have appeared in ZDMG, with Y. LVII—LXI, etc. to follow in 1906. Y. IX, 1—48 in JRAS, and Y. IX 49—103, Y. XVII (Sp.) in JAOS. The translations will be found in JRAS.;

i. e. of Y. I, IX 1—48, X, XI, XII*, XIV, XV, XVI, XIX, XX, XXI, Y. XXXV—XLI, LV, LVI, with LVII — LXI, etc. to follow, and that of Y, IX, 49—103 in JAOS. Much other laborious work has been undertaken and carried through; but the Dictionary of the Gāthic Language of the Zend Avesta has suffered. Work upon this will be now resumed, and it is hoped completed. I must also ask the indulgence of the reader as to the omissions and some irregularities in the numbering of the Sections or Chapters in the present book owing to pressure through enforced haste. Surely petty oversights will be the less freely censured when it is remembered that I have devoted years of eye-sight, patience and severity to the editing of my Pahlavi texts in all their minutest variants, feeling under obligations to probe the source of every error as well as to state my own views of the truth.

L. H. Mills.

Oxford, Dec. 1905.

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* VIII Muséon.

Contents Part. II.

Zarathushtra, the Achaemenids and Israel.

* should be XXIV, a, XXIV, b, XXIV, c, XXIV, d., etc.

Part. II.

Zarathushtra, the Achaemenids and Israel.

Part. II.

Section I.

Preliminary Remarks.

Having done what seemed to me to be possible to do to offer a full treatment of the question of the relation existing between the Greek-jewish Lógos and Zarathushtra. I must ask my readers to accompany me in another pioneer survey, viz. upon that of the question of the relation existing between Zarathushtra the Persian Achaemenids, and the once captive Tribes of Israel.

Exhaustive treatment a necessity.

The main object therefore which I have now immediately in view before me is to bring up all, or most of all the strong facts which stand out as solid proofs of the close connection of Jewish thought with that of Babylonian Persia, recollecting that Babylonia became Persian largely in its theology, and this even in the opinion of Assyriologists, at the Conquest of the Land by Cyrus. With these facts I must do more than merely allude to them.

Section II.

The canonical Books of Chronicles, Ezra, etc., as sources of proof of the connections.

I wish to show that the statements in the canonical Books of Ezra, Chronicles and Isaiah really prove a close historical relation, and one which comes into marked point when we examine

the Biblical language which reports the Edicts of the Persian Kings, and compare them with the extant Inscriptions of Cyrus, Darius, and their Successors. And having shown that a community of thought existed between the two, or at least that this is to the last degree probable, I will then proceed to consider how intimately near the Inscriptions are to the Avesta. If I can succeed in accomplishing these objects, then the door would seem to be open between the hearers of the Avesta on the one side and the Jews of all time subsequent to the date of the Inscriptions on the other. And, in consequence, it becomes nearly certain that the Avesta, in its earlier parts at least, or some lore most closely kindred to it, must have leavened the thought with which Philo was familiar as well as much other occidental lore beside this, with the clear inference from it all that what traces of resemblance exist, if any, between Philo's details and the more prominent features of Gāthic doctrine were, if they were due to any historical influences bearing between the two systems at all, due to an influence originating from the Avesta and its sister lores and not to one originating from Philo.

An appeal to especial Religious Convictions should not be pushed.

In the course of what I have said elsewhere I have thought it best at times to appeal to certain readers upon the basis of their own strong religious convictions which induce them to adhere to the

supreme verity of what some of us call our 'inspired' Biblical statements.

In an argument addressed solely to experts in ancient critical history it would be entirely beneath the dignity of our subject to allude to such a matter; but of course this book, unlike its predecessors, is especially addressed to the larger public. If we could indeed rule-in such an element as the 'inspired' authority of documents and could prove our points, our task would come rapidly to an end. For if there are reasons for supposing certain especial passages in Chronicles, Ezra and Isaiah to possess supernatural claims to validity, then the question of the influence of Persia upon Jewish theology, as well as upon Jewish history would be settled at once without further discussion.

And as many of my Occidental, as well as some also of my Oriental, readers hold in various degrees of conviction to the doctrine of such a supernatural inspiration of their Sacred Scriptures, for the benefit of this class of minds, who are at times exceedingly sensitive upon the point, I pause here to make one single remark. It is merely to say that as there are important persons among the Christians and Jews on the one side, and among the Parsis upon the other who, while holding to the exceptional authority each of their own particular Sacred Scripture, do yet strenuously oppose such claims when made by the other party, it is obvious that nothing whatever would be gained by me if I should intrude at this place such a subject of discussion as the one suggested. We are therefore

neither obliged nor permitted to fall back upon such a source of supposed unquestionable certainty, unless it could be absolutely proved to the total satisfaction of all the parties concerned.

Sources of Proof.

The Exilic Scriptures with their Persian elements.

The facts with which we are attempting to deal seem to me to be absolutely immoveable, and provable, if any literary proof can be termed complete, by certain well accredited considerations, aside from any external corroboration. That is to say, they are proved by the internal evidence of certain surviving writings as corroborated by the notorious circumstances of the Jewish Exile and of the Return, which justly hold a prominent place in all our Occidental as well as in our Oriental religious history.

Persian features of the Exilic Books.

How many sections of the Bible, let us recall [1], aside from all assertion of any especial religious authority for them based upon the fact, are actually dated from the Reigns of Persian Kings. How many books, both of the Bible and of the Apocrypha can only be described as Jewish-persian, and but for their immediate Jewish authorship as being almost as much Persian as they are Jewish; and what further interior affinities do the religious books of the Persians possess with those of the Bible, especi-

[1] See above, and later, upon the résumé.

ally as we include the familiar Inscriptions among the Persian documents!

The mere Historical Relation has of itself great weight.

That some of these works surpass some parts of the 'Bible' in certain significant particulars and vice versâ, has not so much at all to do with our point in the present investigation. It is *the close historical relation existing in general between the features and histories of the two lores* when considered in their entire extent, and this as proving a relation between the peoples which is the matter most of all in point.

Section III.

The Inscriptions as Sources of Proof.

Well did our great Sir Henry Rawlinson pronounce the now so well-known Cyrus Vase Inscription at present in the British Museum to be one of the most interesting that had yet been discovered [1]. But his pioneer rendering can be read in a few minutes as worked over by his successors. So also of the Inscriptions found in Egypt [2]; while upon the Babylonian version of the Behistūn Inscription we have the pioneer work of the great Englishman also re-edited in a masterly manner by

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[1] See also the Greek inscription found in '98.

[2] Dr. L. H. Gray has been reproducing these various items in a most interesting manner in JAOS, see the number for 1900.

his successors. And again once more we have the Scythian Version by Westergaard '40—'44, and following it the English Norris, 1853.

As regards the main matter of it all; that is to say, the Old Persian Sculptures at their known places, we have Weissbach and Bang in their edition (1893) of Spiegel's revised book, 1881.

The Vase Inscription of Cyrus in its relation to the Jewish Scriptures.

We must naturally first make use of the Inscriptions of Cyrus, as the Semitic documents on their side first deal with him, and in a manner so signal.

I refer of course to those memorable words, which, had we but read them now for the first time and with understanding, would produce so deep and startling an effect upon us, as well as upon all who value ancient historical science, for few indeed of the written records of the thoughts of man contain so much that bears upon the interior development of what many of us cherish as the guide to the other life.

Chronicles, Ezra, and Isaiah.

The words occur in the last chapter of second Chronicles and in the first of Ezra, also in the even more memorable terms of Isaiah XLIII, XLIV.

Let me cite the first of them (the Chief Edict) as from our English revised Version: »Now in the »first year of Cyrus, King of Persia, that the word

»of the Lord spoken by the mouth of Jeremiah might
»be accomplished, the Lord stirred up the spirit of
»Cyrus King of Persia that he made a proclamation
»throughout all his kingdom, and put it also in writ-
»ing, saying: 'Thus saith Cyrus King of Persia: 'All
»the Kingdoms of the Earth hath the Lord God of
»Heaven given me; and He hath charged me to
»build Him an house in Jerusalem, which is in Judah.
»Who is there among you of all His people, the
»Lord his God be with him and let him go up.«

Searching Doubts must not be discouraged.

Like all other items in evidence these statements challenge scrutiny. We read them for the thousandth time in their translations or in their language, and at each fresh glance they stir within us, that is to say, within some of us, sometimes curdling doubts. 'The people were indeed restored', so we may hear ourselves concede, 'and both with the consent and at the command of the Persian authorities, but in no such spirit as we have here expressed'.

'The Persian Monarch could not have concerned himself personally at all so closely with the affair as we have it here set forth in these so full allusions'. 'They are wholly improbable as supposed to be what they pretend to be', — so we have often suspected —, and they were got up by the returning Exiles to strengthen their cause against the surrounding tribes. These daring settlers patched up this so-called decree, so we were wont so say, putting it forward as an inspired utterance from the mouth

of the great Gentile Ruler, or from his pen. For where, it might well be asked, could he have at all acquired such a connection of ideas? What ever happened like it? But we have a corroboration of it and one in a form most simple and accessible. We have also wondered, perhaps, how the Hebrew annalist could have been so very unguarded as to make Cyrus actually give orders for the rebuilding of the Temple at Jerusalem, Artaxerxes also supplementing the announcement, as we see also from the Book of Ezra (VI), and lavishing assistance in the form of treasure, if not of men.

The Cyrus Vase Inscription in its Text.

But we take up the so-called Vase Inscription (which is deposited in the British Museum) with the pioneer renderings of Rawlinson and Pinches, emended by Winckler, Hagen, Schrader and Delitzsch, and also the Backstein Inscription, — and we see our Scriptural allusions at once made good, studying also the annals of Nabuna'id, in the same great Repository. This first of the Inscriptions of Cyrus which is applicable to my present purpose, and which was deciphered by Sir Henry, is a political decree, stamped doubtless upon hundreds of clay cylinders systematically distributed, as I think, in different parts of the Province, or of the Empire. This 'copy' has escaped destruction, and well did our great Bahnbrecher emphasise its interest. He was himself under the impression, I believe, that it was deposited in the archives by Cyrus himself, or at his

personal direction. This could however only indirectly have been the case; it was doubtless one of many widely scattered replicas. It was found, as we read, by one Hormuzd Rassam (evidently a Parsi) in a hill at Babylon. The transliterations of the transcribers differ of course very much, as our Pahlavi decipherments so often do; and the renderings also vary as they naturally must; but, as in the case of the Gāthas, the terms which carry the most valuable meaning are generally quite plain.

The Capture of Babylon.

»The great Lord Marduk, (so Kūrash dictated; »was he not thinking of his own Ahura Mazda?), »'regarded propitiously the protection, that is to say »'the protector' of His people, his victorious work, »and his righteous heart, going toward his city »Babīl as a friend and as a companion at his side.«

The Inscription and Isaiah.

With this compare Isaiah »whose right hand I »have holden, in righteousness have I raised him up, »and all his ways will I direct. I will go before »them, and the crooked shall I make straight«.

The thronging Troops.

»His troops spreading out in numbers never »known, (so the Inscription proceeds), like the waters »of a stream marched weapon-girded at his side«. (This is even more graphic than the Prophet): »thus »saith Yahweh to Koresh .. to open before him

»the two-leaved gates, and the gates shall not be »shut«, that is to say, »they shall be forced with »little effort«.

»Without battle, says the Inscription, »made »He (Marduk) him (Kūrash) enter Babīl; my widely »thronging troops came in in peace'. 'Bars of iron »shall I cut asunder', said Isaiah; and in an isolated spot of the worn inscription, according to Hagen at least, occur the words, »the door was destroy- »ed'[1] . . . 'I will loose the loins of Kings', said »Isaiah, . . . and the Inscription runs, 'Nabuna'id »the King who feared Him (Marduk, He, Marduk) »delivered him into his (Kūrash's) hand«. Recall Isaiah's words of Yahweh, »he, Koresh, shall do a »My pleasure.«

The Reception of Cyrus.

But the inscription goes further, and makes him out to be a 'pleasure' not only to the Deity, but to the captured population. In fact, he claims at once a plebiscite from the masses whom he had just conquered or from the Gods who represented them: »whose Kūrash's, (Cyrus's) sovereign authority they »desired to the joy of their hearts.«

The Hebrew records teem with terms describ- ing the welcome; see the citations everywhere; and on his side, in the Inscriptions, Kūrash claims the fawning homage of the Babylonians and dubs it

[1] This need not have been a City Gate; but that it was some portal of importance seems certain: that is to say, if it were indeed anything at all; and it was 'cut asunder'.

genuine. It had however the meanest motives. »They rejoiced« says the ardent politician, »over his »assuming the kingdom, . . . their faces beamed (*sic*), »for the Lord who by force of His power wakes »the dead (a touch this of his Persian sentiment, if the translations have not hid the truth; he was used to speaking so of his Ahura), Who with »care and waiting protection, he continues, had done »all well, Him did they bless with joy, guarding and »maintaining His name.«

The Inscription seems to surpass our Hebrew texts themselves in the high colour of its delineations; and if the Babylonian words were not all so simple, we should hardly believe them to have been rightly read by the distinguished scholars who have so sagaciously and so laboriously worked upon them. We were also once uneasy, as we remember, at the suspicious statement that Koresh (Cyrus) was declared to have seriously professed some real regard for the (foreign) Yahweh. But all the same on the Inscription he never pauses in his steady movement forward:

Consideration for the Native Gods.

»Since I entered Babīl (so he ventures to assert) »amidst exulting shouts (so), and established the »Throne in the Palace of the Princes, Marduk the »great Lord made the honourable hearts (so) of the »inhabitants of Babīl inclined toward me *because I »was daily mindful of His worship.*« Note well this most rational item which is to be compared with what is said below; see it expressing the courte-

ous and humane recognition of the other »Gods«, »the Clan-gods« or »all the gods«, whom the Successor of Cyrus so wisely and sincerely respects. »My widely thronging troops . .« so he continues . . (did something favourable, we may be sure) . . .

»I allowed no affliction to seize all Sumer and »Akkad, the honourable race. I justly took over all »the necessities of Babīl and all its cities. The in- »habitants realised the satisfaction of their hearts' »desires (so), and the dishonouring yoke (n. b.) was »taken from them.« The orator goes on, and laments the sad condition of Babīl under the man whom he had just relieved of his Crown and of his Capitol; not that Nabuna'id was faultless: »Their sighs I »hushed,« so he proceeds, »their anger, (as against »the deposed sinner(?)) I appeased (so). Marduk, the »great Lord, rejoiced over my works so full of . . . »beneficial results (?) . . . He blessed me, Kūrash, who »worship Him in grace, and also Kambuzi'a, my »body's son, since we in righteousness praise before »Him His sublime divinity'.«

Ezra's Expressions vindicated.

This forever annihilates the authority of all who too cynically treat our Bible-texts. If Cyrus spoke thus of these false Gods so inferior to his own Ahura, surely he must have said something like what Ezra records of Yahweh, so near his own great Deity.

And so Isaiah.

»Isaiah had said »thus said Yahweh to Koresh »His Messiah, to subdue nations before him«; and

according to Ezra we have: »Thus saith Koresh »King of Persia: all the kingdoms of the earth hath »Yahweh Elohīm of Heaven given me« (see also the the terms of the Inscription, which heighten the expres- »sions). I am Kūrash King of the all (the then known »world), the great King, the mighty King, King of »Babīl, King of Sumer and Akkad (which he had »just conquered), King of the four quarters of the »world (compare Isaiah's expression 'from the East »to the West« not said of Koresh but in the immediate connexion and in consequence of his inspired action). »I am the son of Kambuzi'a the »great King, the King of Anshan, grandson of (a »former) Kūrash the great King, King of Anshan »of all royal blood.« Here we have doubtless some diplomatic exaggeration, as this hardly agrees with Behistūn; nevertheless this Vase Inscription is practically in line with that and the others. Isaiah proceeds, »thus saith Yahweh; the labour of Egypt »and the merchandise of Ethiopia and of the Sabeans, »men of stature shall be thine, they shall come after »thee; in chains shall they come and they shall fall »down unto the saying; 'Surely God is in thee'' (if said not of Koresh but of Israel, this was yet said in direct consequence of the deliverance of Israel as effected by Koresh (Cyrus)). And according to the Inscriptions not only did the dwellers in Babīl, all Sumer and all Akkad, princes and potentates, fall down before Kūrash (Cyrus) but »all the kings »of the heavenly regions (the four quarters of the »horizon) as well as enthroned as they were in palaces, »altogether from the upper sea (the Persian Gulf?)

»to the lower sea (the Mediterranean) the Kings of »the West lands dwelling in tents (Arab-like), all »brought their heavy tribute *and kissed my feet in* »*Babīl* from . . . to Asha . . . and Shushan . . . to the »cities on the other side of the Tigris.«

Divinities restored to their Temples.

Then as to the actual restoration of foreign Deities and the reinstatement of temple services, this seemed at our first glance upon it to be indeed a steep fence for us to charge; that is to say for those of us who do not simply fall back upon a supernatural 'inspiration'. 'Very likely indeed', so most alien critics have also said, 'does it sound', following upon all that Cyrus is said to have done in the matter of the restoration of the political status, 'very likely does it seem that this great 'heathen' Emperor should cite an order from this 'Clan-god', as he would most naturally have called Him, this Yahweh Elohīm, Clan-god of his insignificant dependants, scarce worthy to be called 'allies'; — and this with reference to the reconstruction of that central religious Edifice the contemplation of which filled them with such fierce fanatical enthusiasm, for it offered the very most pronounced expression of their so exclusive religious party passions; — 'very ridiculous', as we might more openly have expressed ourselves; — but read the Inscription, and see what it says, alluding not to allies, except in the crudest sense, but to the cringing hordes just conquered. He (Cyrus) writes: »I brought back to »their place (the Gods . . .) and made them dwell in

»an abode for ever.« And as to the actual rebuilding of the sacred City, see the Backstein inscription. Eshakkil was a temple city, as it seems, and the Inscription reads »Kū-ra-ash ba-ni-i(m) Ēshakkil u »Ē-zī-da apil m Kambū-zi-ia sharru dannu a-na-ku. »Kūrash the builder of E. and E. son of K. the »great King I.«

And as to the notorious Return of the captive Tribes, if any one still hesitates at that, see the line: 'All the inhabitants I collected and then restored to their dwellings'; see also what is said later upon Behistūn. I cannot help noticing here what we would once term that 'romantic' item, where Artaxerxes, after fulsome commands for a Restoration, makes an appeal for himself to the Jews that they may »offer sacrifice of sweet savour unto Elo»hīm of Heaven and pray for the life of the King »and of his sons,« reminding us also of Ahasuerus and the rest. Who has not at times thought this an especially feeble adjunct to the tale? — Yet it was one of the most sober of all serious statements, connected with all that went before, the one most naturally to be expected of all possible assertions in the connection. »May the Gods,« wrote Kūrash (Cyrus), after having fully restored Them to Their shrines, »may all the Gods[1], he wrote, whom I have »brought into their cities (just as Yahweh was restored »to Jerusalem); may all the Gods, pray daily before »Bel and Nabu for long life for me . . . and speak »to my Lord Marduk for Kūrash the King who fears

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[1] So both Hagen and Shrader as against the first personal.

»Thee, and Kambuzi'a his son.« Compare this also again with the urgent request of Artaxerxes cited just above.

All this piety was of course political to some extent. Nevertheless, as I take it, Cyrus was in a certain sense a man of faith; he really believed these Gods could help him, and this from the very nature of his convictions; and he sincerely desired their co-operation. Once again as to 'building', see a last isolated sentence, if it be correctly given, »I sought to make their habitation strong« (so Winckler and Hagen). If this refers to the demolished houses of the inhabitants, it refers to those of their Gods as well.

The language of Ezra is justified, as I maintain, and so is that of Isaiah, and fully so. It states what must almost of necessity have taken place. And not only was it not one of Cyrus's sudden points of policy, but it was so to speak, a steady business continued by his great, though not immediate, Successor, as we see also from Behistūn (Weissbach and Bang, i. 14). *The first thing that Cyrus thought of in Babylon was to rebuild the temples; and this as a matter of course.* Notice the presence of his son; cp. Ezra VI, 10. The two worked on together.

The Empire was as complex in its religious types as it was vast in its extent, and the amount of business entailed in administering it must have been phenomenal. Beyond a question there existed what was practically 'a Ministry of Public Worship', so to speak of it; and a part of its constant duty

was to restore the edifices and to see to similar needs of its most distant loyal subjects.

So far then from the records of the Hebrew chroniclers being what they might seem at our first glance to be, that is to say, an effect of childlike vanity, or a device of anxious policy mendaciously put forth, to build or rebuild temples proves on the other hand to have been one of the very first as well as one of the most necessary of all occupations of a Persian Emperor after victories. They were, all the time of it, continually building or rebuilding such like edifices. He attended to the reconstruction of cities and temples as a first point of humanity toward his humbled enemies, after the desolations of defeat. And the orders for the work were regularly 'personal' in form, just as our Bibles make them, issued in the King's individual name. Everything is even egotistically exuberant in the terms upon the records. In fact the Biblical edicts are restrained examples. Not only had the potentates no scruples in rebuilding temples, whether to Yahweh or to Marduk, but such scruples as they were conscious of were doubtless in the reverse direction. Nothing like the spirit of a Christian martyr, set with deathly desperation against the slightest recognition of any alien God, could have possibly found a place within the ideas of the Achæmenians, nor could they have understood such a thing, if it had been suggested to them by some adviser. These Achæmenids were men of business and practical to the finest point, and this from the very nature of their case. They

had undertaken to rule a formitable number of important and sometimes bulky nations dwelling in immense tracts on either side of them, even from Egypt to India, as well as from Turkestan to the Southern seas; — and they had no idea whatsoever of trifling with the situation as to any particular. These great multitudes of human beings had the common feelings of their race, and were sensitive, each one of them, beyond all reasonable doubt, as to his own individual religious convictions; and this these Rulers recognised with sympathy. Conscience, instead of urging them not to build for Gods whom they otherwise ignored, would, on the contrary, have led them to such acts.

This would be my first point: the Inscriptions prove amply that the Persian government rebuilt places of worship destroyed by military arson; and this as one of the first dictates of policy and honour. And if there had been no such passages as we find in Chronicles, Ezra and Isaiah, we should know from the Inscriptions alone that Persian gold, if not Persian workmen, had helped on the labour when the House of Yahweh was fully restored or re-erected at Jerusalem upon the Return.

From this we see that the most obvious items which were presented in evidence of the close connection betwen the tribes of the Restoration and the great Achaemenians were in no sense spurious, although we have claimed no exceptional authority for them.

Section VIII.

The Aryan Inscriptions, and the Aryan Languages.

The Cyrus Vase Inscription then beyond all shadow of a doubt, provides us with an effective and decisive parallel to the statements which are now forced once more upon our critical attention.

The detailed passages of Holy Writ are absolutely justified as proving to us that the Jews of the Return, I mean of course their leaders (chiefly), had exact ideas as to the animus of Cyrus, his customs and his power. The picture which they draw is no miniature nor an over-coloured caricature, but an extended canvas, in harmony with the real conditions of affairs, an image to the life; the Cyrus of Chronicles, Ezra and Isaiah is the self-same man whose long since recorded words have been so wonderfully preserved to us upon those few inches of material which we now most justly hold to be exceptionally precious.

But the Vase Inscriptions, though it is the issue of the great Aryan Ruler, is in Assyrian; and in this discussion the very shape of the words possesses point. Moreover (strange as it may seem to say it) the Vase Inscription lacks certain elements of confirmation.

The Aryan Achaemenian Inscriptions.

Their scenic and topographical characteristics.

A Chapter in Parenthesis.

And here I must bring in an element which at the first glance might appear to some superior readers to be quite of the minor class, and hardly telling at all upon this present side in the debate; that is to say, not upon the effectiveness of the Iranian Inscriptions as an element in the argument. And in some other stages of the investigation these details which I am now about to present become indeed once more subordinate.

Let this section be then regarded as being rather a meditation in parenthesis. For it is the physical substance or rather the lack of substance through the cutting out of stoney matter which I desire to recall here for a moment into view, as also the geographical considerations which adhere to them.

We have already read the so-called Edicts in the Chronicles and Ezra, (to linger for a moment once more here upon these particulars already cited) with their striking terms put chiefly into the mouth of Cyrus, but also into those of his successors. We have shown from the Vase writing (so far as that extends as a witness) how those records were possible to have been published by the Chronicler and by Ezra at the times stated, for this could not have been made certain except

through some contemporaneous authority. But the Manuscripts of ancient literature, inestimably precious as they are, have yet their limits, and so the vases and cylinders, for their claims are chiefly moral to the most of us.

Those claims are indeed acute and impress us with a sense of certainty, and they also stir a mental thrill within us when we consider the frail thread of mechanical life on which they hang. But when we turn to the Aryan Inscriptions we are met with something otherwise not comparable as testimony, appealing likewise directly to our aesthetic susceptibilities.

The Aryan Achaemenian Inscriptions have especial elements of Authority.

The clay Vase Inscription which possesses such a strong and almost irresistible intellectual hold upon us, though endowed with a sort of piquant charm to us from the very fact of its so delicate material and from the precarious existence through which it has persisted throughout a protracted period before it came into our possession, yet lacks some elements which our Iranian ones possess. It not only misses that impressive element which their physical dimensions and scenic positions give the Aryan Achaemenian Inscriptions, but to a certain minute degree a percentage of uncertainty inheres within the considerations which render it so valuable to us. Not at all because it has been for a long time hidden. This latter circumstance only enhances its

value, as its seems to me, in the acme of our interested search.

But if a Ruler of Babylonian Persia could write down such statements as we have in Chronicles and upon the Cyrus Vase at the time and place thereby of necessity indicated as the dates and homes of those so memorable writings, then of course any other person whosoever he might be could have done the same, and at any later date; that is to say, any person at all conversant with the more important transactions of the day, and possessing sufficient social status to secure the mechanical execution of the objects. The descriptions and traditions of the great supposed events must have flooded everything everywhere and for a long time after their supposed occurrence, and with the closest of details, and also (let us confess it) sometimes with the amplest of exaggerations. Every 'story-teller of Israel' and of Persian Babylon, whosoever he might be, could, even centuries after their asserted date, repeat these grand though simple annals; and if he repeated them at all he would most probably be more than willing to recall the imperial deeds of his country's former so eminent Ally, and with the usual inevitable result.

The very minor pupils of the schools, Assyrian or Jewish, in many a later period must also have often heard some intended echoes of the supposed events, and that as household words, if indeed there were such occurrences at all within the scope of public knowledge; and all this quite simply and as a thing of course.

But do we actually know from the Cyrus Vase and from the Scripture Edicts that the entire mass of these professed contemporaneous accounts is not really and in its bulk as original a complete imposture and altogether of a later date? For what have we at all as evidence approaching to an eye-sight upon objects to certify to us with ultimate effect upon us that those records were really so old, original and actual as they are now so thought without reserve by most of us to be? Where could the lot of them, the supposed authors of these writings (let us ask), the annalists, the reciters, the commentators and the engravers have got the incipient forms of their ideas as to these alleged collossal deeds at all, and at the dates and places which we have so freely claimed for them? I ask this question as referring to the entire classes living at the times in view, the monarchs, the nobles, the priests and the prophets. How do we actually know that such a state of knowledge was at all at hand with them as we have supposed to have existed in accepting the Vase Inscription, the Edicts, and the other literature of the time, and that which refers historically to it?

We believe indeed and fervently enough, nay we are critically convinced that the Vase is genuine as being contemporaneous with Cyrus and that it was engraved at his command, and that its Assyrian has been practically made out; and our scientific certainty is all the more refined because it is concerned with what is the reverse of gross, but is it

so completely justified as not to be conceivably erroneous? (Let us also not forget that all the supposed related facts which meet us in our Bibles and which are so very dear to many of us are themselves and most of all at stake). How then can we be so positively sure that Cyrus had expressed himself in the very singular manner narrated by the writers in Chronicles and in Ezra, and by the writers who prepared the statements which were engraved upon the Vase and upon its many replicas, if the Vase Inscription lacks any elements of certainty?

Many scholars, whether closely critical or not, may have been, and, as I believe, many were immoveably sceptical as to most of the Scriptural details with regard to the Return and its Imperial subvention, doubting the whole account of it from its beginning on; see above on page 216.

The Biblical Edicts are indeed of themselves alone of a certain weight, and this whatsoever may have been their actual date when they were first recognised as documents in our oldest surviving Hebrew manuscripts; but they need themselves, and sorely, to be confirmed, and this also (although with greatly less persistence) we may say of the Vase Inscription.

As to the rejoinder; 'that the firmest conclusions of even the most advanced of specialists must be always somewhat subtle to the common mind in their chain of reasoning from premise to conclusion'; I will do nothing whatsoever but acquiesce in it. But the following facts remain.

These Bible passages, in spite of our previous life-long intellectual couvictions, or pietistic confidence, might, as I would say, be one and all of them later inserted into the places where they occur in the Hebrew records. For there is literally nothing ancient upon paper, vellum or papyrus, which is absolutely entire as measured by what it originally was. Interpolation, hiatus, detrition have marred completeness everywhere. How then are we so absolutely sure that these people, the Kings, the Prophets and the Scribes, could have known those things at all and at Cyrus' time, or that these events in fact transpired. The Cyrus Vase Inscription itself, almost inestimably precious as it is, is more of a document than an absolutely certain monument, and this most positively.

That it is fragile of course enhances its acute interest in our eyes, and greatly so, as I have already said, but nothing dimensional confirms it. It might even conceivably have been falsified intentionally, forged in fact from its beginning to its close, finding its way also later in the course of time into some Babylonian Noble's library, where it has been (at last after so long a sleep) discovered, like the shoals of other counterfeits.

But who can doubt the authenticity of Behistūn!

Could an Persian Emporer, even if he had the wish to do so, have set a mass of architects, builders and sculptors to work to master that formidable

ascent, three hundred feet above the plain [1]), and to hew out a series of falsifications concerning common public facts of notorious import upon a well known mountain side (not that every individual item there chiselled was really intended to be executed as literally true).

The point which I am endeavouring to drive home upon the convictions of my readers is the unassailable fact of the authorship at the particular time and place of those magnificent details, and so also the full possibility that the others like them in their contents, that is to say, those in the Biblical Edicts and upon the Vase, can likewise be regarded as absolutely genuine and contemporaneous with the events which they are supposed, and which they profess so fully to describe.

Here are the very texts themselves engraved upon the open front of a conspicious eminence in forms which must have taken months or even a few years in those slow days to cut out mechanically after arranging the surfaces for their reception, while the to them so deeply interesting process must have been watched by many a group from Darius's Government from the beginning to the completion, as well as by the passers-by.

So also of their well-mated sister records of Naksh-i-Rustem, Van, Alvand (while those of Persepolis and others within domiciles would be some-

[1] Diodorus Siculus, 2, 13, as Jackson recalls; see JAOS, 24, 78, 1903, wishes us to believe that Semiramis reached the summit of the Mountain through having masses of luggage heaped up from the level of the plain. Does this tend to show that some kind of scaffolding was used to assist the ascent at the time of Darius?

what less obvious to the public gaze). It really seems to me to be the fact, and I do not at all see how we can gainsay it that we have here in these Inscription some of the very excessively few original and therefore positively certified relics of the intellectual life of man, that is to say so far as regards these earlier dates, and the advanced character of their contents.

The existing evidence of the life of books is indeed impressive to us when we take a moment to consider it, and this just in proportions as the links in their identity from the earlier generations to the later ones may seem to us to be so slight. A little scrap of fibrous matter, brittle and exposed to destruction from a score of causes, it seems indeed to us to be almost trivial as the eye falls down upon it; but yet it has been to us an absolutely indispensable section in the long continued life-time of immortal thoughts, just as a single human being is a continuation of a precarious line, often at times with scarce a hope of its survival, from the remote ancestor to the just born descendant. So first from memoriser to memoriser and then later from copy to copy, or from replica to replica (in the case of vases, steles, and cylinders) its endangered existence has persisted through generations of the world's calamities. It is the frail life of human ideas which has been dependent upon a chip of clay, a shred of paper, or a scroll of vellum, and the very feebleness of this flicker of the mental breath makes what it is and what it announces to us all the more endeared, and likewise as we might

safely say of it, all the more sublime. A slender thread of human beauty it has stretched on to us in its precarious continuity unbroken in the very midst of arson, frauds, ignorance and above all of vandalism. It indeed affords us one striking proof the more of that so solemn circumstance, namely 'that the laws of life are really as inexorable amongst us as the laws of death'.

This has sublimity indeed, and I would be the last to point one sentence to lessen it, or mar its charm. *But there is another sublimity.* Amidst the now so indefinitively repeated masses of man's recorded efforts to carry on the knowledge of the world, with which devoted labour our presses have been groaning since the first use of types, no solitary specimen of an original handwriting back of a certain date has been preserved to us as absolutely fixed in its claims to be accredited as regards its time and place of origin.

The oldest Manuscript even of the venerable Veda itself is, strange as one might well consider the circumstance to be, comparatively new, the mere vibration of a note in an echo from the once mighty volume of early Indian song.

But here at Behistūn we stand in imagination beside our travellers and look upon an immoveable elevation bearing beyond all question the very characters which were cut upon its surface more than two thousand four hundred years ago. It is the Great Manuscript of Manuscripts (if we might permit ourselves for a moment so to speak of it). We see the very cavities carved out by the chisels

which were driven by the hands of men who were alive when the distinguished Ruler himself doubtless stood (and more than once) upon the timbers of the temporary structures, and watched the skilful touches of the hewers as they so deftly fitted in the shapes: surely this too has its grandeur; and it holds us silent, as much so as the little piece of pottery, with its truly formidable record (formidable in the immensity of its historical import). Here we have beyond all doubt existing products of 'the pen of iron' from human hands that were original at the work, and these results still stamped upon a mountain from the very body of the earth, at once a record and a portion of the Great Empire which arose, culminated and perished in its allotted periods.

The broken columns of the Palace upon the esplanade which spreads beside a valuable group of these Inscriptions at Persepolis are witnesses indeed to what is transitory. They tell us many a grand, if likewise also many a terrific tale of a once elaborated splendour and of its annihilation, but here is a living element like the soul of a departed body still speaking to us yet and from the selfsame tablets as clearly as when the plains around them swarmed with the troops of the great Organiser, and the stately walls of the original edifices stood in the bloom of their artistic decoration. Strange witnesses indeed these are, as we may remark by way of interlude in passing, and from a very special reason, of the transitory state of human prominence, uttering as they do their magni-

ficent asservations of universal sovereignty (see the momentous passages repeated more than twice), each at the time of its execution expressing a mighty truth, namely that the very habitable globe, that is to say, the to them then known part of it, had been delivered by Almighty God to the Author of these writings to be ruled by him; while the fallen pillars, from these very facts, do but point out to us more vividly the fate of that same regal authority which has now for ever though not untimely passed away. While manuscripts and replicas are good indeed as hear-say evidence, these letters upon the walls of Persepolis and upon the living rock of Behistūn, (Van, Helvand Naksh-i-Rustem) seem to me to be like the hands of the ancient dead which we may grasp to-day as if they were present, and feel the very pulses beat within them as when they traced the great records which we have here before us, Terrestrial sites and scenic bearings as well as the relatively large dimensions of these impressive objects here assume an intellectual dignity beyond that which they originally possessed; for they make the texts which express the records of departed men for ever sure to us.

Manuscripts may vary through fraud or accident, and chasms of wholesale destruction may occur; but here are texts which a score of centuries could not have changed. All the vases of all the excavations might conceivably have been later written than at the time to which we would assign them, but here are characters cut upon a fixed substance from which they cannot move, and so high up upon

its surface that they could not be hid nor reached to ruin. Surely they and their sisters are alone in this their so exceptional authority.

The solitary still articulate voices (so they seem to me to be) from an otherwise now irrecoverable history [1].

Delapidation.

They have been mutilated slightly and in parts, and a little streamlet in the season's rains has obliterated here and there a syllable or indeed entire words, but these are fortunately for the most part easily to be restored from other places where the self-same sentences recur.

Section IX.

The Decipherment of Behistūn, etc.

The Jews and Persians conferred in Babylonia.

They have long since been deciphered and also gradually and elaborately worked up in translation from the early days of Grotefend just one century ago. Those of Behistūn have been rendered largely independently (let me say it with gratification), and sometimes first, by our own great Sir Henry Rawlinson, whose memory will last revered among us so long as genius is respected. Their. phraseology is simple and austere; but it carries on the ideas with singular effect. Possibly we owe the suc-

[1] Not that we must forget the throngs of still extant fixed Inscrtptions upon other themes. Yet even with these in view we may still ask 'what is there comparable to Behistūn and its Persian mates'.

cinctness of the style to this; for at Behistūn every distinct letter was cut out by workmen upon a narrow ledge, or upon some temporary structure erected for the purpose, perhaps on scaffolds laboriously placed, the surface of the rock having been beautifully polished for its reception; and observers say that the seams between the inserted stones fit in so well together that one can scarcely see at a little distance the lines of separation. These great Inscriptions were not so accessible of course to Jews as those in Babylonia; but the substance of them could not fail to have been known to the leading citizens when the precincts of Babylon swarmed with Persian troops as also with their new but sympathetic friends. And we know also from a later document of great value as at least an hearsay evidence, what we might well also have surmised quite a priori, which is that the so-called 'captive' Exiles were not at all confined to Babylon. The Book of Esther alone tends to prove to us that parts of them found their way as far at least as Shushan (so), a supposed summer residence of the ruling Family. The Persians, haughty as they were, and flushed with victory, would be all the more disposed to make their ideas known as well political as formally religious; and the more freely too although, of course, for the most part in general only, to these their now especial friends and dependants, in fact, to their sincere though comparatively so insignificant allies.

Let us then treat these Iranian Inscriptions just as we have treated the Vase Inscription, but

putting items here in the foremost place which do not occupy that position in our treatment of the Vase; and we shall soon see how the one set of writings corroborates the other.

Section IX, a

Beside irrefutable Authority the Aryan Inscriptions expand in a certain way the statements of the Assyrian-aryan Inscription.

As the Aryan Inscriptions absolutely certify to us their dates and the places of their origin, so they bring in with them all the related details of the contemporaneous history, exact as some of those items may be supposed to be, and also those which are not so closely in accordance with a probable or even possible sequence of events. For, let us not at all forget it, false history or history chequered with the various forms of familiar error (and what history is not like this) is, like our ancient Avesta Commentary, often most suggestive to us where the items of precious truth glint to our eyesight only from the midst of innumerable fabrications phantastic (some of them) to the verge of comedy, or subtle in their more rational suggestions.

As it is my object to develop as fully as may be possible a description of the general state of religious [1] sentiment among the Persians at the time of their intimate relation with the exiled tribes of

[1] I do not pause here upon the minor inscriptions found in '<6 or '38, in, etc. etc,

Israel in Persian Babylonia, in order to do so I must endeavour to bring all our documents without exception as sources of evidence into line with one another.

And we can do this in the case of the Inscriptions of Darius and the Biblical Edicts of Cyrus, upon the strength of the many different facts. The Inscriptions of Darius, and his successors detail to us much valued religious sentiment of a peculiar kind as well as a large mass of historical facts (in outline) closely analogous to the events which occurred in the career of Cyrus; and we can for certain objects and within a certain range argue from these latter data most logically back to their predecessors; that is to say, we can most surely infer from these known annals of this Reign of Darius the past existence of masses of such records which must have been made at the command of Cyrus, but which have perished; and we can do this for the following reasons among others. If Darius continued on the impressive career of conquest, re-conquest and discipline so gloriously begun by Cyrus, we may be sure that these were practically identical in animus, as they were continuous in fact, with those of his Predecessor, only the obvious necessary superficial differences being held in mind.

The Inscriptions of Darius bear upon Cyrus.

We can therefore corroborate many general statements in the Jewish records concerning Cyrus by those upon the Iranian Inscriptions regarding Darius

within of course certain limits rationally defined. But we can do more, we can infer the religious animus of Cyrus from the expressed religious sentiment of Darius and with even greater precision than we can from Cyrus' own scanty relics. And this from a very particular and stringent cause, never yet, as I suppose, so fully stated elsewhere, if indeed at all. It will be better to describe it here at once, though I must revert to it later on.

Section IX, b.

The elements of Identity between the Monuments of Cyrus and those of Darius.

It is this; the religious sentiment in the Inscriptions of Darius and his successors, marked as it is, is only to be considered as being, in an exceptional sense *altogether really personal. And this is proved by the fact that its expressions are, so to speak, stereotyped.* Exactly the same syllables express precisely the same thoughts; and that within a large interval of nearly one hundred and fifty years [1], and these as adopted by the successive monarchs of distinctly differing characters and living under different circumstances, as the expression of their faith. If the religious terms were thus 'stereotyped', it proves that they expressed a traditional religious sentiment which was habitually professed by the Persian Kings; and this at once shows us that a certain sincere, or affected, religious sentiment was widely current at least among the upper classes of the vast communities, while it is impossible to say how far deep

[1] From Darius' date to that of Ochus, a period big with events.

down this sentiment may not have reached among the less susceptible inferior populations. If their Kings were constitutionally and officially religious the people must have at least professed to be animated by similar sentiments; and the young among them may often have experienced genuine religious convictions and compunctions. This being the case, we have the important result that we can argue from the expressed sentiment of Darius to that of Cyrus even aside from such statements as he Cyrus has himself so scantily left recorded for us to read and to explain.

We must also take the wider extent and greater bulk of the expressions in the Iranian Inscriptions at the same time into account; see above. Even their reiterations of the self-same sentiments have their effect upon us, and are justly significant.

These expressions; see them cited below; being so constant, uniform, and expected *actually cast more light*, as I would emphatically repeat, *upon the state of feeling at the time of Cyrus than the one extended Inscription left to us by Cyrus himself has done.*

With this interpolated preface we can at once proceed to re-examine the relation which exists between the Biblical passages which mention Cyrus, and the mighty Inscriptions which detail the deeds and thoughts of his great, though not immediate Successor, not of course losing sight altogether of what has been already said upon the Semitic phases of the subject.

Section X.

The Bible Edicts, now more closely compared with the Iranian Inscriptions.

The subject of the Vase Inscription belonged to Babylon; see above; and the leading Jews must indeed have heard the substance of its contents stated and discussed between their educated personages, and this more times than once. A very few of them may also have seen one or more of its many 'copies', if I am correct in my conjecture that our so greatly valued specimen is merely one replica out of a large 'edition'. But the Inscriptions of Darius were on extensive tablets; see above. They stand to-day on Mt. Behistūn, on the walls of the buildings at Persepolis, at Naḳsh-i-Rustem, 15 kilometres N.W. of Persepolis, at Elvend (or Alvand), at Kerman, Susa, Suez, Van, Hamadan, or on temple pillars and prostrate columns, on seals and weights, and vases. The subject matter of these Inscriptions, like that of the Vase of Cyrus, could not fail to have been familiar to the Jews of the Babylonian Provinces for reasons at which I have already hinted. And what the great Iranian Inscriptions said, though few might actually read them in their letter, all officers of the King's Government must certainly have known, for though they are extensive when regarded as Inscription, their literary compass is necessarily but small.

Subject Matter of the Inscriptions; Extent of the Empire.

Upon one of them we have first of all the plainest and most exact details as to the extent of the Persian

sway in its relation to the expressions in Chronicles, Ezra and Isaiah. We believe from the Biblical Edicts that the vast extent of the Domain of Cyrus was common talk with the leading Jews, because that of his Successor was such, and we know this latter entirely aside from our mere belief, and with positive certainty from the Behistūn Inscriptions, the main contents of which must have been universally known to all prominent people of the day as well as to those who practically witnessed their execution. In fact these Inscriptions stand for us as an epitome of all the current historical political information of their period; and that is my chief point at this time just here in citing them. Here is a full, or at least an approximately full list of all the nationalities under the sway of Cyrus's near, though not immediate Successor.

The Empire in its Constituent Parts.

Behistūn, I, V, (l. 13). »Thus saith Dārayavaush (Darius) the King: These were the lands which fell to me: by the gracious will of Auramazda I was their King, Pārsa (Persia), Uvaja (Susa) Bābirush (Babylon), Athurā (Assyria), Arabāya (Arabia), Mudrāya (Egypt), tyaiy darayahyā, those of the Sea (the Islands), Sparda (Lydia (?)), Yaunā (Ionia), Māda (Media), Armina (Armenia), Katpatuka (Cappadocia), Parthava (Parthia), Zarāka (Drangiana), Haraiva (Arīa), Uvārazmiya (Chorasmia), Bākhtrish (Baktria), Suguda (Sogdiana), Gādāra (Gandara), Saka (Sythia), Thatagush (Sattagidia (so)), Harauvatish (Arachosia), Maka (Mekran), in all twenty three nations... Through the favour-

able will of Auramazda they became subject to me«. Here is a literal statement in almost business language. It is of great scientific importance, if only for the establishment of ancient geography. That list comprehends what most Persians would then have called the *urbs et orbis*, or all of it that signified.

The Vase Inscription gave us only a few vague terms. Here we have a mighty catalogue which rests as the foundation stones of history upon the subject, and whose stately particulars beyond all doubt constituted the data for instruction upon the history of the Empire in every institute of learning, and it shows us also as convincingly that such information was spread also in other ways in the time of the Predecessor, Cyrus.

But we should especially note the close similarity of the religious formulas which accompany the expressions in the biblical edicts on the one side and those upon the tablets on the other.

The Divine Sanction Claimed.

»All the kingdoms of the earth hath the Lord »the God of Heaven given me,« this in this one place; and the list of almost the then known habitable Earth on the other, with the words »'through »the might of Auramazda I became their King'«: »When Auramazda saw this earth confused (or 'in »war') He delivered it over unto me«, NR. a, IV (l. 32).

In the same way we may treat the other expressions in our valued Scriptures. »Thus said »the Lord to Cyrus whose right hand I have holden »to subdue nations before him, and to loose the

»loins of Kings.« How did the writers get at these ideas, so natural as they seem to us; for every romancer would have used such words with little care or limit. We have the question: »did this most interesting Biblical statement exist at all as the reported saying of Yahweh, the Lord, through his distinguished Prophet, at any approximately corresponding date? Was the passage indeed contemporaneous with Ezra; and was it possible that it could be contemporaneous with him, or was it simply inserted later, and, as it were, spuriously into this place?« That it could have existed at the time of Cyrus we know positively first from the Inscriptions which carry on the Cyrus records, and from them alone.

The Usurpation of the false Bardiya; i. e. of Smerdes, and his Overthrow.

We turn to further parts of them and we read, Behistūn Inscription, A column, I, X (l. 26): »Thus »saith Darius the King: This is what was done by »me after I became King. One by the name of »Kambujiya (Cambyses) the son of Kuru (Cyrus) of »our family was formerly king here. This Kambujiya »had a brother, Bardiya by name, of the same »father and of the same mother. Kambujiya (Cam»byses) slew that Bardiya. When this happened the »people had had no knowledge that Bardiya had »been slain. Thereupon Kambujiya went to Egypt, »and upon his departure the people revolted. The »Plotting Imposture (literally 'the Lie') made pro-

»gress in the provinces, as well in Persia as in »Media also in the other provinces'«.

I, XI (l. 35)«. Thus saith Darius the King: After »that a certain man, a Magian of the name of Gau-»māta, revolted in Paishiyāuvādā in the neighbourhood »of a Mount Arakadrish. From there he began. It was »in the month Viyakhna, on the 14th day of the month »when he revolted. Thus he deceived the people: »'I am Bardiya, son of Kuru, brother of Kambujiya'. »Thereupon the entire population revolted against »Kambujiya, Persia as well as Media and the other »provinces went over to him, Bardiya. He seized »the government in the month Garmapada on the »ninth day. Thereupon Kambujiya died by his »own hand[1]. . . .«

The Severity of Gaumāta and his Intimidations.

»Then Gaumāta the Magian took Persia as »well as Media and the other provinces from Kam-»bujiya; he acted according to his own will; (that is to »say, he attained complete success); he became King.«

I, XIII (l. 48). »Thus saith Darius the King: There »was no one, neither Persian, nor Mede, nor any »of our family who wrested the Kingdom from Gau-»māta the Magian (God did not loose his loins) the »people feared him much ('on account') of his »daring impetuosity[2]. He wished to put many to »death who had known the former Bardiya. For this »reason he wished to slay them, lest they should know »me that I am not Bardiya, the son of Kuru (Cyrus).«

[1] See Herodotus, who however reports this matter as if it were an accident.

[2] His fury, or cruelty (?); so Rawlinson and Sp.; W. & B., sehr (?).

The Plea of Darius.

I, XII (l. 43). »Thus saith Darius the King: »The authority which Gaumāta, the Magian, seized »from Kambujiya (Cambyses) was from of old in »our family«.

The Plot of Assassination and the Accession.

»No one dared to utter a word concerning »Gaumāta the Magian till I came. Then I called »on Auramazda for aid. Auramazda brought me »help. It was in the month Bāgayādish on the »tenth day; then I slew him and his principal ad- »herents with a few men. There is a fortress Sik- »ayauvatish by name, in a region Nisāya by name »in Media; there I slew him, and took the Kingdom »from him. Though the gracious will of Auhar- »mazda I became King. Auharmazda delivered the »Kingdom to me ...« [1].

Darius establishes his Throne; Pretenders are subdued and executed.

I, XVI (l. 73). »Thus said Darius the King: When »I had slain Gaumāta the Magian, there was a man, »Atrina by name, a son of Upadarma [2] who arose in »Susa, (Uvaja): thus he spake: 'I am King in Susa'. »Thereon the inhabitants of Susa revolted. He was »King in Susa«.

I, XVIII (l. 82). »Thereupon I sent my host to

[1] Recall once more the words of the Chronicler, cited above, »all the kingdoms of the worlds hath the Lord the God of Heaven given me.«

[2] So Weissbach; 'Upadarma'.

Susa: This Atrina was bound in chains and »brought to me and I slew him«[1].

II, XXIV (l. 13). »Thus saith Darius the »King: A man Fravartish by name, a Mede, arose »against me in Media; thus said he to the people: »I am Khshathrita of the family of Uvakhshatra (so, »Uvakhshtra(?)): thereupon the Medish population that »were in the Palace revolted (?) to that Fravartish. »He became King in Media«.

II, XXV (l. 19). »Thus saith Darius the King: The »Persian and Median host, which was with me was »small, thereupon I sent the Army. There was a »Persian, Vidarna by name, my servant; him I made »my commander-in-chief, and I ordered him: 'March »hence and smite that Median host that calls itself »not mine'. Thereupon Vidarna marched with the »host forth. As he entered Media there is a city, »Marush by name in Media. Here he delivered »battle with the Medes. The commander of the »Medes did not presevere. Auramazda brought me »aid; through the gracious will of Auramazda the »host of Vidarna smote that rebellious host right »sore. On the twenty-seventh day of the month »Anāmaka was it.

II, XXVI (l. 29). »Thus saith Darius the King: »('Armenia had revolted against him) I sent my »servant, Dādarshish by name, an Armenian, to »Armenia saying, to him: 'March hence and smite »that rebellious army which does not call itself mine'. »Thereupon Dādarshish marched to Armenia, and

[1] He seems to have executed these offending Monarchs with his own hands. Was this however really meant?

»the rebels assembled and marched against him to »deliver battle. There is a settlement Zuzza (? so) »by name in Armenia. There they delivered battle. »Auramazda brought me aid; through the gracious »will of Auramazda my host smote that rebellious »host right sore. On the eighth day of the month »Thuravāhara it was that the battle was delivered.«

II, XXVII (l. 37). »Thus saith Darius the King: »For the second time the rebels assembled to de- »liver battle against Dādarshish. There is a fortress, »Tigra by name in Armenia; there they delivered »battle. Auramazda brought me aid. Through the »gracious will of Auramazda my host smote that »rebellious host right sore. On the 18th day of »the month Thuravāhara was the battle delivered.«

Column IV Behistun, (l. 31). »Thus saith Darius »the King, what I have done, that was done through »the gracious will of Auramazda in all manner. »After I became King I delivered nineteen battles. »Through the favourable will of Auramazda, I took »prisoner nine kings. Gaumāta, . . Atr̆ina in Uvaja »(Susa) Nadiˇtabaira (Nidintu-bel) in Babylon, . . . »Martiya, a Persian (again) in Susa . . . Fravartish »a Mede, . . . Chitr̆antakhma a Sagartian . . . Frāda, »again a Magian, of Margiana, . . . Vahyazdāta, a »Persian, . . . Arakha, an Armenian.«

IV, LII (l. 31). »Thus saith Darius the King: »'These nine kings have I taken in those battles«. No wonder that Isaiah could venture to write of the predecessor as he did, for Cyrus out-did Darius, as we understand. We might almost hope that the record was exaggerated; see Behistun II, XXXII (l. 73). »Thus

»saith Darius the King; Fravartish was taken and »brought to me. I cut off his nose, ears, and I »cut out his tongue, and stabbed out his eyes. He »was chained in my court; all men saw him, then »I had him empaled in Hagmatāna (Ekbatana). »His principal adherents I imprisoned, and had them »spitted in the fortress in Ekbatana.«

Of Chitřantakhma we have, Behistun II, XXXIII (l. 88): »They took Chitřantakhma and brought him »to me. Then I cut off his nose and ears and »stabbed his eyes out. In my court he was chain- »ed; all men saw him; then I had him empaled in »Arbaira (Arbela.)«

The current Oral Reports are justified.

The hearsay which is supposed to have formed the substratum for all these expressions of the great Hebrew prophet or the Chroniclers is *justified.* It is absolutely sure at least that it *could* have been contemporaneous with the events, and it is also probable to the last degree that it was so contemporaneous. For these dicta from the Inscriptions must have summed up the principal items of all learned teaching, if not indeed of all school history throughout the United Nations; see above. The Jewish scholars knew many a copy of these records, if not indeed with absolute accuracy; and beyond a question they all referred to them and to similar statements made by Cyrus, or in his name, which statements were mates, so to express myself, without doubt, to the solitary specimen which we so

luckily have found. And though it may seem almost superfluous to prove such an easily conjectured fact as that the passages in Chronicles, Ezra, and Isaiah are genuine, and that their authors wrote them from widely current beliefs founded upon documents, yet it is never so well to despise anything whatsoever in a cause like this; and the substantiation of this fact assists the substantiation of that other which I have named, and of still others which I hope to state.

With regard to Babylon.

We have also from these Inscriptions a welcome word of corroboration with regard to Cyrus and at Babylon; that is to say, unless we think an Inscription engraved upon a mountain side is of less importance than one cut on a portable clay vase, or indeed of less importance than a book! The Cyrus vase[1] describes the capture of the great City; see also the historians; but the Vase might conceivably be spurious as we must not forget, and the historians false. It is far less conceivable however that Darius should falsify wholesale upon these tablets, or that others should have forged his name in such a place; see above.

The Cyrus Vase declares that Babylon was taken, and by Cyrus; so Isaiah also implies, not naming the fact however. But from Behistūn we become absolutely certain of it. It belonged to the Empire before Darius, and he, Darius, retook it, as we shall see. And indeed he seems to have re-taken it more than once. This proves that it was a part of Cyrus' conquests, for Cambyses did little in that

direction; and so it corroborates the Clay Vase, as well as the statements of the Greeks.

The passage in its detail is as follows: Behistūn I, XVI (l. 77): »Thus saith Darius the King: »There was a Babylonian, Nadi̇tabaira (Nidintu-»Bel by name, the son of Anaira's (Aniri') he re-»volted in Babylon. Thus he lied to the people: »I am Nabukudracara (Nebukadrezar), the son of »Nabunaita (Nabuna'id). Thereupon the entire Baby-»lonian population went over to him. He seized »the government in Babylon«.

I, XVIII (l. 83). »Thus saith Darius the King: »Thereupon I went to Babylon against that Nidintu-»Bel who called himself Nebukadrezar. The army »of Nidintu-Bel held the Tigris. There he planted »himself, and was also by the vessels (Sp. 'in »boats' (?)). Thereupon I divided my army into »two parts [1]. . . . Auramazda brought me help. »Through the favourable will of Auramazda we »crossed the Tigris, and I smote that host of Ni-»dintu-Bel at will. It was on the 26th day of the »month Atr̆iyādiya that we delivered battle. (19) »Thus saith Darius the King: Thereupon I drew «toward Babylon (itself). Before I arrived at Baby-»lon there is a city called Zāzāna (Zazannu) on »the Ŭfrātāu (Euphrates). There was that Nidintu-»Bel, who called himself Nebukadrezar. He had gone »there with his army to deliver battle against me.

[1] So at least W., & B. better than Sp. 's useful explanation W. & B. conjecturally reading Madyakāuvā, Sp. has — makāwā. W. & B. read usabārim akunavam aniyabyā aspā patyānayam. 'One part I mounted on camels, I provided horses for the others'.

»Thereupon we delivered battle. Auramazda brought »me aid; through the gracious will of Auramazda I »smote that host right sore. The enemy was driven »into the water [1]; the water carried him forth. On »the second day of the month Anāmaka it was »when we delivered battle.«

20 Behistūn II, XX (l. 1) »Thus saith Darius »the King: thereupon (Naidĭtabaira (Nidintu-Bel) »went with a few horsemen to Babylon (itself); »through the gracious will of Auramazda I took »Babylon and that Nidintu-Bel, and I slew him in »Babylon.« Surely the Isaiah of the period might venture to write as he did, for he must have had in his mind's eye similar records, if he was not actually citing parts of these. Replicas of the contents of every Inscription of course abounded on every side, as well as oral reports. And here comes in once more what I think is plainly deducible from the facts, which is that earlier Inscripions, if they were made at all, must have been modelled upon forms like those surviving to us, for those of Xerxes (B. C. 485—463) are exactly uniform with those of Darius (about B. C. 521—485), those of Artaxerxes the II, 404—358 with those of Xerxes, while those of Artaxerxes III (B. C. 358 (?) — 338 (?)) have still fuller sections of identical phraseology.

Isaiah does not mention Babylon here indeed, but his words are unmistakeable at this most striking place. 'Babylon' was a ringing word with exiles, to some of them, the commonest of painful thoughts. He says 'the gates', but he never thought

[1] in time of flood?

to name the place [1]. The very essential increment which the above adds to the foundations of our knowledge needs hardly to be shown.

Section XI.

Objections Recalled and Amplified.

But objections must not only be met, they should be recalled, and where not otherwise reported; they must be constructed and suggested; and this even where they are not actually vital. Is it conceivable, so some of my Jewish or Christian readers might inquire, that a gentile Monarch could at all harbour in his mind such lofty conceptions as we see expressed as well in the Scripture texts as in the Vase writing?

To answer this we must inquire exhaustively into the interior character of Cyrus's Religion. What was then the nature of his God?, in theory at least and losing sight of the ferocious deeds done either by Himself or by His adherents in His name.

XIa.

The God of Cyrus and of Darius as He is described upon the Tablets. Elohē Hashshāmayim is Devá.

And here we come at once upon an item which is of some technical interest, if not indeed of a startling character, for it may well afford us that internal evidence which is so precious to a serious critic. It may help us to prove that the real author of the professed Edict in Chronicles and

[1] In Daniel we have it: see also v. 31.

in Ezra was indeed not a Semitic scribe patching up a falsified report, but an Aryan man, as the text asserts. The expression with which both Cyrus, and Artaxerxes after him, there designates the Israelitish Yaweh Elohīm is, according to our Hebrew Texts, »the God of Heaven«, Elohē Hashshāmayim. But the name points at once to the one signal word for God among the great masses of Indo-germanic human beings. What is »the God of Heaven« but »the Heaven-God«, the Devá [1]?, the most marked word of the sort in the entire Aryan speech. »God of Heaven« indeed occurs elsewhere in the Scriptures and is put into the mouths of Semites in Ezra, Jonah, and Nehemiah; and these are post-exilic. Is not the 136th Psalm post-exilic as well? At all events the term is mostly exilic and post-exilic, and it may well have later insinuated its way into some of those passages which were themselves really ante-exilic. The cast of the words may indeed have been an accident, but I say that there is a very serious percentage of probability that what I have suggested is indeed the truth. The words »God of Heaven« may very possibly add a weighty item to the details which go to prove the deeply pervading truth of the Chronicler. He may well have heard that Cyrus's native God was Devá, »He of the Shining Sky«.

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[1] I allude elsewhere to the fact that the Zoroastrian Iranians abandoned this name for God, making it in fact a name for »Demon«; but they too beyond a question once used it originally for the happy spiritual Beings of the Heavenly world.

XI b.

Ahura Mazda (Auramazda).

Who then, on the other hand was this »God of Heaven« in His definitive Iranian name? Or rather what is the meaning of this latter?

As this treatise may of course be read by some who have no experience at all in this linguistic question, I have to say here that the name »Auramazda« would be a very worthy title indeed for any nation to use for its supreme revered Divinity.

The Meaning of the Name.

Ahura is Indian Ásura, a word for God, but conveying in the Gāthic, more of the meaning »Lord«. As to »Mazda« I would not insist too urgently here upon my own once and indeed still preferred solution of it as »the Great Creator«, for my colleagues generally prefer referring the last part of it to a word for »wise«. The Lord »the Wise One« [1].

Whichever view we choose, the name is preeminently appropriate, even for the most devout of populations to sanction, and to revere. In some respects it is superior even to the Jewish Yahweh Elohīm.

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[1] I object to the »modern« sound of the »Wise One«. »Wisdom« is not at all so natural as an early concept; It sounds to me highly rigid, self-conscious, and factitious. The idea of »Wisdom« was first reported by Nēryōsangh, who however saw the meaning »Great« in »Maz-«. I personally hold to another Mazdā = »wisdom« as a feminine.

Anthropomorphic Imagery and Plurality are not Important as Objections.

The figurative allusions to both are fortunately not such serious considerations as to need to be brought up in our counter-criticisms. We have no need to dwell upon »the Lord God walking in his garden«, etc. on the one hand; for if not the Auramazda of the Inscriptions, then at least the Ahura Mazda of the late Avesta is anthropomorphic enough indeed at times, though never is this the case with the original conception of Him as we have it in the Gāthas [1].

Ahura Mazda seldom if ever in the Plural Number.

The name Auramazda (with Darius), was to begin with, obviously not a plural [2]. »Other gods« are indeed mentioned, but it was Auramazda alone who was really intended to be thought to be »Supreme«. But to pass beyond the question of the meaning of the name.

XI c.

Creative Energy as His attribute.

In one place in our Isaiah, to return continually to our Biblical Edicts, the Inscriptions again

[1] The truly astonishing rhetorical addresses to Ahura in Yasna XLIV, were later rather naturally regarded as the interrogatories of an actual conference between Ahura and Zarathushtra, I think, however, inaccurately. There is however an expression in Y. XXXII, which looks like a prayer for a vision in which the saint should behold his Deity and confer with him after the manner of Moses.

[2] See Elohīm. Ahura is no plural, nor is Mazda, though either might be duals, not however with singular verbs.

seem actually borne in mind in their substance at least, if not in their letter, for, speaking in the name of Yahweh Elohīm, he has: »Ask of me concerning my sons and the work of my hands; com»mand ye me. I have made the earth and created »man upon it. I, even my hands, have stretched »out the heavens.« To this the Darius Inscription, echoing, as we are radically sure, the faith of Cyrus, answers as a sort of reaffirmation: »A great God »is Ahura Mazda who made this earth and yon »heaven, who made man.« So with singular iteration in many places scores of years apart. The terms are curt; but remember that they were laboriously produced with difficulty, indeed at every disadvantage; see above.

XI d.

Providential Designations.

The God of Cyrus in a true biblical sense was represented in the Scriptures as concerned immediately with the affairs of His servant. Is this again out of all analogy and an accident?: »For »this cause (it is written) have I raised thee up for »to make My power known.« Was this again pure folly, a mere rude thrusting of Israelitish religious concepts bodily into the public life of Persia, a flattery which neither Cyrus, nor Darius so soon after him, could even have understood? Far from it. As we continue to read, not only did the God of Cyrus's near Successor »make this earth and yon heaven and man«, but he watched over the destiny of His creature; and the Inscriptions state a far-

reaching and indeed supreme doctrine when they add that God created »civilisation«, so I would prefer to render the word [1]. For Darius at once follows up his statement with a direct application of this gracious power of God to himself and to his political system and adherents. »A great god is Auramazda »who made civilization for man, and who made »Darius King; and (therefore, so he evidently implies, therefore) I am Darius the great (meaning »'the supreme') King, the King of kings [2], the King »of lands of many tribes, the King of this great »earth« [3] (because, as we may well supply, Auramazda made it).

Ten times in the course of these necessarily so short Inscriptions, and at intervals separated by many years, this statement is repeated; and naturally the sculptors would not waste their elaborately chiselled words.

The assertion was a Formula of the utmost sanctity [4]; and it suggested a real monotheism in worship as the essential condition of national success and also of the very validity of the royal title, as »divine by right«. Darius was King of all the lands simply because God who created them made him so, as he believed, and as he so fervently asserted.

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[1] Others render the word merely »happiness«, or »abundance of good things« which latter seems to me to convey an idea rather too flat ever to have had a place on the Inscriptions; yet even this, if the proper literal meaning must be understood, is in a wide sense, »optimism«.

[2] Remember the 23 Lands beneath him.

[3] Practically true, for he ruled the greater part of the to him known civilised world, a kind of Eastern Hemisphere.

[4] Commonplace itself becomes tragic or sublime upon these columns.

»As Auramazda created this great earth He gave it over to me«; so he reasserts, with what seems to us to be a fine insanity, but with what is precisely in accordance with the Book of Ezra and the Chronicles, accrediting indeed their extraordinary remarks about the man next but one before this Darius in the line; »*He* ... has made me King«.

The Divine Providential Support was Continuous, and never Intermittent.

Nor was there any intermission in the support of his Divine Patron. He was at no crisis left with his mere title conferred upon him and with his work in its detail set before him. Auramazda »brought him aid«, as he states, at every conceivable juncture. And if ever a true word was spoken by a devout affirmer, it was just this last when the great Organiser slowly spoke out to his penman what he wished to be made perpetual upon the selected places upon the tablets.

His Work was Organisation and Re-organisation.

»Through the grace of Auramazda, have I placed this earth in order« he declares imperially, though not imperiously. And in using the words »this earth«, he hardly meant »this land« alone, but more probably he seriously thought of what the Romans did when they spoke of the 'City and the Orb'; see elsewhere. And *who that knows what he accomplished can deny that he was simply stating what was a pre-eminent truth?* In fact some might almost suppose him to have been unequalled as an originator (considering his

time and his circumstances) in the entire line of previous or indeed of subsequent history. (He or his Successor(?), even dug a Suez Canal, as we have much right to believe, or at least he began one, and that if not exactly at the Isthmus, yet not so far away from it; see the Suez Inscription [1]).

The nature of this Aryan Deity, even as it is only in so far laid open to us, already vindicates the expressions of our Bibles, and shows their origin.

»All the Kingdoms of the earth hath Yahweh, »the God of Heaven, given to me«, was then no impossibility at all with Cyrus, for Darius his near successor has left almost, if not actually, its equivalent cut upon the rocks, and his successors in their turn repeated these startling assertions upon the walls of palaces and upon temple columns [2]; and, as I hope to show before I finish, there is every reason to suppose that Ezra was really aware of these same facts. And this interlacing of ideas which exists in the religious conceptions of the two nations, the Iranian and the Jewish, even in so far alone as we have expounded it, may well have established a certain harmony of motives; that is to say, a kind of mutual national good-will between the two.

For certainly the extraordinary devotion of the Hebrew writers to these Persian Kings needs more than mere fear or selfish eagerness to account for it.

Such was in general and in the first rough

[1] The Darius there claims to be the son of Hystaspes; possibly however a Darius Nothus took on the Title »son of H.«. I should add however that most critics simply accept these statement of the Inscription.

[2] I will return later to this.

outlines of a statement, the nature of the God whom Cyrus worshipped as shown in the Inscriptions of his near, but not immediate, Successor, as also in those of his later followers [1]; and such was the close affinity of this Deity to the Yahweh Elohīm of the Jews.

Section XII.

The Consideration of Objections Resumed and Carried further.

Dissimilarities.

Distinctions should be freely made.

But it will be only honest to pause here once more, and to discuss a serious modification which presents itself amidst the detailed considerations in our argument; and which also, so far as religious sympathy may be involved, offers an especially great objection. What I have to present now is indeed an obstacle only to the acceptance of a sentimental sympathy between the two Religions, the Jewish and the Iranian, while my proper business is to establish simply a practical Interchange of Ideas between them, and not at all so necessarily a religious sympathy. Yet it is sufficiently obvious that an interchange of ideas is far more probable between two nations in cases where a community of religious feeling also exists; for the bitterness of controversy among those alone capable of it, that is to say, among the intellectual leaders of the people, would have done all that it was possible to do to keep

[1] I must return to this subject later on, developing it.

a knowledge of the rival Theory from the apprehensions of the masses. When therefore anything presents itself which shows that there existed a bar, however slight or serious, to such a community in religious feeling between the two politically allied races, there that something constitutes a hindrance to the opinion that there existed between them also such a community of ideas as I am endeavouring to prove, and which are in themselves conceptions altogether independent of mere sentiment. I refer to an element in the inferable doctrine of Cyrus which is of a marked character indeed.

XII a.

The Objection, a pointed Difference and a Retraction.

As we examine the curious texts of Isaiah XLIV-V, the Prophet seems to us to be really under an apprehension that he may have gone too far in his so flattering assertions in regard to the Great Persian Restorer of his People, and to be hastening to make himself once more secure. And there was little wonder, we may add, that he should not have delayed to make his chief motive prominent. For it was not to be understood, so he implied, that these astonishing expressions [1] were to be put on record for any unpatriotic or religiously unworthy purpose, surrendering the precedence of his own sacred national Deity even to such a »God of Heaven« as Auramazda. »All this was done«, he is careful to explain, »that thou (Cyrus) may'st know that I am the Lord (Yahweh) which call thee by thy

[1] See above.

name«, (not alone »thy God of Heaven«) but »even the God of *Israel*«.

XII b.

Antithesis is Present.

Here we have evidently an antithesis; for what else could the Prophet have meant in addressing a Gentile Ruler with such a significant exaltation of the God of Israel? The terms form a distinct protest against the too pronounced assertion of any claim on the part of Cyrus for his Devá (?)[1], God of Heaven, the Auramazda whom Cyrus's Successor indeed so gloriously names as having placed within his power the twenty-three great nations which included half of the to him then known habitable earth, or even the greater part of it, 'the God who made this Earth and »yon Heaven« while »all the nations of the Earth« expresses the subject matter in the Jewish records; see above. It was as if Isaiah had said, as in the name of the Author of his inspiration: »This Cyrus must not assume too much upon these recognitions which I am expressing, most decisive though they be. These signal words of my Prophet must not detract from the act of our omnipotent Yahweh Elohīm. An especial reason exists for this His interference. It was »for Jacob my servant's sake and for Israel my chosen«, that He, Yahweh, says thus and now to him, Cyrus: »I have called thee by thy name. (And this in spite of the words of your Auramazda[1], »God of Heaven«,

[1] Urgent Probability enforces the duty of these allusions. Even Possibility alone demands suggestions. How else can historical science make its way in discovery?

to you«); »I, Yahweh Elohīm, have surnamed thee, though thou hast not known Me, (so, by these words, superseding all claims of Him your Auramazda[1] whom you have worshipped«). This seems to be a »retraction« indeed, as we recall the terms of the Chronicler, which were these: »Yahweh stirred up the spirit of Cyrus«. It, this modification on the part of the later Isaiah, seems to me to mean: »Be not too confident in that God whom we ourselves have come so near to recognise[1]. Thou hast known Him indeed; but He is but an imperfect revelation of Myself[1]; I am the Yahweh and beside Me there is none else«.

Mutual Exclusiveness is the Rule in all Technical Religious Diction.

This is all very natural as against the claims of any foreign God whomsoever; and it is pretty nearly identical with what Darius himself would most emphatically have reciprocated against any God or godling who asserted for himself the slightest claim to supremacy, domineering as such a supremacy must necessarily have been.

A Distinction Surpassing most Analogies.

But what shall we say to the following: »I form the light and create darkness, I make peace and create evil; I am Yahweh, that doeth all these things«?

[1] Such possible connections of ideas possess imperative claims to be mentioned; see above.

What is the meaning of this? Or has it any special intelligible meaning at all? Is it anything beyond a mere flat assertion that 'the Lord' 'made all things'; 'good' and 'evil'. It would indeed sound strange enough to us that the 'Scriptures' should present any such a proposition here as an abstract discussion, even one concerning »the origin of evil«, and we should view such a supposed discovery with a suspicion almost sardonic. And if the passage, with its bearings, were at all of the ordinary type, we should not hesitate for a moment to discard the possibility of any reference to such profound interior distinctions. Yet the whole matter when viewed in connection with one great characteristic of a certain Religion, becomes peculiar to the last degree. What then at least, let us ask, may it *possibly* have meant, or we may at once make bold to say »what *did* it probably mean?«

Section XIII.

The Doctrine of Isaiah XLV, 1—7.

As I have said above, it has long been thought by some expositors that the words meant exactly what they seem to mean, although I am at this moment not able to state who those expounders precisely were [1]. That is to say, the opinion has long been held that they assert the claim that Yahweh was empowered to control »evil« in its entire mass and for the reason that He »created« it, whereas the words imply that the God of Cyrus

[1] I apologise for this neglect; but the critical reader will easily see that, it is an omission rather technical than fundamental.

was bereft of this function. But where could such an idea have come from?; and is it indeed, let us doubt once more again, any especial idea at all? Or is it the result of a fortuitous concourse of syllables?

We should say at the first glance that the passage probably meant nothing more; see above; than to assert that »the Almighty controlled the misfortunes of His saints as well as those of their opponents, the wicked«.

But upon more careful examination such an hypothesis vanishes at least as an opinion, which excludes the possibility of other elements; and it is to be rejected as not being the most probable solution of these extraordinary statements. For we discover that they refer to something which is distinctly technical, significant to the last degree, historical, contemporaneous, and extremely notorious.

Where is the Doctrine elsewhere to be traced?

We may indeed search both the Inscriptions and the Scriptures throughout, and yet get no further answer. But another witness arises once more upon the scene to explain the doubtful language of the Prophet. The curious words express a doctrine of Dualism, not indeed such a dualism as exists between nature and a transcendent »God« with Plato and his set [1], but a simpler and a downright »Two-god« view.

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[1] Properly first suggested by Anaxagoras; see above.

XIII a.

Dualism in its Fullest sense more Closely Analised.

But what was this Dualism in its interior characteristics? Let us treat the doctrine for a moment as if it were an entirely new one to us, and quite aside from all question as to its presence in or absence from the text of Isaiah from which I have quoted.

The Especial Characteristic of such a Doctrine.

It seems certainly to have been, in its definitive and formulated shape, one of the boldest and most singular suggestions that had ever been formulated, and aside from its theosophic elements, one of the most profound.

The two Foci of Ideas; Good and Evil Elements were sifted, and Multiplicities avoided.

It was a scheme which focussed all the evil influences or personal forces in the Universe on the one side and all the good ones on the other, instead of frittering the great thought of »universal conflict« away by leaving its elements an unsifted tangle of never-ending wranglings among a multitude of Gods and godlets. And it emphatically objected to seeing »all things« so hopelessly involved[1] in confusion and antagonism as they are, while those thus believing in such a confusion should yet hold at this same time to the doctrine that those same con-

[1] The gūmezeshn (i. e. »the mixing«) was abhorrent to Zoroastrian instincts even in the later literature.

fused and mutually antagonistic elements were the product of One universally Supreme and unchangeably »good« Creator. This our Dualism as now considered would hear nothing whatsoever of. It coolly announced that there were *two* Original Forces in the Universe which were wholly antagonistic the one to the other; and it implied a sharp denial that there was any One Supreme Being who was half-evil and half-good. The good Deity not only *did* not, but He *could* not, create 'evil', which was the work of a separate Cause. There were two separated and original Forces contending together in the commingled mass of existing things, the one wholly good and the other wholly evil; and they were also *personal; there were two First Spirits.* And this hypothesis became notoriously recognised in history later; and it is very familiar in its results to us all as critics [1].

If this be indeed the secret of Isaiah's texts, then we have a statement of doctrine in our Biblical passage which could not well be surpassed in its interest or importance. But where did it come from? and by what means was it communicated? The first question hardly needs to be answered; but the rejoinder should be made at once: »Have we not a better certified source for it?«

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[1] It was reproduced notoriously in Gnosticism, or in some sects of it, and also by the Manichaeans. Cp. the Christian Satan.

Was not an Assyrian Dualism the Source of Isaiah's idea?

We have welcomed the Iranian Inscriptions as a means to assist us in our conscientious attempts to understand the Bible, for they evidently prove even to the profoundest sceptic that the drama depicted in the Jewish books had indeed a background that was real, and they have shown us beyond all question that there actually existed a Religion believed in by Cyrus which corresponded up to a certain point with what the annalists make Cyrus say. But, if such a dualism were seriously present in the thoughts of the Author of Isaiah XLV, was not its source Assyria? as that ancient country takes precedence at least in the matter of dates.

Assyriologists most properly put forward the vague dualism which appears upon the Inscriptions which they have so laboriously studied, and, to some extent, have so ably succeeded in explaining. But with all earnest sympathy with their arduous work and its brilliant results, both they and I would class that dualism of that ancient country with the great mass of such like doctrine scattered everywhere.

It is most certainly a significant point, if indeed it be thoroughly made out, that the Babylonians could never arrive at one single original principle [1]. And to my mind the two principles »water« and »chaos« are most engaging. But they (Apsu and Tyāmāt) become at the next step the symbol of »sexual union«, and the »conflict« proper

[1] See Jastrow, p. 412, flg.

only begins with the advent of the later Gods, their product. The first two of the »three classes of »deities each consist of a pair, while the third is »the well-known Triad of the old Babylonian theo»logy, Anu, Bel and Ea . . .« On a certain tablet ten pairs of Gods are enumerated. To each one »an associate is given in accord with the established »doctrine of *duality* (!) that characterises the more »advanced of the ancient Semitic cults in general.«

This has indeed the greatest interest and value in itself considered, but what has it in any conceivable sense to do with our present question? That »pairing« is totally dissimilar to either a philosophical or even to a mythical dualism. Valuable as I again cheerfully admit such a »dualism« as this to be, we can find it everywhere. There is not a cult which has ever been known which does not possess similar traces of this familiar feature. All forms of faith group good and evil gods on opposing sides. If we had nothing else but this, we should indeed have to be content with it; but here we are seeking something definite, pronounced and plain, a great historical intellectual circumstance.

Was it Achaemenian?

As for the Iranian Achaemenian dualism, we can only indirectly and by inference claim it as the source of these ideas expressed in the language of Isaiah. Darius names indeed a devilish personified abstraction, the »drauga«; and he reiterates in thunder tones his detestation of his (?) work, using it as the substance of a verb 'denominative' (adurujiya); but where is there any hint whatsoever that his Auramazda did

not «create evil«, or could not have created it, if He had so willed, or that there existed any other uncreated source of it, on the Inscriptions; and what right have we as yet to postulate such a limitation of Auramazda's power as there expressed?

To find such an idea we must turn to a still sublimer (if yet more painful) theory than any which we can critically report as being positively present in the terms of the Inscriptions, and that to one which, as I hope to prove, is closely related to those sculptured pieces, and which is almost built up upon the sought-for concept, both in the structure of its foundations and in the completion of its fuller frame.

XIII b.

As against both Assyria and the Achaemenids consider the Avesta.

Our Avesta is the only surviving system anywhere which has any original bearing upon the subject. That is to say, it is the only lore of the needed antiquity and of a distinctly religious cast [1], which throws light upon the expressions in Isaiah's texts. Its God is the Auramazda of the Inscriptions, though in an older and verbally separated form; and its Demon is on the other hand the evil God, who, as Isaiah feared, might wrest from Yahweh the sad prerogative referred to [2].

[1] Not only did Heraclitus deal in a dualism (within a Monism) later, but the very Platonic scheme is such (see above), the transcendant God being essentially divided from existing substance; but unless we personify both this »being« and »non-existent« God on the one side and »inert« matter on the other, the dualism of the Academy is not Zoroastrian. We have in the Avesta a wholly Good God on the one side and a wholly evil One on the other; see Y. 45, 2.

[2] That of being in any original sense »the author of evil«.

The Dualism which we have supposed to be referred to by the later Isaiah, and which is not traceable upon either the Assyrian or the Achaemenian Inscriptions is familiar to us all as owing its real origin to those singular fragments which under the name of »Gāthas« are so valuable a heritage to the intellectual religious history of man. The actual name of the fell Creator of all evil is not so important to us as the fact that He exists. Still it has its value.

XIII c.
Angra Mainyu.

Angra Mainyu was the »evil« or »torturing Spirit«. In the later forms of Zoroastrianism, and even in the later, but still genuine, Avesta the ideas become overgrown with the weeds of myth; but in the older and original Avesta they are hard and clear. These ancient pieces, if reason does not belie itself, are of earlier date than the Inscriptions; and they are of such a character as to introduce us at once to great thoughts. In them we have an actually definitive statement of the concept under question which we only gain by inference from other sources.

The Interior of the Matter.

That severe question which, though it may not always be put into words, must yet be ever present where capable men engage in speculative reflection[1] not only existed as a problem among the people

[1] The origin of evil.

who first heard the Gāthas chanted, but it was obviously to them the underlying thought; and it led them to a conclusion at once astounding and enlightening.

It is not indeed stated in technical terms because the Gāthas, as their name implies, were metrical hymns, and in a secondary sense intended for the people.

XIII, d.

The Origin of the Distinctions again more Closely Considered.

For ages groups or hosts of unseen evil beings had been believed in and reported, but nowhere, so far at least as my information extends, had any such definite statements with reference to the supposed facts involved been made before the date of these hymns with their now long lost companions.

There were Gods in plenty which were »goodish«, but who sometimes erred immoderately, and there were some evil Gods who were at intervals capable of better things, but where was the God ever good? (there of course I except the modern view of a Supreme Deity). And with this where is the description of One pre-eminent Being ever evil, so much as bruited [1] at the dates involved, these supposed Deities being also »twin« concepts.

The God of the Inscriptions »created the heavens and the earth, man, and civilisation for him«; and beside Him there was no deity, great or little, on those columns who could compare with

[1] The doctrine of Mani does not intervene here, as it was extremely late.

Him as to this function; but whatever else He made, His creative energy paused at one dire juncture which was unhappily the second great circumstance in the existing Universe. If we can connect the Theology of the Inscriptions with that of the Avesta, He, the Auramazda of the Inscriptions, had nothing to do with the source of either the lesser or the supreme agonies which we suffer or inflict.

He did not create Evil.

This great attempt to save the honour of our God for us modified the first formula which attributed »creation« to Him, and this with an antithesis which, when we soberly appreciate it, becomes immense.

The Maker of Heaven and Earth, of man and his culture, was not *Alone* in a supreme activity during the great originating actions.

Blasphemous as the tone of it may sound to some of us in the West and to the orthodox everywhere (if indeed it does not seem to some of us to be ridiculous), it is still none the less maintained as if self-evident »There were indeed *Two First Spirits*, »a better, they two and evil, as to thought, as to »word, as to deed. And when these Two Spirits »came together they made life and non-life, and how »the world at the last shall be ordered, for the »saints (in the end) the Best Mind, but for the »faithless the worse mental state ...«[1] And the

[1] See Gāthas, 1892—94, pp. 40, 41, pp. 220, 221; pp. 435—441; p. 540, New Edition, English Verbatim, etc., 1900, p. 40—43.

better One had no share in either originating or permitting the more painful of these two alternatives.

XIII, e.

Was the Doctrine merely Academic?

But was not this a mere jugglery of thought worked out by dreamy doctrinaires, and vaguely held by a few vain hearers under exceptional circumstances, and for short periods of time? *There is every reason to believe that it was held most seriously by hundreds of thousands at least, if not by millions* [1] *throughout a large part of a great Empire, and for successive generations.* And in every one of these epochs highly gifted men came doubtless to the fore in those early centuries, — and such as these must have grasped the whole intellectual situation and felt themselves deeply stirred by the character of the idea [2]. Popularly the external features of the theory degenerated with the passing-on of time, as of course they were necessitated to do till they finally became the familiar hypothesis of a God and a Devil with the latter thoroughly subordinated. But the case which the Babylonian Isaiah refers to was not originally that. »I make light and create darkness; I make peace and create evil« was levelled at no »Satan« however promoted. A Rival God was thought of.

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[1] Not that the bulk of the masses had any interior understanding of it, or of anything else of the kind.

[2] Just as the disciples of Mani were later moved by similar considerations.

And much as this may shock us, we must look closer into the interior of the question, not recoiling from the recognition of possible elements of great value in it, however false we may believe it on the whole to be.

XIV.

Dualism weighed.

There is no doubt whatsoever that between the colossal errors, real or supposed, of such a scheme there arose *a column of imperishable truth.*

The Depth of the great Theory.

Aside from all recognition of personalities, real, or supposititious, who does not see that generalising ideas of a searching nature began to form themselves within the minds of those who created the beginnings of such a theory, and this from a deeply seated underlying necessity of the case [1].

Could such minds as those of Zarathushtra and his comrades have avoided a vague consciousness of the one ever indispensable necessity which lay beneath it all; see also above.

Did he not personally and palpably feel what we all now so clearly see to be the truly awful fact, which is that discord is necessarily inherent between all consciously existing things, the clash of opposing forces being inevitably heard in a freed antagonism out of which ferocity with its miseries must inevitably arise, but with it also progress and

[1] Need for these concepts began to be felt only gradually at first, till at last their full formation crystallised.

at last amelioration. To put the sad point further in the language of another still greater than a Zarathushtra, »must it not needs be that offences come?« Did not he, Zarathushtra, first feel this, and then more consciously define it?

Many items unite to prove that thoughts were subtle even then and there. Those attributes, for instance, the immortal Six, selected from a mass of lesser ones, were no mere accident, at least not altogether that. Antithesis was also felt or at least suspected, though accidental discovery doubtless went on hand in hand with recollection, induction, and intuition. The doctrine of 'limit' was foreshadowed plainly. For the terms of which these serious doctrinaires made use show also that they had thought much upon many, if not upon all of the details which later actually developed, though not then and in Iran, within their interesting theme.

They became aware beyond all question from what these ideas arose, as well as whither they were tending; for their sequence and results are adumbrated everywhere within the older documents.

XIV, a.

Morning Lights of the great Theory.

There where doubtless other keen constructors associated likewise with them in their unconscious task, many of them, there and then, and some before them. These may indeed have offered the initiative to this entire train of thought, while Zarathushtra, with his associates, in their turn no doubt contributed some impulse to those striking systems

which arose so near, and at a time not so long later on.

Did he indeed give the clue to that fine idea which absolutely expressed the combining unity of opposites from the necessary effect of mutual limitation as by the well-known example of light and darkness.

Did Zarathushtra ever reach the later so clumsily expressed [1] but simple fact that a thing only exists because of its contraries, sorrow being but a part of happiness. That he helped on the crystalisation of that thought seems really probable, for surely Avesta is the original of Gnostic dualism, as the Gnostics helped on the thoughts of Jakob Boehme [2], from which the later elaborations took their rise.

The Movement at the Moment.

But our business is not so much with those just now and here. Zarathushtra beyond all question felt the interior force in the names of the great Attributes, the Holy Law, the Good Mind, the Sovereign Power, Zeal (the ready mind), Healthful Weal and Deathless Long Life, each one literally an abstract, and at one time each alone conceived of as an idea of that character; — and from this we hold that he was also moved in his dualism by equally interior and fundamental considerations. There was an awful antagonism within the very make-up of the Universe, so he saw. It was the spirit Fury, dimly seen also

[1] Cp. Hegel; but better Fichte.

[2] See Zeller's Geschichte der deutschen Philosophie.

in the Veda, fixed co-eternally within existing things, and there was opposing it a force for Good. Why did he not leave them each a principle or force?

The Reversion to Personification.

Personification is, of course, as we should understand it, at once a lowering of idealistic concepts in this momentous case, momentous not only *in spite* of the evil present, but *because* of it.

Why did not Zarathushtra then refrain from it, avoiding a sequence which deprived his conception of all its finer point? He did not; he proceeded; and the co-eternal Force, or Spirit, Mainyu, the Fury in all existing things, became with him a colossal Being. The name indeed remained with an addition; Mainyu which might and did express the Power of Heaven in both Veda and Avesta, for Ahura was a »Mainyu«, became an »Angra Mainyu« who was the very Soul of Hell.

A dualism purely speculative arose and maintained itself somewhat, or much later on in Greece, beginning from the Nous of Anaxagoras [1] as opposed to matter; why did not Zarathushtra pursue a similar course in developing his system, and leave his evil principal still impersonal, as the great Counterpart [2] in Nature.

The Occassion for his Personification.

The reason in this case, as in so many another like it, is not indeed so very far to seek.

When deep turmoils disturb our very lives,

[1] See above.

[2] Used in an original sense.

we look out fiercely for things tangible, sometimes even for a scape-goat. A Force, clear and marked out as it may be, will yet never do for us to wreak our outraged vengeance on. Who ever cursed a principle?; and we must curse sometimes, for the very sense of justice, in the whirlwind of our calamity. Zarathushtra, like the rest of us, saw days which tried men's souls. Everywhere in the Gāthas we see the marks of it. The fine but yet pathetic effort to maintain a State devoid of lying, theft and murder bade fair, as so many another like it deeply meant, to fail [1]. It was the first of its character perhaps ever as yet made seriously in the history of those remote and otherwise barbaric (?) regions, if not indeed the very first in the records of the ancient world; and its success itself brought on its partial ruin. As usual, the accumulating results of steady thrift did but add fuel to the flames of greed. With, or without warning the storms came on, the raids of Aēshma [2], with their scenes of frenzied havoc. Crops were destroyed by infuriated hordes rushing headlong in, houses wrapt in flames, and the labour of years destroyed in brief campaigns.

How could a »Principle« suffice the sufferer amidst such scenes, or offer any scope for his anathemas? God, if He had been powerful and good, would surely, so he must inevitably have thought, and often uttered (to himself), God would infallibly

[1] The settlement of New England by Puritan reformers bears a strong analogy.

[2] The Fury Demon of the Raid.

have stood by him. *Something had disarmed his very Deity.* That something must be conscious, if even only of his own deep personal abhorrence. Passion blended with his reason till at last it overcame it. His evil principle became a Co-eternal Person; and Philosophy gave way to Creed.

The Pandemonium abolished.

He would indeed hear nothing of a throng of co-equal devils, frittering the effect away. One terrific Being alone could satisfy him; he sought and seized the image, and having personified it, he loaded it with imprecations; that is to say, with solemn words of hatred long pent up, and so the more intensified.

The terminology indeed continued speculative to some extent; »a better« and »a worse« both occur in the neuter, and they are even apparently applied also to the »Two Primeval Ones« [1].

The Good God chooses »Asha«, here undoubtedly the interior essence of the Law.

»As to word, as to thought and as to deed« describes the scope of the two Deities. »Two worlds«, one »mental« and the other »bodily« are distinctly spoken of, and »the laws by which at the first (all) life into being entered«. But this is not technically speculative with close particularising distinctions. Still less was it the language of an Anaxagoras, philosophically so passionless. It was indeed a deep suggestion, that of the »two Spirits«, taken even in

[1] Even if they were intended to be understood adverbially, they are deeply significant.

its lowest aspect, and it was a high refinement upon a crowded Polytheism, the confused creed of their fathers; while Zarathushtra was also on the other hand not approached in this depth of his originality by any of his Iranian successors. Yet his results are theosophical for the most part rather than philosophical.

The Culmination of the Idea.

The pervading miseries of strife manifested in the myths of their early annals, as in the signal experiences of their later human life, had been all thought out and traced to their ultimate sources as being in no respects adventitious or reducible, though they might vary or diminish in delusive periods termed »peace«. These *things were a necessity, the creation of an Original separate and quasi-independent* evil Being, of a Satan who did not »fall«, nor was he ever in his turn created.

This was the doctrine. Not only were the acute sufferings which they personally met in their bloody conflicts with free-booting neighbours so accounted for, but at last all things heavenly and earthly were involved in the idea of it, the greatest as the smallest. The Universe was a scene of »love« and »murder«; and the senses of man were the vehicles to convey the fell effects of these so necessary evil influences upon himself.

Whole classes of the animal creation were called »unholy« or »unclean« because supposed to be created by, or associated with, the evil God (this is my solution); others were clean because

made by His Antagonist. The very planets belonged to Angra Mainyu, at least in the later Parsi Books, while the fixed stars seem to have been Ahura's.

Not only did the tribes live in the midst of a religious war; but there was also 'War in Heaven', as they believed; and the later books depict it; see the Yashts.

The faint glimmer of a great philosophical truth, which must have flickered brightly before the thoughts of Zarathushtra, went out at last amidst a group of contending supernatural beings. Shall we regret it, or be glad of it? — who shall say? We can therefore return to the Biblical Edicts once more, and say in passing, and as it were »aside«, that we have not been muddling on for half a century while we thought that the writer in Isaiah alluded to an actually established belief.

When the Almighty is represented as saying: »I form the light and create darkness. I make peace and create evil, I am the Lord who do all these things; and beside me there is no God«; these sentences are not mere verbiage.

In the light of the Avesta with its most marked feature, the whole passage becomes clear and extraordinary to the last degree. For the Avesta produced a Devil mighty beyond all precedent, or sequent. If not absolutely certain, yet it is extremely probable that the passage in Isaiah alludes to this Angra Mainyu, whom we have here made out, and seizes away his supposed fell prerogative. It is no longer the Angra Mainyu alone, who creates the woe of Evil, according to the

prophetic sentences as thus understood, Yahweh Elohīm now holds that power.

Say what we may of it, the possibility alone of such an explanation is striking; for it definitively offers the one discussion of ideas between Jew and Iranian which has ever been recorded. It is reported in a few broken words indeed, but still it is present, and in the sublime Prophet of the Exile, whatever his real name may have been supposed to be. Whether as Parsis, Jews, or Christians, the passage should be regarded as revealing to us a glimpse into the contemporaneous combined Persian and Israelitish intellectual religious life, so far indeed as this expressed itself upon such a subject, and at its most central point of action. And if our exposition of it be indeed defensible, it casts side-light by many a startling inference upon other significant particulars as to which these old Iranians must have been familiar with the current intellectual convictions of these Semites.

But as I have penned these last chapters in answer to possible objections as to creed, I must in fairness still push on to consider every alleged, or even every conceivable argument against the documents which I put in as evidence.

To test our Pathway. Still further Objections to be considered.

Before then we go any further at all into such questions as touch more deeply upon the origins of the various doctrines let us pause to examine well the ground upon which we have been tread-

ing; and to do this we must suspend for a moment our inquiry into the analogies existing between the Biblical Edicts and the Inscriptions, and devote our whole attention to the question of a connection between the Achaemenian Inscriptions and the Avesta in which latter alone at the period referred to, this doctrine of Isaiah was to be found. Is this connection then between the Two great Iranian Lores actual and real?

Section XV.

The Connection between the Inscriptions and the Avesta pursued; some Intervening Points.

Are we then indeed quite sure that our Avesta is so closely kindred to these most impressive monuments? The latter are relevant enough, as all admit, to any discussion of the Edicts, for they make Darius, Xerxes, Artaxerxes and the rest speak much in the way that the Scriptures make them and their predecessor, Cyrus, express themselves. But, as we have just most emphatically admitted, a negative difference, at least, existed between the Avesta and the Achaemenian Inscriptions which is most serious unless the gap of it can be filled up, and we must push on our criticism still further, and see whether this chasm and other differences may not be closed by considerations sufficiently sound and solid to satisfy the most exacting scrutiny.

XV, a.

Still Further Objections Suggested.

So far from wishing to avert the closeness of the investigation, I have on the contrary virtually

put arguments into the mouths of my opposers; and I will continue on to pursue this plan throughout.

Complete Identity not to be Thought of.

But first, in due justice to the whole case, as in so far presented, let me say that I sincerely hope no serious person will ever suppose that I am aiming at establishing anything like an identity between these two Lores, even though I strive to lessen their divergence, and closely as I may endeavour to explain them as they approach each other in their interior elements and in their historical developments. Upon *absolute identity we must not waste a thought.* I have myself, for one, no doubt whatsoever that many of the ideas on the Inscriptions and those in the Avesta and in the Veda also, were plainly one in the main and decidedly identical in their origin. But it is to be hoped that we know enough by this time of such questions, not to look for any continuous and undeviating unity.

And in order to be thoroughly fair, I will myself start a question which could hardly by any possibility have suggested itself to the mind of any of my readers who has not gone through a long course of study upon the matter involved. It is this. On page 259, above I call attention to the predominant use of the expression »God of Heaven« as being most probably Exilic or Post-exilic, and show what can be said for the theory that the turn of the words is due to the idea of »Heaven god« as Devá, a name for Aryan deities. D(a)ēvas (Devás) are literally »Heaven ones« and a generic Indo-

iranian name for »Gods«. But there is a circumstance to the last degree peculiar about it, and just here I am chiefly addressing readers who may be wholly unfamiliar with the Iranian Lore, for to all who know anything closely upon the subject what I have now to say, would be like the first fact for a beginner. The name, though a most appropriate one for God and prevailing everywhere in the thousand Hymns of the Veda, was, strange to say, though very familiar, yet absolutely inverted in its application in the Avesta; for there it became the universal name for »Demon« and even for the Archdemon of them all, for Angra Mainyu. However this seemingly so curious result may have come about, I will not pause just here to argue [1]; but the fact is most marked; and if the words »the God of Heaven« were really used by Cyrus in the highly religious »good« sense which we have in Chronicles, it shows plainly enough that his Religion, at least, was not completely in harmony with that of the Avesta if only upon this one most important particular of usage. We have also no trace of this Avesta use of the word D(a)ēva for »Demon« upon the Inscriptions, for the word does not occur there.

A »*thing*« is indeed more serious than a »name«; but a »name« used for such a purpose as to designate a people's God, or Gods, cannot be considered to be a matter of little importance. And if my suggestion be valid, it certainly shows that the personal religion of Cyrus, slightly antedating that

[1] See my essay, »The Veda and the Avesta« in East & West, Feb. and March 1902.

of Darius, was out of harmony with the Religion of the Avesta as to this very interesting item; and the fact should be allowed to have its full due weight upon our minds. The Answer to this objection which I have myself originated is this, namely; that the fact that the name Devá, whether as the equal of the »God of Heaven« or not, does not occur within the Achaemenian Inscriptions, Baga only being the term made use of, is positively significant within a certain range. It looks indeed as if the name Devá *were only just beginning* to lose credit with the generation of Darius, that generation having only then begun to feel the distant throes of that great theological schism which dethroned the holy word.

For why otherwise is it thus absent, it being, outside of Iran from the time of the earliest Avesta on, an universal Aryan name for God. But anything which more definitively illustrates the development of this singular and most valuable item of usage gathers interest of itself.

XV, b.

The Natural Necessity of Difference between the related Lores.

So far indeed from wishing to conceal discordant elements, as I would emphatically repeat, I would even affect an extreme attitude as to the general subject of the relation between the Avesta and the Inscriptions. Not only do the Inscriptions differ as much from the Avesta as, say, the Old Testament differs from the New, and as one sect of Christians differs from another, though hardly so

much as the Sadducees differed from the Pharisees, we should rather on the contrary say that *of course* they (these related systems) differed from each other upon the gravest points. In the Inscriptions themselves, short as they from their very nature necessarily are, the first and perhaps most prominent feature is a bloody episode which accentuates a difference between the Religion of the Inscriptions and another closely related form of the same general faith.

The Magian usurper destroyed the Temples doubtless from excess of pretended religious zeal, regarding them as profane; for according to Herodotus the Magians had no temples; nor had the early Zoroastrians; and while the Fire Altars may have had some protection from the weather, we have also no traces of proper »Temples« in the Avesta.

Here then is a difference between two forms of Mazda worship itself which protrudes even from the surface of the sculptured writings.

Of course, and as beyond all question, the Inscription must have differed from the Avesta upon essential elements of detail, for they were widely separated as to time, and even as to locality, from the scenes of that Lore. To suppose that the two were completely identical in all their particulars, even as to some interior characteristics, would be to suppose that the two systems were not subject to the influence of otherwise invariable laws.

And at the first glance we might regard these differences as indeed more incisive than they really are, for not only is Angra Mainyu not named upon them (the Inscriptions) on the one side: but the very

Amesha [1] Spenta seem to be omitted on the other [2]. These seeming discrepancies may be indeed quite explicable; see below; but they exist; and I should be the last person to deny them, and would be willing enough to accept for discussion any further divergencies which might be demonstrated.

But these differences, even if they may be considered to be fully established, would by no means negative the fact that the two systems show unmistakeable signs of common origin, as of important contemporaneous identities in their elements. I have already alluded to some of these marked features, and I will now cite some others.

Section XVI.

Elements of Identity. Auramazda and Ahura Mazda, the Avesta and the Inscriptions.

»A great God is Auramazda« [3]; and this latter name has been justly regarded as the most striking proof of identity in ultimate origin between the Inscriptions and the Avesta; for this name Auramazda was one of the words which first led to the vocabulary of the Avesta as being the proper key to the decipherment of the Inscriptions, not one of the *very* first indeed, but one of the first. I have dwelt above upon the meaning of the Name; and we saw that it did not vary whether viewed in Avesta or Inscription.

[1] Properly 'amersha'.

[2] See below.

[3] See the Inscriptions at many places.

There is indeed one element of difference which turns out to emphasise the identities, and which I only pause to mention as it were aside, and as if in parenthesis. It is an interesting side feature in the history of the two words alluded to, »Ahura« and »Mazda«. If it could be regarded as one target more for objectors, then let it be one proof the more that I wish to make the delineation of the particulars here as open to attack as it may be feasible to make it, inviting opposition at every step. It is not very possible that any initiated student should point adversely to the fact that the name of the Iranian God, the word Auramazda, never appears as a single term in the Avesta; — that there it is 'Ahura' = 'aura', and 'Mazda', words seldom brought into closer contact, and each always, separately declined, while the word Auramazda appears undivided upon the Inscriptions. No one, however young a novice, could say that this has any conceivable weight upon the questions arising; but then some readers are not even novices. My real object in alluding to this matter is to point out just here in a short excursus what a linguistic historian would call a singularly »beautiful« distinction; and I make us of an extreme hypothesis, that of exceptional inexperience in my reader to secure the opportunity. Yes; the two grand old names stand quite apart from each other in the Avesta, old and new, and became welded together by constant usage only later, and throughout many generations. »Ahura«, and »Mazda« made at last one word »Auramazda«, and this a few centuries still later on was twisted into

the Pahlavi Aūharmazd, and then finally, into the New Persian, Ormuzd, Hōrmuzd, or Ahōrmuzd. But what expert in Linguistik will not be keenly interested when we inform him that we have upon the Inscription the plain proofs of a »*transition period*« in respect to this most important designation which also points almost infallibly to *other instances of change.*

While we have no Auramazda in the Avesta and no Ahura Mazda in either the Pahlavi or the New Persian each enduring for centuries and apart, we have even within the narrow compass of the Inscriptions both Auramazda, with the words united, and Aurahya Mazdāha with the words separated, and separately declined [1], so that what I have perhaps wantonly called a »quasi-objection«, I confess for a special and perhaps too trivial a purpose, turns out to be a signal illustration of a most expressive fact brought once again to light in the course of the discussion; namely, that the Inscriptions *actually represent this formative, or transformative, period when the very usages in the language were changing.* That is to say, even within the moderate vocabulary of the Inscription we have »transition« caught, as it were, »upon the wing«, whereas, generally speaking, we can trace such a condition only in an extended literature; compare the dialects of Greece. The circumstance adds 'life' to the entire interlude. It is like some startling sign of personal emotion, and altogether an incisive, though

[1] We now think that we have also an instr., or a voc sing, »Aurahya Mazdāha« by itself.

a minor item among the grave considerations which force themselves upon our view.

XVI, b.

The Attributes.

Next to the Name, then the Attributes of the great common Deity, Auramazda; i. e. Ahura Mazda, mentioned in the two Lores, most eminent as they are in the history of religious philosophy, should be considered.

And first »Creation«. The *Creative Function* among those attributes of Auramazda is referred to with emphatic iteration upon the Inscriptions; see above; and it presents a very marked peculiarity; for the terms persist unvaried from Reign to Reign, and on tablets also far apart the one from the other as to locality as well. This supreme Attribute also distinguishes Auramazda by an immeasurable distance from any other Deity referred to at the time upon them. And in fact, but for the suspected presence of the dualism, this creative energy in activity would determine the sculptures as being quite monotheistic in the ordinary acceptation of the term, lesser deities like the Archangels of the Church being reduced by it to insignificance, so much so that the recognition of them hardly constitutes a claim to a rival existence as serious divinities in a distinctive sense.

Auramazda the only Real Deity.

Auramazda might well be said to be the One real God in our own pietistic sense upon the entire

Inscriptions, the presence of Mithra, Anahita, and the »other gods« with the »clan gods« or »all the gods« to the contrary notwithstanding. Some critics even suppose that Mithra is the original of Saint Michael [1].

And so in the Old Avesta, Ahura is par-eminence Creator (of the good Creation). As to the later Avesta, however, that is, as to parts of it, see below; yet in the later Avesta Ahura is said to be the Creator even of Mithra.

Further; the detail of the descriptive ideas, if not indeed of the very terms, is similar. He is »the Greatest of the Gods« in the Inscriptions, and in Yasna I. he is the »Greatest and the Best«.

He is »maker of this earth« in the one Lore, as we have seen so often, and so also abundantly in the other [2]. The Inscriptions speak of »yon Heaven«, and so does the Avesta [3].

In the Inscriptions we have the creation of man, and so in the Avesta we have Gaya Maretan, »the lifeman«; and his creation is alluded to.

In the Inscriptions the word »civilisation« [4],

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[1] See the valuable paper read by J. J. Modi Head Priest of the Parsis at Colaba before the R. A. S of Bombay in May or earlier in 1903.

[2] See such words as »O Ahura Mazda, Maker of the corporeal worlds, Thou holy One« which occur some score or more times in the Vendīdād alone.

[3] »The Ahunaver was uttered before the creation of »yon« Heaven. In Y. XLIV it is also asked: »who gave the suns. and stars their way, save Thee?, etc. who spread the auroras, the noontides and midnights?« And in Y. 30: »He clothes on Himself the firm stones of Heaven«.

[4] Or »refeshing abundance«, recurringseveral times. Others prefe r »happiness«; see above.

occurs (as I have rendered it), »Who made man and civilisation« (see above); and in the Avesta the *hushiti*[1], and the *hujīti*, the amenities of civilisation, are as pleasing as they are familiar.

The first moral characteristic of Auramazda in the Inscriptions is His »Truth«; see everywhere the condemnation of its opposite. And in the original Avesta[2] Asha (properly »Arsha«) as the »undeviating Law« is the first of His personified attributes. He is »beneficent« upon the Inscriptions; see above; and *Vohu manah* »the good mind« is the second of His attributes in the Avesta. *Vashnā* = »through the gracious will of A.« is characteristic upon the Inscriptions[3], and in the Avesta also it is very marked.

The Inscriptions describe a God who searches the »thoughts«, and we may notice the immediate anxiety in the Avesta to bring the whole question within the intellectual domain[4], *and it probably led the world at that time in such distinctive conceptions.*

The »right path« is an expression figuratively applied upon the Inscriptions, and alone of itself it proves the depth of the practical religious ideas. And the same words »right paths« in a figurative sense are also conspicuous in the Gāthas.

On the Inscriptions we have a report of Auramazda's utterance, His »command« being said to be »this«, the particulars following; and throughout the

[1] Not that the two words are etymologically related.

[2] The Gāthas.

[3] The places are cited elsewhere. Vasnā in the Av.

[4] See the expressions »in thought«, »in word« and »in deed«, etc., »the prizes of the bodily and mental worlds«.

Avesta Ahura Mazda »answers« and »speaks«. In the One Auramazda is said to have granted His suppliant »aid«, and the word is frequent in the Other. Of the few inferior Gods which come to light within the Inscriptions, the only two there named seemed to have stepped bodily forth out of the Avesta [1]. »Magu« the all-important priestly term reproduced upon the Inscription appears as »moghu« (so quite exactly) in the Avesta [2], and we have, I think, its origin in the frequent »*maga*« of the Gāthas [2]. Bactria is of course mentioned as one of his subject nationalities by Darius [3], and Bactria has been largely regarded by scholars as the scene of a part at least of the Avesta [4]. Some of the cities mentioned upon the Inscriptions are also familiar to the Avesta, but one of them, Ragha, is so prominent that many think it to have been the earliest seat of Zoroastrianism, as it was indeed certainly an important centre later on [5].

Parallelisms in Language.

The parallelisms in the two languages above all arrest attention. *Aura* as *Ahura* [6] needs hardly

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[1] Mithra and Anāhita. As to demons, see below.

[2] The »o« instead of »a« is the result of epenthesis, moghu = ma(u)ghu, the »u« in »o« = a + u is anticipated from the »u« in the termination. I mentioned this in the Nineteenth Century Review so long ago as '94.

[3] The only variation being in the termination which is of slight account.

[4] Among the 23 at Behistūn; as Bākhdhi in Vendīdād I.

[5] For the great Prophet's name had become a title there, see elsewhere.

[6] Aura as against áhura, shows that there was an accent on the first 'a' áura; so the Veda ásura = áhura, áura. This accent, being verified, confirms all the other analogies as to the matter of accent.

to be named again, though it is no longer certain that it refers even once to an inferior god upon the Inscriptions, while in the Avesta it refers also to human chiefs at times. But what could be more striking than *yāna* in the sense of »boon«. This is its meaning in the Avesta; but we look in vain for such a sense in the Vedic occurrences of the word, whereas in general the Avesta language is almost purely Sanskrit. As we however glance at our Inscriptions again, we behold it once more before us in the very prominent Avesta sense.

And so of the Avesta word *jaidhyāmi* = I »pray«, we again expect to find our Avesta words in definition in the Veda, but as yet no such meaning is reported for an Indian gadami [1]. We turn however to our Inscriptions again, and there it is. Now both these last occurrences are especially very marked indeed, and carry with them great convincing force; and they should be firmly borne in mind by all who discuss these subjects.

I have just alluded to *vashnā* while pointing its doctrinal sense and to *upasta* = »aid«, and both are common property to the two languages as forms**, or infact to all the three.

Even closer linguistic Grammatical Forms are Similar.

The nominative plurals as in -āsas [2] are common to Inscription, Veda and Avesta, but they are seldom found in the later Sanskrit. And so of important

[1] Gadati is however suggested upon the high authority of Justi.

[2] As against the later Sanskrit termination -ās; the Avesta forms are -aoṅhō, Indian -āsas; The Achaem. is -āha. ** Av. vasnā.

pronouns. *Ava*, scarcely known to the Sanskrit, is familiar to both Avesta and the Inscription; and the pronoun *dim*, unknown to Veda, is common to Old Persian and Zend. The infinitives in the two agree; and here again the Veda shares pecularities with both Avesta and the Inscriptions little known to the later Indian. As to the identity of the two lores in their ultimate origin, we have yet to find the man who holds a doubt.

The Inscription language is, if we may so express ourselves, almost »broken« Zend.

The Historical Details, and the Spirit of the Religions.

And the historical details also, so far as they are indicated, correspond. That the *spirit* of the two Religions also had much in common I may regard as already proved. Let us now turn once more to the objections. We have sufficiently answered our questions as to the absence of the very widely used term devá; but let us ask definitively: »where is Angra Mainyu, the »Evil Creator« of the Avesta upon the Inscriptions?«; and where is Dualism upon them? Where too are the Ameshaspentas?; and might we not even expect to see the name of Zarathushtra?

Section XVII.

Recurring Objections. Angra Mainyu absent from the Inscription.

In the name of reason let us first of all remember that we are dealing with *Inscriptions*, on

the one side at least of our discussion; that is to say, with letters cut painfully upon rocks or walls in places sometimes only accessible with difficulty, and at one spot, as already said, elevated hundreds of feet above the level of the land; and that these characters are cut at times with excessive care.

Surely common modesty, if not indeed common honesty, should forbid our expecting to see everything which was current orally, or even written upon skins or other substances at that date, repeated upon such kinds of records as these now under our consideration.

The name of Angra Mainyu appears nowhere upon those sculptures. Does this defect then prove that the name was not at all in vogue at the time of the execution of those records, or that it was unknown to their authors. This question is of acute interest to us as biblical critics; and this I have often urged; for if it were conceivable that the name of the great Avesta Demon-god was never known to Darius, nor to his Successors, then the quite vital point of the connection between the three Lores, the Achaemenian, the Avesta, and the Jewish would be to a corresponding extent obscured. The Inscriptions, as we hold, are almost an integral part of our Bibles, so to express oneself, for the reasons which no intelligent person can dispute. We have the Edicts of Cyrus, Darius, and their Successors as reported by our Scriptural Authors in Chronicles and Ezra; and we have a closely analogous one cut upon the Babylonian Vase Inscription of Cyrus, as upon Behistūn, etc., in work, or in handwriting, as it might well be

called, and so done contemporaneously with the original authors and at their personal command; see above. Surely no serious expositor can for a moment henceforth think of putting pen to paper upon those passages without having learned all that it may be possible for him to learn from these succinct annals upon the Tablets. So much is absolutely sure and clear beyond all cavil. The Edicts of Cyrus, Darius, etc. in Ezra, etc., and the inscribed Records of those same Kings upon Behistūn, etc., are almost parts of one and the same thing. Of the two, the Inscriptions and the Edicts, in the eyes of critics the Inscriptions possess indefinitely the greater force and claims to credence; but the Edicts are likewise justly treasured. Is then the Avesta as near to the Inscriptions as the Inscriptions are near to the Edicts? If they are, then every Biblical critic has a new source of information and illustration in his hand which it is both his privilege and his duty to use. But the most important name in the Avesta next after that of Ahura Mazda does not appear upon the Inscriptions. If this is omitted there because it was not known, then that would certainly show that the Avesta was just in so far totally strange to the Authors of the Inscriptions, and the external historical connections of expressed ideas would be most certainly broken in one of their catenae. Was then the name absolutely unknown to these Authors and to their public? Was such an ignorance as this probable?; this is the question before us; nay, »was it possible?«

Section XVII, a.

The Occurence of the Name was indeed to be Expected.

There is no doubt at all that there existed very especial reasons why this name, or one very close akin to it, should have been made use of in these severe denunciations; for such many of the sentences in the Inscriptions can only be described to be.

The very diction seems to tremble with a fury which it but half expresses in the vehemence of the writers, concentrated as it was in their doubtless justly provoked animosities.

Section XVII, b.

First Answer to the Objection.

My first answer to the Objection is this; viz. that the needed and so expected name was *substituted*, as I will shortly show below, by one immediately kindred to it; and for this we have a close analogy in the case of the work which it is our very object to bring in as a basis for our evidence. The striking Avesta name of Angra Mainyu is replaced by a most effective representative in the columns of the great Tablets; but so it is in the very Avesta texts themselves, and in passages within them where we should most of all expect to see it in its immediate expression.

Absence of the Name from large Sections of the Avesta.

Do objectors who contravene the connection of the Inscriptions with the Avesta by urging upon

us the absence of Angra Mainyu from the latter as an argument against all analogy between them and the Avesta, really know what indeed every incipient inquirer who takes any interest in these pursuits ought to know, which is that there are *lengthy passages in the Zend Avesta, page on page, and chapter after chapter*, where that name does not occur, and this in a Book of the Avesta whose very title describes it as most of all concerned with Satan's work, the Counter-devil Book [1], and in parts which are almost violent in their denunciations of demoniac things? Did the authors or re-writers who gradually compiled that Book from Chapter IV to Chapter IX, 12 inclusive, nearly one hundred pages of the translation in the Sacred Books of the East, not *know* that there existed in any Iranian man's religious beliefs and fears any such supposititious person as he whose name occurs in the very first Chapter, say some 16 times, and with an emphatic and graphic iteration which should make the passages memorable even as mere literature?

Differing Dates of Sections considered.

Or shall we establish a distinction such as most necessarily prevails as to parts of Genesis, and say that the two or more sets of composers were so wide apart as to time and space that the one, the later, actually did not *know* the other, the prior, so presenting us with an additional reason for the omission?

[1] The Vi-d(a)ēva-dāta, Vendīdād.

Multiplicity of Authors as of Course.

The Vendīdād and all the rest except the Gāthas, had authors and re-editors enough, as we need not mention; but no respected expert anywhere would think of suggesting that the re-writers of Vendīdād IV to IX, 12 which are without the name of Angra Mainyu, were not familiar with their own first Chapter, striking beyond measure as it is, and this simply because they do not continue on to re-echo the revolting Chief Demon's word?; how much more completely would we stultify ourselves, if we reasoned from his absence from these necessarily so shortened chiselled columns [1].

The Name of the great Iranian Devil which would be expected in denunciations was omitted because it was substituted.

Section XVII, c.

The Real Point at Issue.

What was the nature of this substitution? This is the decisive point at issue; is it effective as an asset in my argument?

[1] Angra Mainyu does not occur once in the first eight chapters of the Yasna, and only three times as a proper name in the entire Book. From Yasna IX, 8 (19) where a new section begins the name does not occur, not even in the Gāthas until, Y. LVII, XII, where it occurs once: from there on it does not occur until Yasna LXI, (Spiegel LX), SBE XXXI from page 233 to 312); see the index which was not my work, and which I can therefore cite the more confidently. And from Yasna LXI (LX) to the end of the Yasna it never appears It does not seem to occur once in the Visparad, and but once in the Srōsh Yasht. It does not occur in the Haptan Yasht, nor in the Ardibehisht Yasht, nor in the Khordād Aban, nor in the Srōsh Yasht Hādōkht, nor in the Rashn Yasht, not in pp. 252—291 in Darmesteter's Yashts, SBE XXIII; see the Index. The generic d(a)ēva is frequent.

He Darius, to name him as representing the the other Authors of the Inscriptions, had a point of infinite significance to make; and he went straight to his mark, not dawdling over needless sounds. There was one chief work indeed of a leading Demon with which he had to do, and he fills his Inscriptions with it. He even uses the denominative verb-form, as said before. That word is »*lied*« and it reverberates in cursing tones from the granite [1] everywhere. We may simply claim that Angra Mainyu without the name *is* recalled, for the Lie personified is his peculiar attribute, and as personified, his chief Agent in Avesta. The Drauga of the Old Persian represents that »falsehood« which is the one thing so bitterly opposed in the fierce, though clumsy, sentences; and the author works up its infamies, as Avesta does its sister's, for all that they are worth.

Adurujiya means literally »He did the lie«, »acted Druj-like«. And this Drauga of Behistūn is Avesta »draogha« slightly varied, as draogha itself is but another form of »druj«. And of all the evil names in the entire three sections of Avesta this was the most severe and common. *Here then is the most emphatic Evil Word in all the Inscriptions likewise the very same and most emphatic Evil Term in all Avesta, while in this last extended Lore it points out vituperatively the chief agent of the Evil God, whose name was needless upon the Inscriptions.* In the Inscriptions, as I have said, we have the verb-from of the name (the Druj), seldom the noun-form

[1] Or other rock of Behistūn.

Drauga, and we have it everywhere. Is it likely that the Authors of the Inscriptions were ignorant of an Angra Mainyu when they were making use at every column of the word which appears also everywhere in Avesta to express his essential characteristic?

In the Zoroastrian Books we have it throughout where evil is denounced. We have nothing, of the worst kind of sin or sorrow, I was almost about to say, without the *druj* in verb, noun, or participle; and in parts the repetitions become most vehement. Is it likely that while the Inscriptions and the Avesta are thus actually one as to the very chief effect of Angra Mainyu, the Author of the Inscriptions had never *heard* of that great God-devil, whose dreaded deeds and doubtless also whose very name was* spread from India almost if not quite to Greece, and by his (the author's) own mighty conquests as by those of his Predecessor? For wherever he sent the name of Auramazda, there beside it he hurled his curses upon the »*Lie*«, see the Inscriptions in their bulk.

Among the names which appear so conspicuously at Behistūn stands Raga distinguished in the Avesta as Ragha. Here a great Rebel was defeated, and events of signal political importance of course took place; but for leagues around Raga the name of Angra Mainyu was continually uttered while Darius's forces were still there. It was a *centre* of Avesta influence, and Avesta ideas were dominant, and with these the name and attributes of Angra Mainyu were necessarily familiar, being bound up even with their thoughts of »deity«.

Did none of Darius's officers become conversant

with a word used frequently enough, we may be sure, by bands of the broken enemy to emphasise their fury. They, Darius and his Officers, were having close political business with that locality very frequently; and possibly at the very moment when the Inscriptions were being cut dispatches from that Province were coming daily in.

Is it not moreover likely that a believed-in Personal Spirit, the Drauga, kindred to the Druj, who had a notorious Chief, in fact a separate Creator in Avesta, should not have had *any chief at all* in the religious scheme of the Authors of the Inscriptions?, a lonely Sub-devil as it were, and all without a friend; and this in a lore which was otherwise so close to the Avesta where every angel, as well as every Devil, has a Chief?

I should say that it would be out of all proportion for us to suppose that there was no chieftain at all over this Drauga of the Inscriptions. He, or she, had a Chief Demon over him or her, we may indeed be sure in the Inscriptions just as »the Draogha« and »Druj« of the Avesta City, may represent the Chief par-eminence in their related Lore.

And is it then probable, so I submit, that this Demon Chieftain should not be the *same Angra Mainyu* who figures in the Iranian Books, and whose name had lived for ages. Recollect what has been said already upon the various terms which are common to the two compositions, all marked as they are, and, so to speak, exceptional Avesta words, and yet so familiar to the language of the Inscriptions, and so called-for within the subjects handled,

that they could not even be kept out of the narrow compass of the Behistūn columns; see above.

Conclusion as to the Points.

Can we therefore avoid the conclusion that the Chief Demon of the One book was altogether known to the authors of the other writings, though often out of mind? Is it natural for us to suppose that two records which could coincide in a startling manner upon the name of God and upon His character; that is to say, upon His justice, His beneficence, His grace, etc., in expressions all singularly characteristic, having also the same endeared and venerated name for Him, Ahura Mazda, should differ otherwise than accidentally or mechanically upon such a subject as His notorious »Counterpart«, His fell and necessary Companion, nay His very »*Twin*«[1].

Above all are we to suppose that the later Persian Governments, not only the Functionaries of Darius but those of his entire Dynasty much later on, even up to the year 358 B. C. about, should actually have not known of the existence of such a title, a very curse-word or swear-word sounded in anathemas throughout the entire Middle North of the Empire. For we must of course remember that with every additional century, so much the fuller became the Zoroastrian ritual and the Zoroastrian Lore, the Priesthood too, after the first degeneration from Gāthic days, would be becoming more and more enlightened, as we see from the tone of the Avesta documents.

[1] »Counterpart« is here used only in an etymological sense.

All the while let us recollect that a manyu, if not an Angra Ma(i)nyu, was also at times a hated name in another great Dependency of Persia, for manyu has an evil sound even in Vedic Hymns:[1]

What short of a Bureau of Information could Darius, and the rest have had?, if they had never heard those syllables! To suppose that the entire Dynasty from Cyrus to the last Ochus was originally ignorant of the name of the chief evil Spiritual Being believed in by very large portions of the population of their empire, and this merely because the Name of this Being is absent from these sparse writings, which yet reiterate their execration of His fell work, and of His chief characteristic, and of that of His most conspicuous servants, is merely to manifest an incapacity in judgment upon the subject, and upon all similar questions in their detail. *The Government of Darius could not have been ignorant of such a Name, nor of its meaning.* The reason why that Name was omitted was therefore *not* because it was unknown, but because it was *substituted* and so for the moment out of use.

Section XVII, d.

Then there is another Omission.

This time it is again a word which meets us at every turn in the sister Lore to the Inscriptions,

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[1] See above upon Philo's dunámeis and the Amesha (Amersha) Spentas.

and one which may even be represented in the Semitic Scriptures as already hinted at above [1].

Where are the Devás upon the Inscriptions?

Devá is utterly absent from these Sculptures in whichever sense, in the evil, the Avesta sense, as in the »good« Vedic one. Were Darius, Xerxes, and even Artaxerxes III (B. C. 358 about) ignorant of a word which was as familiar to India as the name of »God« is familiar to us, and which in one of their cities Raga (Ragha), was as familiar to their people as the word »*Devil*« is to us? It is simply »silly« for us for a moment to suppose such ignorance to have been possible. As we have seen from the text of Chronicles [1], there are considerable grounds for us to believe that Cyrus was actually in the way of using the word there in that Semitic form, but in the »good« sense of it which is familiar to well-nigh all Indogermanic speech [2].

D(a)ēva was no unknown Word.

I do not think that these adverse inferences are justifiable. The Name of d(a)ēva was generic. In all conceivable sound reason not only did the Authors of these almost Avesta-Inscriptions originally know of the name of D(a)ēva, as of Angra Mainyu, but they knew of a throng of cognate Gods, Demon-gods, or god-lets, whose names they

[1] See above where I call attention to »Cyrus's« reputed remarks about the »God of Heaven«, and below where I consider the objections.

[2] See below where I return to this.

could not at all, under the circumstances, be expected to transcribe.

Mithra and Anahita.

It may then be said, that both Mithra and Anahita; see above, appear upon an Inscription of Artaxerxes as if they coloured a very natural scene. And they are two of the very most prominent of the secondary Avesta names of Gods. If these then are mentioned, why were the D(a)ẹvas omitted if they were known, and with them Angra M.? The columns were not too »narrow« (it might be hinted) to admit those two; and they were indeed less prominent than the giant Aryan Demon, or the generic God-word, D(a)ẹva in literatures where they were recognised; why then should these, the D(a)ẹvas, as well as Angra Mainyu have been left unnoticed, unless because they were unknown? Precisely. The familiar names of Mithra and Anahita appear here just for a reason which emphatically helps on my case. While scores of Gods and Angels are not alluded to, these two are brought in for the very same reason that the Drauga and all his (or her?) deeds are cited; see above; and for a reason even stronger; for Mithra and Anahita could not possibly have been omitted.

The words were in all human probability inscribed within a building *because their consecrated images had been solemnly brought into it, for they are especially invoked for protection, and in close association with Ahura Mazda* [1].

[1] As in the Yashts.

So the Drauga is cited, and his or her?, acts are summed up in the repeated »adurujiya« because the terms were *indispensable, filling to repletion the composer's* sense of wrong, and expressing the *one chief point* of all his hostile statements, like the »oppositions« of Vendīdād I. The Persian King had little need to name the Devás approvingly or otherwise, since he had another word; but Mithra and Anahita could not have been avoided in cutting a »dedication« within that Building. Artaxerxes accordingly ordered those names to be inscribed.

So Artaxerxes Ochus mentions Mithra doubtless from some such stringent cause.

XVII c.

»*Where are the Amesha Spenta?*«

In the like spirit we may ask and answer: »where are the Amesha Spentas upon the Columns, next to Ahura externally the grandest Concept of the Avesta? Again let me plainly say that it is perhaps conceivable as a possibility that Cyrus and Darius with the rest of the Achaemenids, had never even heard such sounds as express those names. But in view of the facts of the case, this is again to the very last degree improbable. Not only may we cite once more the close presence of Avesta ideas upon the Inscriptions, but the names also occured in the Ṛig-Veda centuries before Darius or Cyrus, as many believe, and as I have already somewhat elaborately shown above [1].

[1] See above, Part I, pages 196 ff.

And just as Angra Mainyu must have been included within the terms which expressed the activity of his chief servant, so the Ameshas must have been present at least to the mind of the man who was so familiar with Ahura, while we recall again the names of Mithra and Anahita, for these were also closely associated with the Ameshas in the Avesta texts [1].

The Ameshas and the Other Gods.

It would indeed be hardly fair for us to say that the Ameshaspentas were quite absolutely necessary as included precisely among the »other Gods« mentioned in the Inscriptions; for we do not contend that *every* Avesta name was positively known to Darius or his successors. To bring in other Gods [2] is not necessarily to adduce every conceivable cognate Deity.

Our Argument Recurs.

But we have only to apply the same kind of arguments already used. No one supposes, let us hope, that the Ameshaspentas were not worshipped in the land of the Gāthas at least as early as Darius, seeing that they were actually old ideas of antevedic origin ; nor will any one contend that the place where they, the Gāthas, were first sung was not afterwards at least within the Empire, nor that

[1] In fact Mithra, as already hinted, is most intimately associated with Ahura, his name occuring with that of Ahura in the double form mithra-ahura like the Vedic Mitrāváruṇa.

[2] See below.

[3] See above upon Philo's dunámeis and the Amesha Spentas.

Raga (Ragha), where those Gāthas formed the central document of a wide religious culture, was not a well-known site; see above, where I allude to the subjugation of Fravartish.

Irrelevancy Once Again.

But why should they have been mentioned in the Inscriptions, save in a case of some close and immediately pressing need?, as was the fact with the names of Mithra and Anahita. Again let me protest against the almost insolent ignorance with which too many of us approach such subjects. If we do not know, we should be at least ashamed that we do not know, while engaging in these discussions, that (as in the case of Angra Mainyu) there are very wide sections of the Avesta Books themselves where none of these great Names appear, though they are those of the August Immortals, the very personified Attributes of their God. The Avesta is now one Book through printing; but it was then on scattered MSS., or partly an oral lore, and not a rock Inscription, yet it consisted of extended parts or documents. If then the Avesta could omit the words from so many lengthy parts of it, why should we wonder that the Inscriptions do not bring them in?

Our Own Usages Compared.

Do we, let us ask again and in the name of common fairness, always, or so often, mention *our* Archangels in our Edicts, or even such a pre-eminent Personification as a member of our Trinity Itself?

In military or political Inscriptions where do we ever say any other such word save »God«?, at least in lands called »protestant«. And this even intentionally, for there are many Christians who do not hold with their brethren as to the full details of current beliefs.

The Relative Prominence of the Ameshas.

And this last meets another just objection to my argument, for some one should say that the Amesha Spentas were far more prominent in the Mazda Faith of the Avesta than our Archangels are in ours at the present stage of our development, though not indeed more prominent than the »Son of God«, or »the Third Person of our Trinity«, and so they should appear upon the Inscriptions, if they were a kindred Lore. Well said again!; but is it true? Was it at all the fact that the Ameshaspentas were so prominent in Darius's creed?; and is it at all necessary to our argument for us to suppose that they were indeed so essential to his Religion?

Did Darius care for the Ameshas?

Did Darius believe in the Ameshaspentas at all, let us seriously ask, in such a sense as to induce him to indict their Names at every turn? My argument depends on no such supposition. Mazda-worship like our Christ-worship, had many sub-divisions beyond all doubt. Darius's faith may well have been of a kind which made him lukewarm toward what were these otherwise most holy supernatural Beings of the Avesta. They may well have been

too »Magian« for him, just as the very Virgin is too »catholic« for some of us [1]?; I refer of course to her »Cult«.

Darius was in a Sense Monotheistic.

Let us not forget that Darius was in one sense monotheistic, and passionately so; for one is never so radical as after crushing rival fallacies; I meant and mean only to assert that the Ameshas were not *unknown* to him. *His belief in them or his non-belief is totally indifferent* to me in my argument just here. Otherwise he is most serious in his devout expressions. Notwithstanding some minor allusions to inferior spiritual beings made doubtless also conscientiously to please his subjects, he approaches even the Gāthic spirit in the strong torrent of his words. And the »Gāthic spirit« is otherwise unique.

He had no disposition at all to divert his preoccupied attention with extraneous detail. Auramazda was with him »the Greatest of the Gods«, meaning by this that He was the only real One in our modern sense, the »Creator of this Earth and of yon Heaven«; so, in the Avesta, Darius had no time at all to pause over the lesser Gods, sub-gods or angels, arch- or otherwise, whichever we may choose to call them, and however much or little he may have believed them to exist, except as sublime conceptions. He may indeed again like us, have at times forgotten them.

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[1] As to some particulars of the belief in her among Protestants.

XVIIf.

And so even in the Avesta there are extended sections in which they, the Ameshaspentas, are not seen.

Take up even the Vendīdād once more, and in all the Books, pretty nearly one third of the Avesta, only one of the »Greater Ameshaspentas,« names occurs from chapter I to chapter XIX, 11, a mass of writing perhaps ten times as great as the Inscriptions. Not Asha, nor Vohumanah, nor Khshathra, nor Haurvātāt nor Ameretatāt appear there, only Āramaiti, and that in her sense of »earth«. Even in the Yasna we have chapters bereft of some of them.

Instead then of carping at their absence from these rough but earnest sentences of the Persian Kings, common sense should rather say to us that the men were simply thinking of other things, and for the very best of all good reasons, namely that what they had to occupy their attention was greatly more pressing upon their immediate needs than such things as the names of minor gods or other theological distinctions.

If then Darius was, or »since«, as we might more confidently say, Darius was, so far as his ideas appear upon the Inscriptions, a sort of Unitarian [1] as Mazda-worshipper, and therefore one of a caste of devotees who detested multiplicity in his adored divinities; — and if he were likewise a vehement Antimagian as well; — and if also, as we know, the Avesta was

[1] »Unitarian« is the name of a Sect which denies the usual doctrine of the Trinity, holding only to a Unity.

distinctly Magian on the other side [1], the Avesta being actually called in its very oldest part a glorification of the same Magian Ameshaspentas, then this abolishes the argument from the absence of the Ameshas, and it leaves the Inscriptions and the Iranian Books as to other particulars still very near akin.

And this is the point of my argument just here. As Darius had lately crushed the false Magian Bardiya, (that is, Smerdes), we have here at once a reason why he should not take pains to engrave upon his Tablets the names of those Spiritual Beings whom he, that Magian, had most probably worshipped with a fervour all too zealous; for his Ameshaspenta Magianism was presumably the reason why he, Bardiya (Smerdes), destroyed the sacred temples of Darius's cult. We reverence the Virgin doubtless, but is it not the fact that one third of the Christians now alive scarcely utter the yet so beloved name except in frigid formulas, while on the contrary, two thirds of the rest of us almost make her »God«, and some again most vehemently oppose her worship. So Darius was lukewarm over these »Magian« Archangels whose influence carried his prime enemy on to his so strangely usurped throne.

An Amesha possibly Referred to.

I will not indeed press the possibility that we have actually an Amesha referred to in the separated âura of Behistūn I, 24 (Sp.) where it may be used like »ahura«, which in the Avestas refers at times to the Ameshaspentas, and once at least indeed

[1] See the curses on the mōghu-ṭbish, the magian-hater.

to the expected Prophet in the sense of »Lord«; see Yasna XXIX, 2, for we now prefer to regard that áurā in the Inscriptions as an instrumental of the chief God's name. Bnt none the less the two occurrences of áurā and áurahyā, instrumental and genitive, as separate words from Mazda; see above; show at least that the first part of the combined name in, Aura-mazda still *retained significance, its sense not having been*, as so often, *lost in the united sounds; and this still vigorous meaning of the separated word points certainly to the Avesta where the separated word is universal, and where it also applies* at times both to the Ameshas and even to the human subject, as well as to the supreme (good) Deity as I have said above, and that in passages nearly side by side. How little possible, let me say with reference to this point as well, is it then that Darius knew nothing of those most august religious Personifications whose names, like that of their great Adversary, were at that very moment of his writing being still sung in many a hymn in that Town and throughout that Province [1] where his successful general had so lately taken decisive military action; and whose names also with little doubt, not so long later on, resounded through the Achaemenian territories even to the very shores of Greece.

If the one Lore, even in its chief document, was almost made up of homage to the Immortal Six, with Ahura, the great Seven; — if these were also sung, though in dimmer allusion, in the earlier Indian Hymns, how is it conceivable that Darius,

[1] Raga (Ragha).

his Successors, or any of their corps of learned men had never even heard the syllables?

And this, again let us recall it, when officials must have been coming and going without intermission from the closely related Zoroastrian Provinces, not to speak of a Pandit here and there from the more distant Indian dependencies.

Even non-Zoroastrian agents from the North could only have avoided general descriptions of the sectional cult *upon the understanding that it was familiar.*

»Time« even should be considered in the Matter of extended Sculptured Inscriptions as well as the carefully acquired »Space«.

It may seem singular that we should mention the requirements of »time«, even as a minor reason for all such omissions upon the tablets; but when we recall how very many such items the Achaemenids may have desired to mention, even »time« itself should not be left unnoticed [1].

Men worked slowly doubtless in those parts then, though quicker possibly than now, above all artistic persons. And Darius was not the man to think that he was born to live forever. Two years, or three, were no slight item, as we may well conceive, with him in his views of any situation whatsoever, just as they are not that now with most of us. Time for completing the interesting work was not therefore to be thrown away. No successor, he

[1] Recall that most significant, if not pathetic, circumstance, the rough-hewn tablet on Behistūn which seems to have been prepared for further Inscriptions; but »time« failed the intending annalist.

might feel sure, would take such care to record his deeds as he himself, and details of angeliology and the like were, we may be certain, the very last of possible considerations which engrossed, even if they crossed, his mind.

Matters of political importance were, as we so clearly see, life and death to him in his eventful moments, for he presents them on a scale of such vast magnitude that we are quite oppressed as we trace them on the stones. These, he thought, and not unnaturally, were controlled by God Himself; see above. And so far as »divinities« were concerned, he dealt with their expected help alone.

Would we then, let us ask again, to close the point, have named our Gabriel and Michael, our Raphael and our Uriel in such a case as this? supposing in fact that we could, all of us, instantly or at all recall each and every name of them at will?

XVII, g.

Zarathushtra's Name. Where is it?

Its absence as an Argument against the Association of the Inscriptions and Avesta.

And so of Zarathushtra; — I mean of course the name. All things, negative, are certainly possible; — as we may often say — »with God« at least-; or rather, led us add, »all things intellectual«; that is to say, »possible«, when we take into our consideration the immensity of human apathy. No relative of Cyrus, nor any functionaries in his employ, may have ever heard the sound of such a title as I have named above. But

the Zoroastrian Town with its surrounding territory comes in, and with perhaps an added force, once more. If the Inscription Religion had any counterpart, so far as our records of such a circumstance can extend, then that counterpart existed, as no one, reading the Inscriptions, will any longer question, at that ancient site. Ragha is a marked Avesta name, let us recall it again; see above. There an Ahura Mazda was worshipped beyond any shadow of a doubt, as all men see, just as the King's own Auramazda was »God« in the more Southern site. We have no inscriptions there at Ragha, but we have what is nearly as convincing, an imperishable Book. The sources of that Book were at that instant extant there, as all should know, and its chief pieces were then in all human probability actually used in worship; and the name of »Zarathushtra« lives throughout them everywhere. Had nothing ever then been heard, let us as before inquire, of a name which was so familiar in the Northern town at the moment when Darius wrote at his more central Capital or at Persepolis? Here was a name, let me say it again, with which a great Province actually rang. Did no lingering echoes of it reach the place where other priests of lesser magnitude were standing in consecrated fanes before altars doubtless all aflame with the same venerated element which shone from scores of Sanctuaries in the Ragha Province, while worshipping the identically same Deity, Auramazda, Darius's God? It does not seem to me to be at all a probable idea that a name so greatly celebrated at Ragha was never

even heard at the central seat of Government; for it became at last so prominent that like »Caesar« in another application in imperial politics, it actually gave title to officials. The Magnates of various places began to take on »Zarathushtra«, till at last their Chief assumed the very form superlative, so, curiously. Others were »Zarathushtra«; but *he* [1] became »most Zarathushtra«, hardly so early however as Darius, but quite probably indeed before the last of these Inscription writers prepared their edicts for the chisels.

Why does not then the name occur upon the Tablets, upon the Rocks and Palaces?

Really it is time that we should begin to hesitate before we protract these queries; see above upon the Ameshaspentas. I have carefully avoided any such idea as the too close association of this extremely conspicuous name with the Southern portion of the Empire. That name is to be sure absolutely embodied in Avesta; — and Avesta in its related lores was widely spread over the North, North-East, and North-West of Iran; but not necessarily so much so toward the South. Both it and the name with it could not have well failed to be known at the Capital for the reasons above given as to Angra Mainyu and the Ameshas.

Perhaps one simple explanation more might here be put in at once to account for its omission, which is, not

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[1] Zarathustrōtema. »The Ragha Province had no formal fifth ruler's name, or title »Zarathushtra«; doubtless because the real or supposed descendants of Z. still lingered there. And the office was hereditary with their head without especial appointment; see Y. XIX.

that the name was too familiar; but that it was perhaps abhorred. Zarathushtra, was of course also »magian« like the Ameshaspentas if he was anything; see the condemnations of the »magian-hater« in Avesta. He belonged to the detested form of the rival Mazda-worship; and just as Catholic hates »heretic« in our times of Reformation, so did Darius hate the Magu and with all the vehemence which could lead to slaughter. How then could Zarathushtra be named (with veneration) by the man who overthrew the chief Magian of the period, the zealous Smerdes, Bardiya, the so-called, or real, pretender and impersonator, if all that story can be believed [1].

If Darius had cited Zarathushtra, it would have been in an hostile sense. No name that could be named would be less likely to be found among such records of a dynasty ostentatiously founded upon the execution of a person of his sect.

The absence of the name »Zarathushtra« from the records proves only that Darius was not insincere, or, – not demented. There is one name indeed upon Behistūn and the rest, which is identical in terms with a conspicuous one within Avesta. It is Vīshtāspa. If we could identify the Vīshtāspa of the Inscription with the Vīshtāspa of Avesta, this would put the Avesta at once into the hands of every Bible-Scholar in the land, which is a leading object of this present book, and a result in practical literature of acute significance and far reaching in

[1] I personally beg leave to hesitate a little before I accept the whole of it; all others however seem to absorb it as it stands.

its effects; for no one knows how widely conclusions like these may one day bear. We must pause however here at this a little, in default of completed evidence. It seems really in our especial sense of it, to be »too good« to be among the things called »true«.

As to »Zarathushtra« however, we have not the slightest intimation of the name.

From the word Auramazda however, as well as from the words »Mithra« and »Anahita«, and also from the continuous tone of the religious sentiment together with the linguistic analogies, we know for sure that the forebears of Zarathushtra and those of Darius once worshipped the same Ahura Mazda as their God in the self-same local tribe; for then those Deities and worshippers were each the self-same persons, and lived in the common home. No one doubts, so far as I am aware, who understands the subject, that there was once a time called that of »Iranian Unity«, and further back in the gray dawn of the early world there was a period of Indo-Iranian, and even of Indo-Germanic Unity. Already in those immemorial days, so well-nigh inconceivably remote, the same Gods whose names we trace on the Inscriptions, in the Avesta, and in Veda were reverently adored with no thought as yet of difference, Áhura as Ásura, Mithra as Mitra, Agni, Atar and the rest; see above; and out of the primeval lore in which those religious thoughts were then embedded emerged the three later branches, the Vedic, the Zarathushtrian, and the Daric. Surely it is mere incompetence for us to suppose that the masses who worshipped under the Persian successors

of Zarathushtra were ignorant, originally so, not only of the very chief Gods reverenced, and of the One chief Demon feared by the masses taught by their own first predecessors, but of the leading Prophet's name as well. Momentary fortgetfulness was beyond all question the chief cause, next to the non-relevance of a citation, why the names were not hewn out, but *original ignorance* is totally aside; — more especially as it involved an unaccountable absence of information on the part of Darius's officials actually appointed by him to report upon the general business details of the public Cults.

It becomes now my duty to notice some criticisms which might be made on Darius as regards his personal character and creed. For a direct indictment of these is next in point; and first as to his Creed; for this naturally falls in as an appendix to the last item. It is indeed quite true that my argument neither directly nor fundamentally depends upon the excellence or inferiority of either the man or his convictions in themselves alone considered; but, as I have more than once implied, there are subordinate elements among those considerations, which bear most seriously upon the results which I am endeavouring to make good.

Section XVIII.

Objections as to further Interior Elements of the Religion of the Inscriptions.

Darius's Creed more closely considered. Allusions to other Gods.

And what of the allusions to »the Other Gods?« Are these not an objection to the comparison of

the Avesta religion with that of the Inscriptions, and upon the ground of the »polytheism« involved in such ideas?, a point not yet so very well thought out.

My answer is that »polytheism« as an accusation just here has fortunately, or the reverse, but little point, for, while in its mass monotheistic, barring the independent Satan, parts of the later Avesta themselves cannot be described as anything but such-like, though from the earlier Avesta this polytheism is absent. Indeed the difference between monotheism and polytheism is no by means always so easy for us to trace in the forms of our own Religion, not to speak of those of the Avesta. We, Christians, are ourselves also reckoning quite without our host if we think that independent critics would always call *us* Monotheists, that is to say, not without some very serious reserves. We are positively the contrary in the eyes of many, though falsely so, as we may be well assured; and this in regard to what some would call the most vital elements of our Faith. Our very Tritheism, (? so, badly named) would make us such in the view of many a cold critic, not to speak of »our God's Mother«, our Angels and Archangels. To defend Avesta from this charge of »many gods«, we can indeed make clear the astonishing refinement of the Gāthas, showing that their Dualism resulted from a recoil against just this many-godded belief, degrading as they evidently thought it to be, while even in the most polytheistic passages of the late Avesta the one good God stands out unusually distinct from the company of lesser divinities. Yet there are isolated

passages in the later Avesta where another Deity closely approaches Ahura in the degree of honour accorded him.

Avesta is indeed, in its later portions, almost Veda in these picturesque particulars. See where in the Yasna Ahura and Mithra are linked together quite as Mitrāváruṇa [1]. A distinct crying back had taken place from the Gāthic age to some still earlier common primeval lore; — for the later Avesta seems to call up again a throng of once-venerated primeval Deities strictly ignored within the Gāthas, one of the strangest and most significant facts yet known to our ancient literature [2]. The Gāthas banished even the time-honoured Mithra with the rest; — or did they actually foredate them?. This polytheism of the isolated passages might however indeed be said to be the merest flicker [3].

But in view of it why should not Darius and the rest, though essentially monotheistic in their spirit, be also tinged with this same veneration for »the many Gods«, such as the later Avesta at times reveals. Personally I think that Darius was singularly free from »many-godded-ness«; — but why should this have been the case? Is there any particular reason why he should not have been deeply infected with

[1] Y. 2, 44 Spiegel, ahura-mithra as dual — Y. 1, 34 Sp. ahuraēibya-mithraēibya, — while yet at another place Ahura is said distinctly to have »created« Mithra; see above.

[2] If Mithra, Agni, and the rest were ignored in the Gāthas, because they were then unknown at the time when the Gāthas were first sung; and never known before that time, the result would be well-nigh stupendous as a circumstance in early history. It would show the Gāthas to be indeed by far the oldest of all surviving books, which indeed some now think them, as it is, to be.

[3] But it exists.

it, seeing that it was so common? Why should he not have been at least as much tinged with it as the Ṛishis of the Yashts? or as *we*, some of us, are ourselves supposed to be.

Instincts of Chivalric Courtesy were moved to Action.

Darius, though fervent in his faith, was no Christian martyr of the early type under the Gentile Emperors, regarding the smallest recognition of other Deities though well accredited, as being quite a heinous crime; see above. His convictions and sense of proportion on the contrary would have urged him to be decent toward the religious feelings of his subjects [1].

He was a politician doubtless, and somewhat ruthless often from the very nature of his aims; — but he was none the less a man embued with sentiment. The religious cults of the various races within his care were dear to him, each of them, as we may be very sure; and every cult involved the deepest interests of human lives, domestic social and political. These creeds, he doubtless saw, as we all see, were in themselves both really innocent and also honourable, as gropings toward the light, the best that their adherents knew. And he himself too shared them personally and most sincerely in a certain sense, for he was glad to hope that the lesser Gods would help him on in his arduous tasks with all their magnitude together his own great worshipped Central Force.

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[1] See above upon Cyrus.

Conscience, let me repeat it with emphasis, instead of restraining him from such words and acts of reverence, would on the contrary urge him to say every word and do every deed of respect and sympathy towards his sincere and pious fellow-countrymen; see above. Consideration for the Gods even of another nation would really in the end, as always, conduce to a better attitude toward his own.

His »Other Gods« indeed were strangely Limited.

We should in no wise ask why Darius names these »other Gods«, »all Gods« or »clan Gods?« but rather »why he names so few«. Our reason given for this and all such like omissions will never vary. Space, time and attention were only left for things immediately practical; that is to say, for things imperatively urgent.

If this last question then is all that keeps the Inscriptions from Avesta, our task is over. Of the Inscription and the late Avesta, the last is the more »pagan«[1] of the two, teeming with accredited divinities, half-gods and angels.

Great as may be the essentials upon which the two resulting lores may differ, the elements on which they are one still keep all our reasonings valid. The facts remain unmoved.

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[1] »Pagan« is here used in no uncomplimentary sense. In Rome the stateliest houses remained most »pagan«.

XIX.

Objections Continued.

Imperfections in the Ideals of Personal Character as manifested in the Recorded Acts and Sentiments of Darius aside from his professed Religious Policy.

The defect which makes the deepest impression upon every one who first glances over the Inscriptions whether hurriedly, or otherwise, is the inhuman cruelty revealed in the few passages of the Behistūn already cited; see above; see also below.

Cruelty.

The execution of the captive rebel »Kings«, see above, leaves little for the imagination to supply.

In extenuation of this I have nothing whatever to put forward at this moment except that poor attempt at a palliation; viz. that it was in accordance with the customs and opinions of the age in which the enormity transpired. Darius doubtless glutted a brutal desire for revenge in these barbaric acts, so far indeed as these Inscriptions are personal at all, and whether he himself really dismembered his captive enemies, as he seems so callously to assert, or not.

The Executions were largely acts of War and in Self-defence.

Aside however from the revolting methods of the executions, we must of course understand that they were constructively acts of war, and might well be so described; see also elsewhere; as done in

»self-defence«. Those enemies had, on their side, risen upon him for his destruction. All that he held dear they had endeavoured to annihilate, and had they been sucessful in their revolt, then they beyond all manner of a doubt, would have treated Darius precisely as he did them.

The International Public must be Struck with Terror.

Aside also from the slaking of vindictive fury, it was the current opinion of the Period that other insurgent princes must be »struck with terror« by the severe chastisement of conquered enemies. Frightful details might deter them (those others) from the same careers of conspiracy and attack. Even Zarathushtra could urge on his followers to executions [1]; and it would be wholly unphilosophical if I should fail to add that some Christian executions of discordant fellow-believers and of criminals show details quite as demoniacal [2]. Those of Darius were however savage acts indeed beyond all question, as recorded on the Inscriptions, if not indeed the acts of savages. Perhaps Darius really never did them, - not personally at least. At all events let us sincerely hope that he exaggerated their low details to deepen the horrific effect upon intending imitators who might hear the rumours of them.

After this the Egotism of the Inscriptions is what strikes us most in our preliminary perusal. Such a peculiarity indeed is not fatal to Darius's his credit; but it has it serious bearings.

[1] See Yasna XXXI, XXXII, etc. [2] Cp. the Inquisition.

XIX, b.

Egotism as a Gross Foible in the Writers of the Inscriptions.

The defect is at times so glaring as to seem to us to be quite diseased in its ever-recurring manifestations, and also, at the same time, strange to say, curiously out of keeping with the religious fervour of the Inscription writers themselves as expressed in other parts of their statements. And this may well nullify all favourable effect which may have heen produced upon us, being also in harsh contrast with the tone of their political action toward the Israelites as recorded in our own Semitic Scriptures.

All is »I« and »me«, as we report with some disgust, upon their writings as transferred to the Inscriptions. »I am Cyrus the King, the Achaemenid« are the only words which have really survived to us of the Iranian Incriptions of one Cyrus, though it is doubtful whether that unique sentence belongs to Cyrus the Great, or to a later pretender; and it is hardly necessary to recall the extreme self-consciousness of his Successor. »I am Darius the great King; Auramazda made me kmg. As Auramazda made this earth he delivered it over to me, etc., see above and below. From of old were my family kings, etc.«

XX.

Answers to the Charges.

My answer to the lot of it is first and again a frank concession. Like most other reigning Oriental

families in ancient, and shall we say also, in modern times, the Achaemenids must have been well-nigh not quite mentally sane on such a subject. So far as their expressions were really personal, they certainly show what must inevitably take place in the case of all persons situated as they so necessarily were.

Lifelong Adulation must in the End Morbidly affect the Balance of the Faculties.

Alexander perhaps naturally lost his dignity, as we remember, so far as seriously to consider whether he should, or should not, assume the honours of the Gods. But then I must recall what I have already said above; see upon page 244, which is that even these expressions may have been really little else but formulas; and, if such, they would have been so written by confidential representatives and even in certain cases without the previous knowledge of the Master.

Fixedness in Statement.

»The laws of the Medes and Persians«, as we understand from the Expressions in Ezra and Daniel, had later at least taken on a certain proverbial »fixedness of character«, and the dynastic claims of their Monarchs formed of course the very centre of their system, which was that of an autocracy quite absolute. Xerxes, we are certain, was in many of his expressions, not only upon the Inscriptions but elsewhere, using terms which had been set by custom at least from the time of Darius; and Artaxerxes was following on in the same manner with

sayings from the time of Xerxes; see above. And perhaps the very word so familiar to us, as the »unchangeability« [1] of »the laws of the Medes and Persians« came from the fact that they were first thus chiselled in the stone on hillsides, tombs and palaces, and so from a very natural cause outlasted every other sort of record.

Documentary Expressions controlled by Hereditary Association.

Very many other expressions beside those which I have noticed bear strong traces of having been controlled by customary forms, decades and half centuries back, as they certainly were so »stereotyped« during the time from Darius to Ochus; see above. And to this thought I must once again return.

Further Extenuations.

But let us, on the other hand, grant for a moment that these writers indicting the texts for their Inscriptions were in fact consciously as personally egotistic as they really seem, from their statements, to have been, and that the fact that they followed fixed precedents or formulae stereotyped for a century and a half at least, has little if any force to shelter them from such an imputation as I have, in the name of my opponents, brought against them, a very great deal, let us say in passing, for us to grant.

[1] See the Book of Daniel.

The Displeasing Foible Engulfed in the Extraordinary Details.

No one, let us hope, who has the smallest sense of proportion in his estimates of history or of politics, can read the Inscriptions without feeling that »personal egotism« is absolutely engulfed so to speak, as an element in the situation by the extraordinary nature of the acts reported.

The Situations called for Self-assertion.

Do we indeed for a moment fully realise what the situation of Darius actually was? For many an untrained reader of our Oriental documents, fails, as I fear, too often to take in what is one half of the matter presented for his consideration. Does it seem to us to be a circumstance of little breadth or moment that Darius actually claimed to possess and govern the greater part, *of the civilised Earth?* twenty three nations large and small as we have seen, but for the most part great, in their extent of territory at least, including how many cities, towns and villages with their totality of inhabitants.

Surely they numbered many millions? Self assertion is no longer the familiar characteristic in view of that. Assertion in terminology in such a case and in such a period was absolutely unavoidable. How could a Persian Emperor govern one half the world in BC. 500—400 without maintaining such an attitude.

In all such cases also there is much that softens our harshest judgments toward the Person, as we ponder them, for they actually move our pity, if

they do not indeed show him to have been hardened to adversities.

Sudden and extreme Vicissitudes waylaid Darius's Daily Course.

This Monarch's life was evidently one long nightmare of Revolts. *He scarcely reigned, as we might almost be induced to say, he wrangled.*

One after another of the mighty peoples, whom he claimed to own and govern was almost always on the eve of insurrection; and sometimes several of them together at a time. Civil war, as a condition of things, was almost chronic.

Can we wonder then that Darius chiselled up his self-assertions everywhere? One never becomes so self-assertive as in the face of danger. The terribly distracted man then hardly knew what a normal peace could be. His domestic administrations were daily struggles, and as to foreign politics his life was one long tumult. Babylon revolted as we saw; and when he turned to put it down, nine great nations rose up against him in his rear. And for a second time it revolted, later. Legal points had likewise to be refuted, with these however a Persian Emperor might doubtless make short work; but vast details of business continually occupied his thoughts; and conquered nationalities were remodelled.

Every foreign State would be quite as imperious toward him as he could possibly be toward it. Whatever he had said and done, that all others would have matched, we may be sure, if only for the

briefest intervals, could they secure the power. No wonder that he sent his sculptors everywhere which such-like texts, a few of which alone may have lingered on the monuments. Events of every calibre, great, little or mediocre crowded in upon him, including within them those which we are studying, year by year, or more probably month by month, startling him if he were indeed susceptible of shock, and baffling him wherever possible, and interrupting everywhere the vast machinery of Government, even where they did not indeed threaten his very Throne; his tasks were endless.

Elements of Truth in his Assertions.

And were there not after all elements of truth in his assertions?; as they pointed his solid claims to be considered so exceptionally prominent, if not indeed, »supreme«? Was it not essentially, as well as obviously and practically, the fact that in times like those Kings, their families and their dynasties were all that stood between the world and anarchy. And was not God indeed his helper, as he, Darius, so constantly and so earnestly declared. Did not the Almighty indeed »raise his predecessor up« as our own Bibles so solemnly assert? I am of the opinion that he needed all the egotism that he could muster, in the course of his immense career. An inhuman age needed a scarce human tone.

Modifications are to be Considered.

But in this case we have a circumstance which certainly modifies our severe censure of his self-

assertion aside from the considerations just mentioned. This ruler, for an exception, was not solely lost in a blind maze of egotism, nor does he think of his fellow countrymen solely in regard to their immediately present interest, nor again in regard to an indefinitely distant personal future with the particulars of which he was at each moment morbidly engaged. He is thinking definitively of his Successors; and this alone here half nullifies our charge, condoning a colossal self-esteem; for an egotism which looks out upon the still enduring life of others, after one has oneself forsaken life, is half redeemed already by the fact.

Beh. IV, 64—65. »Thou who hereafter shalt »see this Inscript«; so he ordered to be cut; »which »I have written (that is to say, in the document »which was to be sculptured), or who shalt see »these figures (which were to be carved out), do »not destroy them (so, fearing vandalism) [1], but so »long as thou livest, preserve them. When thou »seest this inscribed tablet and these images, and »dost not destroy them, but so long as thy family »lasts dost preserve them for me, may Auramazda »be thy friend; may thy family be abundant, and »thy life long [2]; and what thou doest may Aura»mazda make great for thee (i. e. »prosper«)« [3].

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[1] The Inscriptions, some of them and especially those of Behistūn, were placed in situations only with difficulty accessible and for this reason. It is none the less exceedingly interesting to observe how keenly senitive Darius is upon the subject, and how well he guages the danger to all such kinds of monuments.

[2] Remember Ameretatāt.

[3] Behistūn. Col. IV, l. 64—65 (W. B.), l. 69—76.

Behistūn IV, 66 — (W. B.): »Thus saith Darius »the King: »if thou seest this Inscription and these »figures and dost mar them, and so long as thy »family lasts dost not preserve them for me, but »dost mar them, then may Auramazda smite thee; »may thy family be brought to naught, and may »Auramazda confound what thou doest«.

XX, a.

The Altruistic Element.

Naksh i Rustem, a, 4 (W. B.) »When thou now »thinkest: how manifold are the lands which King »Darius possessed, then look upou this image: it »bears my Throne, then wilt thou know them, and wilt also know (what? — any further self-laudation?, nothing of the kind), — but thou wilt know that »*the Lance of the Persian has reached afar;* — »*then wilt thou know that the Persian has fought* »*battles far from Persia.*«

Egotism like that going out upon a future when he, the speaker, should be no more, is only healthy, virile for the times, and to be praised, not pardoned. His mind was on the future glory of the Empire evidently, and this long after all immediate personal interests should have disappeared; though he doubtless wished much for the immortality which he has since received among us. Our charge of egotism is therefore on the whole hardly fit to be sustained.

But to offer another attack upon the Achaemenid, and this time from a slightly varied point of view. Did not Darius *lie?*

XX, b.

Inveracity Supposable.

And here indeed we have a consideration which is well calculated to unnerve our most resolute defence, as well as to make the most ardent panegyrists of the monarch, pause.

Lying is indeed one of the most damnable of all our human infirmities, how much more so when it is linked with actual or intended murder.

The Story of the False Bardiya, Smerdes.

Take the very first and most important of all the dense throng of these serious and most fateful statements. Was Darius truthful as to his account of the deeds and words of the man whom he claims to have succeeded after having justly put him to death?

Was it Genuine?

No one, so far as I am aware, has hitherto ever uttered one word to challenge that strange tale which Herodotus confirms. The successful impersonator and his many murders quickly plotted to conceal the fact of a falsely assumed identity, has passed, so far as I am aware, for current coin. But is it not possible that this great Reign like so many of the lesser ones, was begun in fact with a deed of faithless assassination excused by a ruthless falsehood in a most improbable detail of so-called history? If this were so, who has anything to say in its excuse. Let us hope that there was no inaccuracy there.

XX, c.

Equivocations Elsewhere.

And if lying is to be suspected elsewhere in the assertions of Darius, a lying age should not be the first to say anything against this great Monarch on account of any other possible exaggerations Political necessity then, as too often since, recoiled but little before streams of blood or storms of perjury.

If Darius first murdered the so-called Gaumāta and then later lied to conceal the nature of his crime, and to gather in its fell results, it was a record horrible indeed, — I rejoice that no one has ever harboured a suspicion of it. But did not he, Darius, exaggerate, equivocate, or categorically falsify in many, or any, of those other grand, though rough and simple statements which deal so majestically with whole Kingdoms in a word, and with myriads of human beings, sentence after sentence? Is everything which he wrote out to be engraved upon the tablets to be at once and forever absorbed by each and all of us, with no reserve and little criticism.

Some Equivocation would naturally be present in these extended political Assertions.

I, for one, am quite willing to concede that he may not have been always accurate. Let us acknowledge it, at least for the sake of argument, and once for all, that he may not have been faultless at every turn of those great observations upon these Columns. I have indeed often wondered why historians, and even we, who work upon

the foundations of our histories, should engulf at wholesale each and all of the assertions which we find carved on stone, or stamped in clay by the order of these Oriental Rulers, simply because they are so old and bear the marks of official authorship. Is it then the fact that mankind have only lately entered upon the daring race of competitive deceit, in a word that they have only lately learned the way to speak untruth? Exaggerations must certainly be present in the secondary detail of those great records somewhere; and here and there doubtless a gross untruth maintains its concealed but hideous existence.

Lying was the Universal Implement.

Darius lived, let us once more note it, in a tumult of large events, each of which was charged with all conceivable disasters to himself and with quick or long since organised conspiracies. He suffered from the »Lie« perennially. There was one especial form of the so hated imposture to which he was even month by month, not to say, day by day subjected.

The Monuments are Resonant with the Well-adapted Word.

Political Lie followed upon Lie, as we read, and we need never doubt it. In nine terrible Revolts, Deceit, at first insidious and then barefaced, recurred. Every adverse statement, as it seems, with almost absolutely no exceptions begins with the scathing words . . . . ; . »He Lied!«

The Cases, Some of Them.

First of Guamāta himself: thus he lied to the people (B. I, XI (l. 39): »I am Bardiya, Cyrus's son, »Cambyses' brother; — so of Nadi̓tabaira (Nidintu-Bel) (B. I, XVI, l. 78) »thus he belied the people«; in B. IV § 51 (W. B.): »This one lied« is repeated nine times of the nine rebellious potentates; so in B. IV § 53 (W. B.): »thus said Darius the King: »it was the plotting Lie which made those lands »rebellious . . ., as they (the kings) lied to them, »thereupon Auramazda gave them into my hand« [1].

B. IV, § 54 (W.B.) Thus saith Darius the King: »Thou who hereafter shalt be King here, guard »thyself carefully against the (Plotting) Lie; a man »who is a (Plotting) Liar, do thou punish well . . . . »if thou thinkest: »my land shall go unscathed«. (Notice in passing that this last sentiment is adverse to Egotism.)

The Word is elsewhere Very Frequent.

And count the occurrences on the other In scriptions, if you care for such a thing. What wonder then, if the man so assaulted by the Lie in its most awful form, at last retaliated with a similar detested weapon. He may have counterlied; if I may so express myself.

Our Own infatuated Falsehood.

Do we politically so often hesitate in similar prevarications upon the plea that the »public good

[1] These references are not at all intended to be absolutely fulsome; for such reference see Sp's. Edition, Glossar. p. 226.

justifies the evil means«, not to speak of the trivial »Te-deums« intoned for false victories in the middle ages, nor of our still lower false market news flashed across the wires to deprive the unwary of their property? Darius doubtless, with the rest of them, felt bound upon his own rough principles to Lie in return again, if we might so say, and forsooth also »for the sake of others!« He had little hesitation, as I greatly fear, in penning many a pretence to put down a conjured-up assailant, absorbing also many a weak province »for the greater good of all.« Yet he spoke, we should not forget to say, especially and pre-eminently *for others* as well as for himself, and that not in a vague general drift alone. Beyond all question his thought was on the welfare of great masses as well as upon himself; see above.

XX d.

The Lie self-limited.

If, on the other hand, he had vapoured too flagrantly in the detail of his important narratives, with too egregious an egotism, would not his own Nobles, themselves soon alienated, have ridiculed his blatant edicts, openly, or surreptitiously, teaching every passer-by to do the same? His engraved words were often literally and really a public voice and in a closer sense than I have remarked before, recording as they did the nation's annals. What are they but a people's history?, written also as of course with the view to moulding its near future in development?

Is it probable then that he should have ordered

notoriously perverted facts, and those in too great numbers, to be graven up »with a pen of iron, upon the rock« where they would stand for ages as witness both to his turpitude and to his folly?; see above.

But aside from all this mass of possibility, which it has been so necessary to reproduce, who does not see that Darius longed to speak the very truth, and was fully conscious that what he wrote might be so gravely doubted? Read the following.

An earnest Desire after Veracity and Intention to Preserve it.

B. 10, § 55, (B.W.) »Thou who hereafter wilt read this Inscription, let what I have done appear credible to thee.«

(56). »Thus saith Darius the King; as Mazda- »worshipper (I swear (?)) that this is true, and not »lied, that is to say, it is what I have done of every »kind.« 57. »Thus saith Darius the King: According to the will of Auramazda much more has also »been done by me which is not written in this In- »scription. For this reason is it not written, that »no one, who will later read this Inscription, shall »consider what I have done too much, and shall not »believe it, and shall hold it to be falsified.«

59. »Thus saith Darius the King: Does what »I have done appear to thee to be credible, — do »not for that reason conceal it.«

After that who will deny that this Great Persian spoke more truth than most rulers of his day,

if not more than those of any other day, when he ordered what he did to be engraved upon the mountain side of Behistūn or upon the walls of his Tomb and in palaces?

XXI.

Still Other Considerations. Was a Disinterested Motive present?

Applying our criticism more closely and to a definite circumstance, let us turn once again to the Biblical edicts for a moment, and ask whether their motives, those of Cyrus, Darius and their Successors, were not in themselves wholly political as regards those notorious steps which they took so prominently in behalf of Israel; and for which Cyrus at least was so highly lauded in Chronicles, Ezra and Isaiah, inspiration even of a certain kind having been attributed to him. Were not the motives present altogether those of mere political Expediency? Did not Cyrus find it strategically convenient to himself, and tending toward the aggrandisement of his Empire, to have a vigorous moiety of the impassioned Jewish tribes, now firmly associated as allies with himself, replanted at their old home in Jerusalem on the main high road to the rich Nile territory soon destined to become one of his Provinces or one of those of his Successors, and so to make use of their religious patriotism for his own State ends? If this were indeed the truth, would there be anything so very sinister in the fact?; —

I have some hesitation in discussing so trivial a suggestion; but let us ask:

Could He ignore State Interests?

Would not Cyrus, and Darius after him as well, together with Xerxes and his Successors, have been, on the contrary, morally most culpable, if they had neglected all such considerations? — so letting slip an opportunity to strengthen a position upon which interests of magnitude might yet depend for themselves, and for their adherents.

A great Opportunity in Jewish Patriotism, an Incisive Element.

The fierce Jews, as he had every reason to suppose, would hold their new-built City to the death, with its freshly consecrated Temple, defending it with furious zeal.

Should Cyrus or Darius let this chance for an effective move pass by not utilised?

Their Acumen itself should not be Overrated.

Is it not also, critically speaking, inexact for us to be forever supposing these early Rulers to have been actuated by an acumen keen quite beyond their time? in their still somewhat rudimental affairs of State. The age was not so far advanced, we may be sure, in diplomatic finesse as that we should look for too much intellect and acute sagacity in their close management of affairs just then and there.

XXI, a.

Sentiment of a Certain Type was doubtless Present; and it was Deep.

Subjective Sentiment of a profound and stirring nature no doubt possessed both Cyrus and Darius,

as it did every ruler of their day; and this set on and moved them forward with a vigour all unforseen because unconscious, and, as it were, against as well as with their wills.

XXI, b.

Was this Sentiment fundamentally Religious in its Whole or in Parts.

And here we come upon a consideration still more interior, so to speak than those already mentioned, if that indeed be possible: »Had they, Cyrus, Darius and the rest, any serious personal religious character at all, in the sense in which we understand this characteristic? That is to say, had they any deeply ingrained individual principle founded upon thorough convictions as to the objective truth of the substance of their hereditary Faith?, and made alive by a deeply seated devotion of heart and mind to the aims held in view within its doctrines, laws, and promises? And this leads us on to the simple theme of their Personal religious state in particular.

Their Personal Piety as Individuals.

»Hold not God's command to be opposed to the good;« so Darius ordered to be cut, NR, a, § 6 (W.B); »forsake not the right path; sin not.« This shows more than the customary affectation of religious fervour clothing itself, as it so often does, in mere ritual forms.

Darius I, 5 Behistūn. 5. »Through the gracious »will of Auramazda am I King; Auramazda delivered »the Kingdom to me.«

6. »In accordance with the favouring will of »Auramazda was I their King.«

7. »Through the gracious will of Auramazda »these lands became subject to me.«

8. »In accordance with the gracious will of »Auramazda these lands (i. e. these nations) have »regulated themselves under my law.«

9. »Auramazda gave me the sovereignty; Aura- »mazda brought me help; in accordance with the »favouring will of Auramazda I possess the sove- »reignty.«

Note these last three expressions in one verse or subsection.

Subsection 10 and 11 do not admit of the words; nor does subsection 12; but note the contrast; Gaumāta, the supposed or real impersonator, is said to have acted according to *his own* will. It is true that this may have been intended merely to express; »He was successful« [1]; but see the antithesis in the form nevertheless. It is marked, and must be considered to be significant. It certainly means more than that he acted »independently.« But in the 13th he begins again: »I prayed to »Auramazda for aid«; »Auramazda brought me help . . . .«. »In accordance with the will of Auramazda was I King«; so in the 14th, »According to »the Will of Auramazda I took pains to (restore »the temples, etc.) as when Gaumāta the Magian had »not overthrown our House.«

So in 18: »in accordance with the Gracious

[1] We should naturally understand: »He acted with complete success.«

Will of Auramazda we crossed the Tigris; so in 19 . . . .; so in 20; so in 25 . . . .; so in 26 . . . .; so in 27 . . . .; so in 28. Everywhere in such sections we have the recurring words: »Auramazda brought me aid,« and »in accordance with the will of Auramazda I« . . . . . . , ... ? so in 29 . . . .; so in 30 . . . .; so in 31 . . . .; fortunately not so in the dreadful 32, approaching in atrocity, as it does, one of our own unfortunate conclusions; recall the terribly sad words of that psalm otherwise indeed so beautiful, the 137th. But so also we have the terms in 33, notwithstanding the following horrors. So also in 35 . . . .; so in 36 . . .; so in 38, so in 41 . . .; so in 42 . . .; so in 44 . . .; so in 45 . . .; so in 49 . . .; so in 51; see 53: »Thereon Aura-»mazda gave them (the Nine Kings) into my hand. »As was my will, so I did.« So in 56; »as Mazda-worshipper (I swear), in 56 . . . »According to Auramazda's will is also much more been done by me . . . (58) »former kings have not done what I did; through »the gracious will of Auramazda in every particular . . .«

So in 59: . . . »Auramazda be thy friend; so in 60«, if . . ., may Auramazda kill thee . . .«; so in 61: »This which I have done I did in all manner after »the Will of Auramazda; Auramazda brought me »aid; and the other gods which exist, whoever they »may be (possibly so meaning).

62. »For this reason Auramazda brought me »aid, because I was never hostile, not lying, nor »despotic, neither I, nor my race, because I ruled »according to the Law.«

So in 65 . . . »Auramazda be thy friend . . . »Auramazda make thy results great«; so in 66, »with threats . . . so in 70: »Auramazda gave the »land into my hand . . .; according to A.'s will I did . . .«

So in 73 . . .; so in 74.

Hardly a possible assertion which could admit of the word »by the will«, or »with help of Auramazda« is without them . . . Neither the smallest victory, nor the severest threat fails to call them forth. Where else in ancient writings do you find a parallel to this?[1] Even modern literature seldom offers such a case.

XXI, c.

The Sentiment here portrayed can only be described as »Passionate.«

The man was for the moment, in spite of all our effort to contravene the fact, obviously and clearly fully possessed with a deep and almost passionate sense of reverence toward his Deity. And nothwithstanding every fault of his age or of his personal character, this fervent iteration should make a strong impression upon every serious reader. So in Persepolis d, 1 (W. & B.): »the Great Auramazda, the »greatest of the Gods . . . has instituted Darius as King . . .; so in 2. »This land of Persia, which »Auramazda has presented to me . . ., according to A.'s will and mine it trembles before no

[1] In all respects. I think we might even say that, taking into consideration their necessarily circumscribed extent, these Inscription contain the most ample expressions of sentimental confidence in the Deity of any writings ancient or modern.

other, and in 3 he prays ...: »may A. bring me »help ... and protect this land ... for this favour pray I ...« So in Persepolis, e, 2, and so in 3; — even when arrogantly claiming the Persian kingdom as the great bulwark of the interests of his subjects, he does not forget to add »through Aura«. So in Naksh i Rustem »A great God is A. who made this earth and »yon heaven ...«, so in 3 ..., so in 4 ... »as Auramazda saw this great earth in revolt,« etc...., so in 5 ..., so in 6, as cited above ..., so in the Elvend (Alvand), Inscription 1, he repeats his expressions of praise. The theme itself is, »the greatness of God«. »A great God is A. ... who gave man civilisation (so I prefer; others, »fullness of blessings«; so B. & M.). So in the Suez Inscriptions c. l. There is not a solitary place, as it seems, let me repeat it, in all the Inscriptions of Darius from their beginning on, where he could possibly bring in such expressions of adoration, thankfulness, and prayer to his Supreme Auramazda, and where he fails to do so. This does not look like pure hypocrisy; —, though it may indeed have been intended to express the people's fervour, as I have elsewhere argued. A man may be seriously religious while he is also at the same time »officially« religious.

The Sentiment is Genuine.

If these sentences are on the contrary the natural and well-nigh irrepressible expression of one who was keenly actuated by personal emotional

[1] So far as they were personal at all.

susceptibilies as also by a persuasion of the interior and fundamental truth of the Faith which he had always known; — and if Cyrus at all approached his Successor in these particulars; and we may regard this as highly probable from the facts; then we may also infer that the whole dynasty was in a sense religious, at least »presumably« as the representative of the State Religion, and at times sincerely and personally so; see above; and if this be the fact, then the statements of Ezra at least with regard to Cyrus are fully justified when he hazards the expression that his »spirit was stirred by the Lord.«

Recall once more the words just cited: »All that I have done, I have done through the gracious will of Auramazda . . . in all manner.«

The close inference from the above is to the effect that sincere personal Sentiment influenced and animated much of the Policy of the Persian Reigning Family toward the resident Babylonian Jews whom Cyrus found in the Great City and its environs. And this sentiment, if it is shown to have really existed, certainly carries with it the conclusion that the intellectual association of the Persians with the Jews was all the more a close one.

Section XXII.

The Analogies Pursued.

As to still more pointed allusions in the Israelitish Scriptures, can we criticise Isaiah's so very striking expression, concerning Cyrus as »the called of the Lord« in the sense of providential »establish-

ment?« If Darius's case affords a safe criterion, are not those allusions most fully justified by the texts which have now been cited?

Notice that he, Darius, »calls upon the Lord«: »No one dared utter a word against Gaumāta till I came, then *called I upon Auramazda* for help. Auramazda brought me aid.«

See also where he urgently »prays.« Pers. Dar. d. 3 (Sp. H. 21) »for this boon I pray Auramazda...« so at Nakhsh i Rustem, 5. »for this I pray.« And see too what the objects prayed for were: first; »that Auramazda might protect this land against hostile hosts, against deformities, against the (plotting) Lie,« and in the other »May Auramazda protect me against all evil, and my house and this land.«

Auramazda Communicated Commands.

And God spoke in return to him, not only in general commands, but as to the immediate point at the moment in issue before him: »The command of Auramazda is this.« See also above where I recall the passage from Isaiah, there however cited for another purpose. Isaiah wrote: »I have raised him, »Cyrus«, up in righteousness, and I will make straight all his way.« Or was this a half-citation from the Inscriptions, and as if from well known formulas [1]? I have cited this above on page 222 in

[1] Notice the very words »straight« and »way« (cited above) which occur on them, the Inscriptions, as in the biblical allusions, and so also most prominently in the Gāthas of the Avesta where »straight paths, etc.« forms a familiar figure of most deeply interesting significance, also cited above.

regard to the Avesta and the Inscriptions separately; but we can now more freely compare all the three, the Edicts, the Inscriptions, and the Gāthas.

And this recalls to us again the words recorded in Ezra [1] as already cited where the still later Persian monarch, Artaxerxes, is made to ask »that sacrifices and prayers should be offered up for him in the House of the God of Heaven«; see it alluded to above. Note too that this latter expression »in the House« of the God of Heaven most certainly pointed to Yahweh Elohīm, and not to the national God of Artaxerxes, for the »House« referred to was to be the renovated Temple at Jerusalem. The terms therefore really included a parallel to Darius's appeal to the »other gods« on which I dwelt above. All of which adds increasing force to the considerations which bring the Edicts and the Inscriptions still more closely into intellectual connection.

XXII, a.

As to another conceivable foible, we might be inclined to pause upon the seeming *self-delusion* of Darius; and this, though touched upon under »polytheism«, may be profitably recalled for a moment here.

Darius had indeed a kindly word to say for his neighbours' Gods, as we have seen above. And that he believed too much in them at intervals seems to me to be quite possible.

[1] Cf. Ezra VI already alluded to above. »And that which they have need of give them that they may offer sacrifices of sweet savour unto the God of Heaven, and pray for the life of the King and of his son.« Notice that Cyrus' son was also with him in Babylon when he also uttered an edict asking for prayers.

Certain critics might indeed regard the very theism of Darius as too full a conviction to suit them, and but little restrained in its effusion; but with people such as that, we have here at least very little that is serious to do. Granted however that he, Darius, was indeed superstitious, and most positively so, what possible adverse bearing has such a fact upon my argument as in so far set forth by my statements hitherto? Please to remember that the excellence, inferiority or mediocrity of the characters of these Rulers are matters in themselves considered of quite secondary importance to the general results which I am endeavouring so arduously to maintain, and which have to do with the fact of an intimately *close association between the Persians and the Jews*, and as a consequence upon this, then also with the fact that there existed an appreciably important exchange of ideas between them. Every better characteristic manifested as a habit of mind among the upper classes of the Persians as of the Jews, tends of course to add substance to what I am endeavouring to make out, yet, on the other hand, certain foibles of character are also at times of equal and even of greater efficacy in this direction.

XXII, b.

Superstition, when Sincere, is not an adverse Consideration.

Genuine superstition, unless it be of a wholly sinister cast, carries with it, as a matter of necessity, a certain degree of genuine fervour; and everything which awakens individual religious passion

into fuller play heightens, if it be sincere, the tone of the picture. But vivid personal intellectual action in the two large masses of human beings under review is precisely what is most favourable to the state of things, the existence of which I am endeavouring to demonstrate.

The more vitality there may have been in the daily scenes of religious social intercourse between the two classes among the Babylonian population, the Persian and Israelitish, the more completely the barrier to an exchange of thoughts would be broken down, and the more practically real would be the intercourse between the Persians and their protegés; and this notwithstanding the fact that a certain clash of ideas might at times become perceptible.

If we understand by »Superstitions« an exaggerated veneration for what helps one to be noble and true, and an enthusiastic devotion to its maintenance and propagation, then indeed, we may freely say that the effect of such a superstition would have been to impart an incisive impulse to a type of religion which must have had the effect of bringing the Babylonian Persians and the Babylonian Jews nearer together. That is to say, provided that the pure theologies of the Inscriptions and of the Old Avesta, the Gāthas, were the creed of the Persians on the one side and the better specimens of the Psalms that of Israel on the other. Two differing Peoples, though of distinctly separated race affinities, who were each even to an exaggerated degree altogether inspired by sublime principles basing themselves upon imposing, if possibly only supposed,

occurrences and facts, (in each of these systems although so extremely different in their ultimate origin); — such races would certainly be more readily brought together by any serious circumstances which would tend *a priori* to create a certain sympathy between them. And if this sympathy existed, they might experience, even if it were only for isolated moments, a very flame of ardent mutual appreciation which must of necessity leave some lasting effects upon each; that is to say, upon the mental experiences and character of one, or both, of the convening parties.

Anticipating Alexander and the Greeks of the Areopagus, they would, if only for a brief interval, each strive to make itself as familiar as might be possible with the Religion of its singular though valued chance acquaintance. Even if conflict later supervened, this very perfervour of exaggerated devotion would tend to freer communication of impressions and convictions, which would in their due course all have their effect upon minor details of creed and ceremony; — and this, if shown to be probable, only builds up our argument in still more solid walls.

XXII, c.

Darius's Religious Sentiment, even if of an exaggerated character, is Favourable to our Contentions.

Darius, like Cyrus and the rest, was really so possessed with an innate enthusiasm for the veneration of divine Beings that he would neglect no God anywhere who was recognised by his more substantial subjects, and who, he thought, could help

him; for let us never forget that an inferior God, with him and such-like people, was not much more than an inferior but endeared Person, human or angelic, with ourselves. To trust somewhat to another and inferior God involved no more disloyalty to his Ahura than our own regard for archangelic Personages or even for the Sainted Virgin Mother. If then Darius, and before him Cyrus, accepted among those other Gods the Yahweh Elohīm of the Israelites whether as the Devá, God of Heaven, or as a colleague; — and if he accorded thus to his new found Deity a position unusually high in his own narrow Pantheon, indeed exceptionally close to his own Auramazda, — and who is not persuaded that this was the fact, — would not that sensibility, even if somewhat distorted and awry, still, in the main, help on his own well adjusted religious principle? Even losing sight for a moment of our Yahweh Elohīm as a preferred or indeed even as a particularly remembered Unit among the »other Gods« whom he would occasionally group with his Ahura, could that »Superstition,« even when perhaps partially misdirected as it may have been, fail to carry with it in the end some kind of beneficial spiritual result to himself and to others? Surely in the spiritual apprehensions of a good man there could be nothing so very terrible in the character of a supposed or real supernatural Person to whom his own political or tribal friends were accustomed to accord sincere religious worship, nor anything so very sinister in his veneration toward such a Being. With this much said, we may then return to the

Inscription and the old Avesta, though hardly just here fully to the Veda, and say that they show less superstition of a pernicious tendency, but that they on the other hand show a higher faith as to character and degree than any writings of their age, kind and circumstances; and it would be a poor return to their great Originators if we should refrain from laying our tribute upon their tombs or at their feet. »By their fruits ye shall know them.«

XXII, d.

In our anxious search for further points in criticism with which to fill up our indictment still more completely we might, some of us, hit upon a charge exactly in the reverse direction to the one last named; and see what can be said against Darius upon the side of too little, rather than of too decided a tendency to believe. Is he then on the contrary not impossibly, so we might suggest, open to a charge of »*Scepticism*«, when he expresses himself as he does both with regard to his friends and his enemies upon the Inscriptions, in the matter of rewards and punishments?

The Appeal to Temporal Rewards and Punishments.

And it is certainly a very noticeable fact indeed that so far as his promises of recompense and his threats of chastisement are concerned, his tone is distinctly in contrast to that of the Gāthas and even to that of the later Avesta. »When thou seest this Inscription and dost not destroy it, so be thy family numerous, and thy life long, and what-

soever thou doest may Auramazda make great«, Naksh i Rustem; and so again at Behistūn IV, 65. Everywhere we are reminded of those appeals to temporal rewards which are characteristic of the pre-exilic Semitic Scriptures.

Our Answer.

As to this, I have really not indeed so very much to say. It is certainly very like the allusions to rewards and punishments in our pre-exile Bibles, which notoriously omit all appeals to felicity in another world as a motive for good conduct in this. And I do not at all conceal from myself nor from my readers that we may have here the appearance of a very deep and far-reaching peculiarity indeed. This might even force some of us to concede a much more pervading and even radical difference between the religion of the Inscriptions and that of the Avesta, Old or New, than many of us have hitherto supposed to have existed. Is it not however possible that an extremely exaggerated, and in fact overbalancing faith in the temporal providence of God may have constrained this excessively practical man to confine his admonitions to the immediate circumstances of those whom he was addressing with such solemnity, losing sight for the moment of more distant, though still more sublime, indemnifications.

DogmaticInferences were Necessarily circumscribed.

Or again on the other hand we should not forget that these Sculptured Edicts, posthumous as

they were distinctly, through only in part, intended to be, were written for a vast conglomeration of differing nations spread over an enormous extent of territory; notice the three languages in which they were presented. They therefore needed to be circumscribed as to their dogmatic religious postulates. It was very certain quite *a-priori* and before any questions could be put upon it, that not a few out of those twenty three(?)[1] differing Nationalities would fail to appreciate some element in any appeal to the future world which might be offered in the spirit of the Persian theology; — and from this cause alone he, Darius, may have been the more inclined to dwell upon the present and immediate rewards and punishments which lay, as he so devoutly believed, within the immediate control of the omnipotent Auramazda.

Section XXIII.

A Glance toward the Result.

Cyrus prepared the way and Darius did the work in one of the grandest political structures which the world had, or perhaps, has ever seen, with its age and circumstances considered.

The very roads and mails and viaducts of Iran are said to look back to one of them. While the inclusion of so many nations under one vast Government naturally put a stop to interminable internecine dissensions; and by the very fact left it possible for the otherwise so evil-destined populations to develop the arts of peace.

[1] The names vary at Col. s. I and IV.

And this meant in their case the permission to thousands of honest communities, small and great, to live lives for the greater part exempt from what had so often turned all existence into a scene of horror and dismay.

Well might Darius in the Inscriptions which he composed for his very sepulchre declare: »Auramazda, as he saw this earth in confused warfare, delivered it over to me. And by the gracious will of Auramazda I reduced it to its (proper) condition; (literally »I put it in its place«)«. As christians at least we must acknowledge that the incomparable expressions of Isaiah toward one of these great men were well justified, for the Successor of Cyrus, as well as he himself, was predestined under Almighty God to carry out what proved to be the greatest act of beneficience toward occidental religion [1].

The Rebuilding of Temples Recalled.

As we have already seen above, Cyrus rebuilt the Babylonian Temple at Eššakil (so here); and we should know without much further statement what that act of decent kindness really signified. It meant of course greatly more than the mere reconstruction of an edifice or even the rebuilding of an half-dismantled suburb, for it proclaimed by one act to the population of the greatest City of the World that their religious rights and sentiments would be respected by their manly Conqueror, much as they might be later modified by a superior moral and

[1] The Restoration.

intellectual influence. And on the other hand so of the temples in Iran destroyed by a fanatical pretender, the same undeviating policy of humane generosity was observed. No sooner had the hostile false dynasty struck its colours than, after the execution of its chiefs (which indeed was accompanied with inexcusable horrors a disgrace to any age), conciliation and mercy stepped in at once. The temples in Persia destroyed by Gaumāta were rebuilt like that of Eššakil [1] and that at Jerusalem; see above. And this act again, like both those others (viz. that of Eššakil at Babylon and that in Iran) meant far more indeed than any isolated re-erection of an edifice: Christians at least need hardly to be again reminded of what it did for them as the religious descendants of those worshippers of Yahweh Elohīm, who came back in the Return to people Palestine.

XXIII, b.

The Restoration of Populations to their Homes, Recalled.

We have already seen even in the narratives of these necessarily so exceedingly circumscribed Inscriptions, both Iranian and Semitic, that the reintroduction of displaced peoples went on hand-in-hand with the reconstruction of edifices; but to clinch our point I recall them as complete: »Thus »saith Darius the King: the sovereignty taken from »our Kings I brought back. The temples which »Gaumāta the Magian had destroyed I restored, »and the means of livelihood for the people, the »herds and dwellings«; see above.

[1] So here.

Not Isolated Groups alone Were Restored.

At the first glance we may be inclined to suppose that this latter sentence refers to separate groups of people in restricted numbers, whereas the Return of the Jews involved the movements of many thousands. This objection may be indeed quite valid. But even if small parties alone from each of the innumerable hamlets were concerned, the transfer of populations in the case of Babylon must have been very considerable; and this was moreover really, as a matter of form, the nature of the Jewish Return. »Whosoever there is among you, let him go up« clearly indicates selection. In fact there is no disputing it that most of the so-called exiles preferred to live in their adopted home [1]; and directly in accordance with this Darius goes on to say: »I restored the people again to their place as »well (to) Persia and Media as also to the other »lands, as it was before; I brought back what was »taken away«. Could the parallels be more distinct, or graphic?

It is now time for us to gather up our results, taking a short but comprehensive survey of our argument as regards the Achaemenian Inscriptions, the Edicts, and the Avesta.

XXIII, c.

The State of Religious Public Opinion in Persia is All-important.

And as one of the very most significant and important of the historical facts which we have been

[1] The later Babylonian Talmud and kindred literature is said to possess the higher authority.

enabled to make out, we must bring once more to bear the principle to which I promised to revert for the purpose of expanding my allusions. It was this; see above. We can no longer suppose that it was Cyrus, Darius and Artaxerxes in their isolated individualities who instituted that singularly interesting, and to us of the West so momentous policy of conciliating the Jewish residents in Babylonia, the so-called or real Captives of their Babylonian predecessors, but it was, even at that early age, a thoroughly effective *public opinion* which first gave the hint to the Persian Emperors, and then received their own impulse in return.

As I have endeavoured from the beginning of my treatment of this branch of the subject to intimate, my argument in no respect depends fundamentally upon any vindication of the personal character of Cyrus, Darius or his successors; see above. I have tried to make it clearly understood that the better elements in the peculiar disposition of each of those monarchs might, if shown to be really facts, certainly help me on in substantiating what I am labouring to prove, which is the existence of a necessary, if unforced, connection of ideas between the two communities, the Babylonian Jews and the Babylonian Persians. But there are indeed certain particulars, as I have also claimed, in regard to which my argument gains more in plausibility from the supposed existence of a deeply rooted and acutely intelligent sympathetic sentiment widely dispersed among the ruling circles of the Persians as among the same classes of the Jews; see above.

But everything which has survived to us, and which tends to prove that Cyrus or Darius were anything, or did anything, which corresponded in any serious degree with the statements in Chronicles, Ezra or Isaiah proves at the same time, as I assert, the existence of such a sentiment as I have described as widely extended among the population, if not indeed firmly established among their universal convictions. The devout piety, superstition, or religiously affected self-interest, whichever we may choose to term it, which actuated Cyrus, Darius and the rest could have been as little isolated and individual in the character of a single person as the same pointed fervour of any prominent leading person of to-day. What single religious or political leader has ever really originated the particular sphere in which his earnest moral energies have exerted themselves, or the type of personal piety of which he affords an example? Such men are the slow outgrowth of their age and circumstances. Especially gifted indeed they are, or else they could hardly have become the points at which the feelings, convictions and wishes of their fellow men break forth into expressive action, but none the less they are but minute elements in all those intense forces which have been alive among the people of a certain class who have preceded them, as of those same intellectual and moral influences which survive in their contemporaries. Not only do those strong expressions of religious belief and urgent practical religious fervour which we find upon the Inscriptions prove to have been, in their external shape at least, positively set for-

mulas; see above; enduring from generation to generation among the Persians, at least from Cyrus to Artaxerxes Ochus, and so revealing some kind or degree of sentimental sympathy among the leading classes of the people which linked age to age together, but they also presuppose of course the fact that large sections of the middle and even of the under classes of society in the same age harboured such a common feeling; see above.

Darius and his Successors caused these sentences to be chiselled up where they have remained because they expressed the views, convictions and aspirations closely cherished by large numbers of people of more than one class widely scattered throughout their domains, and acceded to by many more who less fully understood their real import and their aims. And we can hardly cherish a doubt that Cyrus also, and his predecessors likewise, found means for publishing similar announcements very nearly in the same political and personal spirit as that which breathes within these columns, whether as engraved upon other rocks now no longer recognisable, or upon walls, vases, or still smaller objects. Even the vast political policy of the great Organizer himself was seldom wholly individual, as I believe, having grown slowly or rapidly out of a mass of convictions and motives amidst the groups who preceded, and among those who surrounded, the central Figure, and who, for all we know, suggested, if they did not actually control, his action.

I am aware that many will suppose me to be

going rather too far in this direction. I do not mean at all to doubt, or to deny the overmastering personality of either Cyrus or Darius; but if they were men of intuitive sagacity as well, they must have quickly felt the ideas of keener wits in their immediate vicinity, as well as the general push of widely extended common opinion among the upper classes who ruled in the twenty-three, or more, great included within their control. Capacity is as Lands quick to perceive as it is eager to originate.

If then we have proved that Cyrus, Darius and their Successors, the Artaxerxes of Ezra IV being included with them, acted in close consultation with various leading persons in their immediate circle, — and that these persons necessarily expressed in their turn the inclinations and opinions of very large classes of Persians throughout the various States of the Empire, — and if again these views were also on the other hand very familiar to leading people among the Jews, (see Ezra and the other Exilic books), then all this as of course, brings that public behind Cyrus and Darius and this public behind the Jewish Leaders still more closely into active communication with each other. For, as regards the Jewish chiefs on their side, they having no King recognised as reigning at the time, would be still more fully qualified to represent the interests of those from whom they immediately arose, and would be really acting as their spokesmen.

The more fully then we can seize upon what was individual in the character, circumstances and ideas of those influential Rulers on both sides as

regards their policy toward the Tribes of Israel on the one side, and toward the Empire of Persia on the other, and, dissecting these elements, expand them again until we see them to be but shreds of a widely extended power, the more obvious it becomes that such a state of public feeling on the part of the Persians must have been to a very effective degree in touch with a corresponding public feeling among the Jews, who were, for the matter of that, from their well-known antecedents, far more democratic and intelligent than the public of the Babylonian Persians.

The Main and Final Issue.

The question then becomes one of 'public' as regards 'public', which is the fundamental basis of this argument [1]. For, if it was the fact that the two communities were largely vitalised by religious convictions and aspirations which harmonised in many prominent particulars, how much more easy does it become for us to understand the keen interest taken in Cyrus by the Isaiah of Babylon as also the reported good will of Cyrus toward Israel and the same interest manifested by Darius and Artaxerxes according to Ezra, the Scribe. And when we see that the very language of these Edicts which they put into the mouths of Cyrus, Darius and Artaxerxes approaches in many important particulars the words in the Inscriptions ordered to be cut by these very same Persian Rulers, we might almost say that the writers who reported these biblical Persian edicts

[1] And this notwithstanding the immensely greater masses who were at all affected by religious considerations within the Persian Empire.

or proclamations were *actually citing those Iranian Inscriptions*, not of course as to the letter of their wording, but in view of their well-known general effect [1].

Section XXIV.

The age of the Gāthas, and of the Pre-Gāthic Development.

Preliminary.

The above treatise, let us hope, disposes of the doctrine that the Lore of the Avesta did not either in its present form, or in its cognate antecedents exert any influence upon the developments of Jewish and later Babylonian thought.

This Question of the Influence of the Avesta carries with it as of necessity that of its age, the two being properly but parts of one inquiry, for the Avesta could not have exerted influence at any given time unless it existed; nor could it well have existed without having some natural effect upon intellectual developments of a cognate description within the sphere of its doctrines.

Before then we endeavour to drive home the results of our inquiry upon those readers who are practically interested in the current theology of the day, it is desirable to pause for a brief interval, and put in once more and in a somewhat fuller form the effective arguments for the particular date of the documents upon the authority of which all that

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[1] See above.

I have said has been advanced. And with this question of the Age of the Avesta we must consider also that of those antecedent intellectual forces out of which the Avesta arose.

The Antecedents of Avesta.

For, although these two elements, the surviving Avesta, and its antecedent intellectual elements, may seem to some of us to be two distinct questions, they are in reality but separated parts of one and the same subject, just as the »influence« and »the age« of the Avesta become practically one and the same particular. Of course what I have here to say in this Section has been already everywhere implied and even applied above, and in fact partly stated. But the inquiry is of such a nature that we must endeavour to recall all the items above alluded to with many others never as yet thoroughly examined by me or by any other writer; and we must endeavour to knead the mass into one manageable whole. Our first investigation is as to the

Surviving Documents.

This too is a question which, as I need hardly say, has been implied at every previous step; and I only allude to it here to explain that, as of course at such a point as this in my argument, I must refer to my own works. For, imperfect as they may be, they are the only writings as yet ever published which make any pretence to a serious examination of all the evidence; see them cited above.

My throng of Cited Opinions.

The remark which necessarily comes in here is made in the hope that the unaccustomed reader may not be confused by the multitude of possibilities presented in the various translations and interpretations, the object of these works being to present nearly every conceivable opinion; and in fact up to this present date, Aug. 1905, and in view of the latest publications, not a single suggestion has yet been made which, with rare exceptions, may not be found more copiously stated in my Commentary, Texts or alternative Translations, and in my Dictionary. But out of this mass there is *always my selected preference.* So that any intelligent reader can easily see a clear and uniform rendering according to my best judgment and with every conceivable source of information exhausted.

XXIV, b.

The Non-Gāthic-Avesta.

Inextricably combined with this discussion of the Gāthas was an examination of the non-Gāthic Avesta. Of this a large and important portion may be found in the remaining parts of my XXXI[st] volume S.B.E.; see from pages 193 to 400. We may however for every reason regard the Gāthas as forming the central theme of our studies; see above and below.

XXIV, c.

The Age of The Gāthic Documents Definitively Considered.

This question would naturally divide itself into four sections: First; are the Gāthas relatively to the rest of the surviving Avesta »*Old*« at all? Are they not indeed on the contrary relatively the *newest and latest* parts of the assembled different writings recognised as original Avesta.

Secondly.: If not the latest parts of the still surviving Avesta, are they not then, of *contemporaneous* origin with them? This question is of course of a difficult nature; for the at present surviving non-Gāthic Avesta is a collection of documents of very different ages, and the question remains in so far obscure. We may however clear up this difficulty, by taking into our view a general average; and fixing our attention upon what we might regard as the »middle point« of the period covered by the dates of the various documents of the Avesta aside from the Gāthas. Thirdly. Were the Gāthas *anterior* in date to the rest of the surviving Avesta?; and fourthly: »If they were anterior to the rest of the Avesta, by *how long a period* did they foredate it. In order to solve the above questions we must naturally endeavour to fix approximately the dates of either one, or of both the *elements* involved; that is to say, the date of the non-Gāthic Avesta as well as that of the Gāthic. If we can find one single source of certainty as to the date of any one of the various documents involved, our general

inquiry is in the very fact almost upon the moment solved; the date of Gāthas fixes approximately that of the later Avesta and vice versa.

Dates of All the Documents are Involved.

It is however evidently impossible to discuss the first question as to whether the Gāthas are the latest portion of the surviving Avesta without discussing the second question as to whether they are contemporaneous with it; nor indeed is it possible to discuss the third without examining previously the first two, or without taking them for granted as having been already in a measure settled, and so with the fourth.

The Avesta Homogeneous.

In one very serious but restricted aspect the Avesta cannot be said to be exactly homogeneous; on the contrary, as I have everywhere implied throughout, the Gāthic scene is distinct in its kind from those called up in the non-Gāthic Avesta; see above and below. But in a wider and more general view, and as we take in the whole range of the subject, of course the Avesta becomes homogeneous, perhaps rather more so than Christianity, or Judaism as developed into Christianity.

As then we may have before us what we may fairly regard as an approximately homogeneous whole, we may disregard the order of procedure sketched out above and look at the whole subject as one great matter of fact.

XXIV, d.

The Gāthic Lore in its Internal as well as in its External Evidence.

I have all alone let it be seen that I rely chiefly for the validity of all my conclusions upon *internal evidence* Yet it is not to be denied that some valuable evidence involving the Yasht and Vendīdād Avesta exists which is at first sight wholly external, and would be so named. And in the course of my discussion later on I will produce such matter. But even what we may have to say as regards external evidence and with reference to the Yasht-Avesta must yet be rigidly estimated as to its internal characteristics.

If then what we may have to say with regard to the so-called external evidence more nearly dealing with the Yasht-Vendīdād and other non-Gāthic Avesta itself depends for its manipulation upon internal considerations, how much more does the supposed older Avesta, the Gātha, depend upon interior views. With this let us proceed. Having decided what the Gāthas actually are in their surviving Manuscripts as rationally edited and translated; see above; our next question is: »Are they genuine«?

Are they Genuine?

By »genuine« I mean »are they what they seem to be, and what they by implication profess to be?« And this is unusually important because they practically imply in almost every line that

they are the compositions of a person or persons actually living amidst the scenes which they recall and sharing in the convictions, fears, hopes and even other sensibilities which they at times so unconsciously and yet so vividly disclose, in the meanwhile also conveying to their hearers the most important doctrines [1].

The Secret of their Influence.

For why do they make any impression upon us at all aside from the momentous principles which they contain? It is because we feel that they sincerely and at times dramatically, if unintentionally, portray those living scenes as historical occurrences and events, and so they open to us an insight into another department of religious and even of political history.

The Essence of the Internal Evidence.

And how are we convinced of all this?. From their emotional spirit. And where do we trace this? In their extraordinary personality (sic), if we might make use of such an expression for their »animated subjectivity«. I mean their allusions to private yearnings, their emphatic iterations of personal feeling, not to say at times, »their passion« [2].

It is these indications, given, as it were, in passing and without motive, which prove to me that

[1] See above on page 70, etc.

[2] For I recognise not only much point in their personal diction, but actual emotional warmth and occasionally unquestionable »fire«. I find in them everywhere at times intense individual feeling. Sometimes we have only a stately emphasis conveyed by the rhetorical use of iteration; compare the repeated »I who« of Yasna XXVIII; see however the fiery Y. XXXI, XXXII, etc. etc., and the extremely personal Y. XLVI and LIII.

they were written by some person, or persons, who actually lived amidst the scenes implied in every line, and that these persons really harboured the sentiments which they express.

The Alternative.

Or else, on the contrary, this sustained »individuality« proves to my mind that they were deliberately concocted in the most subtle possible manner with the intent to deceive; for if they are not genuine, they are not at all in the form of innocent myth handed down from father to son, or from generation to generation, like the complete masses of the later Avesta, which hardly lay a serious claim to genuineness in the sense here indicated.

Are they not Frauds?

If not genuine themselves, are they, the Gāthas, not in fact laboured and conscious imitations of what is genuine; in plain words are they not then artificial impostures. And here I must again call the attention of the reader to this crucial question on the solution of which depends quite completely the validity of my entire argument as much so as that argument depends upon the fact of the strong subjective personality of the Gāthas. Such an indictment of them as quasi-fraudulent compositions I, for one, am not at all prepared to advance, though writers may well be found, present or future, who do not, or who will not, hold with me as to this reluctance; and I will give them all credit for sin-

cerity. It is also not absolutely impossible that they may be right, but to me the point seems to be hardly fit for debating. I must return to this matter further on; but I note here, in the meanwhile, the following items. That they, the Gāthas, were consciously intended falsely to depict unreal scenes, seems to me to be wholly beyond reasonable belief, first of all because *there would be no one who could have composed them under such a supposition;* for the only conceivable authors of such publications could not possess the necessary literary skill to carry out such a curious device as an intentional fabrication; see this question resumed below.

Could they have been later imitations made in good faith, as if romances?

It is indeed conceivable that such pieces might have been constructed as imitations of genuine sentiment in dense scenes of over-wrought and artificial civilisation, blasé, if we might be allowed to make use of such a term, as for instance in some centres of India, though hardly even there at such a date as that of Cyrus the Great, if we are to credit current opinions as to the former state of some of those places. As to the possibility of such imitating reproductions in dense India witness the great masses of closely worked-up Indian literature, much of it also of the most vivid character. But the state of literary and artistic life in Iran could not well possibly have been so over wrought with artificial conditions as to make it at all conceivable that such elements of taste or conviction could have prevailed

there as in the more densely populated India at that early period. Even the Persia of the later Sasanids hardly shows such rich and pointedly varied forms of thought as became manifest in contemporareous India, or in Persian centuries later on. The ideal Gāthic saint on the contrary was the Husbandman chiefly because upon him depended the food supply of the population. The Priestly Class seems to have been next to these the most recognised, while the word for »soldier« hardly appears; So that no one at all familiar with such a subject would be likely to suppose it possible that pieces like the Gāthas, with their lost companions, could have been artificially produced in comparatively rough Iran at anything like the period at which even upon the most exaggerated late negative estimate, we could feel ourselves at liberty to place them.

Motives Absent.

Then we should not forget to inquire after a motive for such an effort [1]. Why should any religious poet desire, even if he had the power, to write Hymns which imitate the spent passions of a bygone day in such a serious and impoverished situation.

If he had any such motive, it would be sure enough to crop out; but where is there a trace of it? It would be as wonderful a result if they were so constructed as indeed their character remains wonderful upon the other and more original supposition. For their remarkable contents, in themselves con-

[1] See above on page 70 where I notice that they were the central documents of the Parsi religion, the least likely of all compositions to be consciously trifled with.

sidered and apart from their »personality«, fairly stagger us when we try to concede their early age. Bereft of all myth-structure, though alluding in passing to a myth, so pure, so deep, so simple, with no miracle, and with their quite unparalleled rhetorical expressions for their times; see Yasna XLIV, who could indeed without an effort believe that such things could be pre-Christian at all in their undoubted home [1]?.

Yet, if a chain of reasoning has any force at all, this is logically, if not quite mathematically, verified from internal evidence as being native to the time and place reported; and the Inscriptions themselves, as to the general date of which there is no dispute, are in some particulars nearly as incredible.

XXIV, e

An Existing Anthology indefinitely proves the existence of Predecessors.

The Gāthas in their Origin and their Main Elements pre-existing in Their Predecessors.

The Gāthas, as they exist to-day, prove not only the extremely probable former existence of companion pieces long since lost, but they also at the same time prove the existence of much kindred individual conviction in the souls of thousands, if not of hundreds of thousands, of human beings, as well as the expression of those convictions in

[1] Aside from the fact that our Achaemenian Inscriptions almost match them in their personal religious fervour, and aside also from all the contentions which we have made above.

personal conferences and formal instructions of every description in days, or ages previous to their later re-appearance.

And in such a discussion as the present it is not sufficient to consider the question of an important Lore in its existing documents alone, but in its forerunners as well; that is to say, in the intellectual forces out of which it has arisen.

All historial phenomena are recurring Manifestations of ever-abiding Active Forces.

For no such a mental phenomenon as even the main doctrine of the Gāthas could, under any circumstances, and in any community have been of any *sudden origin* [1]; and this all philosophical religious history should be thought at once to prove.

Sudden Upheavals Improbable.

It is hard indeed for some of us to give up the idea that the Gāthas, perhaps more than any other ancient compositions, are the result of a quasi-instantaneous supernatural inspiration, but science has long since discarded such puerilities. No psychic development in the history of the human race has ever taken place without its long antecedent causes, which form a part of an ever-continuous chain of being of which the special development is but a link. The lofty tone of the Gāthic pieces gives them, as I concede, the appearance of philosophic-religious inspiration, but even Greek thought grew slowly.

[1] See above in Vol. I.

XXIV, f.

The Practical Nature of Our Inquiry.

We must therefore endeavour to establish the inferred, but none the less, real existence of a vast psychic power extant at a period previous to Darius, of which the surviving Gāthas express the continuance; for all conceivable forms of consecutive intellectual and psychic developments are of this nature, having a beginning, a culmination and a decay [1]. These pre-existent general ideas were in all human probability not only identical with the spirit of the Gāthas as being merely separate parts of one and the selfsame thing, but they also doubtless embodied particular convictions closely cognate to those expressed in the Gāthas, if not actual historical delineations as to places and events not much unlike those in the later Avesta.

The Objectivity of the Point.

And this inferred circumstance is as much a solid reality as the re-manifestation of these forces in the Gāthic Hymns themselves, or as the existence of any other conceivable object, and far more effective upon the developments of early historical results than most others, however easily its existence may have been thus reached by inference. For in discussing it, I am seeking to establish the existence

[1] All things indeed whether psychic, intellectual, moral, spiritual, and even physical, are but items in one great Monism, and more or less valuable re-manifestations of the ever recurring results of permanent forces.

of a great intellectual energy which arose, spread and became effective at an important ancient epoch, bearing in the most serious possible manner upon the interests of large and, ultimately, of vast populations in their individual, domestic and even political moral life, and involving almost first of all the very means of honest livelihood and honest commerce; and it is the existence of this necessarily pre-existing practical Power which in the above discussions I have for the most part been obliged by anticipation to assume, but must now more closely investigate and point.

Fuller Statement Desirable.

For obviously certain as such a pre-existing Power must of necessity be, and obvious likewise as its characteristics become to the trained historian, there are many intellectual persons untrained to these especial modes of thought who have never conceived of such a thing.

Time therefore is throughout Indispensable for these Developments.

Even the moral idea, which is the quintessence of all the psychic values under consideration, could not have »found itself«, so to speak, before a seriously prolonged interval of time had transpired, as I have long since suggested, or implied.

The above Inference Homogeneous to our entire Procedure.

So much then, let us hope, is clear; we are seeking to establish the pre-Gāthic existence of a

Gāthic doctrine as well to establish the nature of that doctrine in its existing documents; and for the especial reason that we are seeking also to establish a post-Gāthic continuity of it in the lores of the Babylonian and Palestinian Jews, as well as in the later Avesta and in the later Parsism; nothing »*isolated*« should arrest our attention for a moment at this present juncture. The very point of all our efforts hitherto here is »continuity«, to establish the persistence of one ever self-same existent, but moving, and therefore externally ever-changing mass of psychic or intellectual vitality. To say that the Gāthas in their origin are as important as in their results would be mere tautology; but the facts now noted are in no particular phantastic, visionary, or unpractical; — they are, on the contrary, realistic in the extreme, though not ultimately definable as to their precise details.

The pre-Gāthic Lore is indeed our very first objective in this part of our investigation; and without a due recognition of this we cannot proceed. But of course we can only consider it thoroughly through the study of its results. These are the Gāthas in their Documents, as we have said, which we have now definitively decided to be the genuine product of a person who lived amidst the scenes implied or depicted in them; and these principles must be recalled at every step in the following distinctions and discussions.

Section XXV.

A first natural Query; was the Language a Living one?

If then the *Gāthas are* genuine as being the earnest and even impassioned expressions of practical personal convictions and feelings, would they, or rather could they, have been written in a *priestly dead language*[1] artificially kept alive in Iran at any early period, even if[2] other literary compositions referring to the same general religious beliefs but *in another spirit* were indeed later written in the same language after it had ceased to be spoken as a vernacular? See also what I have said above as to the possibility of their being forgeries worked up as historical romances, if I might be allowed to recur to such an idea.

The Yashts not necessarily Sung in a Living Tongue.

The language of the Yashts might indeed be »a dead« dialect, and Zarathushtra, or some other later literary priest, might certainly have written them, the later Yasna and the Vendīdād in a priestly language otherwise also »not living« to the people, for they, these documents, breathe the atmosphere of other days, whether later or earlier[3] than the Gāthas, days when the ancient myths were fully alive and constantly revived by priestly writers quite possibly in a generally unknown tongue.

There is little room also, so far as I can see,

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[1] The question is of vital moment at this point to our endeavours to fix the dates.

[2] Which was probably the case.

[3] See above.

for the Idea of deliberate literary fraud as regards them.

The Circumstances of the Gāthas; as Direct Appeals.

For how could Zarathushtra have written the Gāthas in an unknown tongue when they were specially intended to be recited at assemblies of the tribes? See Y. XXX and Y. XLV. Those addressed in those passages were actually supposed to be spoken to as being present in the concourse; »and they came« from near and from afar.« And these adresses themselves are germane to the entire pieces; see especially XLV; and they could not well have been later prefixed, or infixed.

The Crisis was Acute.

Even a modern Roman priest at Rome conversing fluently at times with colleagues in Latin would never in moments of keen emotion, or when he wrote to overcome an armed heretic in a religious war, continue to express himself in such a way. I do not think it to be at all admissible that these personal strophes, so strenuous as they are, were written in an arm-chair dialect of archaic elegance after the words had lost all meaning for those whom the author professes in these very terms to edify and to arouse; and this I hold not by any means because of any assertion to this effect, for »assertion«, as I never fail to notice, meets my unqualified contempt, but solely from their actual characteristics as spoken pieces.

Further Inference.

But if the Gāthic words were current as the

vernacular of their day, and were meant to be understood by the people, then what is the latest possible date at which we can place them?

XXV, a.

Latest conceivable Date.

The latest conceivable date for them would be that of a Gāthic language as being not inconceivably still alive as a vernacular at the close of the Parthian period, from B. C. 100 till A. D. 225. Did then a Zarathushtra under a Vishtāspa live at such a date and compose in it?; see below. Such a question has never been put forward and deserves no answer.

The Language of such a Date was Pahlavi.

Coins of the Empire had been Pahlavi for close on three centuries [1]. Haug even supposed some Pahlavi to date back to the 5th century B. C. There was therefore no living Avesta speech at such a date as B. C. 100 to A. D. 226 circa for a Zarathushtra to make use of in his ardent compositions.

If then he did indeed make use of a living language, let us naturally ask *when* was that living speech current as a vernacular in the region where we place the scene of the Gāthic struggle?, for the answer to this question will give us the latest possible date for the authorship of the Gāthic hymns in a living language and for the time of Zarathushtra.

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[1] We need not pause to consider the question whether the use of Pahlavi on coins would show that it had been vernacular for some time; yet I should say that such would be the case.

The Search for the Date.

To find out then the date at which he lived and wrote in his living dialect we must go back from the time when the vernacular had become Pahlavi; that is to say, we must go back from the date of B. C. 300—400 about at least, and see what we can find to point out our path for further progress. Such a wayside object, the age of which is beyond all dispute, soon meets us in the somewhat formidable shape of Behistūn; and what is its evidence as to this particular? [1].

XXV, b.

The Dialect of the Inscriptions as a Gage for the Age of the Gāthic.

As we have already abundantly asserted, the Inscription language forms one branch of the original tree of which that of the Old and New Avesta represents another less fully varied, and the question immediately arises as to their relative age; for if we solve this problem, we are not far from the solution of the question as to the age of Zarathushtra and of the Gāthas.

The Deteriorated state of the Inscription language.

This deterioration is of course to be regarded as a phonetic change *from an inferable Mother-speech of the Inscriptional*, the existence and character of which we are obliged to conjecture from

[1] See above for anticipated hints.

the Gāthic and the Vedic, utterly heterogenous as the subject matter contained in each of them may be.

Evidence Prima Facie.

This deterioration of itself offers good *prima facie* evidence that the subject matter contained in it is of a relatively later age than the Gāthas; but it is by no means of itself a final and conclusive evidence; for an older language may be, and often has been, used for later literary purposes. Recall at once the Latin and the Sanskrit and also the later Avesta speech itself which, as I hold, lingered as a priestly language after the Gāthic had ceased to be spoken.

And I think it to be extremely probable (see above) that even much later Avesta, which has now perished, if not indeed much of our at present actually surviving later Avesta was written not only after the Avesta had ceased to be generally spoken, but also, some of it, much later than the time of Darius. For Avesta of some kind was, as I fully believe, written on to an indefinitely later period; see indeed the very imperfect diction of Y. XXIV.

Priestly Language.

The Inscriptional likewise may itself have shared this peculiarity to some degree, with nearly all the modern languages extant [1], for it seems as if the stone-cutters of Behistūn themselves did not under-

[1] Compare at once even some of our present works of fiction which sometimes aim directly at reproducing ancient forms of speech.

stand what they were chiselling; witness their mistakes; yet a living speech was probable.

Ancient Forms even linger in a Living Language.

Not to press such particulars as this last mentioned, we must never forget that a language almost universally preserves some of its archaic forms in one section of a country while it develops novelties in another. And especially in isolated regions, remote from densely populated centres ancient casts of dialect often live on, the inhabitants speaking and composing new matter in them; and so also this occurs not with antique dialects alone, but with complete antique languages; compare the Lettish (the Lithuanian) even yet spoken in the heart of Germany and likewise, I suppose, written to some extent; see also the Welsh and the Irish. So that we shall have to abandon for the moment this point of the relative greater deterioration of the Inscriptional at least when regarded as our main, or as one of our main arguments for the posterity of the Inscriptions; that is to say, for their posterity to the spoken Gāthic.

Other considerations intervene.

But while the question of the priority or posterity of the Achaemenian dialect to that of the Gāthas and spoken Vedic has thus no positively decisive force in itself considered as to the priority, or posterity of the documents which where written in either or in both, yet after it has once been positively made out that certain documents were

composed in a spoken Gāthic, and on the other hand that the Achaemenian was sculptured or engraved as a spoken dialect at the dictation of Darius B. C. 500 circa, then the question of the priority or posterity of the dialect of this spoken Achaemenian Daric to that of the spoken Gāthic becomes to the last degree interesting and important to our inquiry as to the date of the Gāthic documents.

The Date of the spoken Gāthic relatively fixed.

For we have a right to assume that the spoken Gāthic was of about the same age as the spoken mother-tongue of the Inscriptional Achaemenian Daric which was a sister-speech to the Gāthic, and we can, other things being equal, draw an inference from the state of the Achaemenian, as at present seen on the monuments to the date at which its mother-speech stood at its still undeteriorated quasi-Gāthic stage as a spoken tongue, that is to say, in such a state as corresponds to that of the Gāthic as it now appears to us in the texts of the original Hymns; and this would of course give us at least the latest possible date at which the Gāthas could have been composed in a spoken vernacular speech; for while later literary matter may appear in an older dialect, older compositions can not be written in a tongue which does not yet exist.

Our Inference.

If then the Achaemenian Daric took from one to three centuries to reach its stage of deterioration from its mother-speech which was a spoken lan-

guage, — and if it be fair for us to suppose that its sister-language stood at about the same general state of preservation or development together with it at any one accepted period, then of course, as said above, we reach the latest possible time at which the Gāthas could have been chanted in an undeteriorated spoken tongue sister to the mother-speech of Daric as being so many scores, or hundreds of years earlier than the Inscriptional; for after such a conjectures date no such undeteriorated language existed upon the analogies assumed, as both the Gāthic and the Daric had begun to deteriorate. For if spoken Gāthic survived later than the time of Darius, which, in spite of our *prima facie* supposition, is a thing in itself by no means at all impossible, then this would bring the spoken Gāthic to close upon the time of the vernacular Iranian Pahlavi which succeeded it as a spoken dialect; see above and below; *but this Pahlavi certainly required two centuries at least to deteriorate to its then present state from that of the spoken Gāthic, which was not therefore post-Daric.*

The unproved link in the above chain of argument is of course the assumption that the mother-Daric and the spoken Gāthic must have deteriorated at about the same rate of disintegration during about the same interval of time; *but this asumption has every probability in its favour.*

Probabilities.

Other things being equal, two widely spoken branches of the same original language would undergo about the same degree of change in the same

given interval of time in the same general territory, even though the particular places where each most flourished were in point of fact somewhat far apart.

Gāthic and Vedic.

For, let me say it in passing, and for the benefit of non-experts, no question whatsoever exists among respectable specialists as to the circumstance that the mother-speech of the language of the Achaemenid from which it deteriorated to its condition upon the Tablets, was, save in a few dialectical features, identical with the Gāthic, just as the Gāthic is, with the same exceptions, nearly identical with the Vedic.

We can therefore say at once, without any further obvious reasoning, that it is practically impossible, so far considered, that the Gāthas could have been composed later than the Inscriptions, for not very long after the Inscriptions the Pahlavi language which shows

a very Marked Deterioration from the Gāthic

began to appear. This deterioration of the Pahlavi when read as Parsi from the Gāthic furnishes almost an exact parallel to the supposed deterioration of the Achaemenian Daric from its mother-speech; and it is therefore of crucial importance to our argument, except in the mere matters of degree [1]. If then

The Deterioration of the Achaemenian

and of the Iranian Pahlavi severally from their orig-

[1] Some few Semitic features linger in the Pahlavi even when viewed as being for the most part Iranian; but we can fairly throw them out when weighing such a question. Nearly all Pahlavi Semitisms may be read as Aryan ideograms; see elsewhere.

inals occupied relatively about the same space of time calculated upon the different degrees of their changes, we can at once pass beyond our preliminary results as to the date of the original Avesta; see above, and say that we have ascertained at what time approximately as the latest possible period the Gāthas could have been composed in a spoken tongue; for we are now in a position to measure with fairly probable accuracy the lapse of such a period of time during which the deteriorations could have taken place from the date of the two mother tongues before the date of Darius in accordance with our present deductions.

XXV, c.

The final question for us now to handle is *How long before Darius were the mother-Achaemenian pre-Daric and the Gāthic spoken as Living Tongues?*

Of course none of our details are mechanically exact, especially where I compare the state of the Iranian Pahlavi relatively to the state of the Gāthic with the state of the Achaemenian Daric relatively to its original as sister to the Gāthic; for; see above, I am obliged in justice to repeat that the deterioration of the Pahlavi, while furnishing a striking analogy with that of the Achaemenian has reached a much greater degree of change as to its interior nature, and this must have occupied a longer time. But this only

Tends to Strengthen my Contention

as to the greater age of the spoken Gāthic; for it points out that the change from its condition to that

of its sequent was greater, and that other things being equal, it must have occupied more time. Upon what principles then shall we proceed to measure the time of the duration of these linguistic alterations from the date of Darius back?

Our Procedure.

Unless some irregular influences were at work, we ought to be able to make a fair estimate of the extent of their duration and of their progress as well.

The Influences: Were they exceptional?

What then were the possible irregular influences, aside from time, which may have intervened to retard or accelerate the process of deterioration in either the case of the Gāthic or of the original of the Achaemenian Old Persian, so that either the one or the other outstripped its rival in these processes of change during a corresponding, or during the same period of time?; for while some old dialects [1] change slowly in remote and secluded sections of a territory, others do not retain their forms so long unmodified, or but little modified.

What Extraneous Influences could have been at work?

Here we have, unfortunately, no effective data whatsoever to go upon in our inquiry as to the possible existence of exceptionally retarding or accelerating influences acting upon this process of

[1] See elsewhere as to the Lettish, the Irish, the Welsh, etc.

change. The two branches of the same language seem at first sight, and even after reflection, to have about equal claims to the character of stability and wide use, the Avesta language toward the North and the mother-Inscriptional toward the South. And if the Avesta language was indeed as wide spread as the Achaemenian at the Daric age, then my argument meets no obstruction; for, given two branches of the same general language spoken over two widely extended adjacent territories, there is no reason at all why one should change much more rapidly than the other, though the degree of the celerity of both development and degeneration would naturally not continue to be exactly the same. See indeed how little even Avesta and Vedic have really changed [1], notwithstanding extensive time and space. Who can tell then that Avesta was not only spoken at the date of the Gāthas, but widely spread at that time over the entire middle North of the future Persian Empire?

[It would look indeed factitious if we paused to inquire whether the Achaemenian Daric was itself more than a court language, for the stone-cutters make blunders which would otherwise seem difficult to explain; see above, but we will not pause upon this.]

Our way is Clear.

Taking it then for granted as probable that, considering the amount of change experienced, the

[1] One man might almost ask a question in Avesta and another answer in Vedic even with less difficulty than an unpractised Englishman could converse with a Scotchman intentionally speaking Scotch.

Achaemenian Daric occupied about the same interval of time in its deterioration from its mother-speech as its cousin-tongue, the Iranian Pahlavi, occupied in a similar process (here leaving the extraneous peculiarities of the Pahlavi for a moment out of view [1]), we have reached reasonable data for us to form our opinion as to how late at the latest the Gāthas could have been composed in a spoken tongue in view of such analogies.

To Measure the Process.

For we have now only to make a judicious conjecture as to how long the process of deterioration lasted from the state of the Gāthic to the state of the Iranian Pahlavi.

The Duration.

A half century would generally be considered by most of us who have lived beyond such a period, as a very short interval of time indeed to allow for such linguistic changes; and we can hardly consider anything less than a century or two.

Provisional Conclusion as in so far Reached.

If then *Zarathushtra was able to express* his own passionately held doctrinal views in his Gāthic language, he must have done so at the very latest

[1] Of course there was a degree of change from the Gāthic to its sequent dialect which was exactly like the change of the mother-Achaemenian to its successor, though we have only the more fully changed Pahlavi to shew it. It may have occupied more time or less in its process, but the sister-speech may have on the other hand varied at an exactly similar rate. We must not however indefinitely split up the questions.

a hundred years before Darius, while, aside from exceptional influence, we should naturally think rather of two or three hundred years before the Achaemenian with the dates of the kindred Veda in our eye. So much from the internal evidence of the linguistic facts as they stand, and from the internal evidence of the cognate Achaemenian documents; and this would bring us at once to about 620 B.C. as the very latest possible date for the Gāthas, while it suggests, a much earlier period, say, 960 B.C.; but before we settle finally upon this estimate see our further reasonings below.

XXV, d.

Further Internal Evidence in External Documents. Herodotus and His Successors.

We have also documents not linguistically cognate, nor yet certified as to their age by such a class of data as those by which the age of the Inscriptions is certified to us.

The Father of History.

Nobody however doubts that Herodotus lived about from 484 to 424 B.C.; and he alludes signally to certain Persian religious customs which point at once to the Avesta; see above. But his allusions, one and all, refer to matters known only to the later Avesta, not at all to the Gāthas as such [1]. We cannot resist the impression that the oldest part of the Avesta as such had exercised little influence upon

[1] See the extracts in Kleuker; see also p. 6 and p. 11 of this work.

him, Herodotus, and that it was surpassed, in the common current religious sentiment, by the more richly coloured, if more superficial, lore of the later Avesta; and we infer at once that the Gāthas were written before Herodotus; and we are about to proceed immediately to a measure of this priority without any fuller consideration of one certain incisive argument in its favour for which I have however necessarily furnished the materials in my arguments above; but there I have hardly set it at all in adequate point, as the matter requires a special section or sub-section.

The Priority of The Yashts to Herodotus. Were the Yashts and the Gāthas Contemporaneous?

In order then to have our subject well in hand, and for the measure of the priority of the Gāthas to Herodotus, it would be very useful for us to ask whether the priority of the *Yashts* to Herodotus may not form a necessary prelude to our further progress, with indeed the very interesting question: »were not these Yashts in their priority to H. also at the same time *contemporary with the Gāthas?*«

In fact this would be a properly concomitant inquiry; and we can on no account pass it by. Were not the Gāthas then, even supposing that we placed their antiquity at a minimum at two centuries before Herodotus, yet even at that distant date, contemporaneous with the Yashts; for their actual date, whether more ancient or less remote, has in itself, and aside from a certain particular line of argument, nothing whatever in it which forbids the

opinion that the Yashts were sung beside the Gāthas, of course I mean, comparing the two styles of compositions aside from decisive arguments to the contrary yet to be made; these reasonings have been somewhat implied above; but for the moment it will be very useful to consider the question here entirely aside from them; for above, where its answer is implied, no space appeared for its indispensable fuller statement.

XXV, e.

The Gāthas and the Yashts; Were they then Contemporaneous?

While then the Gāthas must have been composed in a living language, and while the rest of the Avesta *may* have been composed in a dead one, there is no reason at all of course why the so-called later Avesta might not also itself have been composed in a *living language.* The widely different natures of the compositions do not at all in themselves positively forbid a contemporaneous authorship, even upon the same territory; and the language may have continued on to be a living one in spite of everything. Could not then two of the general divisions of the Avesta have been composed, not only each in a living language, but at the same actual time; see above? The Gāthic represented a distinct reforming work carried on politically and to some extent by force of arms, just as the radical agitation of Martin Luther produced a literature clear of that rich Catholic colouring which was

constantly in course of being reproduced at precisely the same moment, Old and New going on side-by-side. In a case at all similar to this what we now call the »New Avesta« would have claims to Antiquity of date equal to those of the Gāthas.

Actual Yashts in the Gāthic Scene.

A curious item here intervenes. We are accustomed to repudiate even with warmth such a view as the simultaneous prevalence of the Gāthas and the Yashts, but we are familiar enough with Yashts of a certain kind which were indeed actually sung at the Gāthic scene by the D(a)ẹva-worshippers mentioned in the Gāthas.

Why could not, *a* Yasht Avesta though not *the* Yasht Avesta, have been sung by parties not so much in sympathy with Zarathushtra, but yet sung all through the Gāthic struggle? No objection can at all hold which is based altogether upon the nature of the Yasht Divinities, for

Mitrá and his set were indeed worshipped at the Gāthic Period; and we should note the fact with especial interest.

We here possess an altogether forgotten argument in favour of the Yasht Gods as present in the Gāthic conflict. Do we not know that Deities exceedingly closely cognate to the Yasht Mithra and his colleagues, in fact almost their other selves, actually must have been sung in the scenes of the Gāthic movement? For to whom did the D(a)ẹva worshippers of the Gāthas direct their cult? As

we remember them, they were beyond all doubt cognate to the D(a)ẹva-worshippers of the Vedic South, being probably the most Northern of the South-Aryan settlers, so to speak. They could not therefore well possibly have avoided singing hymns to Mitrá, who was Mithra, nor to Soma, who was H(a)oma, — a kind of Vedic Yasht was then actually, and beyond all question, chanted in the very presence of the Mazda-worshippers with the living Zarathushtra at their head and in the Gāthic struggle — so that in itself considered and apart from my well-known contentions, our new proposition has nothing whatever that is impossible in it, nor improbable; quite the reverse was evidently the case. But this supposition. while telling for the abstract possibility of a thriving Mithra-Cult side by side with the Gāthic Mazda-Cult, in view of certain circumstances, soon seems to be one of the strongest of all arguments against the probability of the full-thriving presence of a corresponding Mazda-worshipping Mithra-Cult among the hosts of the living Zoroaster; — for that D(a)ẹva-Cult of Mitrá (Mithra) was, as I need hardly recall, the creed of his deadliest foes and in the Mithra Yasht of his successors the D(a)ẹvas of the Gāthas still appear as Devils, and not as the holy Gods of Veda, but as those of the enemies of Zarathushtra.

And it is from this cause all the less likely that this Zoroastrian Mithra-Cult should have been flourishing at the very crisis of the Gāthic struggle beside the hostile D(a)ẹva Mitrá-Cult.

But for the sake of full discussion and ample illustration, let us for the moment forget this settling blow to our interesting supposition of a rigorous Mazda-Mithra Cult side by side with the D(a)ẹva Mitrá-Cult of the Gāthas. Abstractly and aside from my necessarily anticipated solution, let me repeat it, there is no reason at all why the Gods of the Yashts [1] should not have been in favour at the Gāthic scene and date. *But if they were, how could the Gāthic-Cult have shut them so much out?*

Zarathushtra could only upon one remote presupposition have been ignorant of the holy names of Mithra and the rest; nor could he have hated them in any sense, for he himself is greatly honoured in their post-Gāthic liturgies.

Could the Passionate Zeal of the Reform Struggle have Banished the thought of Them altogether?

The vehement animus of the Gāthas directed fiercely toward reform might naturally shut out inferior details, and with them here and there some Godlet, but not the very foremost believed in supernatural Beings of the Race; so that we may well ask again; »where is Mithra in the Gāthic.« He should have appeared there beyond all question, if he were still high in his authority, being one of the greatest, oldest and most prominent of all the Avesta-Vedic deities, and even in the later Avesta, where he appears, or re-appears, though still a

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[1]) See Vayu probably cited in Y. LIII.

creature of Ahura's, he is yet linked with Him at times in an almost supreme position; see above. He is mentioned by Herodotus, and by the later Avesta, and since the latest Avesta (here for the moment recognised as later; see above), is a witness exactly similar to Herodotus in this matter, we may also ask here; »where is H(a)oma in the Gāthas?«; compare his position as Soma in the Vedic; and where are the other late Avesta deities in their throng, as well as Mithra.

No Trivial Reason for Their Absence should be Entertained.

It will then not do at all for us to say that such Gods as these, the first of whom was next after Ahura and His attributes in the non-Gāthic books, could have been kept out of sight altogether in the Gāthas, and *through any mere accident.*

Rejoinder.

The only rejoinder just here conceivable might be that the Yasht-Cult, although not thriving, was still sufficiently in force to represent the Cult of our surviving Yashts, so that we might fully say that, if it were not for other particulars, the Avesta Yashts, were contemporaneous with the Gāthas, notwithstanding the fact that the pre-eminent Mithra does not appear in these celebrated Hymns.

Not Sufficient.

To this I say that a mere mingling-in of the names at the Gāthic period does not suffice to represent the Cultus of the Yashts as it has survived to us.

Mithra and the rest could not indeed have possibly been totally forgotten in the Gāthic scene, if they were ever known before it; and this I have never doubted; and many an obscure poet may well have woven a little ode to them to die still-born; but that was not the Yasht Cult of the non-Gāthic documents. There those Gods are vigorous to the last degree, and their chants a mighty chorus; and if that Cult was on at the Gāthic day, they could in no wise have been kept out of the Gāthic, though the Gāthas are so few; for, few as their weighty remants are, they are homogeneous, singularly so. From one you may know a hundred; and if a hundred Gāthas kept out Gods not hostile or indifferent, where could their Cult be seen? And that they were hostile like that form of them presented by the Gāthic D(a)ẹva-worshippers I have never for a moment thought.

An Alternative here.

May not a debater then ask, for argument and to exhaust the possibilities: »Could not a *friendly rivalship* between two cognate Cults existing side by side each in a most thriving state have been prevalent in the Gāthic scene, whereby the favoured Gods of the one were *purposely*, though not in an *unfriendly* spirit, kept out of the liturgies of the other with each of these liturgies in the fullest bloom.

Improbable.

The reader will clearly understand that the motive of these queries is as much »illustration« as

serious inquiry; for they really in fact in their very asking solve themselves.

Two Thriving and yet Friendly Cults Could not have prevailed.

Not in such a simple scene. This is my obvious response; there could not be room for two such thriving Cults harmonious with each other yet with one of the two having no trace, even in its finest hymns, of the dearest Gods of the other. Here we have no vast scene of hyper-cultured religious sentiment with its infinitesimally diversified, yet professedly friendly rival sects, raising a quasi-harmonious volume of sacred song. »Hostility« in such a rudimental scene as this little spot in Iran would most certainly intervene, or, on the contrary, furnish a necessary prerequisite to the simultaneous co-existence of two rival sects, each in full life and each carrying with it the necessary complications of conflicting interests; *and we have exactly such a picture in the Gāthic war itself; for the D(a)evas-worshipped there were exactly such Mitrá-deities in jealous opposition; see just above.*

The Settling Consideration.

Moreover here comes in once more our one ever-unanswerable reason, with its mates. Certain Yashts indeed, like our surviving pieces to Mitrá and the rest must certainly have been sung at the Gāthic period, but not those Yashts themselves, for the Zarathushtra of the Gāthas is a living person in a simple scene, whereas he of the Yashts is quite half-deified. A man cannot be a myth and a non-

myth both at precisely the same interval of time. The Gāthic Zarathushtra is thoroughly human, as much so as Darius upon the Monuments, whereas in the Yashts, Vendīdād and non-Gāthic Yasna he is bereft of all identity, with but the fringe of his former self upon him.

Supposable Mithraic Yashts in the Gāthic Spirit were, by themselves considered, thoroughly possible at the Gāthic struggle. Other Mithra Yashts now long since lost may once have sounded, sung by a personal Zoroaster, so that we could escape the acceptance of a Prophet half godlike as in the surviving Yashts and Vendīdād; but we are not dealing with such supposed pieces here and now, *but with surviving texts*, and we have now here at present nothing whatsoever to do with such hypothetical considerations, deeply interesting as most of them may be. At another point above I enter upon some hypothetical presuppositions and carefully consider the inferred or probable pre-existence of pre-Gāthic hymns, breathing the Gāthic spirit. There, true enough, the Singers would be as human, simply in accordance with the supposition, as we upon our theory hold the actors in the Gāthic movement to have been. But just here hypothesis, however interesting, is out of place, *as we are now handling facts*. Our surviving Yashts, poetical and beautiful beyond measure as they are, and with a half-deified Zarathushtra in the midst of them, and with D(a)ȩvas, Gods of India as their demons, cannot have been contemporaneous with the Gāthas for the reasons above given.

These suppositions are therefore, none of them, in order as valid for our main argument at this place.

My own Theory Restated.

There would therefore also be no use in elaborating a suppositious scene where a really living Zarathushtra chanted Vedic Yashts with Mitrá as a leading Deity in the midst of them, for »hostility« could hardly, be excluded from such a complication; and »hostility«, whether from incompatibility in doctrine or rivalry in Cults, between Z. and an *Iranian* Mithra I have never accepted; just the contrary. I simply suggest that Mithra, with the rest, though still in a sense revered at the Gāthic period was merely *crowded out*, so to speak, from *the first places* in the enthusiastic Gāthic movement. Our own mediaeval Reformers did not repudiate the Virgin; they merely dethroned her from an exaggerated homage.

If then the above points possess any validity at all, the Mithra-Yasht with its companions, lost or still surviving, represents a different stage in the Zarathushtrian development from the Gāthic, and the two could not possibly have been contemporaneous in the same community, even if both are placed at a date long previous to Herodotus.

The Zarathushtra of the Gāthas as Contemporaneous with the Yashts being Impossible, was he Subsequent to them.

As Herodotus and the so-called later Avesta point thus to a difference in the epochs of the

Gāthas and of the at present surviving Yashts (etc.), so our answer to this second Question; see above, answers also our first, and one can only allude to it in passing and in a quasi-rhetorical, quasi-hortative spirit as a home-driving of the contentions which have just been made. For, if the Yashts, Vendīdād and the non-Gāthic Yasna could not, as the lore of the half-deified Zarathushtra, have been contemporaneous with an historical Prophet of the name who appears in the Gāthas, and if, on the contrary, the half-deified Z. must have post-dated the real man as the mythical postdates the historical in cases of this particular kind, how much less, on the other hand, is it necessary to show that these same non-Gāthic books could completely ante-date the Gāthas which they have just been proved to postdate; and how much still less could they be mentioned with the conclusion that they, the Gāthas, were the latest possible of all the still-surviving books of the original Avesta. For the same reasons which make them impossible as contemporaneous with the Yashts, etc., here make them impossible as their sequents.

A useful Point pressed Home.

And yet we should on no account let slip the opportunity of driving home our point, as this last suggestion, strange as it may be, possesses exceedingly great interest, though, as I believe, it has as yet been advanced by no one; and except for our one ever-abiding consideration; that is to say, except for the living presence of a Zarathushtra in the Gātha, and

the other internal considerations, there is no possible reason at all why the Gāthas should not be post-Yasht productions, and I for one; and let me say it with emphasis once for all, would immediately reverse all my present views upon the subject, and with the least possible hesitation as to such a course.

The First Natural Suggestion.

Any unprejudiced observer would do the same. All the chief Gods of the so-called late Avesta are unquestionably old and quasi-identical with some of the primeval Vedic deities, and any reader fresh to the subject would say at once that they have simply died out from the Gāthic period and its documents, having previously flourished in the period of the non-Gāthic Avesta, so leaving the Gāthas the *latest of all the original surviving Avesta compositions.*

The Advantage in This inconceivable View.

Here then we should have no entangling element of »recrudescence« to deal with, the recrudescence of the Mithra Cult with that of H(a)oma in the later Avesta, and the rest which vanished from the Gāthic period. And this »recrudescence of the once banished Gods, however it may be forced upon us, having also its analogies; see below, yet it does most certainly complicate our case. With this last suggestion however of the lateness of the Gāthas we should have before us a clear and simple proposition being completely freed from the necessity to accept a dying out of the ancient Deities and then their resurrection.

But the facts, already so abundantly made out, are altogether too much for the pleasing theory; it cannot hold for serious discussion. As said above, an historical person, such as Zarathushtra in the Gāthas, might take on later mythical attributes, as was the case with some other great religious agitators in early times; and this was very frequent, even if not always a necessity; but a mythical person, although he may have had an historical origin, seldom or never becomes completely again historical in pre-critic ages. So our attractive myth must vanish. There was no post-Yasht, post-Vendīdad, historical Zarathushtra.

Was he, on the Contrary, then Pre-Vedic.

For the sake of completeness we must recall this question here, though I have often enough made a similar suggestion; see above and in my other Works. Do the Gāthas then on the other hand ignore our Mithra and the rest, because they, these Deities, *did not exist at all at the Gāthic period;* that is to say, because they had never been worshipped in Iran at all before this date. Such a supposition would place the Gāthas at an epoch superior to some of the oldest Vedic Hymns, whole masses of which worship Mitrá with Váruṇa, with one Hymn to him (Mitrá) by himself. In this conceivable case we should evidently have to measure the age of the Gāthas by a fresh standard altogether, from which I, for one recoil; see however the estimate below.

Or again let us ask; »Was Mithra a Post-Gāthic Importation?«

Could the primeval Gods, Mithra (Mitrá), H(a)oma (Soma), while they had been previously known in India, have been as yet at the Gāthic period never known at all in Iran; so that their appearance in the Later Avesta was an *importation* from the Northern Indian outposts.

»Not probable« would be my verdict. Our entire conception of the situation here presents the picture of a large unit. The Avesta, — including Gātha, Yasht, Vendīdād and non-Gāthic Yasna, — is, in a sense, homogeneous with itself [1], notwithstanding its two main departments, or divisions, Gāthic and non-Gāthic. The Mithra of the Yashts by no means came from the Mitrá of the Veda; but both Mithra and Mitrá came from the same primeval parent. A Mithra throve among the Irano-Vedic tribes in the original Irano-Vedic period and in the self-same original Irano-Aryan Home. No serious experts differ here.

The Decadence and the Recrudescence.

So that we come back once more to the general opinion that the Gāthas, with their once personal Author, antedate the Yashts, notwithstanding the presence of some primeval Gods within these latter and their absence from the Gātha; and that these ancient Deities were simply pushed aside; see above,

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[1] See above.

and though not dishonoured, yet totally dethroned in the growing Gāthic reform; but that they found their way back again once more to prominence in the Yasht Avesta.

Reaction, The Pulse of History.

For nearly all religions show a similar pulsation of development; first polytheistic nature-worship; then the same reformed; then polytheistic anthropomorphism creeping back as the masses grow weary of the abstract, and are glad to hear once more the ancient venerated names endeared to song and story. Rigid reforms hold only in an age of reason.

Dates again and finally Considered in the Light of History, as before in the Light of Linguistic Law.

If then the appearance of the Irano-Aryan-Indian Gods was a recrudescence in the Yashts, at what date before this recrudescence must we place the Gāthic-Hymns?; for the recrudescence began, if at all later than the Gāthic date. No sudden recrudescence could have taken place, for we repudiate things sudden; see above. At what date then from this different point of view, shall we place them?

If Herodotus, say at 450 B. C., began to describe the later features, then if those later features, thus described post-date the characteristics of the Gāthic, by what period of time approximately do they thus post-date them? That is to say, how long probably, let us ask again, and now from this changing point of view, how long

before B. C. 450 circa, did Zarathushtra live and compose his Hymns? Our argument is here parallel with that from the linguistic deteriorations; see above, but yet separate from it. If we allowed from one to three hundred years for the Achaemenian Daric language (500 B. C. flg.) to degenerate to its present stage upon the Inscriptions from its mother-speech where it stood at the Gāthic-Vedic standard; see above, then surely we must allow a corresponding, if indeed a parallel transpiring, period for the recrudescence of old Indo-Iranian divinities from the time of their summary (?), or gradual banishment from their once supreme position, at the Gāthic and pre-Gāthic periods.

We are not Dependent directly upon Statement.

And let it be well remarked once more that we have here again no *statement* of Herodotus at all as to this matter of age. He simply repeats what he has heard and records what he has seen; if he tried to convince us as to this matter of the comparative age of documents, I for one should utterly disregard his assertions. But he is absolutely unaware of such a question, and, like our very Gāthic sentences; see above, he is totally unconscious also of the evidence which he is giving; and this is all that imparts validity to his data in these questions, as I hold [1]. What he says at 450

[1] See his allusion to the treatment of »dead bodies« cited by Kleuker. Where does Haug quote this essential point?; somewhere beyond a doubt. Although the absence of this feature from the Gāthas does not fatally militate against the existence of the custom at that period, we should yet expect to see some allusion to it in the Hymns or in the earlier non-Gāthic Yasna.

B. C. circa depicts without intending it, and without knowing it, a Magian scene from one to four centuries later than its Gāthic predecessor.

Later colouring is Ancient.

Space does not permit me to particularise further here, or I might recall that Hermippos (?), even at 250 B. C. about, affords also some graphic details which meet us in a manner calculated to arrest attention only in the far later Bundahish which does not even represent a post-Gāthic late Avesta, but a post-Avestic and wholly traditional and later Zoroastrianism.

Deductions not Avoidable.

It is hard indeed to credit the considerations which here force themselves upon us, yet we must not blink them. If Hermippos at B. C. 250 could cite a feature now most prominently preserved to us in the late Bundahish, or, as we should rather say, in that extremely late production which we generally place at about the fifth to seventh century of our era, if not much later, this almost throws our well considered estimates into confusion by suggestions of extreme priority. For, if such ideas were traiditonal at B. C. 250, *where, in times previous to this, must we place the later Avesta itself?*, not to speak of the still earlier Gāthas, supposing that we have proved their relative remoter age; yet see all the colouring of Theopompus, B. C. 300

circa, and of the other Greeks who cite various features of Zoroastrianism which with undeviating iteration *recall the late Avesta* [1] *and that alone.*

All this cannot be at all conscientiously ignored, and it forces us to report once more again the rather extreme, if provisional, opinion that even the later Avesta itself may indeed have predated Herodotus, 484—424 B. C., by from one to three hundred years, which would of course force us to place our Gāthas at our earlier figure of 1000 B. C., and suggests an epoch still anterior to that; see S.B.E. XXXI, where I even named the excessive 1500 B. C. for this outside earlier limit. And this, because the sister lore of the Veda was once thought, and is, as I suppose, by many still thought to date from an equally remote age, or indeed from one still further back.

Section XXVI.

Can anything be so Old, or Old at all?

Some of us may indeed be seized with a morbid septicism such as Schleiermacher, I believe, reported somewhere. He said, I think, that in early youth he experienced strange doubts as to the reality of many of the well-known figures in Old history. We may fall at times under the like incubus, and doubt our whole question, root and branch.

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[1] See them all reproduced in Kleuker, Haug or Jackson; see also J. J. Modi.

Nevertheless Reason remains Unshaken.

If Darius ever lived and dictated his »copy« for Behistūn, then with our deductions Zarathushtra was just as much a person from one to three centuries before him, perhaps still earlier. And, if this be the case, then he lived and taught in Iran at the latest at 650 B.C., and possibly at 900 B. C. or earlier. All conscientious historians are sternly strict with their own suggestions, and we, who labour upon these foundations of history, are the hardest of all searchers to convince; and we incline to take the most moderate of veiws; but minds fresh to the subject would generally choose B. C. 900; and some might say, »Why not the Vedic age of 1000 or 1200 B. C.?, so, once held by scholars.

Absolute Evidence is not to be Expected.

As to an exceptional certainty such as we have from Behistūn, Persopolis, etc., we must learn to do without it. No other documents like ours possess it. A range of two hundred years, let me say it again in passing, is quite approximate for such an estimate on such a Lore. Some differ three hundred years as to even the Bhagavadgītā, while as to the R. V. itself see how views have varied.

The Non-Gāthic Documents, their Age.

Having reached this approximate estimate, the corresponding opinions as to the Age of the non-Gāthic documents of the Avesta fall in naturally.

Those pieces are of course of various Antiquity; see my views in S. B. E. XXXI, Introduction pp. XLVI—XLVII.

We proceed here entirely in cold blood We should call the Haptanghāiti the oldest work next after the Gāthas, and put it, say, a century later; then the Srōsh Yasht would come in, say at another fifty years later, then the Hōm Yasht and the others, then parts of the Vendīdād, etc., placing say fifty years between each, though the substrata of each and all the documents, even perhaps without excepting the Gāthas, was in each case older than their texts as they now survive to us.

Extreme Opinions.

There has been some tendency to place even the vigorous Yashts very late; see above, say even in the fifth Century A. D.; and one is always tempted to revise one's estimates; but those who suggest this last, some of them, still hold to an Antiquity for the Gāthas of some six hndred years B. C. at least. This would however leave an unnatural gap intervening between the different documents of a literature accepted as an homogeneous unit; so approximately. There are indeed portions of Avesta possibly as late as A. D. 500; see Yasht XXIV; and it is not always possible for us to decide as to what additions may not have been made by way of interpolation here and there; and this even up to modern times; but to hold the Gāthas to date from B. C. 650 odd, *and then to put the*

still vigorous Yashts a thousand years behind(!) them does not look natural. If the Yashts, even the best of them, were sung so late as in A. D. 500, how is it possible that the Gāthas were composed in 650 B. C.? With these remarks I close my estimate. Logic seems to force us to place the successive documents approximately at the points which I have named.

XXVI, a.

The difficult Alternative.

If however on the contrary it should indeed prove at last to be the fact that the Gāthas and their doubtless voluminous lost companions were composed so late as B. C. 100 to A. D. 226, about the dates suggested by my respected opposition, then we should certainly lose a signal monument in religious history, but we should in place of it gain one sinister curiosity the more and of a character rare to be met in the annals of deceit. We might even place the Gāthas at the head of such existing tricks, and done, *cui bono?* The later Avesta makes no pretence to genuiness in the sense here intended. It is the free voice of the mythic feeling added-to indefinitely from poet to poet and from seer to seer; the Gāthas on the contrary, unless they are true, are an abominable sham, one item more to add to the hideous mental deformity of men. But let us hope for better things. Here in these ancient pieces in their grand simplicity we may have indeed the spontaneous utterances of a soul who did not wish

to lie, and who leads all good men on like a lone star amidst terrific by-gone glooms. And may it shine on forever throughout coming history as one pure light the more from God to show the better way:

»Thus that better than the good may he come nearer
Who unto us straight paths of profit shows
Of this life bodily the use, of that the mental
In the Eternal Realms where dwells Ahura,
Like The noble and august, O Mazda Lord.«

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[1] Yasna XLIII, 2.

Section XXVII.

Sketch of the Facts Resultant from the Foregoing Discussion.

Having proved, or attempted to prove, that Bible, Tablets and Avesta are in so far closely related, and having done my best to present to the reader the solid arguments which make for the Antiquity of the Iranian documents early and late, the way is now fully open for us to proceed toward other elements which stand like ruined temples significant of long past circumstances over the landscape in our path before us. And, as we advance, I will endeavour to point out to those of my readers who may accompany me a few of the more conspicuous objects of personal interest which should awake their attention, and ultimately engage their close and laborious consideration; and this, though an economy of space is fast becoming here an imperative necessity.

A word as to further Restricted Procedure.

But before I advance upon these I must say a single word to those readers who may suppose that I have proved what is self-evident, or at least that I have overproved my points, leaving little space for sequents. These gifted and accomplished inquirers will concede at once that all procedure in such an investigation should be, if possible, exhaustive, and that to the last degree, for otherwise it would be just in so far worthless.

But they may not be aware that the main question which has been hitherto under discussion is, or was, once considered by certain writers to be still unsettled. So that no excuse would be valid, had I refrained from an absolutely ultimate attempted delineation. Criticism under these circumstances becomes simply honesty.

Positive or Provisional Conclusions.

I have therefore expressed myself in a very decided manner in regard to what points I have considered at my present stage of research to be provable, while I have practised a correspondingly strict reserve with regard to others. And it will be of course understood that except where space and time are given for discussion, I must in this brief Summing-up adhere still more closely to this practice, giving the resultants of the possible facts rather than the facts themselves, except in cases where I am in a position to completely verify; and this upon principle, and again for the reasons given. Readers will recall for themselves how carefully I have repudiated many ultimate conclusions especially upon such matter as the Biblical Edicts which have yet occupied such considerable space above. I have not declared them to be, as they have now survived to us, exactly in the form in which they were first made public; nor have I asserted that »the God of Heaven« was certainly Devá [1], nor that the Iranian Dualism is at all certainly

[1] To save interrupting the progress of assertion one makes use sometimes of the words »it is« after the fullest notice has been given of incomplete conviction.

present as a positively proven fact in Isaiah XLV; nor even that Cyrus's creed was positively that of Darius and his Successors; nor have I anywhere positively defined as to particulars in how far Persian influence had been felt in Israel, for I do not regard any premature *comittalism to be in good form in such an extended presentation.

What I have strenuously asserted with attempted proofs, and what I now repeat with emphasis, is the existence of both a possibility and probability as to these matters cited, the latter being exceptionally substantial.

With this much further preface I now present my apocopated report, giving indeed a sort of prospectus of future labour.

Section XXVIII.

The Exilic Elements in the Hebrew Scriptures.

Experts have pretty nearly agreed upon what is Exilic in our Hebrew Scriptures, quite sufficiently so at least for such a purpose as I have now in view; for the exact measure of Persian influence is not at all the immediate result which I have proposed to myself; we can therefore proceed provisionally.

What is Exilic, and what is Post-exilic?

When however we speak of what is Exilic, we should at once understand that we are by no means confined to the predominantly Exilic books; that is to say, not to such Books as in their bulk are known and acknowledged to date from the

Period of the Exile and to contain matter derived from Persian Babylon, for there is scarcely a book in the entire Bible, as now surviving to us, which does not contain Exilic elements.

Experts can easily trace the hand of the »Priestly Writer« as he is now quite technically termed; for the complete mass of the documents was over-written and rewritten by him, or »by them,« in the course of the ever-continuous re-copying. Aside from some amusing instances of semi-commercial reluctance, no serious critic supposes that there is, or was, originally any such Eschatology in the Pre-exilic Semitic Scriptures as that now present within the Exilic portion; and, as Exilic matter is also traceable in the predominantly Pre-exilic Books, the remark applies as well to them so far as these differing elements are present within them. There are almost books within books.

XXVIII, a.

The Pre-exilic Eternal Life.

The only Eternal Life, for instance, that was original to the Pre-exilic portions was such as appertained to the existence of the Deity, being quite unlike any of our modern ideas of futurity. No man who had ever died was distinctly believed to have revived to a permanent full consciousness either in this, or in the spiritual world, least of all to a permanently resuscitated body. Enoch and Elijah were merely stated to have escaped death, so partaking of that life of God which Adam and

Eve would have shared, had they not fallen; see Genesis [1]. Miraculous resurrections such as that recorded in the Book of Kings [2], etc. were but temporary revivifications to be succeeded by eventual redecease, totally dissimilar to our ideas of the risen body, while the preternatural sagacity incidentally attributed to the shade of Samuel forms the exception which proves the rule.

The Classic Hades may be Compared.

The life of the departed Soul before the Exile was a shadow life, very like the classic Hades, »the land where all things are forgotten«.

Its conditions not resulting from a Judgment.

Very little, if any, distinction seems to have existed as being made between the good and the evil, with scarce a thought looking toward a full personal future bodily state. Those expressions in the Exilic Books which seem to be Pre-exilic had reference to National Resurrection, that is to say, to a moral and religious revival, and were therefore figures of speech, as in the case of Ezekiel's vision of »dry bones«. Separated skeletons became reunited into the former human forms representing the morally reconstitued State, though the imagery was probably derived from Persian passages which described a supposed positive resurrection of human beings [3].

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[1] »Lest he put forth his hand and take of the Tree of Life, and eat and live forever.«

[2] If indeed it was intended to describe more than resuscitation.

[3] After the exposure of the dead to the birds as a substitute

The Exile as a Modifying Force.

The Exile had already exerted a powerful psychic influence upon the Jews *entirely aside from any direct intellectual inspiration from without*, and as presenting a mere change in their external condition, and this with the gravest possible spiritual results. It stirred the first conceptions of a future life within their minds by recalling them indirectly through their sufferings to the spirit of their Holy Law. The loss of the Temple Service made the closest attention to their »Scriptures« all the more a necessity. From this obvious cause the Ancient Books acquired an influence presumably even beyond what they possessed originally. *The National Existence having been obliterated in the Conquest and Captivity, religious admonition, which had been addressed to the Nation, turned itself perforce toward the individual.* Appeals to personal conscience were made in the terms of Jeremiah and Ezekiel obviously with the most gratifying results. The previous temporal rewards and punishments for righteousness or sin having been proved through experience to be illusory, the ancient Sheol or Hades began to take on the features of the later Heaven and Hell, and even some thoughts must have begun to be experienced looking toward permanent future bodily life continued beyond the grave; and this doubtless entirely aside from any direct Persian[1] in-

for burial, the 'dry bones' were roughly collected, while as the prelude to a formal resurrection 'bone would join to his bone'.

[1] That sporadic ideas of a furure life in a revived body must have occurred to some individual Jews before such convictions came in with a flood of other elements from the Persian Lore may be also

fluence, though Persian colouring must have been borrowed. For Religion, as it developed, notwithstanding the fact that it began to appeal to the awakened conscience, could not all at once shake off the earlier appeal to bodily rewards and punishments and the long implanted hopes and fears with regard to them. When therefore men began to look toward a future life for those requitals which had proved illusory in this world *through the Captivity*, something like the idea of a future corporeal existence, National and even Individual, began to suggest itself *precisely in order that such realistic recompenses as they had so long been taught to expect might at last be fully gained. And a future bodily life* could alone afford either the receptive conditions or the implements for such experiences.

But while such a natural development was ripening the minds of the clear-headed Israelites, these doctrines had long been both familiar and predominant in the Creeds of their new Allies.

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regarded as self-evident from the common experience of physicians. The dead have not only been seen in dreams in every land, and at every age, but in fever cases they are seen together with other illusions while the patient is awake. Subacute delirium is especially misleading. Here only the superficial nerves are thrown into morbid activity, generally those of vision and hearing, while the substance of the brain is not affected and the judgment remains still clear. The patient, not aware of these common symptoms, cannot but believe his own senses which he has always trusted; for his reason is cool. This was the case with Martin Luther when he threw his inkstand at the Devil, and frequently heard mutterings as he sank to sleep. Did not John Bunyan have some such similar experiences. A throng of such like cases present themselves in the biographies of enthusiasts. I would call attention to the extraordinary prevailing neglect of these simple but important factors in the discussion.

XXVIII, b.

Resurrection and the Future Bodily Life, with their concomitant doctrines, present in the Original Iranian Lore.

On such a point as this I think it hardly necessary for us, in the present point of our Discussion, to linger, though an excellent Author upon the subject devotes important space to it [1]. No forms of religion or indeed of philosophical thought are without their predisposing causes, which in ancient times no doubt operated still more slowly than at present. The Christian Religion was some centuries in developing from the Pre-exilic, Exilic and Post-exilic Judaism, while the Muhammedan occupied a certain period in a similar process. The Mithraic cult was a branch of the Zoroastrian; Gnosticism, if it might be called a religion, had its incipient periods; see also the Neo-platonism, and the later Manichaeanism. Should one then assume for a moment for the sake of argument that the earliest Avesta documents, the Gāthas, were several centuries later than they really were, this might be convenient as a stratagetic movement, and would in no way affect our procedure, for they, the Gāthas, must have existed long previously in their forerunners, nor are we left with this obvious inference *a priori*; for as we have already seen, some of their main elements may be found in the Indian Sister Book, at an age long previous to the Exile, and far apart territorially from any possibility of contact [2].

[1] See Stave.

[2] As late as Theopompus would answer our purpose, while even Herodotus may be fully accepted as describing later Avestic particulars.

Here then are the facts, — Judaism all moved with formative receptivity on the one side, – and the fully developed System of Iran on the other, and in this last these ideas new to Israel had all been long since focussed in a just perspective, and completely established in accepted dogmas. Here therefore was the overwhelming influence of a mighty State-Religion dominant in the great Empire [1] of which they, the Israelites, had become in a sense citizens, or at least of course the subjects, dating their public acts from the beginnings and from the annals of the Persian Reigns. What wonder that this Religion of the Great concentration of States helped-on the Jewish Creed. The *Old Seol* already in process of transformation all at once assumed the forms of the full *Persian Eschatology*.

A *Resurrection*, if not absolutely universal,

[1] Surely those who very properly are doing their best to array all the possibilities of Babylonian influence upon the Jews will in moments of reflection accede to the extraordinary difference in the vital forces of the two sources of influence, the Babylonian and the Persian, at least from the date of the Capture of Babylon, or indeed as a matter of psychic power quite apart from the question of the time when it began to operate. Babylonian or Chaldaean influence was, as I freely admit, so powerful at the very earliest periods that it would seem almost to coincide with the thing influenced, if Abram really came from Ur of the Chaldees.

A very different question however presents itself when we examine the Exilic period. Why is it so little mentioned that Babylonian influence became Persian from the Capture of the City; see however Jastrow. And what of the Persian Faith itself regarded as the Creed of populations. The Inscriptions proved to redundancy that the Cult of Auramazda was not only spread over all Iran, but that it possessed enormous practical and political influence. As a mere psychic force it totally overwhelmed at that time all that was Semitic outside of Israel. In fact what Cult was so effective and served by such hordes of Priests for such multitudes of worshippers all over Iranian Asia.

supervened upon the first rudimental ideas of it, and appeared with all the colouring of the Zend Avesta. There was to be a Judgment quite forensic, as we have it in the later Parsism based upon Avesta where the full details have perished. »A New Heaven and a New Earth« were to appear »wherein should dwell righteousness,« according to familiar Avestic terms, extinguishing as with a blaze of light every trace of other ancient endings.

The *Angeliology* of the oldest Scriptures, which was nearly as dim as their Sheol, became occupied with such figures as a Michael and a Gabriel, while the number »*Seven*«, as attached to them, is as conspicuous as it is significant [1].

And perhaps even more marked than all became *the Person of the Devil.* »Satan« ceased to remain a general term and became a proper Name. In Job at the Introduction he appears among the Angels of God.

But his sinister attitude does not remain long concealed. He is soon recognised as the »*God of this world*« almost a complete counterpart of Angra Mainyu, bereft alone of independence; see above. The *Demonology* as expressed in Demoniacal possession and dispossession is very striking; cp. the Christian Gospels.

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[1] The most prominent particular of the kind in the entire Zoroastrian Creeds carrying with it immense influence probably over all North Persian Asia. A dim sevenfold of planets and of Angels is also reported from the Babylonian Tablets: but what comparison does this bear with the vastly extended Iranian system in days when literature had abandoned clay for a better material.

The world periods are four in Daniel as they are in the later Zoroastrianism, repeating earlier lost documents; and this has struck others as worth mentioning; but in the later Judaism, i. e. in Christianity, *Satan is bound a thousand years*«; and so in the later Parsism, reflecting earlier tenets [1], he is restrained.

The *Temptation of Eve* seems to me to be hardly coloured at all by the light of Parsism, but that of Zarathushtra bears the very strongest analogy to that of Jesus.

The *Distinction of Clean and Unclean* in Leviticus and Ezekiel seems to be almost a part of the Vendidad [2], where it alone receives its explanation [3].

Idol-worship is nowhere so severely reprehended as in each; and the same may be said of *Sorcery*.

Even the doctrines of *Soteriology* seem to have been affected, for, as Apocalyptic hopes led on the soul to bear the evils of existence in view of Restoration, millennial or final, which were Persian thoughts, a *Messiah* became expected. And so in Parsism the Saoshyant is to help bring on the great result; and this concept pressed forward too the Jewish hope; the first was even expected to be Virgin-born as was the last

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[1] In the Millennium of Libra he is freed for a thousand years after having been restrained. See Bundahish XXXI.

[2] Recall the Naçus and the rules for purification.

[3] Some of the animals called »unclean« seem excellent enough, and a reason for their extinction is only clearly given when it was said that the Devil made them.

The »*Fire*« in each became still more a symbol of spiritual purity, and Altars burned with sacrifices in each religious system.

The »*Seven Candlesticks*« recall Zoroastrian imagery [1], while on each side a hierarchy prevailed, some Priests of the Jews possessing princely rank, as did a Persian dynasty [2]. Each Religion was a religion of written books, and who can say *which had here priority;* and each, whether by intention, conquest or migration, carried its tenets far and wide. Greek ideas doubtless mingled with the Hebrew and the Persian views, while Assyriology and Babylon had doubtless their share of influence. But the Persian system came in like a spring-tide and flooded everything. Shall we then say that Christianity in its bare outline was the result of both, with its vast conquests over the habitable globe. Many a cold-blooded witness would at once assert as much.

XXIX.

Regarded as *Literature* indeed, the Jewish went far beyond its rival, though using that rival's principles; except in its great frame-work, the Zoroastrian pales before the other. Job, Isaiah, Daniel, the Apocalypse surpass our utmost efforts at appreciation, while the drama of the Crucifixion with its antecedents, its main action, and its close, seems quite unspeakably magnificent. It should be regarded as a most solemn as well as a most distinguished

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[1] See elsewhere for a throng of illustrative analogies.

[2] The house of Sasan which claimed priestly blood.

privilege of Parsism that it helped on, if it did not give the very keynote to some of the sublimest passages in religious literature which the earth has ever seen.

The One Inapproachable Exception.

As regards its influence upon doctrine, we must however make one altogether isolated claim for Israel, and this concerning the matter now just last mentioned, which became at once the very central circumstance in the Christian system, and one which is not only absolutely apart from Persian ideas, but contrary to them, and arising spontaneously from within the late Semitic cult. *Where is the Religion that ever emerged from obscurity, which offered its very God as a sacrifice partaking of the sorrows of the creatures whom He had brought into being?*

Nothing Persian and nothing Babylonian can approach this »Holy of all Holies« in its remotest precinct. As to the other elements, however, even proceding to much subordinate detail, grand as they are quite apart from the inapproachable conclusion, they would never have existed at all but for the Jewish, nor would they have been what they are aside from the Persian. Surely Avesta in its sister schemes and in its sources, if our careful reasoning has not been utterly at fault, conferred upon the great Christian Church of all ages the utmost conceivable benefit, since but for its Priestly King, the great »Restorer«, who was animated by Avesta

Lore or by its sources directly or indirectly, our Jesus the Christ would not have been born in Bethlehem, nor would he have agonised in Gethsemane, nor met his end on Golgotha!

The influence of Parsism upon *Speculative Philosophy*, only indirectly concerns us here, — but there are religious elements in those profoundly interesting foci of conjecture which have survived in Avesta documents long lost or present, and which have been already named; see above.

XXX.

The Question of Common Origins.

Among the sources from which both the Iranian and the Jewish Lores were derived, as we must never forget, some were certainly *the same*. When we go far enough back, or far enough down, of course we come upon early universal identities which present a speculative question quite apart from our present theme; and we can never tell what feature anywhere may not be a survival from some such primitive original; perhaps where we least expect to see it this may be at times the case. It is however naturally our business here to study only influences which have operated within the historic period, and we must now devote our attention especially to these.

XXXI.

Semitic Influence upon the Avesta.

A priori we should say at once that the absence of all Semitic influence is inconceivable. Yet

we must not overlook the fact that all the great practical circumstances of the period make a religious influence by the scanty Jewish population upon the vast Iranian Empire a matter of inferior estimation, and an intellectual force most certainly greatly limited in the sphere of its operation. None the less however must we regard the exist·nce of some such influence at some juncture, and to some extent as probable in the extreme.

XXXI, a.

Particularly as Regards the Later Avesta.

As regards the later Avesta especially some of the most valuable pieces are now conjectured by respectable writers to be as late as the time of the invention or adoption of the present Avesta Alphabet, this latter having been a marvellous philological feat. If the Fifth or Sixth Century A. D. is to be thought of, this brings us near upon the time when Khosroes invited Simplicius from Athens [1], and by that time it is quite certain that much information with regard to the Church of the Roman Empire must have found its way among the Literati of the Sasanian Priesthood [2]; and one is strongly inclined to suspect Biblical colouring in many passages in the Bundahesh, so that by inference at

[1] Did not the Persian works upon Aristotle really receive their first impulse from these associatons.

[2] How is it possible that the passages in Isaiah and Ezra which so distinguished the early Persian Emperors, should not have been pointed out times without number by Jewish doctors to Persian friends.

least Semitic influence ought surely to be also present in some of the features of the original Avesta; but when we come to look for it we are baffled almost at once.

If we commence at the well-known Semitic forms in which the Avesta Alphabet at present appears, we are met by the fact that the most Aryan of all Aryan Books, the Veda, stands likewise at present also in a Semitic character. And if we mention the Semitic elements of Pahlavi aside from the Alphabet as a further sign of Semitic influence, we are told that these forms are only logograms[1]. On the other hand, however, we are permitted to say that even the mechanical adoption of Semitic signs shows at least Semitic intercourse at some previous period in the early history of the two races, while we may claim that Semitic influence has left its marks upon the forms of the Pahlavi and even upon those of the New Persian sentence. This much per-contra. Aside from it however, where is our Semitism in the Avesta?

Scarce a word of the Semitic language appears within its texts, not even in the latest of them, whereas a throng of Persian words appear in the Bible; see above and below. Not only is the mythology totally Aryan[2], with all the proper names, but many of them are also Indian. Avesta is really Veda, or vice versa, and its speech is closer to Indian than Greek is close to Greek[3].

[1] like our viz = »namely«.

[2] See above.

[3] See Oldenberg's Vedic Religion, p. 27, citing my translation of Y. XXVIII into Sanskrit from Roth's Festgruss 1894.

The very metres of the Ṛk appear with absolutely no influence from India far up in the Iranian North [1], while the central concepts of the Avesta, »The Immortals«, are all prominent, though not collected, in the Veda; see above, as is the Demonology in its leading features. Where then, let us ask again, is the Semitism? Here is our almost Sanskrit Book, with all its elements Aryan, even, as we might almost say, to its latest comments. We are met with difficulties when we inquire for the foreign element.

There is one element in doctrine, however, which should be considered; and it may seem to some readers to be Semitic in its flavour.

XXXI b.

Have we an all-important Case at hand?

We should at once and long since have simply cited those signal and oft repeated words of Vendīdād; »O Ahura Mazda Creator of the worlds, or Settlements, Thou Holy One,« or those in Yasna I. Surely here we have, as some would say, beyond all doubt an echo from Genesis at the Creation narrative. No such direct address in the vocative indeed occurs in Genesis; but neither is there any such in the oldest Avesta. Some also have called attention to the »Six Periods of Creation,« in Yasna XIX, etc. which are still remembered in stated festivals scattered throughout the Parsi year.

[1] See the most beautiful of all of them in the Trishṭup of the Gātha Ushtavaiti* and Spentamainyu already mentioned. This Thrishṭup of India and of Iran came from the same remote original in the common prehistoric home. A possible suggestion of an Indian origin for the Gāthic Trishṭup would be wholly uncritical.

But, if we concede Semitic influence here at the very foundation of all Cosmology, what has become of all the Aryan superstructure; for Aryan it has been fully proved to be; see above. It presupposes an homogeneous base, as we can easily perceive, and a Supreme personal Originator; for we have even a Dhātar, Creator, in the Veda, who, if somewhat late, yet presupposes something homogeneous before him; and in fact even Váruna seems to take on creative functions.

If these features are dim in the Veda, as it might be said, so is the Angelology also »dim« in it, though we know it to be related [1]; see above. We are either forced to think of a parallel development [2], or to turn our fixed scrutiny upon the documents and ask very seriously, has not Genesis itself been helped on from primeval Aryan sources? The »creation« doctrine of the Avesta and of the Inscriptions is quite as extensively and emphatically urged in those documents as it is in the genuinely Pre-exilic portions of the earliest Israelitish Books. Taking into consideration the relative extent of the two sets of surviving writings, some would say that the Iranian works far surpass the Israelitish in these respects, for Avesta and Inscription are far less large in bulk when we excide their many repetitions; see also the endless iteration of the Ṛk. How comes it then that in Genesis we have foundations with no homogeneous superstructure [3]. If Genesis the

[1] An all-important fact.
[2] See above.
[3] till we come to the Exilic elements.

First was absolutely Semitic in its ultimate sources, what has become of its homogeneous personal Angelology, its Demonology, its Eschatology, and its Soteriology, following closely in connection, not to speak here of a beatific Millennium, which last is however cognate only as to its interior significance.

It might almost be called a foundation without a superstructure, a pedestal without a statue, all parts of the phenomena being in order in the Iranian system. We have, the mass of us, and perhaps most fortunately so, got our Semitism upon the brain, grown with our very growth, bred in us from our race; to doubt the absolutely original Semitism of Genesis the First seems at the very thought of it to be profane. Yet Reason must be allowed its course as hitherto.

XXXI, c.

The Immemorial Age of the Aryan Race [1].

The Aryan race and the Aryan languages are presumably as old as the Semitic. In fact non-semitic Akkad and Sumer with the extremely prominent Aryan terms in their primeval language seem to antedate portions at least of Semitic Babylon, while the ancestry of the Irano-Indians is immemorially remote. The name of Auramazda has been reported on Babylonian tablets. The very name of the Sumerian Sovereign was patesi (?); and what is that but Avesta pa(i)tish. Even at the foundations of the earliest Babylonian Cosmology, at the base of their entire religious system we have an Aryan word.

[1] Japhet?

If »apsu« be not well-nigh the commonest of all the Aryan nouns, then what is it? It looks irresistibly like »water«; compare Genesis. Even Tiāmat, looks suspiciously like(?) »Temah darkness«, a conspicuous Iranian torment, while as regards »Ādar« it has actually stepped in its completed form neatly from the Avesta and the calendars, or out of their originals. The pure Iranian word was once doubtless even at an early period of immemorial usage as applied to a »month« in Persian, in Jewish, and in Babylonian [1]. Here is a most palpable and significant application of the term in each of the three languages. To which did it originally belong? It is again a common Aryan word applied to a common Month, the Month called »Fire«, most sacred of Avesta symbols, chief in the sacrifice as in the home. See it naturally adopted as a Syrian and Assyrian God. What sense has any other explanation. Fire was a proper Deity with an immense, if not universal cult. It could not well have helped becoming a God in Syrian and Assyrian; but its position was so dominant in Medo-Persia that it gave its name to a great Province; see Āδarbāgān (so) and the Zoroastrians have been called Fire-worshippers. If »patesi« is pure Medo-Persian, with »apsu« another universal wide-spread Deity who forced his Persian name on Babylon, how is it possible that the Syrian Ādar can mean anything else but Fire? To abandon Fire as the

[1] Surely the claim that this name is originally Semitic seems to be exposed to a reductio ad absurdum, but here I write with reserve.

meaning of the Syrian God seems self-stultification; but if Ādar meant fire in Babylonian, it was well nigh the commonest of Persian words. Nothing could be more decisive.

Khisleu may be Khshathra somewhat condensed by expected shrinkage. It is another Parsi and Babylonian month, for an »s« replaces »t« and an »l« an »r«[1]; Not only is achash'dar'pān (so) = »khshatrapāvan« a compositum of pure Medo-Persian in Daniel 3. 2, its first member being reported by Kohut from many other books, but even the Avestic Khshathravairya may appear as Ahasuerush. The -uer- = -ver- is the second part of the compositum also represented as -ver- in the later Parsi Khshatraver, the »vairya« being itself a pointed Gāthic word in this connection. These forms are said to occur upon the Babylonian tablets.

See also the Aryan »Tēbeth« Month to Avesta »tap« = »to burn«, cp. Persian Tābistan = »summer«. Āb looks again like Persian for »water«, this also in view of the practically certain Ādar. Is it very likely that »Father«, if such an explanation could be thought of, would have become the name of a month? Even Elūl may conceal Haurva- of Haurvatāt as, »l« is »r« and »u« is »v«; and so we have (H)erver-; and why is not Tishri, Tishtrya, Tishtar, Sirius?

See also the Seven Spirits of Zechariah, Job, and the Apocalypse rivetted to the Avesta in the Book of Tobit by the close occurrence of Asmodai,

[1] Benfey carries this out much further. It is most singular that in an otherwise very full and careful reproduction of the points of exhaustive discussion this notorious article is not even mentioned; and Iranian scholarship seems grossly defective.

a corruption from Av. Aęshmō d(a)ęva, a leading Gāthic demon, where also (in Tobit) the Avesta City Ragha, (Ragā, Rai, Ῥαγαι) appears; compare also Raji; and these, not to speak of Haurvatāt and Ameretatāt, the two last Ameshaspends in the early Talmud together with Khshathravairya (again) where they are unfortunately classed with some Avestic infernals such as the Mūsh and the Ashemogh [1]. And further we have the honourable mention of the Jewish Exile-arch*, their political representative in Babylonian, as being fourth in rank in the Babylonian-Persian community under the Arsacids [2]; and this, with the no less striking proof of Persian influence afforded by the recorded persecution of these same Jews under the early Sasanians [3]; and though the name of Zarathushtra the prophet had no existence 2000 (?) years B. C. yet the remark of Berosus shows accidental relation. No one will suppose for a moment that I suggest our present Avesta as the *immediate* source of these particulars in Hebrew or Assyrian; for I have even conceded for argument that the Gāthas themselves might be quite late; the »Source of sources« should be our only main objective, and that was Aryan as to these particulars beyond a doubt [4].

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[1] Supposing the name occurring there to be the same.

[2] The home Jews envied them.

[3] See Kohut's Jewish, Angeliology throughout. Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes, Bd. IV. 1866. Both Avesta and Veda should be studied in this connection.

[4] Persons not altogether at home in these studies might feel disappointment at this; but the source of a thing is an interior part of the thing itself.

It might afford some solace, if we conceded the matter of territory to Babylonists; for the non-Semitic Akkad and Sumer, which seem to antedate some particulars in Semitism, were seated on the Euphrates [1] banks, or in its neighbourhood. But it an Aryan or non-Semitic race had sufficient influence to conquer there, it could well have shed out rays of light to both Babel and Iran; and why not even to India as well. The Iranian scheme hangs well together from base to summit, having its foundations of the widest dimensions and firmest structure, whereas the original Semitic one lacks symmetry. A borrowed idea, even that of »Creation« might indeed conceivably have been built upon in Iran, but »Creation« is the main theological idea of the Achaemenian Religion and so of Avesta. Avesta as to all its greater elements is absolutely one, and accounted for as such, as it has its remotest beginning in common with the Veda. If then the creation scheme of Genesis and that of the Avesta resulted from some common source, this source was primitively Aryan; that is to say, more than possibly, rationally, and probably.

Could influence, if at all at work, after suggesting »Creation« in the scheme of Genesis have stopped at such a point, supposing such a suggestion to have been itself Semitic.

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[1] Is not Euphrates itself »the hu-prathu« = a Sansk. »suprat'u« = »the very broad«, so with Oppert, or the hu-fratu = »the well-flowing«, with Spiegel; both pure Aryan. If this be indeed an Aryan imitation of a Semitic, original; yet see how old it is; and who can tell whether the* parattu so confidently termed Semitic may not be our Aryan prathu after all. Cp. also the Greek *Εὐφράτης*.

Surely the same forces which made Avesta one as a mass of monotheism (apart from sporadic occurrences, and apart also from Satan's speculative independence) [1] must have had something to do with the slow long struggle of the same doctrine in Israel; that is to say, if, as we have postulated, the primeval Aryan Lore suggested a monotheistic creation. This doctrine hung long and often in the balance in Israel and from the very first, as we well know; see the Books, though it was the One doctrine of all doctrines. Elohīm is actually polytheistic at Gen. I, 26, »let us make man«; the very stolen teraphim of a Yahweh-worshipper are simply called »my Gods«; and teraphim are mentioned later. The Golden Calf was adored as soon as Moses turned his back; recall the brazen Serpent, and among the rest Moloch-worship with its infanticide. For half centuries together, all Israel seem downright Baal-worshippers, and so does Judah to a less degree; see the Books.

The battle for a Divine Unity only began seriously with the cry; »Hear, O Israel, the Lord your God is One Lord; and on me shall ye concentrate your affections« [2]. What was then the secondary source of this? The Exilic Priestly Re-writer who re-pointed the expressions, in the never ceasing re-copying of the Mss. as they wore out. How little do we picture to ourselves the simplest facts. Being exilic bred, these Re-writers lived in contact with a Lore which before all things forbade

[1] See below.

[2] »Thou shalt love the Lord Thy God with all thy heart ... etc.«

idolatry as few others did; and all that they wrote expressed a higher mental standard; compare the late Isaiah with the hordes that cried to the golden calves; »these be thy Gods, O Israel, etc.« We must not forget that aside from excessive puerilites in the ceremonial of Vendidād, the main mass of the Avesta concepts are most rational, as the Ameshaspends are God's Attributes, etc., etc.

Here then is Avesta in its chief bulk, the one consistent representative of Monotheism in the Ancient World [1] with Angeliology, Demonology, Purifications, Antimagic, Judgment, Heaven and Hell, Soteriology and Chiliasm, a mass quite compact in itself, and conquering at last, as all now own, its way over Jewish simplicity with Babylonian myth; and here is Israel on the other side idolatrous, as we might almost say of it from its very birth. Baal-worshippers, one half of them, for quite half the time, and lapsing continually into every form of evil.

How is it possible that the Exilic Priestly Rewriters with their now newly attempted monotheism, more monotheistic even than their original [2], should not have *helped on* the »One God« faith of Israel,

[1] ,aside from an independent Satan, which is an original and Gāthic element. Let it be noted well, and kept constantly in memory, that the main argument of this book concerns *the Original Avesta the Gāthas*, while the later is also of great, though secondary importance and is alluded to extensively in connection with side issues. The Religion of the later Avesta is as much modified from that of the Gāthas as the later Christianity is modified from its original. There is no Mithra, even as a created fellow deity in the Gāthas; see above. Where I speak of »polytheistic« tendencies; see above, I mean to refer only to the later Avesta with its modified religion.

[2] The sources of Avesta, or Avesta itself.

while continually incited by the one distinguished source and centre of all early monotheistic sentiment. Where do we ever hear of Iranian lapses into idolatry and in Mazda-worship? There are wide gaps in Iranian history indeed, and notwithstanding this the usual astounding catalogue of national and individual crimes appears, but where is the *idolatry?* The advanced position allowed to Mithra in places belongs to the later Avesta; and this was also the elevation of a cognate Deity distinctly created by Ahura as if it were His son, less startling to outsiders than our Christian worship of the Trinity.

Dualism Really a Recoil.

The very Dualism which obtrudes itself speculatively upon us favours the settlement of my conclusion.

It was the extreme expression of disgust at sin. The unclean thing was utterly thrust out from Deity. Naturally I do not press these conclusions here and now as if they were fully proven. But I must *suggest* them for future consideration, or I would leave my work half-done. Where would science be; let me ask it once more, if we never made advanced proposals?

Corruption of course forced its hideous presence into the sacred fanes of Zoroaster even immediately after his distinguished birth, but look at the records of the very Temple in the Books of Kings and Chronicles [1].

Well has it indeed been said, that the public of the Gāthas was indefinitively »purer than the public

[1] Baal-worship, wanton immorality of ultimate description.

of the Psalms«; and enormous is our loss in the destruction of their masses [1].

In closing I will recall a few of the promised items which I have already here and there foreshadowed, if not indeed anticipated, and which present to us some very striking exterior features. They may assist the wearied reader in carrying away some more distinct impression of the facts. The nuclei of some of them have been already mentioned.

Section XXXII.

A few Coincidences of Reported Expressions in the two related Lores.

»King of Kings.«

No one has forgotten this expression. It occurs at Ez. 7, 12 of Artaxerxes, in Daniel II, 37 in the first Epistle to Timothy VI, 15, and it is repeated in Revelations XVII, 14, XIX, 16, and perhaps elsewhere. A memorable phrase indeed it is; and it came from nowhere else but from the Achaemenian Inscriptions; that is to say, in the Inscriptions we have the first certified occurrence of it [2]. It appears on all the longer ones and on some of the shorter ones, and it refers to each of the Kings who has left Inscriptions at all of sufficient length to admit of it, some dozen times together. It extends through the Pahlavi literature and it survives, I believe, at present as a title by courtesy of our contemporaneous Persian Rulers.

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[1] Of course hundreds (?) of the Psalms have perished likewise.

[2] See the dates.

Another expression which has very marked significance is the word »Paradise«, having its origin in the Avesta pairid(a)ēza. I have alluded to it above, but hardly cited it; it was entirely a post-exilic word.

Then there are also a throng of other purely Persian words in our Semitic Hebrew Scriptures, largely in Isaiah. I do not here of course allude to the Iranian elements in all the Persian names which would be naturally expected as of course. And if we cannot quite say that many of the best known foreign words in the Exilic Books of the Old Testament are of this language, yet we can assert that at least some sores of important terms are plainly such.

A particular Aside.

The Harps of Israel on the Willows, the Waters of Babylon, and the Lord's Song Unsung.

The associations of the Jewish Tribes with Babylon were naturally at first embittered, however much the feeling may have become modified with time, and the expression of it is vivid.

Psalm CXXXVII speaks nature, if ever any composition did; it is no patched up set of fragments, nor did it speak a sentiment confined to ideas; see its revolting close, which is at least of value as a sign of origin. The expression »they that carried us away captive required of us then a song« possesses especial weight, for it shows that the religion of these gifted people had attracted semi-popular attention as well as official notice

among their Babylonian masters; and if among these, then also among their new found Persian fellow-countrymen. And when they said »Sing us one of the songs of Zion«, the reported wish cannot have been a pure invention. Traces of derision indeed are to be seen in it, yet notice the point of its satire; it is aimed at their devotional fervour quite as much as at their reputation for lyrics. The sting went deep indeed, as we need little doubt; and it aroused a fury which passed the bounds of the better side of human nature, as the close is probably genuine [1].

And will anyone with mental eyes refuse to see that the subtle Hebrews could *know* as well as *hate.* They *knew* indeed the enemies who *knew* them so well, and with a sagacity acute to the point of fiendishness.

The knowledge was reciprocal, and the vindictiveness itself would sharpen their infuriated wits. And if they knew the mass of the Babylonian tenets in their outline, the Iranian systems must also have come in their mighty force upon them, for reasons which do not need to be here repeated.

A Few Coincidences.

Then as to the signal Daniel passage, here indeed again, as a good [2] authority points out, we may have a partial resurrection only in this Rising

[1] Cp. also the embittered tone of Isaiah: »Bel boweth down and Nebo stoopeth.«

[2] See Stave's very able an l very useful »Einfluss des Parasismus« 1898, a scholar so impartial that he cites in approbation a great

from the Dust, the revivification of the martyred dead who had otherwise lost their expected »bodily» reward in this life; but in view of the completely Persian colouring of Daniel throughout, of course the imagery as it stands in its present form is Iranian, the idea which it clothes being possibly of independent origin; see elsewhere.

Forensic Judgment.

The forensic nature of the Judgment in this passage as well as in the Apocalypse surpasses that preserved to us in Vendidad XIX, Yasna XLIII, etc., but the legitimate expansions of the idea in the later Zoroastrianism afford distinctive detail, nowhere however approaching the magnificent rhetorical presentation in the last Book of the Bible.

(For Further Colour
see the Book of Esther, etc.)

Conclusion.

The name of Cyrus occurs in all the Exilic Books at least some fourteen times, each in a significant connection, often to point a public date. The name of Darius occurs some thirteen times, though doubtless referring to more than one sovereign of the name, as might be indeed possibly, though not probably, the case with Cyrus.

The name of Xerxes as Ahasuerus occurs some seven odd times.

The name of Artaxerxes about the same.

Writer from whom he elsewhere differs on his main question, and this upon what is among critics generally considered to be at his weakest work.

Were the names of the Jewish Kings themselves more often cited, that is to say, outside their immediate personal historical connections? The Jews of the Captivity knew the Persians of Babylonia as well perhaps as their descendants knew the Syrian Greeks, or better. Were they then influenced by them? while at the same time of course exerting influence. Even if the Babylonian Jews were as embittered against the Babylonian Persians as they were at first against the Babylonian natives, a mutual exchange of ideas would have been unavoidable, especially in view of the striking character of the Persian doctrine, so simple and so strong.

But the Jewish tribes were the grateful protégés of the Babylonian Persians [1]. Nowhere within the covers of our Bibles, or of any other similar religious book is such language made use of in regard to any non-native Prince as that made use of in regard to Cyrus. The Achaemenid is actually called »the anointed of the Lord«, a very »Christ.« Darius is recognised as an almost equally important benefactor; and the request of Artaxerxes for their mediating prayers reflects the Jews' attitude toward him. The Persian colouring of the Bible is the more to be expected because the only leading Jews who lived later at Jerusalem were descendants to a man, almost, of those who for two generations at least had lived in Persian Babylon.

An enthusiasm for things Persian is distinctly

[1] They actually seem almost to accept (?) the Persian religious leadership in terms, see Isaiah XLIV—V.

presupposed in their enthusiasm for the Restorer; and the very first essentials of the Pharisaic-Christian Creed [1] were probably *helped on* by this emotional devotion. The Jews indeed could scarce endure the name of a foreign God, nor any avowed doctrinal item from a foreign source, being perhaps the most fiercely exclusive religionists whom the world had ever seen [2]; but in spite of all, they were fairly taken by storm by the Persian policy as by the Persian beliefs, so that the spirit of the Persian Faith at last brought the struggling »Life and Immortality« fully to its light toward the days of the Christian Advent.

If the above deductions be at all correct, it becomes more than ever obvious that such elements of similarity as exist between the Gāthas and any Occidental Philosophy are either due to parallel development, or, if to historical contact, they are then owing to the influence of Persian Babylon upon Judaea rather than of Greece or Jewish-Greece [3] upon the Persians.

Parallel development has been however shown to have been strictly partial with an inferior percentage of incisive force. We are then left to the final conclusion that a pre-Gāthic, or an ex-Gāthic form of religious thought, which existed as the source or result of the Gāthas and their lost fellow-compositions »*helped on*« the momentous doctrinal

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[1] For the Creed of Cyrus must have been closely cognate to that of his successors.

[2] ,i. e. of their type and standing.

[3] in Egypt.

developments of the Jewish Exile and the Christian era already sufficiently described, if indeed this Gāthic or pre-Gāthic Lore did not actually *save the original tendencies of the Jews from perishing.*

What is then our Last Word?

If our impressions after the above discussions present any definitive shape and point, surely they arise from a profound sense of the doctrinal importance of that singular Lore which is obviously, all things considered, unique in the religious history of the human race. We may indeed not be personally, all of us, in entire sympathy with these tendencies, even taken together with their final results, actually ourselves preferring perhaps the previous simplicity of the Ancient Jewish Sheol and the like.

But such a personal preference in no way touches our view of the very great scientific and literary importance of the existence of these pronounced elements in the original Zoroastrian Creed.

We might indeed, if we were advanced reformers in a particular [1] direction even make use legitimately of the fact of the Persian character of certain tenets that we may not altogether approve, or of a conceded Persian influence upon their development.

But none the less we revert to the astounding circumstance that our Eschatological system was anticipated in a wonderful manner in early centuries before the Christian era; and this evolution of ideas still kept compact even while it was unfolding, re-

[1] , a negative tendency.

maining also at the same time wonderfully profound, clear and far reaching. It was further beyond all question thoroughly well-meant, and a system necessary and predestined to be some day expressed as inevitable in the course of the history of human religious ideas. And it found its spokesman, whether he were absolutely original or not, in the epoch-making doctrines of one of the greatest and purest [1] men that have ever been afforded us as a boon upon the earth. Well may Iran be legitimately proud of a name which has been world-wide in its just renown for very many generations, and as revered as it was extended [2].

[1] ,judg ingalways from his Hymns and by the deep sentiment pervading them.

[2] Zarathushtra Spitama, the Son of Pourushaspa, Prophet of an Ancient Iranian Tribe, is at once akin in a sense to the Vedic world, and at the same time he is its superior, a Soul unique in history.



The Gâthas

of

Zarathushtra (Zoroaster)

in metre and rhythm,

being

a

second edition

of the

metrical versions in the author's edition of 1892—94

to which is added

a second edition (now in English) of the author's Latin version also of 1892—94, in the Five Zarathushtrian Gâthas, which was subventioned by His Lordship, the Secretary of State for India in Council, and also by the Trustees of the Sir J. Jejeebhoy Translation Fund of Bombay, and is now practically disposed of; (see also the literary translation in the Sacred Books of the East, XXX, pp. 1—393 (1887), itself founded by especial request upon the limited edition of 1883)

by

Lawrence H. Mills, D.D., Hon. M. A.,
Professor of Zend Philology in the University of Oxford.

to be had of

F. A. BROCKHAUS, LEIPZIG.

1900.

Yasna IX.

The Vision of Haoma to Zaraϑuštra.

Y. IX, 1—48.

(2)

Pahl. text translit. 1) **Pavan hāvan' ratīh[1] [pavan hāvan ī[1] gās] hōm madam sātūnt'[2] av' zartūšt', 2) pavan ātaχš[3] pīrāmūn'[4] yōšdāsarēnešnīh [amataš[5] ātaχš gās[6] kāmīst'[7] χalelūnastan'[8]] (pavan) gāsān' srāyešnīh[5] [amataš[9] zag ašem vohūk'[10] ī[11] III gūft' man'[12] fravarānih[13] av' levīn'].

** χ is here used for ﻫ = kh. [1] A (DJ), B (D, Pt. 4) om. ī. [2] B (Pt 4) raft. [3] A (DJ) om. gās here which the others insert. [4] B (D, Pt 4) pirāmūn', and ins. va. [5] B (D, Pt 4) om. from amataš to srāyešnīh inclus. [6] diff. word from gās above; cp. gātū. [7] M kāmist'; A (DJ), E (K[5] Sp.) kāmīst'. [8] so A (DJ); E (K[5] (Sp)) šūstan'. [9] A (DJ) om. aš. [10] so A (DJ) -ūk'. [11] A (DJ) ins. ī. [12] A (DJ) om. man'. [13] Citation from Y. 12 (13), 1.

The Pahl. Text transl. At the hāvan ratu[1] (the hāvan prayer-time) [the hāvan gāh[2]] Haoma came to Zartušt (Zaraϑuštra) (2) when he was cleaning[3] around the fire, [when he wished to wash the fireplace[4], and when he was intoning[4+5] the Gāϑas, [when he uttered the Ašem Vohū which is thrice[6] said, and which is* before the fravarānih (i. e. the fravarānę)[7]].

[1] See note on the Avesta text.

[2] See note 4.

[3] Lit. 'in his cleaning'. I cannot accede to this homely rendering just here, with Nērysōangh and Haug; I regard the original word as meaning 'consecrating'; see SBE. xxxi, p. 231, 'served and sanctified', two words to express the idea.

[4] Notice the close proximity of the two identical forms gās, with yet totally different meanings, one from gāϑa and the other from gātu.

[5] Lit. 'in his making heard the Gāϑas'.

[6] 'Or which is the three-said'.

[7] We should have naturally rendered: 'the III ašem vohū's which have the fravarānę before them'; so possibly; see also Nēr.'s yat p'raṇarāṇe prāk. In our present texts some ašem vohū's occur *before* the fravarānę, and not the fravarānę before them. The fravarānę is mentioned because it would be naturally associated with any special mention of the ašem vohū. We remember that it was with the Ahuna Vairya that Zaraϑuštra repelled the Demons after his temptation; so the Ašem Vohū thrice repeated, followed by the fravarānę, Yasna XII (XIII), an especial confession of faith, would equal an Ahuna Vairya. Aside from the reasons given, I should render as indicated above in my alternative.

The Vision of Haoma to Zaraϑuštra.

Trl. At the hāvanī ratu[1] ** Imperfect proofsheet.
Haoma came to Zaraϑuštra
while (ritually) cleansing[2]
[about] the (sacred) Fire
and intoning the Gāthas[3].

[1] The hāvanī-ratu (prayer-time) was from six to ten A. M.

[2] He was not merely removing soil, but engaged in initial sacrificial work.

[3] For the free critical rendering see SBE. XXXI, pp. 230—235 (1887), which I still regard as the best possible form for the general presentation of this Yasht, preserving, as it does, the rhythm.

Nēr.'s sansk. Text. [(Heading.) Hūmastūmasya [-stomasya] mūlaṁ. Hūmasya muktijananeḥ sanmānakṛtaye kila, ānandakṛtaye, ārādᶜanāya namaskaraṇāya, mānanāya, prakāśanāya; pūrvoktivat jñātavyaṁ.]

Yašt. Hāūanāyāḥ gurutāyāṁ[5] [kila, hāūanasaṁdᶜyāyāṁ] hūmaḥ upeyivān jaratᶜuštraṁ [prāptavān] (2) agniṁ paritaḥ pāvayantaṁ, [kila, agnistᶜānaṁ parivartulaṁ snāpitum abᶜīpsantaṁ] gātᶜāśca samudgirantaṁ [tat ašim vohūtrayaṁ bruvāṇaṁ yat pᶜraūarāṇe[5] prāk].**

** The various restorations of Burnouf and Spiegel are mostly good. The Mss. show débris. It would be mere affectation to report the irrational variants here.

[**Nēr.'s Introduction Trl.** The beginning of the Hūma-praise-song (Yašt). To the honouring[1]*, that is to say, for the rejoicing, for the sacrificing-to, for the homage-making-worship, for the venerating-consideration[1], for the celebrating praise of Hūma the holy (lit. free-*of-birth)[2], etc. to be understood as aforesaid (i. e. as above)[3].]

Nēr.'s Yašt. trl. In the ratu[4] of Hāūanā, [that is to say, in the time of the Hāūanā] Hūma came* toward Jaratᶜuš*tra* [came up to him], cleaning around the fire, [that is to say, wishing to wash around the fire-place], and chanting the Gāthas, [and (also) saying that three-fold ašim vohū which is[5] before[5] the pᶜraūarāṇe[5]].

[1] Namaskaraṇa corresponding to nīyāyešn, gave us our accepted rendering for [Pahlavi] as *'praise'; mānanā should correspond to šnāyēnītārī and χšnaoϑra. Prakāśana represents a frāz afrīganīh in the sense of 'celebrating praise' as in frasastayaęsča.

[2] 'Free' seems peculiar to Nēr.'s kind of Sanskrit. He uses muktātman for aharūv'.

[3] Referring to previous occurrences in the Yasna.

[4] Gurutā is used by Nēr. apparently to imitate a leading definition of ratu; but, as the gloss shows, he means a ritualistic division of time.

[5] My instinct would be to regard 'pᶜraūarāṇe (so J.*)' prāk as a quasi-compositum'; but see the note upon the Pahl.

Parsi-pers. text. transit. Pah hāvan ratīh pah hāvan gāh hōm avar raft (ān) zartušt (2) pah ātāš [gāh] pīrāmūn yaƐnīpāw-u-pāw-yād-[1] mī-kard [ ] kiš ān i ašem vehī (sic) i III (si) guft mūn (*sic* for kih) frarūnī (*sic* for fravarānē) pah pēš

[1] 'Attending to' the cleaning?; yād however may not have been meant; yet what could bād (or—?) mean here?

A study of the

Five Zarathushtrian (Zoroastrian)

Gâthâs,

with

text, translations, etc.

(being the first attempt as yet ever made to treat the subject with full exhaustion of materials),

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Pahlavi translation for the first time edited with collation of manuscripts, and now prepared from all the known codices, also deciphered, and for the first time translated in its entirety into a European language,

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also

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together with

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being the enlarged literary apparatus and argument to the translation of the Gâthâs in the XXXIst volume of the Sacred Books of the East,

by

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F. A. BROCKHAUS, LEIPZIG.

1892—94

the pure *and* religious *one* [to the disciple, that is, let it be to me no decease]. *This* text is to be repeated twice, etc. (NB. Notice is again given to the student that the translations of the Pahl. and Ner. are throughout rather expositions than translations, as final translations of either in the ordinary sense are wholly misleading and therefore worse than useless; see Introd. pp. XIV-XVII, XXV).

Parsi-persian Ms. frlt. Va niyâyishn ân shumâ, Gâsân *i* ashô! Nêk û kih ân *i* [] nêkî har-kudâm, [kû, har-kudâm âdamî az nêkî *i* û nêkî ✻ Hast hih êdûn gûyad; în nêkî [] az [] Dîn [] *i* har kas [] nêkî], ✻ (b) [] pah kâmah pâdishâhî dehad Hormuzd*[1], [pah lâ'iḳ (?) *i* û] ✻ (c) Kûshishn *i* tuvânîhâ [zûr [] ḳûvatîhâ] ma-râ pah rasad* (?) az Tû kâmah ✻ (d) Ân *i* Ṣavâb dâshtan dehad [ân *i* [ma-râ = *am*] pah [] Ṣavâb dâshtan bih dehand], [] ân man dehâd Spendarmad ✻ (e) Ân *i* rûzmand, *i* bandagî [] [shâgird = *âhavisht*] [] [ân man] pah Bahman jân [dehad (sic) = *ân ra pavan Vôhû-mân adâ* (sic pro khayâ) *dâbûna(ê)d** (sic)], kûm [] [bâz**-(?) = *dûz**- (? *dûr**-)] -jân nah bâshad ✻ *[1]Ôr° (?). (NB. *v* is used for *w* in this Gâthâ; see note on page 2, Parsi-p.)

Free tr. And to*[1] this one that best of all things (*[1] or 'for')
May that the glorious man bestow*[2], the glory; (*[2] or 'obtain')
Reveal* Thou, Lord, to us with*[1] Spirit bounteous (*[1] or 'O spirit bounteous')
What truths by Right* Thou giv'st, and Good Mind's wisdom,
With life's rejoicing* increase and on every day.

Pahl. trl., etc. Thus also that which is of every kind the best, (b) the beatitude (not merely 'the welfare') is to be give to* (?) the beatified man [*as* a reward]; (c) do Thou therefore make manifest, [i. e. do Thou declare who the glorified (or 'beatified') man is (so in this erroneous gloss), for through Thee is his manifestation], O bountiful Spirit who *art*, (or 'Spirit of') Aûharmazd, [that is, Thou understandest who the glorious (or 'beatified') man *is*]; (d) and *do Thou also make manifest* what Ye* give (or 'he gives') *as* just (or 'aright') in accordance with (or 'as') a good mind's regulation, [i. e. the Religion] (e) during every day as the joyful-minded giving-on* of a long life.

Ner.'s sansk. text. Evaṁ cha tasmai viçvebhya*[1] utkṛishṭatarâya (b) çubhamate* narâya, çubhaṁ pradâtavyaṁ, [prasâdaḥ], (c) Tvaṁ prakâçaya, [kila, Tvaṁ brûhi yat çubhamân naraḥ kaḥ], Tvaṁ mahattaraḥ* adriçya-mûrtir*, Mahâjñânin, [kila, Tvaṁ jânâsi yat çubhamân naraḥ kaḥ], (d) yo dadâti satyaṁ uttamena pramâṇam manasâ [Dîniṁ] (e) viçveshu vâsareshu dîrghajîvitatayâ** utsavasya dâtâ. [1] So J.*, P. C.

Ner. transl. (a, b) And so to this man more excellent than all *and* beatified (or 'glorious(?)') happiness (or 'glory (?)') is to be given [the reward]; (c) do Thou therefore manifest, [that is, do Thou declare, who the beatified man is], Thou the greater[-est] Spirit, O Great Wise *One*, [i. e. *it is* Thou *who* knowest who the beatified man is], (d) who gives the true regulation

Gâtha(â) Us'tavaiti(î).

I.

[illegible] 1.

[illegible] 1. Text

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

NB. The Commentary here refers also to my former printing.

Verbatim trl. (with paraphrase). Laus vobis Gâthae sanctae! In*-salute* [esto, i. e. salus esto (uštâ locat. adverbialiter usurpato loco nom.)] huic cui-[-cumque]; in*-salute* esto, i. e. salus [esto] alicui [cuicumque (sancto civi)]! (i. e. yahmâi kahmâichîḍ(ṭ) = cuicumque). (b) Secundum arbitrium suum (-infinite)-regnans-et-dominans det M. [vel 'constituat'] Ahura (c) continuos-[Suos-]duos-[ministros, i. e. duas proprietates Ahurae, unam ut ministrum salubritatis (sanitatis, incolumitatis omnino)*, et unam ut ministrum immortalitatis animo conceptam, i. e. ministros duos suae voluntatis alentes felicitatem et vitam longinquitate productam hâc et illâc] validos-duos. [Ad me] accedat**[1] [hoc donum quod precibus meis expeto, i. e. 'Amen! sic fiat[1]!', id] a-Te expeto [et exoro] (d) [ad] Sanctitatem [legis Tuae sacrae] sustinendam, [i. e. ad auctoritatem ejus ubique in patria nostra defendendam et augendam]. Hoc mihi des, O Pietas*[2], [O Spiritus devotionis ab Ahura in nos inspirate (e) insignia-potestatis (vel 'divitias'*(?) in gratiam Causae sacrae Tibi praecipue devotas' (cp. îštîm, Y. XXXII, IV et raẹ̄khnañhô, Y. XXXII, XI) praemia-sacra, [i. e. emolumenta bene merita] Bonae vitam Mentis]. [1] Vel lege 'gatê = venire', longe non; fortasse est 'geḍ(ṭ) = Sansk. gha + id legendum = immo vere!' [2] vel lege '°tî 'des Tu. O Ah., per Pietatem in nobis efficacem'.

Pahl. text translit. Nîyâyishnŏ avŏ lekûm, Gâsânŏ î[1] aharûbŏ! (a) Nadûk* (*sic loco nêvak) valman* mûn zak î[2] valman[3] nadûkîh kaḍârchâî, [aîgh, kaḍârchâî anshûtâ min nadûkîh* î[4] valman* nadûkîh*. Aît mûn aêtûnŏ yemalelûnêḍ: aê nadûkîh* ash min denman*[4] Dînŏ*, va min Dînŏ* î[1] kolâ aîsh I[5] nadûkîh*]. (b) Afash pavan kâmak shalîtâîh[6] yehabûnêḍ Aûharmazd [pavan avâyast î[2] valman*[7]]. (c) Tûkhshishnŏ[8] î tûbânîkîhâ, [zavar î[9] patûkîhâ], am pavan yâmtûnishnŏ[10] min Lak, kâmakŏ. (d) Zak î Aharâyîh dârishnŏ dahishnŏ[1] [zak[1] î[1] pavan[1] mozd[1+11] Aharâyîh[1] dârishnîh[1] barâ yehabûnd], zak[12] avŏ li yehabûnâḍ Spendarmaḍ. (e) Zak î râyê-hômand[13] î[14] tarsakâî (sic) [hâvisht-homandîh avŏ[15] li[15]] pavan[15] Vohûman[15] jân[15], [yehâbûnêḍ[15](-nâḍ), aîgham apagayêhê[16]** (?) al yehevûnâḍ[17]]! [1]DJ. om. [2]DJ., D. ins. [3]D. om. [4]DJ. ins. [5]DJ., D. om. [6]D. pâḍakh-

I.

The Anthem (beginning) with "Usʹtâ".

Free tr. Praise to you, the sacred Gâthâs!

Salvation to this one, to this one whomsoever,
Let the absolute Mazda give it, He Ahura; * imperfect proof-sheet.
Long-lasting strength be ours; of Thee I ask it.
For the upholding Right, this, Piety*, vouchsafe us,
Distinctions*, blest rewards, the Good Mind's life.

(Rhythm only is attempted, heavy syllables sometimes counting as two.)

shahîh. [7] DJ. ghal. [8] all tvaskhishnŏ, or tûkh°. [9] D. î. [10] ins. î. [11] D. om. [12] D. om. zak î; DJ. om. î. [13] corrected; DJ. râyê-h°. [14] D. om. î. [15] see P. [16] Zend. char. =°hya

Pahl. trl. Praise to you, O Holy Gâthâs. Happy* is that one for whomsoever (oblique by position) *is* that which *is* that happiness, [that is, for every man *there is* happiness from his happiness. Some say that this benefit is his from this Religion, even from the Religion with is the benefit of every single person (individually)]. (b) Aûharmazd also grants *it* to him according to the sovereignty of *His* desire (or 'pavan-kâmak-shâlîtâîh as compos. = 'He who exercises authority at will'), [*i. e.* according to his desire]; (c) *and He grants*[*1] (?) the energy of the powerful *ones* (or 'energy which *consists* of* powerful characteristics*'), [the strength of (or 'which *is*') powerful *qualities*]; *they are* a desire to (i. e. *desired by*) me in their coming from thee. (d) That which *is* the giving of the possession (or 'maintenance') of Sanctity, [that which they shall give me as* a reward, the possession (or 'maintaining') of Sanctity], that may Spendarmad give me, (e) and that which is the glorious thing which *is* the venerating* (*recognition** (?)) [discipleship (?)], and life in accordance with a good mind, [that is, may no life-extinction be mine].

*[1] Or tûkhshishnŏ î t°. are governed by the force of kâmak = vas(e)mî; see the Gâthâ.

Ner.'s sansk. text. Namo yushmabhyaṁ, he Gâthâḥ puṇyātmanyaḥ[1]! pratyuttaravâk* Hormijdasya; prakṛishṭâ vâk Jarathuçtrasya. [1] Sundaraḥ sa yasya çubhaṁ kebhyaçchit*, [kila, kebhyaçchit* manushyebhyaḥ çubhât* yasya çubhaṁ. Asti kaçchit* evaṁ brûte yat çubhaṁ Dînitaḥ; Dînitaḥ sarvasya kasyachit[2] çubham[3]]? (b) Asya svechchhayâ (so) râjyaṁ Mahâjñânî dadâti Svamî, [samîhitenâ 'sya], (c) adhyavasâyasya* balavataḥ* prâptau tava kâmât. (d) Yat* puṇyagrahaṇasya dânaṁ tan mahyaṁ dadâtu pṛithivî, [kila, yaḥ prasâdaḥ puṇyasaṁgrahe dîyate taṁ mahyaṁ dadâtu Spindârmadâ] (e) çuddhimate bhaktimate* [çishyâya], uttamaṁ cha jîvitaṁ Manaḥ* [Gvahmano* 'maraḥ], [kila, me apajîvitaṁ** mâ bhûyât]. Dvivâram vâchyo gujastaḥ, etc.

[1] P. [2] so J.[3], J.[4], J.* [3] C. adds to this at length. (Sandhi is only intermittingly applied and Sanskrit of every period is used with unusual application.)

Ner. transl., etc. Praise to you, O sacred Gâthâs. The answer of Hormijda;

Jarathuçtra's declaration). Prosperous* is he whose prosperity is for any one (meaning 'for every one' (?)). Some say that *the rendering should be* that *this* welfare *is* from the Dîn; *and* from the Dîn is every *man's* prosperity *derived*]. (b) At his own will the Lord the Great Wise *One*, bestows *upon that one* (or '*upon us*') the sovereignty in accordance with His desired *object* (or 'desire') (c) for* powerful zeal in its acquisition in consequence of thy desire (or 'prayer'), ([or from His desire for thee in the acquisition of strong zeal']); (d) let therefore the Earth* (sic) = Âramaiti) grant me that gift which *is that* of the apprehension of sanctity, [that is, let Spindârmadâ grant me the grace (or 'reward') which is *given* in the apprehension of Sanctity]; (e) and let the highest (i. e. the good) mind [the immortal Gvahmana] *give life* to

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2. **Text.**

Verbat. trl. (with paraphrase). Itaque huic [sancto civi (vel 'nobis (?)'] omnium optimum (b) beatitate**-(vel 'gloriosa-indole*')-praeditus vir [propheta] beatitatem* [vel 'felicitatem illustrem**'] det ([vel fortasse ex contrario 'pro hoc sancto (vel 'pro nobis') sibi-det (i. e. accipiat (?)) hic vir beatitatem** sacrae Causae* nostrae']); (c) Tuo, [i. e. per Tuum spiritum]* plene-revela*[1]-et-indica per* [Tuum] beneficentissimum* spiritum*, O Mazda, (d) [eas doctrinas et disciplinam] quas* statueris Sanctitate [ut]Bonae sapientias[-tiam]-caelestes[-tem] Mentis (e) omni die [in omnes dies*[2]] longaevitatis* beato-incremento. *[1] Vel fortasse 'observans tuere (vel 'ordine constitue''). *[2] vel 'huic [sancto] summum bonum sit] omni die (in dies),

Pahl. text. translit. Aêtûnŏch zak î[1] min harvispgûn[2] pâhlûm (b) avŏ valman* î khvârîh-hômand gabrâ[3] khvârîh[4] yehabûnishnŏ [[5] mozd]. (c) Lak pêḍâkînŏ, [aigh, [6]Lak yemalelûnŏ[7] aîgh[8] khvârîh-hômand[7] gabrâ[7] mûn[7], mamanash* [9+7] pavan[7] Lak[7] pêḍâkîh], afzûnik mînavad î[10] Aûharmazd, [aîgh, Lak khavîtûnih aîgh khvârîh-hômand gabrâ mûn],, (d) mûn[11] yehabûnêḍ[12] râst[12+13] pavan[12+13] zak î[12+13] Vohûmanŏ[12+13] paḍmânŏ [Dînŏ*] (e)[14] pavan[15] hamâk[16] yôm pâvan[17] dêr zîvishnîh hû-ravâkh-manîh madam[10] yehabûnishnŏ[18].

[1] DJ., D. ins. î. [2] so DJ. [3] P. ins. varman* râ (so D. late). [4] DJ. khvârishn; D. om. va. [5] P. ins. pavan âgh. [7] Mf. om. [8] D. for mûn. [9] DJ. ins. ash. [10] DJ. om. [11] DJ., D. om. zak. [12] DJ., D. have line *d* so. [13] M. Ahârayîh shapîr for râst and om. pavan z. V î. [14] M. ins. i. [15] P. om. ash. [16] so D.; DJ., °mâî. [17] D. om. [18] DJ. °ûnêḍ.

A DICTIONARY

of the

GÂTHIC LANGUAGE

of the

ZEND AVESTA,

being

Vol. III

of a

Study of the Five Zarathushtrian Gâthas,

the Commentary, vol. II, completed in lexicographical form, with full grammatical details, as the sequel to the XXXIst Vol. of the Sacred Books of the East, pp. 1—XLVII, 1—194

by

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First issue 𐬀 to 𐬞 (pp. 623—821.)

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1902.

Semi-popular Notice.

"The Gāthas, or Hymns, of Zoroaster are by far the most precious relic which we possess of Oriental Religion, the Only sacred literature which in dignity, in profoundness, in purity of thought, and absolute freedom from unworthy conceptions of the divine could for a moment be compared with the Hebrew Scriptures." Critical Review Jan '96.

An explanation printed for Circulation among Friends

(This rectification seems to be most urgently called for, certain parties seeming not to have noticed it as printed elsewhere.)

In the *Revue Bleue* of Paris, Feb. 1895, and also in a document of public uuthority in that City, bearing the date of the year 1895, the following passage occurs in a necrology upon the late lamented Professor Darmesteter, with reference to his request to the Rev. Dr. Mills to take his place upon the Sacred Books of the East: 'Darmesteter publia deux volumes de cette traduction anglaise: quand il fut arrivé au tome III, qui devait contenir le Yaçna, un érudit . . ., M. L. H. Mills, lui fit savoir qu'il s'occupait lui-même depuis longtemps d'une traduction de ce texte. Avec cet oubli de soi qui caractérise le vrai mérite, convaincu d'ailleurs que toute traduction du Yaçna pour laquelle on n'aurait pas de secours nouveaux serait nécessairement défectueuse, il céda à M. Mills l'honneur d'achever la publication.'

The impression naturally received from these remarks is the erroneous one, that the Rev. Dr. Mills in some way originated or suggested the idea that he should take upon himself the task of writing the translation of the Yasna for the Sacred Books of the East, in the place of Professor Darmesteter. As this is in direct contradiction to Dr. Mills' statement in the Preface to the XXXIst vol. of the Sacred Books of the East, an extract from one of Professor Darmesteter's business letters of the time is here appended, as it has been considered an "ample refutation of the unfair insinuations" of the *Revue Bleue* and of the other publication.

'*5 Nov. (1883).*

Cher Monsieur Mills.

. . . M. Max Müller m'a écrit pour me demander si j'avais l'intention de lui donner la suite de ma traduction du Zend-Avesta. Malheureusement cela m'est impossible, des occupations nouvelles me prenant tout mon temps. Je lui ai donc répondu que je ne pouvais, et je lui ai dit que vous étiez la personne la plus compétente pour me remplacer,

ayant fait votre étude personnelle depuis plus de huit ans de la partie essentielle du Yasna. Il me répond aujourd'hui:

'"After what you say M. Mills would certainly seem your best successor. Would you kindly write to him -- you could so much better explain what is really wanted. It is very desirable that there should not be much delay."

'. . . Je crois que la chose serait bonne et pour la collection elle-même et pour vous; pour la collection, parce qu'elle aurait la version des Gâthas la plus au courant possible; pour vous, parce que cela imposerait l'examen de vos vues à tous les savants et au public en général.'

[Professor Darmesteter here refers to the preliminary edition of proof-sheets of Dr. Mills' larger work, which had been for some time in his hands. It will be seen that he makes the translations which occur in it the basis of his request, and he wishes them to become the translations in the volume of the Sacred Books which he requests Dr. Mills to translate. He proceeds:]

'Vous n'avez qu'à détacher de votre travail la traduction rhythmique avec quelques notes explicatives et le mot à mot quand vous vous en écartez trop. Cela vous prendrait infiniment peu de temps, puisque le travail est déjà fait. Vous n'aurez qu'à y joindre le reste du Yasna, . . . Réfléchissez bien sur le sujet, puis écrivez-moi votre détermination décisive: je crois que vous surmonterez vos scrupules et que vous direz oui. Je le désire du fond du cœur; car, à défaut de vous, je ne vois pas qui pourrait faire la chose et la faire bien. . . . Dans l'espoir d'une réponse favorable,

'Je suis,

'Votre bien dévoué,

'James Darmesteter.'

Some spontaneous remarks of distinguished critics.

„ . . . Das Ergebniss einer erstaunlichen Arbeit sehr mannigfaltiger Art... unser Verständniss der Gâthâs mächtig gefördert ...." — *Göttingische Gelehrte Anzeigen,* Mai 13, 1893. Professor F. Justi.

"Tous ceux qui s'occupent de l'interpretation des Gâthâs rendront hommage à l'immense labeur scientifique de M. Mills . . . . son livre reste un instrument indispensable pour létude. . . ." — Professor James Darmesteter, *Revue Critique,* 18 septembre, 1893.

"... insbesondere von Mills,* der diese schwierigen Gedichte mit Beigabe des sämmtlichen Interpretationsapparates der Ueberlieferung in gründlichster Weise behandelt hat ..."

* Lawrence H. Mills, A Study of the Five Zarathushtrian Gâthâs 1894 .... and the Zend Avesta, Part. III, the Yasna, &c., in the 'Sacred Books of the East, Vol. XXXI, Oxford 1887. — Professor F. JUSTI in the 1897, *Preussisches Jahrbuch*, p. 68, *Sonderabdruck*.

Mills, Lawrence H., A Study of the Five Zarathushtrian (Zoroastrian) Gâthâs with texts and translations, also with the Pahlavi translation ... with Nēryōsangh's Sanskrit Text ... also with the Persian text ... together with a commentary ... 1894, pp. XXX, 622. 4º.

"... Wer heute im Avestī selbständig und mit Erfolg arbeiten will, muss sich die gesammte Tradition dienstbar machen. Das hat Mills in seinem Werke: 'A Study of the Five Zarathushtrian (Zoroastrian) Gâthâs' an dem schwierigsten und dunkelsten Teile des Avestā gethan. Er gibt erst den Text in Originalschrift, im ersten Teile bis p. 153 und im dritten Teile bei Yasna 51 u. 53 auch in lateinischer Umschrift; dann folgt eine wörtliche lateinische Uebersetzung, der Pahlavītext und dessen Uebersetzung, Nēryōsanghs Text in Umschrift und Uebersetzung, der Text einer modernen Parsi-Uebersetzung des Pahlavitextes in Umschrift und eine freie englische Uebersetzung des Grundtextes. Der vierte Teil p. 339 bis 622 enthält einen ausführlichen Commentar, der als Erläuterung dienen soll zu der Uebersetzung der Gâthâs, die Mills in den Sacred Books of the East Vol. XXXI gegeben hat. Theil 1 und 4 waren schon 1892 ausgegeben worden.

"Mills' Werk, das Ergebniss langjähriger, mühe- und entsagungsvoller Arbeit, vereinigt bis auf ein Wörterbuch, das in Aussicht gestellt wird, alles, was für die Erklärung der Gâthâs nothwendig ist. Man mag im einzelnen noch so viel abweichen, immer wird es die Grundlage bilden, auf der sich jede weitere Forschung aufbauen muss. Mills hat mit ihm der Avestaforschung einen hervorragenden Dienst geleistet, und es gebührt ihm dafür der wärmste Dank und die vollste Anerkennung.

"Halle (Saale). R. Pischel."

(*Zeitschrift der D. M. G. July, 1896.*)

L. Mills, The Five Zoroastrian Gâthâs with the Zend, Pahlavi, Sanskrit, and Persian Texts and Translations. Leipzig 1892—94. This work affords to every Avesta-scholar complete materials for the Study of the Gâthâs. Bombay Iranian Catalogue. Prof. Wilhelm 1901.

The edition of the book is nearly exhausted. Jan. 1902.

The author is occupied with a (possible) new edition of S.B.E. XXXI.

itâ; pers. *nah-khvâstar,* and *nâ-khvâstar;* cp. for form ind. *anehás.*

𐬀𐬥𐬁𐬌𐬱, y. 28, 9; 32, 15; 53, 8, instr. pl. m., nt. of 𐬀𐬥𐬀 (which see) through these, illis, adverbially used; (trad. curiously errs; see the texts).

𐬀𐬥𐬀𐬊𐬗𐬀𐬢𐬵-, hostile; or nt., hostility, displicentia; n. du. masc. (returning for form to Justi), or inst. s. nt. (?) 𐬀𐬥𐬀𐬊𐬗𐬀𐬢𐬵𐬁, y. 44, 15; cp. ind. *ókas* + *a* priv.; rt. *uc;* cp. *uxor;* goth. *bi-ûhts**, etc. [The pahl. trlr. is here in error or confused; see comm.].

𐬀𐬥𐬌𐬌𐬀, other, alius (atque);

n. s. m. 𐬀𐬥𐬌𐬌𐬋, y. 29, 1; 50, 1; 53, 5 (pahl. *zakâî min*)

n. s. m. (so rd.) 𐬀𐬌𐬥𐬌𐬌𐬋, y. 53, 4, DJ (J.[2])

acc. s. m. 𐬀𐬌𐬥𐬌𐬨, i. e. *𐬀𐬌𐬥𐬌𐬌𐬆𐬨

acc. s. m. 𐬀𐬌𐬥𐬌𐬨, that is 𐬀𐬌𐬥𐬌𐬌𐬆𐬨, y. 53, 5 (𐬌*, 𐬌 = pahl. 𐬌 = (𐬀)𐬌𐬌 (𐬌𐬌 with inherent vowel))

(acc. s. m. *?𐬀𐬌𐬥𐬆𐬨, lat. av.)

acc. s. m. 𐬀𐬥𐬌𐬌𐬆𐬨, y. 34, 7;

(one Ms. 𐬀𐬥𐬌𐬌𐬌𐬆𐬨), y. 34, 7.

inst. s. m. 𐬀𐬥𐬌𐬌𐬀, lat. av.

dat. s. m. 𐬀𐬥𐬌𐬌𐬀𐬌𐬨𐬁𐬌 „ „

gen. s. m.** 𐬀𐬥𐬌𐬌𐬈𐬵𐬈 (sic) „

gen. s. m.** 𐬀𐬌𐬥𐬌𐬌𐬈𐬵𐬈 (as deciphered (see p. 1) 𐬀𐬌𐬥𐬌𐬌𐬀𐬵𐬀, not '*ainyẹhẹ*');

n. dual m. 𐬀𐬥𐬌𐬌𐬀, lat. av.

n. pl. m. (?) 𐬀𐬥𐬌𐬌𐬀(?) „ „

n. pl. m. 𐬀𐬥𐬌𐬌𐬈(?) „ „

n. pl. m. 𐬀𐬥𐬌𐬌𐬁𐬢𐬵𐬋 „ „

n. pl. m. 𐬀𐬥𐬌𐬌𐬀𐬢𐬵𐬋 „ „

acc. pl. m. (?) **1 𐬀𐬥𐬌𐬌𐬀 = (**1𐬥)𐬀𐬥𐬌𐬌𐬀

acc. pl. m. 𐬀𐬥𐬌𐬌𐬇𐬧𐬔, y. 44, 11; 45, 11 (pahl. *zakâî min*)

(acc. pl. m. 𐬀𐬥𐬌𐬌𐬀𐬧𐬔, later av.)

inst. pl. m. 𐬀𐬥𐬌𐬌𐬁𐬌𐬱, later av.

dat., abl. pl. 𐬀𐬥𐬌𐬌𐬀𐬉𐬌𐬠𐬌𐬌𐬋 „ „

gen. pl. 𐬀𐬥𐬌𐬌𐬀𐬉𐬱𐬄𐬨 „ „

g. pl. 𐬀𐬥𐬌𐬌𐬌𐬀𐬉𐬱𐬄𐬨 „ „

acc. s. f. 𐬀𐬥𐬌𐬌𐬄𐬨 „ „

nom. pl. f. 𐬀𐬥𐬌𐬌𐬂 „ „

nom. pl. f. 𐬀𐬥𐬌𐬌𐬂𐬢𐬵𐬀 „ „

n. pl. f. 𐬀𐬥𐬌𐬌𐬌𐬂𐬢𐬵𐬀 „ „

n. pl. f. 𐬀𐬥𐬌𐬌𐬂𐬢𐬵𐬋 „ „

acc. pl. f. 𐬀𐬥𐬌𐬌𐬂 „ „

acc. pl. f. 𐬀𐬥𐬌𐬌𐬂𐬢𐬵𐬀 „ „

g. pl. f. 𐬀𐬥𐬌𐬌𐬀𐬉𐬱𐬄𐬨 *(sic ?) „

„ „ 𐬀𐬥𐬌𐬌𐬀𐬉𐬱𐬄𐬨𐬀𐬵𐬈 *(sic ?) „

(gen. pl. f.**(?) 𐬀𐬥𐬌𐬌𐬄𐬨 (sic) „)

n. acc. s. nt. 𐬀𐬥𐬌𐬌𐬀𐬙 „ „

n. s. nt. 𐬀𐬥𐬌𐬌𐬀𐬙𐬀𐬵𐬈 or* 𐬀𐬥𐬌𐬌𐬀𐬀𐬵𐬈 (J.)

n., acc. s. nt. [Avestan], lat. av.;
n., acc. pl. nt. ([Avestan]-)[Avestan], lat. av.
inst. pl. nt. [Avestan], later av.;
cp. *anyá*, old pers. *aniya*. [Is a formation from [Avestan] + [Avestan] probable?; a connection of [Avestan] with *alius* seems difficult; cp. armen. *ayl*, etc.; see the usual occurrences cited; but cp.(?) *ollus* for *on-lus*, *-ûllus* (?) from an orig. **ono*, which is also set (?) for *ana*, [Avestan] (?)]; the pahl. trlr. led with *zakâî;* Ner. *anya-;* pers. *dîgar*. **[1] [Avestan] as orig. pahl.-av. = z. [Avestan], lost nasalisation.

[Avestan], 'otherwise', aliter, y. 51, 10; pahl. *zakâî-khadûînak;* pers. *dîgar âyin.* (notice the total difference of Ner.'s sk. from the pahl. here, he having read a pahl. *zak* instead of *zakâî);* see [Avestan]; cp. ind. *anyáthâ.*

([Avestan](-[Avestan]-)), among, between, inter (as separating; cp. inter-dico); see [Avestan] and [Avestan]; y. 33, 7; 49, 3 ([Avestan]-); 51, 1 ([Avestan]-), pahl. *andarg;* Ner. *madhye*, y. 33, 7; *antarâle*, y. 49, 3; 51, 1; [Avestan]([Avestan]) is first expl'd at y. 49, 3 by *min . . . javîḍâk; vibhinno bhavâmi* (a by no means obvious distinction of the highest importance followed by all critical writers); cp. ind. *antár*, old pers. *añtar*, *ἔντερον; intrô(d);* old irish *eter*, *etir* (W.), (lost nasalisation of *e*), etc.

[Avestan], read [Avestan], gain, attain, attingere, stem [Avestan] for [Avestan];

3d s. conj. act. [Avestan], l. av.
1st pl. opt. act. [Avestan] „ „
1st pl. opt. act. [Avestan] „ „

stem [Avestan]

3d pl. indic. med. [Avestan], l. av. (so already Fick); [Avestan] causative stem.

1st s. indic. act. (so) [Avestan], l. av.
3d s. indic. act. [Avestan] „ „
3d s. indic. act. [Avestan] y. 32, 11.
3d pl. ind. act. [Avestan], l. av.
3d s. pret. [Avestan]-[Avestan] „ „
2d s. imperv. act. [Avestan] „ „
2d s. imperv act. [Avestan]-[Avestan] „ „
2d s. imperv. act. [Avestan] . [Avestan] „ „
2d s. imperv. act. [Avestan]-[Avestan] „ „
1st s. conj. act. [Avestan] „ „
(1st s. conj. act. (?) **[Avestan] „ „)
3d sg. conj. act. [Avestan] „ „
(med. forms in variants)
part. perf. med. [Avestan] „ „
n. s. m. [Avestan], y. 33, 5

part. causative prest.
[Avestan]-, l. av.
g. s. m. [Avestan]
(= [Avestan]- irreg.

transfer to an *a* declens.); cp. ind. *âp, âpiré;* lat. *apio, apiscor, adipiscor.*

[illegible], [illegible], f. water, aqua;

n. s.	[illegible],	later av.
acc. s.	[illegible]	„ „
acc. s.	[illegible]	„ „
inst. s.	[illegible]	„ „
abl. s.	[illegible],	trsf. to [illegible] decl.
abl. s.	[illegible],	later av.
g. s.	[illegible]	„ „
g. s.	[illegible]	„ „
g. s.	[illegible]	„ „
loc. s. (?)	**[illegible]	„ „
loc. s.	[illegible] ([illegible] is a postposition)	

[loc. s. *(?) [illegible], if to [illegible], [illegible] then (?) to an *a* decl., ·[illegible]-=(?) [illegible]- (?), or possibly adv. to an [illegible], transf., read [illegible]* (?)]

dual in (?) comp.	-[illegible],	later av.
(dual (?) var.	-[illegible]	„ „)
n. pl.	[illegible]	„ „
n., voc. pl.	[illegible]	„ „
acc. pl.	[illegible],	y. 51, 7.
acc. pl.	[illegible],	y. 44, 4.
dat., abl. pl.	*[illegible]	(mistranslit.)
gen. pl.	[illegible],	lat. av.
gen. pl.	[illegible]	„ „

; pahl. *mayâ;* Ner. *âpo;* pers. *âv;* cp. ind. (*áp*), *apā́*, *apás*, etc., *ὀπός;* lith. *ùpé* (?), etc.

[illegible], y. 32, 11; see [illegible] (or possibly [illegible] ([illegible]))? As from [illegible] = [illegible], 3d s. caus. act. 'takes away', aufert; cp. *âpáyati* [or preferring the root [illegible] ([illegible]), we must accept a loss of *ya* as in [illegible] for [illegible] (?) and cp. ind. *adhyâpayati* (?) and *pratyâyayati* (Wh.), rendering 'causes to go away', i. e. 'takes away', the pahl. seeming to favour this root [illegible] with *vazlûnḍ;* as a free rendering however the pahl. may still point to [illegible] causative of [illegible], [illegible]].

[illegible], alien, later, alienus;

acc. s. nt. [illegible], y. 31, 20 (adverbially).

[illegible], lat. av.

abl. s. nt.	[illegible]	(read [illegible]-)
g. s. nt.	[illegible]	(=[illegible]-; [illegible] is = [illegible] + [illegible]; see introd.)
n. pl. m.	[illegible],	later av.
n. pl. m.	[illegible]	„ „
gen. s. fem.	[illegible]	„ „
acc. pl. f.	[illegible]	„ „

The pahl. trlr. led with *min akhar;* Ner. *paçcât;* pers. *az pas;* cp. ind. *ápara*, *aparám**; formation [illegible] + [illegible] ([illegible] inferior compar. suff.); cp. z. [illegible] from [illegible], ind. *ádhara*, *ávara* from *áva;* cp. z. [illegible], ind. *úpara* from *úpa;* z. [illegible], ind. *ántara* from *ánta*, etc.; cp. *ἀπωτέρω;* cp. goth. *afar*, *aftra*, ohg. *aftarô;* see for further etym. [illegible].

[Avestan], alien man, homo alienus; acc. pl. m. [Avestan], y. 45, 11, homines alienos; pahl. *akhar* (?) *anshûtâân;* Ner. *paçcât* (?) *manushyânâm;* pers. *pas* (?) *âdamyân;* cp. for formation [Avestan], *aparânta* (= 'living beyond the (western) border'); for etym. see [Avestan], [Avestan].

[Avestan], y. 51, 7; acc. pl. f. of [Avestan] (= water), which see.

[Avestan] (l. av. [Avestan]), away, from; cp. ind. *ápa; ἀπο**; lat. *ap* in *ap-erio, ab, abs;* goth. *af;* germ. *ab;* engl. off.

[Avestan], y. 33, 5; see [Avestan], [Avestan]; n. s. m. part. perf. med., adeptus; cp. ind. *âpânám, âpânúsas;* RV. II, 34, 7, *tám no dâta maruto vâjínam rátha âpânám bráhma citáyad divé-dive;* pahl. *barâ'm ayâfînâî* as = [Avestan] + [Avestan] imperv., erron., but so first indicating the root; Ner. *avâpaya;* pers. (N.B.) diff. text; *bih am bâyad** = pahl. *shâyad* (?); cp. RV. IX, 10, 5, *âpânâso vivásvato jánanta ushâso bhágam sûrâ áṇvam ví tanvate.*

[Avestan], last, ultimus; superl. formation from [Avestan];

n., a. s. nt. [Avestan] (so), lat. av.

n. s. nt. [Avestan], y. 53, 7 (perhaps adverb.).

a. s. nt. (adv.) [Avestan], y. 30, 4; 45, 3; 48, 4; 51, 14.

loc. s. m. [Avestan], y. 43, 5; 51, 6.

n. s. fem. [Avestan], y. 44, 19.

The pahl. trlr. led in recognising the adv. form, *vad val zak î afdûm;* Ner. *yâvat nirvâṇam;* pers. *ân ân i akhar*, y. 30, 4; so *vad avŏ zak î afdûm*, y. 45, 3; so Ner. in y. 48, 4 *nirvâṇe;* so in y. 51, 14, *vad avŏ zak î afdûm;* see the texts at the places; superl. from [Avestan]; cp. ind. *apamá*, so *adhamá* from *ádha* (as = *adhás*), *avamá* from *áva*, *upamá* from *úpa*, *paramá* from *pára.*

[Avestan] (l. av. [Avestan]), upon, about, after; y. 30, 11; 31, 17; 32, 3, 8, 15; 48, 5; cp. old pers. *apiy;* ind. *ápi; ἔπι, ἐπί.*

[Avestan], thereto, thereafter, postea, abhinc, y. 29, 4; [Avestan] + *[Avestan] + [Avestan] which see; cp. sk. *ápi ca;* the pahl. trlr. first explained by *akhar*, followed by all (except Haug, who erred just here). * cp. [Avestan].

[Avestan], was known, or announced, y. 44, 18; 3d s. pass. aor. of [Avestan] (which see).

[Avestan], m. offspring (?), progenies ?; acc. s. [Avestan], y. 48, 5; posterity, [or (whether a compos. or not) 'since birth' (?); see [Avestan]]; so pahl. *akhar min zerkhûnishnŏ;* Ner. *paçcât yat jâtânâm;* pers. *pas az zadan;* cp. for form

only *apiprânî*, 'accompanying every breath'.

[Avestan] (> + [Avestan] which see); y. 32, 9 'away from'; > is the particle of emphasis; cp. ind. *ápa* + *u* = *ápo;* cp. (to illustrate the infrequent use) RV. II, 28, 6, *ápo sú myaksha varuṇa bhiyásam mát sámrâṭ ṛtâvó 'nu mâ gṛbhâya;* RV. V, 48, 2, *ápo ápâçîr áparâ ápejate prá pûrvâbhis tirate devayúr jánaḥ;* RV. X, 88, 12, *â yás tatâno 'shâso vibhâtîr ápo ûrṇoti támo arcíshâ yán;* so the pahl. *barâ;* Ner. *adhikam;* pers. *bih.*

[Avestan], y. 44, 4, acc. pl. f. of [Avestan], ,water', which see.

[Avestan], without a superior, having no first, nullum-primum-habens; acc. sing. nt. adverbial (or masc. with [Avestan]?) [Avestan] [Avestan]- (?) = y. 28, 3; [Avestan] or -[Avestan] (which see) + [Avestan] priv.; cp. ind. *ápûrvyam;* the pahl. has *fratûm*, prob. reading [Avestan]; Ner. *prathamasya;* pers. *avval.*

[Avestan], to, against, ad; y. 31, 13; 43, 3, 7; 46, 11, 12; 51, 9, 19; cp. ind. *abhí; ob; operio;* goth. *bi* (?), etc.

[Avestan] (? see -[Avestan] [Avestan]-; pp. of [Avestan], [Avestan]), viewed, seen, nom. pl. nt.(?) [Avestan], y. 31, 2; 50, 5; pahl. y. 31, 2 *madam-nikêzishnîh;* Ner. *upari prapâdânam;* pers. *avar* nigarishnî;* y. 50, 5 (*afam*) *madam-nikêzîd;* cp. ind. *dṛshṭá*, pp. of *darç, dṛç.*

[[Avestan], f.(?loc. s. -[Avestan] [Avestan]-), y. 31, 2 'in view', in-conspectu (so altern.). The pahl. trlr. seems at y. 31, 2 at first sight to offer a loc., but it is a compos.; the loc. was therefore first suggested by Roth; cp. ind. *dṛ́shṭi*].

[Avestan], most furthering, maxime sustinens; superl. of -[Avestan] [Avestan]-; acc. s. nt. [Avestan]; y. 51, 1, maxime sustinens, prosperans; pahl. *madam barishnîh;* but Ner. *upari varshâmi.* Note the difference and judge of the error committed in holding Ner.'s trl. to be a reproduction of the pahl. pure and simple; some false reading such as *bâr-* made him think of *bârîdân*, 'to rain' [in, however, the figurative (?) sense; cp. RV. VIII, 50 (Müller, Auf. 61), 7, (Indra) *úd vâvṛshasva maghavan gávishṭaya úd indrâ 'çvamishṭaye;* Sâyaṇa: *he maghavan gavishṭaye gâ icchate mahyaṁ ud vavṛshasva, utsiñ-* casva gâm* (*), *iti çeshaḥ* (?); but Ludwig 'giesz dich ausz, o M.'; so Roth; cp. RV. IV, 20, 7, *ud vâvṛshâṇás tavishî 'va ugrâ 'smábhyaṁ daddhi puruhûta râyáḥ;* Sây.: *udvavṛshâṇo 'bhîshṭân kâmân varshakas tvaṁ râyaḥ paçvâdidhanâny asma-*

bhyaṁ stotṛbhyo daddhi, dehi; RV. V, 53, 14, *vṛshṭvī́ çáṁ yór ā́pa usrí bheshajáṁ syā́ma marutaḥ sahá*]; pers. *avare-barishn* (not misled by Ner.); cp ind. *bhára,* booty-bringing: see [Avestan].

[Avestan], steadfast characteristic, n. pl. nt. [Avestan], y. 33, 13, res-, vel indoles-, sine-dubio; the pahl. affording only the general sense, *pavan patûkîh* (= 'with', or 'as to', capability); Ner. *çaktyâ;* pers. *pah tuvânâî*;* perhaps [Avestan] = [Avestan] = 'two' + [Avestan] = 'full'; i. e. dubious, undecided, and this with the *a* priv. would be 'decided', 'not dubious', i. e. 'implanted characteristic'; cp. *ádvayas;* and for form cp. *prâ,* as in *jaraṇi-prā́s, ratha-prā́-; πλη-, impleo;* goth. *full-s,* etc.

[Avestan] (so correcting -[Avestan]*(?)), y. 53, 5, see [Avestan] and [Avestan] (?); as from [Avestan] + [Avestan], 2d pl. improp. conj.; cp. form of impf.** *ā́sta* + *abhi* = 'gain ye', 'nitemini'; or refer the word to [Avestan]; cp.** *abhi-yatta,* 2d pl. of *yat*(?) athem.; cp.* *yákshi* to *yaj** beside *yájati,* or as past p., cp. *yatta* = z. [Avestan]-. Reading [Avestan]*, 'and with these', we have hisque, fem.; 'and with these religious natures (or 'precepts')'; the pahl. seems to have read [Avestan]...[Avestan]; see *pavan kôlâ* II *(dô);* Ner. *ubayor, -s, (-ḥ);* pers. *pah har dû;*

[Stating other possibilities, consider the reading [Avestan]*[Avestan] as 2d pl. imperv. from the root of -[Avestan], [Avestan], cp. ind. *yas,* but athem.; from *yah* = 'be ye zealous' (hardly a voc. of a past part. 'O ye honoured ones' (? to [Avestan])).]

-[Avestan], not seeking wealth in herds, not thrifty, minime incrementum afferens; minime-diligens;

n. pl. m. [Avestan], y. 49, 4; from -[Avestan] (which see) + [Avestan] priv.; cp. for form ind. *gavyánt, pitū́y-, stabhū́y-, vasū́y-;* pahl. *afshuvînishnô*;* notice the total difference of Ner. with *avinâçanaṁ;* see comm.; the pahl. is made certain as above deciphered by the pers. *nah-afzûnî-kunandah,* so also indeed by the gâtha-text.

-[Avestan], for sacrificial use, metrical, loc. sg. (acc. pl. ?) [Avestan], y. 46, 17; Justi comp. *ápsas;* RV. IX, 88, 7 *ā́po ná makshū́ sumatír bhavâ naḥ sahásrâpsâḥ pṛtanâshā́ṇ ná yajñáḥ;* Sâyaṇa has: *apsa iti rûpanâma bahurûpastvaṁ pṛtanâshâṭ pṛtanânâm abhi bhavite 'ndra* iva yajño yashṭavyo, bhavasî'ti* (so the 2d edit.; Ludw. however does not follow Sây. with Roth and Grassm.)

if we also fear to follow this admirable suggestion as to the zend word after the hint of the pahl. trlr. which is *padmân* (Ner. *pramâṇam*, pers. *andâzah*), then cp. ind. *ápas* as = 'holy action at the altar'; see RV. I, 110, 1, *tatám me ápas tád u tâyate púnaḥ svâdishṭhâ dhîtír ucáthâya çasyate;* cp. [Avestan]; [Avestan]; y. 56, 3, 3 (Sp.); read pahl. [Avestan] (so D.) *[Avestan], not as printed [Avestan]; this latter seems an erroneous transliteration of some early writer into zend characters of the pahl. word *gâs* or *gâth*, for a variation exists which may give [Avestan], i. e. *gâthŏ*, the ordinary non-organic [Avestan] *ŏ**1 being misread in Sp.'s edition by the *copyist* as *r* [Avestan]; and if it be *gâthŏ* (or *gâsŏ*), it gives the correct idea of metric sanctity; cp. *opus* (?); old h. germ. *uoba;* germ. *üben* (?), see above. *1 poss. *gâth va.*

[Avestan], f. deathlessness, indefinitely prolonged life, eternal life, vita sine-morte in longinquitatem producta, immortalitas;

n.s.,l.av. [[Avestan]-° =] [Avestan]

n.s. [Avestan]-° = [Avestan]
y. 33, 8 (correction).

n. s. [Avestan]
= [Avestan]-, y. 34, 11.

acc. s. [Avestan], y. 34, 1.

acc. s. [Avestan]- = [Avestan]

[inst.s.(?)[Avestan]- = [Avestan]
y. 44, 18 = 'in regard to [Avestan]' (and poss. (?) 47, 1; see nom. (?) and also acc. (?) du.)].

g. s. -[Avestan]- = [Avestan]
y. 31, 6; 32, 5. [Avestan]–

g. s. *[Avestan]([Avestan])[Avestan] (so corr.)

g. s. (-[Avestan]- =) [Avestan] (so)

loc. s. [Avestan]- = [Avestan],
y. 45, 7; 48, 1.

n. dual [Avestan][[Avestan]][Avestan], y. 45, 5 (so only possibly; see acc.); 47, 1 (? so only poss.; see acc. du. and inst. sg.).

acc. du. [Avestan] [[Avestan]] [Avestan], y. 44, 18, 45, 5, but see nom. (?); 45, 10; 47, 1 (? see nom. du. (?) and instr. s. ?); 51, 7.

nom. acc. du. [Avestan][[Avestan]][Avestan], l.av.

dat. du. [Avestan][[Avestan]][Avestan] (= ·[Avestan]-)

g. du. [Avestan]- = [Avestan]

g.du.[so altern.(?)] [Avestan]
= [Avestan]-, y. 33, 8 (so possibly (?), but see nom. s.).

acc. pl. [Avestan]
= [Avestan]-, y. 31, 21; (altern. y. 33, 8);

[Avestan] + [Avestan], which see, + [Avestan] priv.; cp. ind. *amṛtatvá;* rt *mar,*

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'die'; cp. ἀμβροσία* (?); pahl. *amerôdâḍ*; Ner. *amirdâde*; pers. *amerdâd*.

[Avestan], not-dying, immortalis;

acc. s. m. [Avestan], lat. av.

g. s. m., nt. [Avestan]- = [Avestan]

n. pl. m. **[Avestan] introd. to y. 28

(so perhaps [Avestan], as if in comp.)

n. pl. m. [Avestan], lat. av.

acc. pl. m. [Avestan]- = [Avestan], l. a.

acc. pl. m. [Avestan]- = [Avestan] " "

acc. pl. m. [Avestan]- = [Avestan] " "

acc. pl. m. [Avestan]- = [Avestan] " "

acc. pl. m. [Avestan]- = [Avestan] " "

dat., abl. pl. m. [Avestan]

dat., abl. pl. m. [Avestan]

gen. pl. [Avestan], lat. av.

voc. pl. m. [Avestan] " "

voc. pl. m. [Avestan] " "

n. acc. sg. nt. [Avestan]; from [Avestan] plus [Avestan] priv. [[Avestan]- = -[Avestan] often in an accented syll. bef. [Avestan], (and [Avestan] = *rt*, as in [Avestan], cp. *mártya*); cp. [Avestan] = *pṛtana*, yet see [Avestan]* (?), cp. *mártya-kṛta* (?), [Avestan] = *ṛtá*, [Avestan] = *pṛthu*, also [Avestan], cp. *kṛtvan*, *[Avestan], cp. -*kṛti*, *[Avestan](*)[Avestan]*, cp *ấkṛti*]; cp. ἀμβρόσιος (?), etc.; the pahl. trlr. naturally led the way in recognising the connections of this and the preceding word.

-[Avestan] (?-[Avestan]), going (?), coming, iens (?), veniens; pt. pres. of the stem [Avestan] of [Avestan] ([Avestan], which see), acc. s. m. [Avestan], y. 46, 5, venientem (?); pahl. *yâtûnêḍô*; Ner. *samâgamanaḥ*; pers. *amâd* and *âyad*; cp. *âyati* of ind. *i*, *aya* (+ *â* (?)).

[Avestan] (= [Avestan], or [Avestan] formerly deciphered *aêm*; but the *ê* sound is totally absent); y. 29, 8, this, hic. [[Avestan] g. du. (placed here for convenience), y. 30, 3 emended on account of the metre to [Avestan], but an ancient form is of course possible. So the pahl. trlr. first explained as to base and case with *min valmanshân*; Ner. *etayos ca*; not so the parsi-pers. Ms. which read *mûn* for *min*.]

[Avestan], y. 44, 12, n. s. m., hic; see [Avestan], [Avestan].

[Avestan], y. 34, 6; 46, 1; 50, 9; 1st s. imperv. conj. act. of [Avestan], [Avestan]; I will go; ibo; the pahl. trlr. first recognised the root and 1st pers. sg. with *sâtûnam*; Ner. *pracarâmi*; pers *ravam* (y. 46, 1); cp. an ind. *áyâni*

